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ABSTRACT 
Sections 7, 8 and 28A of the Civil Law Act 1956
1
 are enacted to regulate the assessment of 
damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle 
accidents. The provisions aim to control the quantum of damages being meted out by the 
courts. Despite the good intention of the legislature, the provisions have been viewed with 
disfavour by many as a legislative attempt to reduce the quantum of damages and/or fetter 
or worst still, to divest the judiciary of their discretion in the assessment of damages. The 
actual impacts on judicial discretion and the quantum of damages are however yet to be 
fully worked out. Therefore, this research is to be welcomed as it seeks to critically 
appraise the actual effects of sections 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956 on the exercise of 
judicial discretion and the quantum of damages being awarded by the courts. The same 
critical appraisal is also extended to section 11 of the CLA 1956, the court rules relating to 
the assessment of interest on damages as well as the provisions relating to the assessment 
of damages in Singapore and Brunei. This research applied both the descriptive and 
analytical approach. Malaysian data have been collected from primary and secondary 
sources together with interviews with legal practitioners and representatives from several 
Malaysian insurance companies. This research began with the proposition that despite the 
provisions in the CLA 1956 and court rules, judges in Malaysia still retain their discretion 
(albeit with statutory interventions) in assessing damages and interest on damages for 
personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. It 
concluded that sections 7, 8, 11, 28A of the CLA 1956 and Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules 
of Court have resulted in mixed effects on the judges’ discretionary power; total abolition 
of discretionary power, maintaining the discretionary power as it was before the 1984 
amendments, maintaining the discretionary power but with restrictions and mere 
codification of existing practices. The research also provides several suggestions for 
statutory amendment in order to rectify the problems with sections 7, 8, 11, 28A of the 
CLA 1956 and Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012. The suggested amendments 
are also necessary to ensure damages and interest awarded for personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents is consistent, fair and reasonable to 
the claimants while affordable to the insurance industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Act 67 (of  Malaysia). Hereinafter  referred to as “the CLA 1956”. 
iv 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Seksyen 7,8 dan 28A Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956
2
 digubal untuk mengawalselia 
penaksiran ganti rugi bagi tuntutan kecederaan diri dan kemalangan maut yang diakibatkan 
oleh kemalangan jalanraya. Peruntukan-peruntukan ini pertujuan untuk mengawal kuantum 
ganti rugi yang boleh dianugerahkan oleh mahkamah. Di sebalik niat baik pengubal 
undang-undang, peruntukan-peruntukan ini telah dilihat oleh banyak pihak sebagai usaha 
pengubal undang-undang untuk mengurangkan jumlah ganti rugi dan mengongkong atau 
lebih buruk lagi melupuskan kuasa budibicara kehakiman dalam penaksiran ganti rugi. 
Kesan sebenar pindaan ini ke atas budi bicara kehakiman dan jumlah ganti rugi 
bagaimanapon masih belum dapat dikenalpasti sepenuhnya. Oleh itu, kajian ini sangat 
dialu-alukan kerana ia bertujuan membuat penilaian kritis kesan sebenar seksyen 7,8 dan 
28A CLA 1956 terhadap pemakaian budi bicara kehakiman dan jumlah ganti rugi yang 
dianugerahkan oleh mahkamah. Penilaian kristis yang sama dilanjutkan kepada seksyen 11 
CLA 195, peraturan-peraturan mahkamah berkaitan penaksiran kadar bunga bagi gantirugi 
dan peruntukan-peruntukan berkaitan penaksiran gantirugi di Singapura dan Brunei. 
Penyelidikan ini menggunakan pendekatan deskriptif dan analisis. Data dari Malaysia 
diperoleh daripada sumber-sumber primer dan sekunder serta temu bual bersama pengamal 
undang-undang dan wakil daripada beberapa syarikat insurans di Malaysia. Kajian ini 
bermula dengan cadangan bahawa walaupun terdapat peruntukan di dalam CLA 1956, 
hakim-hakim di Malaysia masih dapat mengekalkan kuasa budi bicara mereka (walaupun 
dikawal oleh peruntukan undang-undang) dalam penaksiran ganti rugi dan kadar bunga 
bagi ganti rugi untuk tuntutan kecederaan diri dan kemalangan maut yang diakibatkan oleh 
kemalangan jalanraya. Kajian ini menyimpulkan bahawa seksyen 7, 8, 11, 28A dan Aturan 
42 Kaedah 12 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 menyebabkan beberapa kesan terhadap 
kuasa budi bicara kehakiman; penghapusan kuasa budi bicara secara total, pengekalan 
kuasa budi bicara seperti keadaan sebelum pindaan tahun 1984, pengekalan budi bicara 
tetapi dengan sekatan-sekatan tertentu serta sekadar pengkanunan amalan-amalan yang 
sedia ada. Kajian ini turut menyediakan beberapa cadangan untuk pindaan undang-undang 
bagi mengelesaikan masalah yang terdapat dalam seksyen 7, 8, 11, 28A CLA 1956 dan 
Aturan 42 Kaedah 12, Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012. Pindaan-pindaan yang 
dicadangkan adalah juga perlu untuk memastikan gantirugi dan kadar bunga untuk tuntutan 
kecederaan diri dan kemalangan maut yang diakibatkan oleh kemalangan jalanraya 
kemalangan kenderaan bermotor adalah konsisten, adil dan munasabah untuk pihak-pihak 
menuntut manakala berpatutan untuk industri insurans. 
 
 
                                                 
2Akta 67.Selepas ini dirujuk sebagai CLA 1956. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
The advent of industrialized society brought with it massive increase in motor vehicle 
usage as well as motor vehicle accidents. In exchange for increasing mobility, modern 
society is paying a hefty price in terms of compensation for personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising from motor vehicle accidents. The steep ascending trend was and 
still is largely due to the rise in the number of motor vehicle accidents and the increasing or 
rising claim cost per accident.
3
  At the home front while the government and various other 
non-governmental agencies are working hard to reduce the number of motor vehicle 
accidents, the Malaysian legislature has come up with its own method of controlling the 
amount of damages by enacting several provisions in the Civil Law Act 1956
4
 to regulate 
the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims.  
 
The law on personal injury and fatal accident claims in Malaysia originated from the 
English Common Law. Being a branch of law that stems from and develops by the courts 
over centuries, the body of law is essentially uncodified.  The application of the law is 
generally in the hands of the judges guided by the principles handed down by the courts in 
                                                 
3 The upward trend in claim cost is contributed by many factors including (but not restricted to) the raise in cost of medical treatment, 
wages, cost of living, administrative cost, inflation etc. which changes with the change in times and circumstances. 
4 (Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as the CLA 1956. 
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previously decided cases. It ‘is largely a matter of imagination but with restriction’.5 The 
‘imagination’ of the judges, an overstatement certainly, is the ‘judicial discretion’ where 
judges are allowed to apply their own reasoning before arriving at a suitable compensation 
which is just and reasonable to the claimant. The ‘restriction’ is where the judges are 
reminded or cautioned not to depart from ‘the general run of damages’.6 In the case of 
Malaysian judges, the ‘general run of damages’ has been established through various 
decisions handed down by the courts either in England or Malaya/Malaysia and the 
application of the provisions in the CLA 1956. 
 
The first statutory provisions relating to the assessment of damages for personal injury and 
fatal accident claims in Malaya/Malaysia were introduced by section 3 and 4 of the Civil 
Law Enactment 1937.
7
 The Enactment was repealed and substituted with the Civil Law 
Ordinance 1956
8
 and later the Civil Law Act 1956 (rev 1972).
9
 The CLA 1956 (rev 1972) 
was amended in 1975 and 1984 by the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1975
10
 the Civil Law 
(Amendment) Act 1984.
11
 From 1984 onwards, sections 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956 
constitute the only legal provisions in Malaysia which deal with assessment of damages in 
personal injury and fatal accident claims. These sections not only provide for the cause of 
action for both personal injury and fatal accident claims,
12
 they also provide for the 
methods of assessment of the damages under various heads.  
 
                                                 
5 Dass, K.S., Quantum in Accident Cases, vol. 1 (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Law Publishers, 1975), at 9. 
6 Ibid. 
7 (F.M.S no 3 of 1937). 
8 (F. of M. No 5 of 1956).  
9 (Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as the CLA 1956 (rev 1972).  
10 (Act A308). Hereinafter referred to as the CLAA 1975. The amendments were consolidated into the CLA 1956 (rev 1972).  
11 (Act A602). Hereinafter referred to as the CLAA 1984. The amendments were consolidated into the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) forming the 
current CLA 1956.  
12 The cause of action for fatal accident claims was first introduced by the Fatal Accident Act 1846 (UK). The provisions in the Act were 
adopted into section 3 and 4 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937. The cause of action for personal injury claims is a creature of the 
Common Law.  
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However, twenty nine (29) years after the 1984 amendments to the law on personal injury 
and fatal accident claims, the provisions relating to the assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims still generate a lot of debates among legal scholars, 
practitioners, judges and those involved in the insurance industry: most of which are cast 
somewhat negatively. The fairness and relevancy of the provisions are often questioned 
and criticized. Similarly, the conflict between the exercise of judicial discretion vis-a-vis 
the strict statutory provisions is also another point of contention.  
 
This dissertation will, as far as practicable, investigates, assesses and evaluates the effects 
of the current provisions in the CLA 1956 on the assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents with special 
reference to the exercise of judicial discretion and the amount of damages being awarded 
by the local courts. It will highlight how the current provisions in the CLA 1956 operate in 
regulating the assessment of damages. Most importantly, it will explore the question of 
whether the provisions have indeed abolished or fettered the exercise of judicial discretion 
in the assessment of damages as claimed by many legal scholars and whether the 
provisions have any effect in reducing the amount of damages being awarded. 
 
This introductory chapter deals with the background of the study, the statement of 
problem, research objectives, research questions, hypothesis and the significance of the 
study. It presents a review of the main literatures used as references throughout this 
research project. It also incorporates the research methodology adopted for data collection 
and analysis as well as the scope and limitations of the research. Finally, it provides a 
summary of the discussions in the subsequent chapters. 
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1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
In 1984, a legislative reform was made to the law on personal injury and fatal accident 
claims with the passing of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984 (CLAA 1984). The 
primary aims of the reform are two-folds. First, they are to create uniformity in the 
assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims. This was reflected in 
the Explanatory Statement to the Civil Law (Amendment) Bill which stated that “This Bill 
seeks to make certain amendments to the Civil Law Act 1956 in view of vast variance of 
court awards in respect of action for damages for personal injuries including those 
resulting in death.” Secondly, to control the amount of damages for personal injury and 
fatal accident claims being meted out by the courts.  
 
The statutory amendments are necessary with the view to ensuring that the damages 
awarded are fair to both the claimants and insurance industry. The then Deputy Home 
Minister during the second and third reading of the Civil Law (Amendment) Bill 1984 
stated that the amendment to the CLA1956 (rev 1972) was to prevent the past practice of 
allowing large awards which was injurious to the insurance companies or industry.
13
 He 
later expressed his view in The Star on August 14
th, 1984 that ‘the sole reason for the 
amendment Act is to restore the old principle of law relating to award of damages – judge 
not to give full compensation but only fair compensation. VT Singham J in Marimuthu 
Velappan v Abdullah Ismail
14
 acknowledged the intention of the Parliament and his 
Lordship stated:  
                                                 
13 Dr Mahathir Mohammed, the Prime Minister (as he was then), in supporting the amendment said in the Straits Times of Saturday on 
September 8th, 1984 that that the changes were necessary to prevent Malaysia from becoming a ‘litigious society’ which in the long run 
affects the society and not the insurance companies alone.  
14 High Court Malaya, Ipoh [Civil Appeal No: 12-9-05] 
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“However, it is to be observed that amongst the objects for the substantive 
amendments to the Civil Law Act 1956 which came into effect on 1 
October 1984 were first, to make certain the awards in view of the 
variance of court awards in running down cases for personal injuries and 
dependency actions and secondly, with the view to protect the financial 
position of the Insurance Industry in this jurisdiction.” 
 
To do so, the CLAA 1984 had amended sections 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956 (rev 
1972). The amendments abrogated the Common Law heads of damages known as damages 
for loss of earning in lost years, loss of expectation of life under estate claims as well as 
loss of service and society of the deceased. It also introduced a new head of damages 
known as bereavement and several provisions which regulate the assessment of damages 
for loss of support and loss of future earnings.
15
 These regulatory provisions include 
specific conditions which must be fulfilled before the damages can be awarded, limiting 
factors upon the assessment of annual loss (multiplicand) and specific methods to be used 
in determining the duration of prospective loss (multiplier). 
 
Comparing with the previous revisions and amendments to the 1956 Act, the CLAA 1984 
has made significant changes to the law on personal injury and fatal accident claims in 
Malaysia. It is, however, unfavourably received by the legal fraternity.
16
 Their main 
objections were based on their assumption that the amendments had significantly reduced 
the amount of damages to be received by the claimant under personal injury and fatal 
                                                 
15 VT Singham J in Marimuthu Velappan v Abdullah Ismail, op. cit., commented “The Explanatory Statement to the Civil Law 
Amendment Bill 1984 states that the amendment is intended to provide specific rules to guide judges in assessing personal injury 
claims.” 
16 Balan, P., “Deduction of Living Expenses From Damages for Loss of Future Earnings”, (1992) 4 Journal of Malaysian Comparative 
Law, 229 – 235, at 229. 
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accident claims. Since the amendments had “swept away a substantial amount of Common 
Law principles which benefited the injured persons and as well as the dependants of the 
deceased victims,”17 they have “severely truncated the court’s power to grant 
compensation adequate to the actual loss suffered”.18  Because of these changes, the 
claimants are getting less compensation under the CLA 1956 comparing with what they 
would have been receiving under the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) and at Common Law. 
 
Another main reason for these criticisms against the 1984 amendments is their effects of 
the power of the judges in exercising their discretion in the assessment of damages. 
Presumably the judicial discretion is an inherent and integral aspect of the law on personal 
injury and fatal accident claims, the introduction of several provisions by the CLAA 1984 
regulating the assessment of damages for loss of support and loss of future earnings is 
viewed by some as the legislative attempt to “fetter judicial discretion in the assessment of 
damages”19  and challenge “the full and adequate compensation concept”.20 The ‘Uncivil 
Act’ as coined by the Bar Council Malaysia21 was said to have swiped away a precious and 
important facet of the legal system by limiting the use of judicial discretion
22
 in the attempt 
to control the upward rise in the awards for these claims. Some were very vocal in 
expressing their dissatisfaction with the amendments by contending that the CLAA 1984 
did “not take into consideration the situation and the local and economic life of the people 
                                                 
17 Ibid. See also Balan, P. “Damages for Personal Injury and the Civil Law (Amendment) Act, 1984”, (1989) Journal of Malaysian 
Comparative Law, 181 – 191 and Balan, P., “Damages for Personal Injuries and Causing Death: A Critical Survey”, (2004) 31 Journal 
of Malaysian and Comparative Law, 45 – 67. 
18 Dass, K.S., Quantum of Damages in Personal Injury, Parliament v Common Law, A critical Examination of the 1984 Amendment to 
the Civil Law Act 1956, (Kuala Lumpur: Legal Circle Book Sdn. Bhd, 1997), at 5.  
19 Dass, S. Santhana, “Is There a Need for Review after a Decade of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984 on Damages?,” 11th 
Malaysian Law Conference, (Kuala Lumpur, 8-10 November 2001). 
20 Reiss, Seth M., “Quantum for Future Loss in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Cases After the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984”, 
(1985), 2 Malayan Law Journal lxii – lxxi, at lxii. 
21 Bar Council Malaysia, “Editorial : The Uncivil Act”, (1984), 17 No 3 Oct Journal of the Malaysian Bar (INSAF), at 3.  
22 Cumaraswamy, Param, “Memorandum on the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984”, (1984), 17 No 3 Oct Journal of the Malaysian Bar 
(INSAF), 4- 9, at 4. 
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of Malaysia”.23There are also many calls for the provisions to be “reconsidered as to 
whether they meet the aspirations of a caring society”24 even from the inception of the 
amended Act.
25
 
 
Despite the above criticisms, a study of the cases over the years shows that the amount of 
damages being awarded for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents are on the upward trend. In 1986, the plaintiff in Dr S. Underwood v Ong 
Ah Long
26
 was awarded over RM 1million for pain and suffering, loss of pre-trial earnings 
and loss of future earnings. On October 5, 1995, a judge in Klang Sesion Court awarded 
2.6 million to the plaintiff also for pain and suffering, loss of pre-trial earnings and loss of 
future earnings.
27
 The Kuantan Session Court’s judge in December 2006 awarded RM 9.8 
million to a ten-year old girl who has been paralyzed from the waist down as a result of her 
injuries.  In the same year, an award of RM 8.75 million was given to a magician couple 
from the United States of America for injuries resulting from a motor accident in 1998.
28
 
The arguments that the local courts are more conservative comparing with the courts in 
United States of America and England and that millions-ringgit awards are rare in our local 
jurisdiction
29
 are now the things of the past.  
 
The above cases show that the amount of damages awarded for personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents is still on an upward trend despite 
the so-called ‘statutory control’ imposed by the CLAA 1984 over the judges’ discretion in 
                                                 
23 Bar Council Malaysia, “Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984”, (1984) 2 Current Law Journal, 209-216, at 209. 
24 Balan, P., op. cit., (2004), at 46. 
25 See article in the Straits Time of Saturday, 8th September 1984. 
26 (1986) 2 MLJ 246. 
27
 S. Radhakrishnan, “Is the Deep Pocket Syndrome is Spreading Out to Asia?” Trends in Liability Insurance”, (1997) XXVI No 3, 
Journal of Malaysian Bar (INSAF) 62-72, at 68. 
28 “Ten-year-old Girl Awarded Highest Accident Claim In The Country”, The Star Online, 4th May 2009 
<http://thestar.com.my/news/story> . 
29 Chelliah, Kandiah, “Should the Award for Damages be Controlled in Order to Prevent the Increase in Insurance Premium?”, (1998) 2 
Journal of the Malaysian Bar (INSAF), 30-43, at 36. 
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the assessment of damages. As such, it is the primary task of this research that, despite 
opinions and criticisms of the writers referred to above, other than abolishing the judges’ 
discretion in the assessment of damages for loss of earning for lost years, loss of 
expectation of life under estate claims as well as loss of service and society of the 
deceased, the provisions in the CLA 1956, after the 1984 amendments, merely regulate the 
exercise of judicial discretion in the assessment of damages for heads of damages provided 
in the Act.
30
 Even within the parameters of the provisions in the CLA 1956, there are still 
many areas in the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims 
where the judicial discretion still exists.  
 
Therefore, it is obvious that there is an urgent need for a serious study to be carried out to 
thoroughly re-analyse and re-evaluate the actual effects of the provisions of the CLA 1956 
on judges’ discretionary power in assessing the damages for personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. It is sincerely hoped that the final 
outcome of this research work would answer the questions of whether the CLA 1956 has 
abolished, fettered or merely regulate the discretionary power of the judges. Should there 
be such effects, this research aspires to re-evaluate them in order to see whether they have 
any significant effect on the amount of damages being awarded by the Malaysian courts.  
 
 
 
                                                 
30 The assessment of damages for other heads of damages (the heads of damages not provided by the CLA 1956) still governed by the 
Common Law principles and decided cases. Judges generally have a wide discretion in assessing these damages by applying the 
Common Law principles and decided cases to the fact of the case. 
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1.3 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
The primary aim of this research is to critically re-analyse and re-evaluate the existing 
provisions in the CLA 1956 relating to the assessment of damages for personal injury 
claims, fatal accident claims including interest for the damages awards with particular 
reference to the 1984 amendments. The re-analysis seeks to re-evaluate the actual effects 
of the statutory provisions on the discretionary power of the judges in assessing the 
damages. It focuses on unravelling the imbroglio, so to speak, as to whether the provisions 
in the CLA 1956 have indeed abolished or fettered the exercise of judicial discretion in the 
assessment of a substantial portion of the damages as claimed by many writers. In doing 
so, this research will first identify the amendments introduced by the CLAA 1984.The next 
step is to critically re-analyse how the amendments are supposed to operate in regulating 
the assessment of damages. The re-analysis will then focus on the question of whether the 
amendments have abolished or restrict the exercise of judicial discretion in the assessment 
of damages. 
 
Should the re-analysis of those provisions shows that the judges’ discretion are in any way 
abolished, fettered or regulated by the provision, the research will re-examine whether the 
restrictions imposed on the exercise of judicial discretion have any effect in reducing the 
amount of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents being meted out by the judges. The researcher sincerely hopes to unravel 
whether the provisions have indeed caused the claimants to get lesser compensation as 
claimed by many writers. 
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Towards the end of the thesis, in Chapter 6, the writer will also embark on re-analysing the 
statutory provisions in Singapore and Brunei with regard to the assessment of damages for 
personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. The re-
analysis will attempt to examine how judicial discretion operates within the confines of 
those provisions in the two neighbouring countries. The legal frameworks pertaining to the 
law on personal injury and fatal accident claims as well as the current practices in the two 
countries are chosen due to the proximity of the laws and judicial interpretations
31
 on the 
same between them and Malaysia. Despite having sprung from the same source, the 
statutory developments in these countries have created some crucial distinctions in the 
laws on personal injury and fatal claims. These distinctions will serve as useful references 
in re-analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the statutory provisions in these countries 
as well as in making comparison between these provisions and the provisions in the CLA 
1956. The lessons learnt from the re-analysis and re-evaluation will hopefully be beneficial 
in devising suitable recommendations for improving the CLA 1956.  
 
On a practical note, the re-analysis of these provisions are also be important considering 
the frequent traffic from Malaysia going in and out of these two countries. The respective 
law in Singapore and Brunei on the same will affect local insurance companies in terms of 
claim pay-outs. Similarly, Malaysians travelling to Singapore and Brunei will also be 
affected by the respective provisions in the two countries. Due to word limit constraint, it 
must be pointed out and emphasised that it will be beyond the scope of this work to extend 
the study on the same into the law of any other common law jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
31 Chew, Leslie,et. al., “A Comparative Analysis of Various Aspects in the Law of Personal Injuries in Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore”, 
(2008) 3 Malayan Law Journal, i-xliii, at iv. 
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To reiterate, the ultimate objective of this research is to propose changes to the current 
CLA 1956 in the hope of strengthening the assessment of damages for personal injury and 
fatal accident claims in Malaysia. The recommendations will of course take into 
consideration the vital aspect of the exercise of judicial discretion in interpreting and 
applying those statutory provisions. 
 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In meeting the objectives of this research project, the following research questions will be 
specifically looked into and re-analysed in the context of the web of uncertainties 
surrounding the actual effects of the 1984 amendments to the CLA 1956 on the judicial 
discretion in the award of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out 
of motor vehicle accidents. They are: 
1. How do the amended provisions in the CLA 1956 regulate the assessment of 
damages? 
2. In the effort to regulate the assessment of damages, do the amended provisions of 
the CLA 1956 abolish, fetter or merely regulate the exercise of judicial discretion? 
3. If the amended provisions of the CLA 1956 did abolish, fetter or regulate the 
exercise of judicial discretion, how do they affect amount of damages being 
awarded? 
12 
 
4. How do the corresponding provisions of the laws in Singapore and Brunei on the 
same affect the exercise of judicial discretion in the assessment of damages? And, 
what lessons can Malaysia learn therefrom?  
 
 
 
1.5 HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis begins with the proposition that the law on personal injury and fatal accident 
claims at Common Law is intrinsically32 discretionary. It should remain discretionary 
despite being regulated by statutory enactments. Therefore, although the exercise of 
judicial discretion on several aspects of the law on personal injury and fatal accident claims 
arising out of motor vehicle accidents are affected by the provisions in the CLA 1956, a 
large portion of the law still allows for judicial discretion. Since the statutory scheme on 
personal injury and fatal accident claims in Malaysia is enacted to ensure that the quantum 
of damages awarded by the courts are manageable, viz., fair and reasonable to both the 
claimants and insurance companies, the thrust of the judges’ discretion stays despite some 
statutory interventions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Emphasis added to indicate the intrinsic and flexible nature of judicial discretion in the matter of assessment of damages.  This being 
the case, the upward trend in the quantum of damages is something to be expected and, hence, inevitable. The upward trend itself is 
always determined by a number of variables which cause the quantum to rise in the face of changing times and circumstances. The 
quantum of damages is both a question of law and fact and, it must be emphasized, it does not and will not remain static. Neither does it 
nor will it fall. 
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1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The contributions of this research can be seen from a few angles. First, it serves as an 
addendum to the existing literature on personal injury and fatal accident claim 
compensations specifically with regard to claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. 
Secondly, from the practical point of view, it proposes amendments and/or improvements 
to the current CLA 1956. Thirdly and no less significantly, it also renders more clarity and 
certainty to the grey areas of the law hitherto left open as a result of criticisms against the 
CLAA 1984. 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia is the only common law country which possesses sections 7, 8 and 28A of the 
CLA 1956.
33
 As such, most of the literature on the law on personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents is limited mostly to local authors 
with very little input from other Common Law countries which apply similar fault-based 
scheme in motor accident claims but without the statutory provisions similar to those of 
our CLA 1956. The existing literature on this subject mainly focused on the motor 
insurance law in Malaysia,
34
 third party rights,
35
 assessment of damages in personal injury 
and fatal accident claims
36
 and compilation of cases on quantum of injuries (case 
                                                 
33 Although the Singaporean Civil Law Act (cap 43) and the Brunei Fatal Accident and Personal Injuries Act have provisions which are 
almost similar to the CLA 1956, there are many areas where there are apparent dissimilarities between the three statutes which set the 
CLA 1956 apart from the other provisions. For clarification see discussion in chapter 6. 
34 See Nik Ramlah Mahmood, Insurance Law in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Butterworths, 1992). Poh, Chu Chai, Law of Insurance, 2nd 
ed., Singapore: Longman, 1990). 
35 See Hamid Sultan Abu Backer, Janab’s Series to Law, Practice and Legal Remedies, (Kuala Lumpur: Janab (M) Sdn. Bhd., 2005), 
Sidhu, Mahinder Singh, Penanggung dan Pengambil Insurans Motor dan HakPihak Ketiga, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan 
Pustaka, 1997), Chan, Wai Meng, Third Party Rights in Insurance Law in Malaysia,( Petaling Jaya: Sweet & Maxwell Asia,2008), 
Balan, P., Perlindungan Pihak ke Tiga Dalam Undang-Undang Insuran Motor, (1988) Makalah Undang-Undang Menghormati Ahmad 
Ibrahim, 86-113, Baduyah Obeng, Insurans Motor Pihak Ketiga Yang Diwajibkan di Malaysia, (1998) 1 Current Law Journal, supp i-
xxii, Baduyah Obeng, “Hak Pihak Ketiga Untuk Membuat Tuntutan Dan Menguatkuasakan Penghakiman Yang Diawardkan Kepadanya 
Terhadap Syarikat Insuran Motor (Insurer)”, (1998) 1 Current Law Journal, supp xxiii – xl, Baduyah Obeng, Insurans Motor: 
Perlindungan Kepada Pengambil Insurans dan Pihak Ketiga, LLM Dissertation, Faculty of Law, UM 1994/1995 and Chan Wai Meng, 
Rights of Third Parties in Insurance Law in Malaysia, PhD thesis, Faculty of Law, UM 2007. 
36 See Dass, K.S., Quantum in Accident Cases. (vol. 1- 3) (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Law Publishers, 1975 – 1984), Chan, Shick Chin, 
Personal Injury Law Practice and Precedents, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 2001), Nathan, R.K., Quantum of Damages, 
(Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 1991), Nathan, R.K., Practical Approach To Assessment of Liability and Damages in Tort, 
(Singapore: Malayan LawJournal Pte. Ltd., 1986), Syed Ahmad Alsagof, The Law of Tort in Malaysia and the Syari’ah, (Gombak, Syed 
Ahmad  S A Alsagof, 2004), Lim, Audrey, et. al, Assessment of Damages: Personal Injuries and Fatal Accidents (Singapore: 
Butterworth, 2001),Verupillai, Jeyaratnam, Damages: Loss of Expectation of Life Survival and Deductibility, (Singapore: Malayan Law 
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citatory).
37
 Only a handful of the published literature attempted to critically discuss the 
effects of the application of sections 7,8,11 and 28A of the CLA 1956 on the law on 
personal injury and fatal accident claims
38
 as well as the amount of damages being 
awarded by the courts. These literatures are, however, mostly in the form of articles. The 
discussions are confined to a specific area of the law each and do not cover all aspects of 
the provisions in the CLA 1956 resulted from the 1984 amendments. The only 
comprehensive work done so far which focuses on the same subject is a book published by 
Dass, K.S.,
39
 and a paper presented by Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar during a 
conference in 2008.
40
 
 
There is also a shortage of comparative analysis of the law on personal injury in Malaysia, 
Singapore and Brunei published. The only literature found so far is an article by Leslie 
Chew et al., and a book written by Michael F. Rutter. Unfortunately, although the article 
by Leslie Chew et al., briefly examined the law on personal injury and fatal accident 
claims these three (3) countries, it did not, however, cover all aspects of the law thereon. It 
mainly focused on the award for loss of future earnings, loss of future earning capacity and 
                                                                                                                                                    
Journal, 1984), Dass, S. Santhana, op. cit., (2000),Nasser Hamid, op. cit., (2008), Lim, Heng Seng, op. cit.,(1995), Dass, K. S., “Interest 
on Damages”, (1980) 1 Malayan Law Journal lxxxv – lxxxvii, S. Radhakrishnan, “Quantum of Damages in Personal Injury Claims” 
(1995) 3 Malayan Law Journal xxix – xl, T.S.T., “Interest in Damages in Running-Down Cases” (1966) 1 Malayan Law Journal xxxi- 
xxxiii, Verupillai, Jeyaratnam, “Loss of expectation of Life and the Living Plaintiff”, 1 (1982) Malayan Law Journal, lxix – lxx, Reiss, 
Seth M., op. cit., (1985). 
37 See Sidhu, Mahinder Singh, Casebook on Motor Insurance Law in Malaysia and Singapore, (Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book 
Services 1995), Simon, Andrew Christopher, ed., Personal Injury Quantum, Cases and Materials, vol 1 & 2, Petaling Jaya: LexisNexis 
Malaysia, 2008), Nasser Hamid and Hamid Ibrahim, eds., Road Accident Citator, (Petaling Jaya: Gavel Publications, 2007). 
38 Dass, K.S., op. cit.,(1997), Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, Damages Under Malaysian Tort Law: Cases and Commentary, (Petaling 
Jaya: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2009), Dass, S. Santhana, “Chan Chin Min v. Ibrahim Ismail - the Unsettled Dispute as to Whether the Court 
Has the Authority to Reduce the Statutory Multiplier in Dependency Claim”, (2006) 3 Current Law Journal, i-xliii, Balan, P. “Loss of 
Future Earnings, Loss of Earning Capacity and the Civil  Law (Amendment) Act 1984”, 17 (1990) Journal of Malaysian Comparative Law, 
169 – 180, Chelliah, Kandiah, “Section 7(3)(iv)(d) of the Civil Law Act 1956 and Fatal Accident Claims : Does the Multiplier Differ From a 
Claimant Who is a Parent (s) and One Who is a Spouse with Children?”,(1995) 1 Current Law Journal,  Muhammad Altaf Hussain 
Ahangar, “Dependability of Dependency Claims: the Malaysian Perspective”, (2004) 1 Malayan Law Journal xxii – xxxi,  Khoo, Guan 
Huat, “Assessment of Damages in Fatal Accident Claims and a Commentary of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984”, (1993)1 Malayan 
Law Journal cxxix – cxxxviii, Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, “Damages for Loss of Earning in Malaysia: the Need for a Just 
Multiplier”, (2003) Malayan Law Journal, lxxxi – xcvi, Reiss, Seth M., op. cit.,(1985), S. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., (1995), Balan, P., op. cit., 
(1989), Balan, P., op. cit., (1992), Balan, P., op. cit., (2004),  Bar Council Malaysia, op. cit., (1984). 
39 Dass, K.S., op. cit.,(1997), 
40Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, “Judicial Responses to Damages Law in Malaysia: An Analysis”, 5thAsian Law Institute 
Conference, (Singapore, 22-23 May 2008). 
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pre-judgment interest.
41
 The book written by Michael F. Rutter,
42
 on the other hand, 
although fairly detailed, only covers the law in Malaysia and Singapore without discussing 
the law in Brunei. Moreover, it was completed in 1993. In the circumstances, an up-to-date 
and a far more comprehensive and critical work put together by a focal hypothesis is 
urgently called for whether for the insurance industry or the legal fraternity particularly in 
Malaysia.  
 
The above are the gaps this research sought to fill. The finding of this research will 
contribute to the body of literature on the assessment of damages in personal injury and 
fatal accident claims arising out of motor accident not only in Malaysia but also in 
Singapore and Brunei. 
 
On a more practical note, a study of the laws in Singapore and Brunei is essential in view 
of the high frequency of Malaysian vehicles entering Singapore and Brunei and vice- 
versa. Since the law of the country where the accident occurs, lex loci delicti commissi, is 
applicable in the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal claims,
43
 a Malaysian 
citizen who is involved in a motor vehicle accident in either Singapore or Brunei will be 
liable to the law applicable there. Similarly, a Singaporean or Bruneian will also be subject 
to our local law if he or she is involved in a road accident while driving in Malaysia. 
Although the law in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei are almost identical, there are a few 
significant features in the law of each country which set them apart from each other. As 
such, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive study on the law governing the 
assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
                                                 
41 Chew, Leslie, et al., op. cit. 
42 Rutter, Michael F., op. cit. 
43 Law of the place where the tort was committed 
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vehicle accidents in all three (3) countries in order to fully understand the respective 
strengths and weaknesses of the said laws especially in respect of the exercise of judicial 
discretion in the assessment of damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims. 
 
The study will also benefit the legislature and policy-makers in enacting or planning for 
future reforms or amendments to the statutory provisions relating to the assessment of 
damages as well as claim procedures. Since personal injury and fatal accident claims 
arising out of motor vehicle accidents comprise the bulk of civil cases in our courts, the 
statutory provisions on the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident 
compensation must be sufficiently fair and effective in balancing the rights and obligations 
of claimants as well as those of the insurance companies. As such, it is important for us to 
analyse and evaluate the full effects and implications of sections 7, 8 11 and 28A of the 
CLA 1956 on the judges’ discretion in the assessment of damages and the amount of 
damages being matted out by the courts. 
 
 
 
1.7 LEGAL FRAMEWORKS STUDIED 
The law pertaining to assessment of damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims 
originated from the Common Law principles laid down by judicial decisions. The 
development of the law was not systematic and largely depended on the generally accepted 
principles of Common Law and the judges’ common sense. Realizing the rapid growth in 
socio-economic conditions and the rigidity of the Common Law, the English Parliament 
was the first to intervene by introducing statutory provisions which altered selected areas 
17 
 
of the law in the assessment of damages.
44
 This helped to remove the rigidity in the 
Common Law which in certain cases prevented deserving claimants from claiming 
compensation under tort.
45
 The Malaysian, Singaporean and Brunei Parliaments also 
followed suit with the introduction of their very own respective statute on personal injury 
and fatal accident claims. Below are the legal frameworks used in this research. 
1.7.1   Malaysia 
 
The statutory provisions in Malaysia which deal directly with the assessment of damages 
in personal injury and fatal accident claims are sections 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956. 
Section 7 governs the assessment of damages for loss of support, section 8 deals with 
claims by deceased’s estate while section 28A governs claims for personal injuries. Section 
11 of the CLA 1956 and Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rule of Courts 2012 on the other hand 
govern the assessment of interest for the damages. Along with the provisions in section 7, 
8 and 28A of the CLA 1956, the Malaysia judges also use their discretion in assessing 
damages to be awarded based on the Common Law principles, decided cases and the 
submission of the parties to suit the facts of the case. The application of Common Law 
principles is made possible by Section 3 of the CLA 1956 which allows the application of 
Common Law and the rules of equity administered in England as at 7
th
 April 1956 
whenever there is a lacuna in the local law.
46
 
                                                 
44 See the Fatal Accident Act 1846, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the Administration of Justice Act 1982. 
45 E.g.: the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona which extinguish any causes of action vested on the deceased once he passed 
away. 
46 Chan, WM., op. cit., (2008) at 7, Wu, MA, The Malaysian Legal System (3rd ed.), (Petaling Jaya: Pearson,2005), at 123-138. The cut-
off date is different for Sabah and Sarawak. However, one may question the wisdom of this provision on the cut-off date. 
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1.7.2   Singapore 
 
The Civil Law Act (cap 43)
47
 is the main statute that deals with assessment of damages in 
personal injury claims in Singapore. Similar to Malaysia, Singapore also applies the 
Common Law principles and previously decided cases to supplement the provisions in 
sections 10,11, 20, 21 and 22 of the CLA (cap 43) whenever necessary. The Application of 
English Law Act (cap 7A) allows the English Common Law and principles of equity 
applicable in England as at 12
th
 November 1993 which has been part of the Singaporean 
law to continue to be applicable in Singapore subject to qualifications of suitability to the 
circumstances of Singapore and its inhabitants.   
1.7.3   Brunei 
 
Contrary to Malaysia and Singapore, Brunei does not have Civil Law Act. The law 
governing the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims in 
Brunei is provided in the Fatal Accident and Personal Injuries Act (cap 160).
48
 The Act 
abolishes the application of the English statutes in Brunei.  Despite not having a Civil Law 
Act, the provisions in sections 3, 4, 6, 11, and 12 of the Fatal Accident and Personal 
Injuries Act (cap 160) are very much similar to the provisions in the Singaporean CLA 
(cap 43). Along with the Fatal Accident and Personal Injuries Act, the Common Law is 
also applicable in Brunei by virtue of the Application of Law Enactment (cap 2) and 
Brunei’s special arrangement with the government of United Kingdom which placed the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as the final appellate court for civil cases in 
                                                 
47 Hereinafter referred to as the CLA (cap 43) 
48 Hereinafter referred to as the Fatal Accident and Personal Injuries Act. 
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Brunei.
49
 Since Brunei’s departure from relying on the English statutes is fairly recent, the 
assessment of damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims in Brunei are very 
much influenced by the assessment of damages in England.   
 
 
 
1.8   LITERATURE REVIEW 
A significant number of publications on the law on personal injury and fatal accident 
claims have been published by local and foreign authors. However, since a large facet of 
the law relating to the assessment of damages for these claims in Malaysia is distinctly 
different from those applicable in other countries, the literature written by foreign authors 
such as those from England, Hong Kong and Singapore are relevant to this research only in 
respect of their discussion on the assessment of damages based on the Common Law 
principles. As such, the works of Peter Cane,
50
 Harold Luntz,
51
 and A.I Ogus,
52
Mark 
Lunney, Ken Oliphan,
53
 Harvey McGregor 
54
 and David Kemp
55
 for example are only 
relevant for the general discussion on the assessment of damages for the heads of damages 
not provided for by sections 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956.  
 
Due to the differences in the statutory provisions between Malaysia and other countries, 
this research relies mostly on literature written specifically on Malaysian law on personal 
                                                 
49 See the Brunei’s Supreme Court (Appeal to Privy Council) Act (cap 158). 
50 Cane, Peter, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (Butterworth : London, 1993). 
51 Luntz, Harold, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death, 3rd ed., (Melbourne: Butterworth, 1990). 
52 Ogus, A. I., The Law of Damages, (London, Butterworth, 1973). 
53 Lunney, Mark and Ken Oliphan, Tort Law Text and Materials, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
54 McGregor, Harvey, McGregor on Damages, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003). 
55 Kemp, David and Peter Mantle, Damages for Personal Injury and Death, 7th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell , 1999) and Kemp: 
David, The Quantum of Damages, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004). 
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injury and fatal accident claims assisted by some literature on the laws in Singapore and 
Brunei. The literature from Singapore and Brunei are relevant in view of the considerable 
similarities between the CLA 1956, CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accident and Personal 
Injuries Act. However, since several pertinent provisions in the CLA 1956 are absent in the 
CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accident and Personal Injuries Act, the use of the literature on 
the law in Singapore and Brunei is generally confined to the discussion in chapter six (6). 
Due to the impracticability of including all the literature in an extensive manner, only the 
most important are reviewed in this section. 
 
A classic literature on the assessment of damages in personal injury and fatal accident 
claims in Malaysia is found in the works of K.S. Dass.
56
 The author provides a complete 
discussion on the method of assessment of damages in three (3) volumes. The books not 
only discuss the law and principles applicable in the assessment of damages, they also 
provide list of comparable cases in which the damages were awarded. Unfortunately, since 
the final volume of the book was published in 1984, the discussion in the books is based on 
the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) and the Common Law principles which were applicable in 
Malaysia at that time. The enactment of the CLAA 1984 had made the books partially 
obsolete since the CLAA 1984 had altered many aspects of the law discussed in the books. 
As such, there is a huge gap between the law as applicable now and the law stated in the 
books.  
 
The books written by R.K. Nathan,
57
 S. Santhana Dass,
58
 Lim Heng Seng, 
59
and Chan 
Shick Chin
60
 are all books which discuss the current law on personal injury and fatal 
                                                 
56 Dass, K.S., op cit., (1975 – 1984). 
57 Nathan, R. K., op. cit., (1991) and Nathan, R. K., op. cit., (1986). 
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accident claims. The discussions however focus on the method of assessment based on the 
respective head of damages rather than the actual analysis of the provisions in the CLA 
1956. The same approach was also adopted by S. Radhakrishnan,
61
in his article published 
in the Malayan Law Journal. These publications, although invaluable in term of explaining 
the basis of assessment and the ‘grey areas’ in the law, were published some years ago.  As 
such, they did not contain the more recent decisions such as those of Ibrahim bin Ismail & 
Anor. v Hasnah bte Puteh Imat,
62
 Looi Gnan Peng v Bey Tong Hai,
63
and  Sumarni v Yow 
Bin Kwong & Anor.
64
which have huge impact on the assessment of damages in personal 
injuries and fatal accident claims in Malaysia.
65
 
 
The Bar Council Malaysia,
66
 Seth M. Reiss,
67
Param Cumaraswamy
68
 and Khoo Guan 
Huat,
69
 took a different approach to the discussion by focusing on the provisions in the 
CLA 1956. Unfortunately, the analysis centred more on the issue of whether the provisions 
are just to the claimant rather that the issue of the application of judicial discretion vis-a-vis 
the provisions in the Act. The discussions are quite brief considering that they are in form 
of articles published in legal journals. Thus, limited and not comprehensive enough to 
cover all aspects of the law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
58 Dass, S. Santhana, op. cit., (2000). 
59 Lim, Heng Seng, op. cit., (1995). 
60 Chan, Shick Chin, op. cit., (2001). 
61 Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., (1995). 
62 [2004] 1 CLJ 797. 
63 [2005] 1 CLJ 685. 
64 [2008] 3 CLJ 489. 
65 Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, op. cit., (2009). 
66 Bar Council Malaysia, op. cit., (1984). 
67 Reiss, Seth M., op. cit., (1985). 
68 Cumaraswamy, Param, op. cit., (1984) 
69 Khoo, Guan Huat, op. cit., (1993). 
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The more recent published book on the subject of assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims is written by Nasser Hamid.
70
 Realizing the divergence of 
judicial opinions and interpretation with regard to the assessment of damages, the book 
focuses on how the provision in the CLA 1956 is to be applied rather than explaining the 
individual head of damages or discussing the issue of relevancy or fairness of the 
provisions. The author discusses the interpretation of the wordings in the provisions such 
as the terms shall, living expenses, wife, gratuity etc.  The discussion also includes some 
related issues pertaining to the wording used in the provisions such as the right of a ‘wife’ 
married under customary marriage to the claim for loss of support, the claim for engaging a 
housekeeper in exchange for the claim for loss of service of wife and the ‘modern trend’ in 
assessing living expenses. Most importantly the book also contains subject search which 
includes relevant cases as illustrations as well as the full text of several important decisions 
in personal injury and fatal accident claims. 
 
An excellent discussion on the application of the provisions in the CLA 1956 in the 
assessment of damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims is provided by the 
esteemed KS Dass.
71
 The book critically scrutinizes the effects of the amendments made to 
CLA 1956 (rev 1972) by the CLAA 1984. KS Dass opined that although the amendments 
had restricted the power of the judges in the assessment of damages by abolishing several 
Common Law heads of damages and providing conditions prior to the award for loss of 
support and loss of future earnings can be awarded, the provisions nevertheless fail to 
prevent judges from allowing large awards. He concluded that “in many cases, claimants 
were left without being properly compensated while the undeserving is rewarded in 
                                                 
70 Nasser Hamid, op. cit., (2008). 
71 Dass, K. S., op. cit., (1997). 
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abundance”.72 He also highlighted several grey areas in the Act whereby different 
interpretations other than those intended by the Parliament can be adopted. The 
ambiguities in the terms ‘good health’, ‘receiving earning before the injury or death’ as 
well the cut-off age for loss of support and loss of future earnings were some of the several 
“follies” in the Act which have negated the intention of the Parliament in regulating the 
assessment of damages. The most interesting aspect in the book is his proposed Bill to 
amend the provisions in section 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956. This proposed Bill took 
into consideration the problems in the provisions which he had highlighted in the book.  
 
KS Dass’s opinion on the amendments made by the CLAA 1984 is to some extent echoed 
by other authors whose main interest is on personal injury law. Professor P. Balan, in 
several of his articles commented that the conditions set by section 7 and 28A of the CLA 
1956 imposed severe restrictions on the judges in awarding quantum for loss of 
dependency and loss of future earnings. His criticism primarily rested on the facts that the 
requirements of good health and earning income at the time of injury are not practicable in 
modern days.
73
 He also stated that the sections had removed many Common Law 
principles which benefited the injured persons or dependants of deceased persons. In his 
other article,
74
 Balan concluded that despite the commonly accepted interpretation, the 
ambiguity in the wording of section 28A of the CLA 1956 may imply that the section was 
not meant to be applicable for persons over the age of fifty (55), persons not in good health 
and also persons claiming for loss of future earning capacity. As such, the assessment of 
award for these persons rest solely at the discretion of the judges.  He also opined that 
                                                 
72 Id at 9. 
73 Balan, P., op. cit., (2004). 
74 Balan.P., op. cit., (1990). 
24 
 
living expenses must strictly be proven or admitted. Otherwise, the compulsory deduction 
provided by section 28A of the CLA 1956 is not applicable.
75
 
 
The book written by Michael F. Rutter
76
 is also very crucial for this research. Although 
Rutter mainly discusses the methods in the assessment of damages according to the 
separate head of damages, his discussion also includes some comments on the effect of the 
1984 amendments to the law on personal injury and fatal accident claims in Malaysia. 
Similar to Dass and Balan, Rutter also is of the opinion that the provisions in the CLA 
1956 contain some ambiguity in the wordings and sometime lead to many harsh 
consequences which might not be the intention of the legislature while enacting the 
amendment.
77
 The most important contribution of this book to the research is the 
discussion on the law in Singapore. Since both Malaysian and Singaporean law on 
personal injury and fatal accident claims are discussed simultaneously, the book has 
contributed much in the researcher’s effort to critically analyse the law in the two 
countries.  
 
Professor Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar also had written several interesting articles 
criticizing the fairness of the provisions in the CLA 1956.
78
 His arguments are based on the 
limited concept of dependants, unrealistic meaning of loss of support, unjust reduction of 
multiplier and unreasonable deduction in the name of contingencies leading to injustice to 
the claimants. Altaf is partly in disagreement with Dass’s proposed Bill. One of his 
arguments is that it is unjust to bar a person at the age seven (7) to twenty three (23) that 
have yet to earn income from claiming loss of future earnings if he did not possess at least 
                                                 
75 Balan, P., op. cit., (1992). 
76 Rutter, Michael F., op. cit. (1993). 
77 Id. at 646 – 665. 
78 Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, op. cit. (2004), Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, op. cit., (2003). 
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a university education or vocational training. He also disagreed with Balan’s and Rutter’s 
interpretations of section 28A above. He opined that the section is all embracing and 
comprehensive, thus applicable to all. His most recent publication is a book commenting 
on the cases which were decided based on the provisions in the CLA 1956.
79
 The book, 
although invaluable especially in respect of the author’s critical scrutiny of the grounds of 
judgments in the cases reported, only deals with the post 1984 law. It does not offer any 
insight on the law prior to the CLAA 1984 thus making it difficult for the reader to 
understand the problem of the old law and the purpose of the provisions in the CLA 1956. 
Similarly the book also does not explain the legal principles relating to the law on personal 
injury and fatal accident claims. 
 
As evidenced above, although there are many literatures on the subject of personal injury 
and fatal accident claims available, most of the material which critically evaluate the 
effects of sections 7, 8, and 28A of the CLA 1956 are in forms of articles. Therefore the 
scope of discussions is limited to specific area only. This is understandable due to the 
limited capacity of an article. To the researcher’s knowledge, there is no single concise 
material which had ventured to critically evaluate the actual effects of the provisions in 
section 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956 on the discretionary power of the judges in the 
assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents. There is also no specific literature which actually examines the effects of 
the provisions on the amount of damages awarded in these claims.  
 
                                                 
79 Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, op. cit., (2009). 
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Similarly, other than the book by Michael F. Rutter
80
 and an article by Leslie Chew, et. 
al.,
81
 there is an absence of a concise effort in analysing the law in Singapore and Brunei 
on the subject. Unfortunately, the book by Rutter was published in 1993, thus the 
discussion and cases referred to were only up to that year. More recent development in the 
law such as the 2011 and 2012 amendments to the law on interest in Malaysia is not 
available. The book, although contains some reference to Brunei cases, did not discuss on 
the law in Brunei. The article by Leslie Chew, et. al., is the most recent publication which 
ventures to compare the law applicable in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei. The authors 
focus on the assessment of damages for loss of future earnings and loss of future earning 
capacity (with special reference to a Brunei case of Saurabh Gurung v Julia 
Moksin).
82
There is also a comparative analysis of the issue of pleading general damages for 
pain and suffering in statement of claim, pre-judgment interest and assessment of damages 
for specific body part in the three (3) countries. The article however does not discuss the 
assessment of damages in on fatal accident claims.  
 
 
 
1.9   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research is a doctrinal legal research involving systematic inquiry into the current or 
novel legal issues. It adopts two approaches: the first approach involves library research 
whereby information is gathered from primary sources and secondary sources. The 
information gathered via the library research is crucial in analysing the effects of the 
                                                 
80 Rutter, Michael F. op. cit., (1993) 
81 Chew, Leslie, et. al., op. cit., (2008). 
82 [Civil Suit No 18 of 2005]. 
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provisions in the CLA 1956 on the exercise of discretionary power of the judges in the 
assessment of damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents. The second approach is via interviews with several practitioners and 
representatives from the insurance company. Although the interviews only play a minor 
role in the research, the findings nevertheless are crucial in order gain practical insight into 
the problems faced by the practitioners and the insurance companies with regard to the 
application of sections 7, 8, 11 and 28A of the CLA 1956. At the same time, the interviews 
also enable the researcher to triangulate the findings of the research as well as to ascertain 
the practicability of the suggestions in the final chapter of the thesis. 
  
1.9.1 Data Collection 
Primary data was collected from Acts, Rules of Court and Practice Directions. Aside from 
the published copy of the above, publication from online sources such as the Attorney 
General Chambers and the Bar Council of Malaysia were continuously referred to for an 
updated version of the provisions involved. Apart from the current Federal and State Laws, 
these databases also provide excess to older laws such as repealed Federal and State Laws, 
Laws of the Federated Malay and Unfederated Malay States, Laws of the Straits 
Settlements etc. Similarly, databases provided by the Attorneys General Chambers of 
Singapore and Brunei were also utilized in the same way. 
 
Case laws and grounds of judgment for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising 
out of motor vehicle accident cases were also gathered as part of the primary data for this 
thesis. Most of the cases were retrieved from the Malayan Law Journal, Current Law 
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Journal, All Malaysia Reports, Personal Injury Reports, Singapore Law Reports and 
Brunei Law Reports. Online databases such as LexisNexis online database and CLJ Law 
subscribed by the University of Malaya and University Utara Malaysia were often utilized. 
Since it is beyond the objective of this study to compare every aspect of the law on 
personal injury and fatal accident claims in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, the case laws 
were confined (as far as possible) to cases relating to motor vehicle accidents only. They 
were referred to for the purpose of interpretation of statutes and legal principles as well as 
understanding the basis behind the decisions of the courts. Since the provisions in section 
7,8,11 and 28A of the CLA 1956 is applicable in all personal injury and fatal accident 
claims, the selection of cases referred had to be done meticulously to avoid confusions 
with other types of personal injury and fatal accident claims. This is due to the fact that 
there are certain elements in the law which set the motor vehicle accidents cases with other 
type of accident cases.
83
   
 
Secondary data was gathered from published materials such as books and articles from 
journals, published and unpublished academic papers and conferences, on-line databases 
and internet sites. JSTOR, LexisNexis Academic Universe and LexisNexis Total Research 
System, Westlaw and CLJ Law were among the frequently used online databases. 
Similarly, the research also relied on online publications in Bank Negara Malaysia, the Bar 
Council of Malaysia and Persatuan Insurans Am Malaysia’s official websites for data on 
claim pay-outs, financial reports, Practice Directions and any recent publications relating 
to personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. These 
websites provide information on motor vehicle insurance which are accessible but not 
                                                 
83 For example, the position of the Court of Appeal as the final appellate court and the unlimited jurisdiction of the Session Court in all 
personal injury and fatal accident claim cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents. 
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generally known by the public. Other references in hard copy volumes such as Halsbury 
Law of England,
84Mallal’s Digest85and Halsbury Law of Malaysia86were also frequently 
referred.  The same method is also used in evaluating the laws and practices being applied 
by judges in Singapore and Brunei.  
 
The researcher also conducted several interviews with legal practitioners representing 
claimants and insurance companies as well as the officers (both executive and managerial 
levels) from several insurance companies. The interviews were done in order to collect the 
practitioner’s and the officer’s perception on the effects of sections 7, 8, 11 and 28A of the 
CLA 1956 on the judge’s discretion in the assessment of damages for personal injury and 
fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. At the same time, the 
interviews also enable the researcher to gather their insight on the effects of the provisions 
on the amount of damages being awarded by the courts. 1956. The most crucial purpose of 
the interviews is to find out the practicability of the researcher’s suggestions. Interview in 
legal research is necessary in order to find out about the practical application of certain 
rules of law, cause and effect, current status, trend or perceptions or for the purpose of 
learning the views of expert in respect of certain legislation.
87
 
                                                 
84 “This is the best encyclopedia of English Law available in a set of volumes.”Anwarul Yaqin, Legal Research and Writing, (Petaling 
Jaya: LexisNexis, 2007), at 75. 
85 “The most significant digest on Malaysian and Singapore cases is the Mallal’s Digest which summarizes the reported cases of the 
Malaysian and Singapore superior courts and appeals to the Privy Council.” Ibid, at 73. 
86 “The Malaysian version of encyclopedia called the Halsbury’s Law of Malaysia is unique because it encompasses both the common 
law and Islamic Law.” Ibid, at 76. 
87 Chatterjee, C., Methods of Research in Law (2ndedi.), (London: Old Bailey Press, 2000). 
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1.9.2 Data Analysis 
This research applied a two (2) method of data analysis,
88
 namely descriptive and 
analytical methods. The descriptive method was used to examine and explain the 
provisions in the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) and the problems relating to the application of the 
provisions in respect of the exercise of judicial discretion in the assessment of damages. 
The analytical method was used to breaks the provisions in the current CLA 1956 into 
separate categories to facilitate the task of analysing the effects of the provisions on the 
exercise of judicial discretion in assessing damages for personal injury claims, fatal 
accidents claims as well the assessment of pre and post judgment interest. Analytical 
approach was also adopted in analysing the provisions in Singapore and Brunei. By 
employing these methods of data analysis, the researcher was able to analyse how the 
provisions and practices in the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal claims 
arising out of motor accidents claims operate in social context.
89
 This enables the 
researcher to evaluate the statutory provisions, principles and considerations adopted by 
the judges in assessing the amount of damages to be awarded.  
 
 
 
1.10 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
Although the law relating to personal injury and fatal accident claims is applicable for all 
kinds of accident claims such as personal injury insurance, medical negligence, workmen 
                                                 
88 “Where the aim of a study is to prepare a dissertation or thesis, the research in most cases involves the use of more than one 
approach….Most legal studies follow exploratory, descriptive,  explanatory, historical, analytical, critical or comparative approach, or a 
combination of some or all.”Anwarul Yaqin, op. cit., at 19 and 49.  
89 Anwarul Yaqin, op. cit., at 10. 
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compensation and many other related disciplines, this research focuses solely on the 
assessment of damages for  personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents.  The cases cited throughout the thesis are as far as possible claims 
arising out of motor vehicle accident. The selection of cases is crucial since there are 
several features in the law on assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents which set the motor vehicle accident cases 
apart from other types of accident cases. However there are several instances where non-
motor accident cases are cited due to necessity or the relevancy of the cases to the 
discussion.  
 
 
 
1.11 ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS  
The thesis is divided into seven (7) chapters. The following is a description of the focal 
issues addressed in each of the chapters: 
1.11.1 Chapter 1  
The introductory chapter discusses the outline of this thesis covering the background of the 
area being studied, the problem statement, the objectives of the research and its 
significances. It also presents the research questions, the scope and limitation of the 
research, the research methodology as well as the methods adopted for data collection and 
analysis. Finally, it provides the outline of the whole thesis and a summary of the 
discussions in the following chapters. 
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1.11.2 Chapter 2  
This chapter is divided into three (3) main parts. The first part discusses the subject of 
compulsory motor insurance. It explains the provisions in the Road Transport Act 1987
90
 
which provide statutory assurance
91
 to the victims of motor vehicle accidents that they will 
be compensated for injuries and losses suffered out of motor vehicle accidents. It also 
explains the contractual obligation of the insurer to compensate the claimants in a motor 
vehicle claims. The second part of the chapter focuses on the introduction to the law on 
personal injury and fatal claims in Malaysia. Since detailed discussions on the provisions 
in the CLA 1956 on this matter are in the following chapters, this part only discusses the 
origin and the development of the law on personal injury and fatal accident claims in 
Malaysia, covering both the Common Law and the CLA 1956.The final part of the chapter 
explores the application of judicial discretion in the assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal claims in Malaysia.It begins with the defining the concept of judicial 
discretion followed by a discussion on how judicial discretion operates within the purview 
of the provisions in the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). The provisions in the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) 
is examined in the effort to understand the problems with the application of the provisions 
in the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) in relation to the application of judicial discretion as well as 
the reasons behind the 1984 statutory amendments.  
1.11.3 Chapter 3  
This chapter discusses the effects of section 28A of the CLA 1956 on the assessment of 
damages and the amount of damages in personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle 
                                                 
90 (Act 333). 
91 Although the cause of actions for personal injury and fatal accident claims are derived from tort, the provisions in the Road Transport 
Act 1980 ensure that there will be enough funds available to pay to the claimants (from the insurance company insuring the vehicle at 
fault) and the claimant have direct against the insurance company insuring the vehicle at fault. 
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accidents. The section regulates the assessment of damages for loss of expectation of life, 
pain and suffering as well as loss of future earnings.
92
 Rather than discussing the heads of 
damages individually, the chapter deals directly with the effects of the amendments made 
by the CLAA 1975 and the CLAA 1984 to the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) on the exercise of 
judicial discretion in the assessment of damages and the amount of damages being awarded 
by the courts. The discussion ranges from the effects of the abolition of the award for loss 
of expectation of life and loss of pre-trial earnings, the introduction of the pre-conditions 
for the award for loss of future earnings, the itemization of benefits to be excluded in the 
assessment of multiplicand, the effects of section 28A on the assessment of damages for 
loss of earning capacity to the imposition of fixed multiplier in the assessment of damages 
for loss of future earning capacity. 
1.11.4 Chapter 4  
This chapter is a continuation of the previous chapter. It however focuses on the analysis 
of section 7 and 8 of the CLA 1956. The sections provide for the assessment of damages in 
fatal accident claims. Using similar approach as the previous chapter, it directly deals with 
the effect of the provisions on the exercise of judicial discretion on the assessment of 
damages for fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents and the amount of 
damages being awarded by the courts. The discussion touches on the effects of the 
abolition of the award for loss of service and consortium, loss of expectation of life and 
loss of earnings in the lost years. It also discusses the effects of the introduction of the 
award for bereavement, the substitution of the award for ‘loss arising out of death’ with 
‘loss of support’, the itemizations of death benefits to be excluded in the assessment of 
                                                 
92 The section is also said to indirectly regulate the assessment of damages for loss of pre-trial earnings and loss of earning capacity. 
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multiplicand for loss of support, the imposition of the pre-conditions for loss of support 
and the introduction of the fixed multiplier in assessing damages for loss of support. 
1.11.5 Chapter 5  
This chapter discusses the law on interest in Malaysia and several related issues on the 
same subject. It starts with defining interest and its purpose followed by discussing the 
development of the law on interest which mainly focuses on section 3 (1) of the English 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the precedence set by Jefford & 
Anor. v Gee.
93
 This chapter then examines the law on interest in Malaysia. The provisions 
in section 11 of the CLA 1956 and the rules of courts (before and after the introduction of 
Rules of Courts 2012) are analysed in order to determine the effects of the provisions on 
the assessment of interest for damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising 
out of motor vehicle accidents.  The final part of the chapter elaborates three primary 
issues which originate from the interpretation of the provisions relating to the award of 
interest i.e. interest as a matter of right, variation of interest rate and compounded interest.  
1.11.6 Chapter 6  
This chapter deals with the analysis of the law relating to personal injury and fatal accident 
claims in Singapore and Brunei. It starts with an exploration of the development of the 
Common Law, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. The 
discussion is then followed by the analysis of the effects of the provisions in the CLA (cap 
43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act in respect of personal injury and fatal 
                                                 
93 (1970) 2 QB 130. 
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accident claims. The effects of the abolition of the award for loss of expectation of life
94
 
and loss of earnings in the lost years, the absence of provisions relating to the assessment 
of damages for loss of earnings,
95
 the minimal provisions relating to the assessment of 
damages for loss of support, the introduction of the award for bereavement, maintaining 
the award for loss of service of wife or child and loss of consortium of wife and the 
introduction of the award for provisional damages.  
 
The law applicable in these countries is initially very much similar to Malaysia. The 
enactment of the CLAA 1984 later sets the Malaysian law apart from the law applicable in 
either Singapore or Brunei. Singapore and Brunei still relies heavily on the Common Law 
principles with regard to the assessment of damages since most of their provisions relating 
to personal injury and fatal accident claims in their respective Acts are very much similar 
to the English’s Administration of Justice Act 1982.  As such, the provisions relating to the 
assessment of damages especially with regard to the award for loss of future earnings and 
loss of support in the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accident and Personal Injuries Act are 
essentially different from the CLA 1956. 
1.11.7 Chapter 7  
This chapter concludes the thesis by providing the findings of the research. It also presents 
the possible reforms that may be put in place to overcome the problems identified in the 
provisions of the CLA 1956. 
 
                                                 
94 For both personal injury and estate claims. 
95 Which includes loss of pre-trial earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of future earning capacity. 
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1.12 CONCLUSION 
At the outset, the researcher is of the view that the assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents in Malaysia is still at 
the discretion of the presiding judge or judges albeit somewhat restrained due to statutory 
intervention. This discretion, of course, is not absolute and can never be one. The judges 
albeit operating within the statutory parameters of section 7, 8, 11 and 28A of the CLA 
1956 and the Common Law principles thereon, nevertheless still retains his or their 
discretion in the award of damages. Moreover, they have to take into consideration the 
peculiar facts of each case and the submissions of the parties involved. Many writers had 
criticized the provisions in the CLA 1956. They contended that the introduction of the 
CLAA 1984 had abolished or fettered the discretion of the judges to the detriment of the 
claimants. Although the 1984 amendments constitute some departure from the long 
accepted norms and principles, it is still argued that the assessment of damages for 
personal injury and fatal accident claims is better served by applying the discretion of the 
judges considering the complexity of the matters involved and the multitude of 
considerations that need to be factored into the computation before damages can be fairly 
assessed and awarded. The ‘judicial discretion’ referred to, which constitutes the heart of 
this thesis, is that which is left after the 1984 amendments to the CLA. The researcher will 
carefully set out in the coming chapters to prove and justify her hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES FOR 
PERSONAL INJURY AND FATAL ACCIDENT CLAIMS ARISING 
OUT OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The cause of action for personal injury and fatal accident claims originates from tort. 
However, in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising from motor vehicle accidents, 
the Malaysian legislature has supplemented this cause of action with statutory provision by 
making it compulsory for all vehicles travelling on Malaysian roads to have motor 
insurance policy. The Road Transport Act 1987
1
 requires all motor vehicles users to insure 
their vehicle against certain third party risk.
2
 The compulsory motor insurance policy 
ensures that there will be sufficient fund to pay the damages to the claimants. 
 
The Civil Law Act 1956
3
is the only legislative provision governing the assessment of 
damages in all civil litigation involving personal injury and fatal accident claims. The 
current provisions in the Act is the result of two major amendments to the Civil Law Act 
1956 (rev 1972)
4
 done via the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1975
5
 and the Civil Law 
                                                 
1(Act 333).Hereinafter referred to as “the RTA 1987”. 
2The victims of motor vehicle accidents claiming under motor vehicle insurance policy is also known as third party. The parties to an 
insurance policy are the insurance company and the policy owner. A third party is not a party to the policy. In certain situations the law 
however gives right to a third party to an insurance policy.  
3(Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1967”. 
4(Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1956 (Rev 1972)”.  
5(Act A308). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLAA 1975”. The amendments were consolidated into the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). 
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(Amendment) Act 1984.
6
The law on assessment of damages however is not limited to the 
provisions in the CLA 1956 only. For the heads of damages not provided in the CLA 1956, 
the Malaysian judges are bound by the Common Law principles.  
 
 
 
2.2 COMPULSORY MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
The event which gives rise to a cause of action for personal injury and fatal accident claims 
arising out of motor vehicle accident is the occurrence of road traffic accident involving 
insured vehicle. This right of action is derived from motor vehicle insurance policy which 
is compulsory for all vehicles travelling on Malaysian roads. Historically, there was no 
specific law on motor vehicle insurance. Victim of motor vehicle accidents had to rely 
solely on tort to claim for damaged for injuries or any other losses inflicted on him due to 
the defendant’s negligence. Since a suit under tort is filed against the defendant on his 
personal capacity, there is no guarantee that the victim will be compensated.  In cases 
where the defendant is a man of straw, the victim will be without compensation regardless 
of the judgment obtained .Even in the rare cases where the defendant’s liability is insured 
by an insurance policy, the doctrine of privity of contract demands that the defendant pay 
the judgment sum to the victim before indemnifying them
7
 against the insurer. The victim 
(as a third party to the insurance policy) had no direct recourse against the insurer.
8
 As 
                                                 
6(Act A602). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLAA 1984”. The amendments were consolidated into the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). 
7Chan Wai Meng, Rights of Third Parties in Insurance Law in Malaysia, PhD thesis, Faculty of Law, UM 2007, at 211. 
8 Since an insurance policy is a contract between the policy owner (insured) and insurance company (insurer), the strict application of 
contract law would preclude a third party from filling a suit to enforce the insured’s insurance policy in order to obtain compensation for 
injuries suffered despite the policy term. 
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such, he was barred from suing on the insurance policy even if the policy is affected for his 
own benefit or if the policy provides that the insurer is to remit the policy money to him.
9
 
 
The statutory legislation governing compulsory motor vehicle insurance was first 
introduced in England through the Road Traffic Act 1930.
10
The preamble to the provisions 
itself clearly explain the objective behind the enactment of the provisions. It reads, ‘An 
Act… to make provisions for the protection of third parties against risk arising out of the 
use of motor vehicles’.11 The RTA 1930 (UK)was later repealed and replaced by the Road 
Traffic Act 1960, the Road Traffic Act 1972 and later on the Road Traffic Act 1988. Part 
IV of the 1988 Act provides for protection relating to death or bodily injury including 
passenger, caused by the use of motor vehicles
12
 by ensuring that any judgment in respect 
of quantum and liability will be meet by the insurer of the vehicle at fault. 
 
Similar to the situation in England prior to the enactment of RTA 1930, victims of motor 
vehicle accidents in Malaysia also had to rely on tort in order to claim compensation for 
personal injury and fatal accidents. However, seven (7) years after the enactment of the 
RTA1930 (UK), the Federated States decided to enact their own statute on motor vehicle 
insurance by adopting similar provisions as in the RTA 1930 (UK) into Road Traffic 
(Third Party Insurance) Enactment 1937.
13
 The Enactment introduced the compulsory 
motor vehicle insurance policy covering third party risk to the Federated Malay States. The 
Unfederated Malay States also had their own separate laws which more or less similar to 
                                                 
9 Chan, Wai Meng, Third Party Rights in Insurance Law in Malaysia, (Petaling Jaya: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2008), at 1. 
10Hereinafter referred to as the RTA 1930 (UK). The purpose of this Act is to ensure that there are sufficient fund to compensate victims 
of motor accidents. 
11Baduyah Obeng, “Insurans Motor Pihak Ketiga Yang Diwajibkan Di Malaysia”, (1998) 1 Current Law Journal, suppi – xxii, at i. 
12 Sidhu, Mahinder Singh, Penanggung dan PengambilI nsurans Motor danP ihak Ketiga, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 
1997), at 8. 
13FMS Enactment No 17 of 1937. 
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the RTA 1930 (UK).
14
 After 1957, the various Road Transport Enactments of the 
Federated and Unfederated states were unified under the Road Transport Ordinance 1958. 
The Ordinance was later on repealed and substituted with the RTA 1987. Sabah
15
 and 
Sarawak
16
 adopted the Road Transport Ordinance 1958 in 1984 and later on the RTA 1987 
in 1988 after their incorporation with Peninsular Malaysia.
17
 
 
Part IV (sections 89 – 107) of the RTA 1987 provides for compulsory motor vehicle 
insurance policy under the heading of ‘Provisions against Third Party Risk Arising out Of 
Use of Motor Vehicles’. Section 90 (1) of the RTA 1987 made protection against third 
party risk arising out ofroad
18
 traffic
19
 accident
20
as prescribe in section 91(1) of the RTA 
1987 a compulsory coverage for all motor vehicles
21
 use on Malaysian roads.
22
 Section 
90(1) RTA 1987 reads: 
Subject to this Part, there shall not be lawful for any person to use or to 
cause or to permit any other person to use, a motor vehicle unless there is 
on force in relation to the user of the motor vehicle by that person or that 
other person, as the case may be, such a policy of insurance or such a 
                                                 
14 See Strait Settlement Ordinance No 5 of 1938, Road Traffic Third Party Enactment 1938 (Johore), Road Traffic Enactment no 16 of 
1356 AH (1938 AD) (Kedah), Motor Vehicle Enactment No 16  of 1356 (1938 AD)(Terengganu). 
15 Was governed by Road Traffic (Third Party Insurance) Ordinance 1949 (Sabah Cap 129). 
16 Was governed by Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risk) Ordinance 1949 (Sarawak Cap130). 
17Section 1(3) of the RTA 1987. 
18 Section 2 of the RTA 1987 defines‘Road’ as any public road and any other road to which the public has access. It includes bridges, 
tunnels, lay-bys, ferry facilities, interchanges, round-abouts, traffic islands, road dividers, traffic lanes, acceleration lanes, deceleration 
lanes, side-tables, median strips, overpasses, underpasses, approaches, entrance and exit ramps, toll plazas, service areas, other structures 
and fixtures to fully affect its use. The coverage however does not extend to road under construction since ‘road’ under construction 
would only be considered as ‘road’ for purpose of section 70 and 85 of the Act. 
19Section 2 of the RTA 1987 defines‘traffic’ to  include bicycles, tricycles, motor vehicles, tram cars, vehicles of every description, 
pedestrians, processions, bodies of police or troops and all animals being ridden, driven or led. The application of section 90 of the Act 
however is only confined to motor vehicle. 
20 Section 2 of the RTA 1987 defines ‘accident’ as an accident or occurrence whereby any injury is caused to any person, property, 
vehicle, structure or animal. 
21 Section 2 of the RTA 1987 defines‘Motor vehicles’ as vehicles of any description, propelled by means of mechanism contained within 
itself and constructed or adapted so as to be capable of being used on roads and includes a trailer. 
22 Failure to observe the above section would make a driver liable for fine not exceeding RM1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 3 
months or both. The person so convicted would also be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving license for 12 months. Apart 
from being liable for criminal sanction, failure to insure vehicle under section 90 of RTA 1987 also would make the owner or driver of 
said vehicle personally liable for civil action by the third party.  
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security in respect of third party risk as complies with the requirement of 
this Part. 
 
The scope of coverage of the policy must cover protection against personal injury and fatal 
accidents.  Section 91(1) of the RTA 1987 reads  
(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Part, a policy of 
insurance must be a policy which-  
(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer within the 
meaning of this Part: and  
(b) insures such person, or class of persons as may be specified in 
the policy in respect of any liability which may be incurred by 
him or them in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any 
person caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle 
or land implement drawn thereby on a road (emphasis added) 
 
Section 96 of the RTA 1987provides for third party’s right to enforce judgment in personal 
injury motor accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accident against the insurance 
company which insured the vehicle at fault. By virtue of this section, the insurance 
company insuring the vehicle at fault has the statutory duty to satisfy the judgment
23
 once 
                                                 
23
The definition of the term ‘judgment’ in this context is not only limited to an order from the court on liability and quantum , it also 
includes any amicable settlement without admission of liability reached by both third party and the insurance company and recorded as 
consent judgment. Liability of the insurer to pay the awards to the Plaintiff only arises after the judgment is delivered. In QBE Insurance 
Ltd v Hasyim b Abdul &Anor, [1982] 2 MLJ 62.,  the application to bring the insurer as third party was rejected on appeal on the ground 
that liability of insurer to a third party did not arise before judgment had been obtained. An insurance company will also be liable to pay 
the amount agreed upon by them and the third party and the third party signed a discharge letter agreeing to waive any further claim. In 
this instance, although no order was obtained from court, both sides are bound by the discharge letter: a contract stipulating that the 
insurance company will pay the agreed amount and third party waiving any further right to claim against the insurer over the same 
subject matter. 
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the claimant obtained the same against the person insured by the policy and a notice had 
been sent to the insurance company.
24
 
 
The right of the third party to enforce the judgment is further strengthened by the motor 
vehicle policy wordings. All motor vehicle policy have specific clause which undertakes 
the payment of any claim made against the insured or his authorized driver in event of road 
traffic accident. Under the heading of Liability to Third Party, the insurer undertakes to pay 
the amount the insured is obligated to pay to third party in event of death, bodily injury or 
property damaged.
25
 The same term appears in all motor insurance policies.
26
 
 
 
 
2.3 THE LAW ON PERSONAL INJURY AND FATAL ACCIDENT 
CLAIMS IN MALAYSIA. 
The law on the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims in 
Malaysia is a mixture of the Common Law and the provisions in the CLA 1956. 
                                                 
24Nik Ramlah Mahmood, Insurance Law in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Butterworths, 1992), at 239.Insurer’s liability to pay 
compensation under section 90 and 91 of the RTA 1987 is conditional upon the absence of any application for stay of execution of the 
judgment pending appeal. If there is an application to hold or postpone payment of the judgment until decision of appeal delivered, the 
insurer is yet to be under any obligation to pay. At the same time the insurer must have notice of proceeding from third party. No sum is 
payable under sec 91 of the RTA 1987 unless insurer had been notified of the proceeding at least 7 days before the commencement of 
the proceeding. 
25
Note that the coverage of section 90(1) of the RTA 1987 does not include damage to property. 
26 Example of motor vehicle policy wordings are as follows: We will pay the amount which You or Your authorized driver are legally 
liable to pay (including claimants' costs and expenses) for:-  (a) death or bodily injury to any person except those specifically excluded    
under Exceptions to Section B. (b) damage to property as a result of an accident arising out of the use of Your Vehicle provided Your 
authorized driver also complies with all the terms and conditions of the policy that You are subject to.  
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2.3.1 The Common Law 
The Common Law is generally defined as the rules of law develop by the courts through 
decided cases distinct from legislation passed by parliament. It comprises of a set of 
principles and specific rules on a wide variety of issues which originates in the custom or 
maxims common throughout England and expanded, modified and developed over a long 
period of to a new set of fact via reasoning by analogy.
27
The reception of English Common 
Law and rules of equity in Malaysia is made possible by section 3 of the CLA 1956.
28
 The 
section formally recognizes the reception of the English Common Law and rules of equity 
in three (3) stages. The states in West Malaysia may apply the Common Law and the rules 
of equity in force in England on the 7
th
 April 1956. Sabah and Sarawak on the other hand is 
at liberty to apply the laws as at 1
st
 December 1951 and 12
th
December 1949.
29
 
 
By virtue of this section, the Common Law and rules of equity as applicable in England 
can be adopted in Malaysia in the absence of local statute so long as the Common Law and 
rules of equity does not act contrary to the local norms and circumstances. Any 
development in the Common Law and rules of equity in England after the cut-off dates is 
treated as persuasive and not binding
30
 
                                                 
27Rutter, Michael F, Applicable Law in Singapore and Malaysia, (Singapore: Butterworth, 1989), at 69. 
28
The English law was formally received in Penang and Melaka (former Strait Settlement) in 1807 and 1826 respectively. The Federated 
Malay States, Sabah and Sarawak formally received the English law in 1937. Prior to this, the English Common Law and rules of equity 
had been informally applied in these states by virtue of them being under the British administration. See Ahmad Ibrahim, Towards a 
History of Law in Malaysia and Singapore, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992). 
29 Sabah and Sarawak also may adopt statutes of general application applicable in England applicable on the respective dates. Similar 
adoption is not available for the states in West Malaysia. Only in event of lacuna in local laws in commercial transaction such as 
banking, insurance, partnership that the states in West Malaysia are allowed to adopt the English statute. The liberty however restricted 
to those statutes which were in force as at 7th April 1956. Any amendment or revision to the statute after the cut-off date will not be 
applicable in West Malaysia. Penang and Melaka on the other hand enjoyed a slightly different status then the other states in West 
Malaysia. These two states along with Sabah and Sarawak are allowed to adopt the English statute relating to matters enumerated in 
section 5(1) CLA1956 up to the date in which the issue is being tried on. 
30
The Malaysian courts have not shut the door for the importation of the Common Law and principle of equity indefinitely. There are 
many examples of Common Law cases decided in England after these dates being judicially followed in Malaysia. Since the principles 
in assessment of damages in Malaysia is more or less in line with the English Common Law, the local court still take into consideration 
the English decisions after 1956 to the extent that it is suitable to the Malaysian context Jag Singh v Toong Fong Omnibus Co. Ltd. 
[1964] 30 MLJ. Lord Scarman in a Privy Court decision in Jamil bin Harun v Yang Kamsiah & Anor[1984] 1 MLJ 217 held:“…their 
Lordships do not doubt that it is for the courts of Malaysia to decide, subject always to the statute law of the Federation, whether to 
follow English case law. Modern English authorities may be persuasive but are not binding. In determining whether to accept their 
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The decisions of the English courts provide an authoritative source of law on question 
relating to the assessment of damages.
31
The decisions of the English Courts (other than the 
Privy Council) especially from the House of Lords are usually treated as highly persuasive 
although not binding. The application of these cases are however limited to issues on 
principles of assessment of damages. The local courts are reluctant to follow English cases 
with regard to quantum of damages. The differences in economic and social condition 
between Malaysia and England made adopting similar quantum as decided in England 
inappropriate for local cases.
32
Even in the following decades, when the social and 
economic condition in Malaysia are much improved than that in the 1960’s, the courts are 
still reluctant to adopt English quantum not only in term of monetary value and economic 
utility, but also with regard to social outlook.
33
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
guidance the court would have regard to the circumstances of the states of Malaysia and will be careful to apply them only to the extent 
that the written law permits and no further that in their view it was just to do so.” 
31Rutter, Michael F., Handbook on Damages for Personal Injuries and Death in Singapore and Malaysia, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: 
Butterworth Asia, 1993), at 6. 
32 In Pahang Lin Siong Motor Co. Ltd. v Cheong SweeKhai, [1962] MLJ 29, Thomson CJ specified two conditions before English 
decisions to be applied in Malaysia: “Accepting this views two consideration must be borne in mind in their application in this country. 
The first of these of that local social, economic and industrial conditions are pole apart from condition in England and Scotland and any 
tendency to take any particular line in relation to the assessment of damages in case of this type from a consideration of English and 
Scottish cases is not calculated to produce very useful result.” 
33In a High Court case of Bas Mini Muhibbah  Sdn. Bhd. v Abdullah bin Salim, [1983] 1 MLJ 405, Abd Razak J reiterate the marked 
differences between the two countries which compel the local courts to adopt the English quantum with reservation:“Coming now to the 
problem before us, Counsel for the appellant in seeking to vary the order of the learned President, as I said earlier seem somewhat to be 
obliged to say that in the light of the Robertson's case that the amount given was under the circumstances excessive. In viewing our own 
situation I do not pretend to be a social scientist to say that I know what is the real answer to the problem before me. I do not pretend to 
know also whether the Malaysian society had gone through the social transformation that it can safely be said to have reached such 
heights of sophistication akin to that in a western society.... Against our way of life for different religious background and different 
culture the Western way of life does not easily fit into the life pattern. It may be we are slow in accepting it, I don't know. May be our 
outlook towards life is different... I would say thus that in so far as the rule regarding compensation for loss of consortium is concerned, 
the decision of Robertson v. Turnbull must with deference to their Lordships in that case therefore be applied here with reservation lest 
an injustice be done.” 
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2.3.2 The Civil Law Act 1956 
Historically, the current CLA 1956 was preceded by the Civil Law Ordinance 1878, the 
Civil Law Ordinance 1909,
34
the Civil Law Enactment of 1937,
35
the Civil Law (Extension) 
Ordinance 1951
36
 and the Civil Law Ordinance 1956.
37
The 1956 Ordinance was later 
replaced by the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) which came into force on 1
st
 April 1972. The CLA 
1956 (rev 1972) saw two (2) major amendments in respect of the assessment of damages 
for personal injury and fatal accident claims via the CLAA 1975 and the CLAA 1984. The 
current provisions on the assessment damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims 
arising from motor vehicle accidents are the result of these two (2) amendments.   
 
The Civil Law Enactment 1937 
The first statutory codification of the provisions relating to the assessment of damages for 
personal injury and fatal accident claims can be traced back to sections 3 and 4 of the Civil 
Law Enactment 1937.Section 3 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937 provided the statutory 
cause of action for fatal accident claims. The provision was adopted from the English Fatal 
Accidents Act 1846. It is a statutory departure from the Common Law rule which prohibits 
a third party from claiming damages for the death of another person. 
38
 This rule prevented 
widow, children or parents who are the dependants of the deceased from taking any action 
against the tortfeasor for the loss of their financial support due to deceased’s demise. 
                                                 
34 The Civil Law Ordinance 1878 and the Civil Law Ordinance 1909 were applicable to the Strait Settlements (Penang, Melaka and 
Singapore). 
35(F.M.S no 3 of 1937).Hereinafter referred to as the Civil Law Enactment 1937.The Enactment introduced the English CommonLaw to 
the Federated Malays States (Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan.) 
36(F. of M.No 49 of 1951). The Ordinance extended the application of the English Common Law to the Unfederated Malay States 
(Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu and Johor)which became part of the Federation of Malaya in 1948. 
37(F. of M. No 5 of 1956). Hereinafter referred to as the Civil Law Ordinance 1956.The Ordinance replaced the Civil Law Enactment of 
1937 and the Civil Law (Extension) Ordinance 1951. It was applicable to all eleven (11) states of the Federation. 
38Under the Common Law, death of a person is not a civil wrong, thus does not gives rise to any cause of action. “In a civil court, the 
death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury”.See Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp. 493, also see decision by Salleh 
Abbas FJ in Sambu Pernas Construction v Pitchakarran [1982] 1 MLJ 269. 
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Section 3 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937 allowed claims for damages to compensate any 
loss arising from the death of the deceased for the benefit of deceased’s wife, husband, 
parents and child. Although the measure of damages was stated as ‘loss resulting from 
such death’ the section actually provided for damages for loss of dependency.39 
 
Section 4 of the Civil Law Enactment of 1937 was an exact copy of section 1 of the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934.
40
 It provided for damages available to 
deceased’s estate upon his demise. This section abolished the Common Law rule 
personalis moritur cum persona.
41
By virtue of this section, an action for damages
42
 
initiated by the deceased prior to his demise can be continued by a representative acting on 
behalf of his estate for the benefit of the estate.
43
Damages recovered from the proceeding 
will go to deceased’s estate and distributed to his beneficiaries named in his will or as 
intestacy.
44
The damages recoverable under section 4 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937 
comprised of any heads of damages available to the deceased had he did not pass away 
such as damages for pain and suffering, loss of amenities, loss of expenses, loss of 
earnings prior to demise, loss of expectation of life and loss of future earning in lost years.  
The section also allowed the deceased’s estate to claim for any expenses incurred as the 
result of deceased’s demise such as funeral expenses.45 
 
Although sections 3 and 4 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937 provided for the statutory 
causes of actions for damages claimable by deceased’s dependants and estate, the actual 
                                                 
39Also known as loss of support. 
40Hereinafter referred to as the Law Reform 1934.Cussen J in Lok Yin v Pat Thoo (1946) 1 MLJ 26 held “Our law is identical with the 
corresponding English Act – The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1934, section 4 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937 is the 
same as section 1 of the English Act”. 
41 Personal action died with the person. 
42Except for defamation, seduction, enticement and adultery. 
43 The claim is also known as ‘estate claim’. 
44Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., (1993), at 493. 
45See explanation by Suffian J in Yap Ami &Anor v Tan Hui Pang [198] 316. 
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method of assessment were not provided. The sections only contained provisions on the 
measure of damages, persons entitled to claim for the damages and persons who can bring 
the actions for the damages.  The assessment of damages was still based on the Common 
Law principles and decided cases. Similarly, the causes of action and the assessment of 
other heads of damages not provided by the sections were also based on the Common Law 
principles and decided cases. 
 
The Civil Law Ordinance 1956 
The provisions in sections 3 and 4 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937 were later adopted by 
the Civil Law Ordinance 1956 vide sections 7 and 8. Sections 7 and 8 provided for 
damages for loss of dependency and estate claims respectively. Similar to the Civil Law 
Enactment 1937, the Civil Law Ordinance 1956 also did not provide for the assessment of 
damages for the above claims. It also did not contain any provisions on other heads of 
damages claimable in personal injury and fatal accident claims. The law relating to the 
assessment of damages for loss of dependency, estate claims and the heads of damages not 
provided for in the Ordinance remained uncodified. Judges had to rely on the Common 
Law principles and decided cases.  
 
The CLA 1956 (rev 1972) 
Section 7 and 8 of the Civil Law Ordinance 1956 were adopted by section 7 and 8 of the 
CLA 1956 (rev 1972).The provisions in section 7 of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) were 
essentially the same as section 7 of the Civil Law Ordinance 1956. They provided for the 
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measure of damages, the persons who can initiate an action, the limitation period, persons 
entitled to the damages as well as the benefits to be received by plaintiff which were to be 
excluded from the assessment of damages under the section. The assessment of damages 
was still based on the Common Law principles and decided cases. Only in respect of 
proviso (i) to section 7(3) and section 7(11), did section 7 of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) 
differed from section 7 of the Civil Law Ordinance 1956. Section 7 of the CLA 1956 (rev 
1972) included paras (b) and (c) to proviso (i) of subsection (3). The new paras excluded 
any sum payable under employees provident fund, pension or gratuity which were, will or 
may be paid as a result of the deceased’s death from being taken into consideration in the 
assessment of loss of dependency. Subsection (11) on the other hand included the 
definition of the term ‘pension’.  
 
The provision in section 8 of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) werealso similar to section 8 of the 
Civil Law Ordinance 1956 except for a few minor substitutions in the wordings. The 
substitutions however did not result in any changes in the application of the section.The 
provisions in the section among others provided for the cause of action andthe list of 
actions which were unavailable to the estate.  
 
The Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1975 
The CLA 1956 (rev 1972) was later amended by the CLAA 1975.  The CLAA 1975 
included para (d) to proviso (i) to section 7(3).
46
 Para (d) excluded any financial benefits 
                                                 
46Section 2 of the CLAA 1975. 
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which were, will or may be paid to the dependants as a result of the deceased’s death from 
being taken into consideration in the assessment of damages for loss of dependency. 
 
The CLAA 1975 also saw section 28A being added to the CLA 1956 (rev 1972).
47
 The 
new section specifically provided for damages in respect of personal injury claims. Similar 
to proviso (i) to section 7(3), section 28A also excluded any sum which were, will or may 
be paid to the plaintiff out of any contract of assurance, insurance, pension, gratuity or any 
compensation received as the result of his injuries from the assessment of damages for 
personal injury claims.
48
Other than the introduction of these new provisions (effects of 
which will be addressed in detail in the next chapters), the assessment of damages for 
personal injury and fatal accident claims remain the same as those in the CLA 1956 (rev 
1972). 
 
The Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984 
In 1984, the Malaysian legislature enacted the CLAA 1984
49
to amend the CLA 1956 (rev 
1972). The amendments introduced by the CLAA 1975 and CLAA 1984 formed the 
current CLA 1956. The CLAA 1984 abrogated several Common Law heads of damages 
such as damages for loss of earnings in lost years,
50
loss of expectation of life,
51
 loss of 
                                                 
47
Section 3 of the CLAA 1975. 
48Which may includes the awards for pain and suffering loss of amenities, loss of expectation of life, loss of pre-trial earnings, loss of 
future earnings and loss of future earning capacity. 
49
The Act adopted several statutory reforms introduced by the English Administration of Justice Act 1982 (cap 53). Hereinafter referred 
to as the AJA 1982. The AJA 1982substituted the Fatal Accident Act 1976 and the Law Reform (Misc Provisions) Act 1934). The new 
Act is the result of  Report No 56 (1973) and Lord Pearson Report (1978, Cmnd 7054) published by the Law Commission and the Royal 
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury. 
50Section 3 of the CLAA 1984. 
51Section 3 and 5 (b) of the CLAA 1984. 
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service of child as well as loss of services and society of wife.
52
The CLAA 1984 also 
introduced and regulated a new head of damages known as bereavement.
53
Other than the 
above, the Act also went one step further  to include several provisions which regulates the 
assessment of damages for loss of dependency and loss of future earnings by amending 
sections 7
54
 and 28A
55
 of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). 
 
The CLAA 1984 has altered many facets of the law on the assessment of damages for 
personal injury and fatal accident claims in Malaysia. Damages for loss of earnings in lost 
years, loss of expectation of life in estate claims, loss of service of child as well as loss of 
service and consortium of wife are no longer available. The damages for loss of 
dependency, estate claims,
56
 loss of future earnings and loss of earning capacity, can still 
be awarded. The assessment for these heads of damages however are regulated by specific 
statutory provisions in sections 7,8 and 28A of the CLA 1956.The award for loss of 
expectation of life in personal injury claims and loss of pre-trial earnings are also still 
available. The damages for these two heads of damages are however lumped into damages 
for pain and suffering and loss of future earnings respectively. The effects of the provisions 
in the CLA 1956 will be addressed in detail in the next chapters. 
  
 
 
                                                 
52Section 2 (a) of the CLAA 1984. 
53Section 2 (a) of the CLAA 1984. 
54Section 2(a) of the CLAA 1984. 
55Section 5(b) of the CLAA 1984. 
56Except for loss of earnings in lost years and loss of expectation of life. 
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2.4 JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
The term discretion has always been associated with the notion of choice. Linguistically, 
discretion stems from the word judgement or good judgement. It later evolves to connote 
personal autonomy in making judgement, assessment or decision.
57
 It is the right of self-
determination which the actor (discretionary holder) possesses as a consequence of the 
responsibility that he has.
58
 It refers to a situation in which an official has latitude to make 
authoritative choice not necessarily specified within the source of authority which governs 
his decision-making.
59
 These choices are not only guided by statutory goals, legal criteria 
but also inescapably the decision-makers value and experiences.
60
  Discretion is not a duty. 
While duty would oblige the actor it to do certain act eventhough the procedures or 
methods to perform that act is not specified, discretion gives the option to the actor to 
decide or act as well as the way the decision or action is to be completed.
61
 
 
2.4.1 Overview of the term ‘judicial discretion’ 
Although many had despaired to give a definite legal definition to the term judicial 
discretion, most had associated it with the power of the law which is given to the judges to 
choose among several alternatives, each of them lawful.
62
 It is to be excised prudently after 
weighing, reflecting, testing, studying and gaining the impression of the many alternatives. 
The term ‘discretion’ when qualified by the word ‘judicial’ carries the notion of judges 
choosing amongst the available alternatives with reference to the rule of law, reasons, 
                                                 
57Galligan, J.D., Discretionary Powers: A Study of Official Discretion, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1992), at 7 
58Hawkins, Keith, ed., The Use of Discretion, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), at 93 
59Atkins, Burton and Mark Pogrebin, ed., The Invisible Justice System: Discretion  & the Law, (Denver: Anderson Publishing, 1978), at 
1. 
60Sossin, Lorne, “Discretion and the Culture of Justice”, (2006) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 356-384, at 357. 
61Abdul Aziz Bari, “Kuasa-Kuasa Budi Bicara, Teori dan Pemakaiannya dalam Undang-Undang Perlembagaan dan Undang-Undang 
Pentadbiran”, (2004) 8 Jurnal Undang-Undang dan Masyarakat, 39-57, at 40. 
62Barak, Aharon, Judicial Discretion, (London : Yale University Press, 1989), at 7. 
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justice and not according to personal whims.
63
  It is where ‘a judge, who has consulted all 
relevant legal materials, is left free by the law to decide one way or another’64 within the 
framework set by the law. The judge is entitled to choose one that appeal to him from the 
various numbers of options. As if the law or the legislature is saying ‘I have determined the 
content of the legal norm up to this point. From there on, it is for you, the judge, to 
determine the content of the legal norm, for I the legal system, am unable to tell you which 
solution to choose.’65 
 
 It is to be noted that discretion only exists when there are more than one right and lawful 
options available to the judge. It does not exist in situations where judge have to choose 
between right and wrong or lawful and unlawful. In these situations, there is a specific 
obligation on the judge to choose the right and lawful option. As such, although the term 
discretion is often defined as the freedom of choice between several options, this definition 
is actually an oversimplification of a term that conveys not only the authority to choose 
between several options but the authority to choose between different options for good 
reasons
66
based on the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties as well as the law, 
legal principles, judicial precedence and norms governing the issue at hand. Therefore, 
although the judge has the discretionary power to decide on something, this power cannot 
be exercise arbitrarily, least it can be struck out by a higher court.  
 
 
                                                 
63Massey, I.P., Administrative Law, 3rd Ed., (Lucknow : Eastern Book Company, 1990), at 55. 
64Greenwalt, K., “Discretion and Judicial Discretion : the Illusive Quest for the Fetter that Bind Judges”, (1975) 75 Columbia Law 
Review, 359 – 399 cited in  Hawkins, Keith, ed., op. cit., at 50. 
65Barak, Aharon, op. cit., at 5. 
66Galligan, J.D., op. cit., at 7. 
53 
 
2.4.2 Judicial Discretion in the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) 
Section 7 and 8 of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972), although provided for damages for loss of 
dependency and estate claims, contained many shortcomings which caused grave concern 
to the legislature. The sections were seen as insufficient, unclear and ambiguous.
67
The 
absence of specific provisions in the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) on the method of assessing 
damages had caused judges to rely on their discretion in meting out suitable damages to the 
claimants. Some of the provisions in the sections were also not properly defined.
68
 
Therefore, questions of how the damages was to be calculated and which principles to be 
applied were left to the discretion of the presiding judge. Although the discretionary power 
exercised by the judges was not absolute, (the assessment must be governed by the facts of 
each case, submissions of the parties, the Common Law principles and decided cases), it 
had caused significant variances and uncertainties in the courts awards. The awards were 
also seen as speculative.
69
 
 
Section 7 – Damages Claimable by Deceased’s Dependants 
Section 7 of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) provided for damages for loss of support. The nature 
of the award caused a lump sum amount being handed over to the dependants of the 
deceased as compensation for what deceased would have given to his dependants in term 
of monetary support had he did not passed away. There were several aspects in the section 
which called for judges to exercise their discretion; 
 
                                                 
67Parliamentary Debates, House of Representative, Sixth Parliament, Second Session, 18th July 1984, at 3318 (Tuan Radzi Sheikh 
Ahmad). 
68Ibid. 
69Ibid.   
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(a) Measure of damages 
Section 7(3) stated: 
in every such action the Court may give such damages as it thinks 
proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties 
respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action is brought: 
(emphasis added) 
The section did not define what amount to ‘loss resulting from such death’. It fell on the 
presiding judge to decide what constituted such loss. The absence of specific interpretation 
of the phrase ‘loss resulting from such death’ was the reason why the Supreme Court in 
Chong Pik Sing & Anor. v Ng Mun Bee & Ors.
70
 had to refer to the decisions in Franklin v 
The South Eastern Ry Co,
71
Taff Vale Ry Co. v Jenkins
72
 and Davies v Powell Duffryn 
Associated Colleries Ltd.
73
to conclusively define what damages was available to the 
deceased dependants under the section. Based on the decisions, the Supreme Court 
concluded that section 7 of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) only provided for injuries capable of 
evaluation in monetary terms. Losses which cannot be assessed in monetary terms such as 
loss of consortium cannot be awarded under the section. This monetary loss was defined as 
“benefit in money or money’s worth arising out of the relationship would have accrued to 
the person for whom the action is brought from the deceased if the deceased had survived 
but has been lost by reason of his death”.74 
 
                                                 
70[1985] 1 MLJ 433. 
71(1858) 157 ER Ex 448. 
72[1913] AC 1. 
73[1942] AC 601. 
74Per Lord DiplockinMalyon v Plummer (1963) 2 All ER 344. 
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(b) Amount of damages 
How the monetary loss was to be assessed was also not provided by the section. Section 
7(3) of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) only provided that court may allow such damages as ‘it 
thinks fit’. The amount of damages and the actual method of assessment which will enable 
the court to arrive at the amount were left to the judge to decide based on the facts of the 
case, submission of the parties, Common Law principles and previously decided cases. 
 
The method generally adopted by the judges was by multiplying the deceased probable 
annual financial contributions (multiplicand) with the length of time in which the 
dependants would be depending on the deceased’s contribution (multiplier). The task of 
arriving at the multiplicand was made easy if there was specific evidence showing 
deceased’s annual contribution. However, in the absence of reliable evidence of actual 
contribution from the deceased, judges had to assess the possible contributions based on 
deceased’s income and employment benefits at the time of death together with 
considerations for positive contingencies,
75
 negative contingencies,
76
 living expenses and 
the number of dependants under deceased’s care.77 
 
The multiplier was assessed based on deceased’s and the dependants’ age at the time of 
deceased demise together with their life expectation. Judges also had to deduct certain 
percentage as deduction for benefits received due to accelerated payment in lump sum and 
contingencies which affected the dependency period. The contingencies included 
remarriage,
78
 prospect of dependents cease to be depending on the deceased
79
 and the 
                                                 
75Probable future increase in earnings, future employment benefits, bonuses, increment etc. 
76Probable demotion, salary decreases, illness etc. 
77See Chan Yoke May v Lian Seng Co. Ltd. (1962) MLJ 243. 
78Prospect or subsequent remarriage of spouse (claim for loss of dependency by spouse). 
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possibility of reduction or cessation of contribution to the dependants’.80The case laws 
were not in uniformity as far as the assessment of multiplier was concerned. The variance 
in the assessment did not help to draw a clear, distinct and authoritative conclusion.
81
 
However, the courts have conventionally used the formula of: 
Retirement age minus actual age at the date of death minus a further one-
third of the difference for contingencies.
82
 
 
Section 8 – Estate Claims 
Section 8 of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972)recognized the cause of action for estate claims 
without specifying how the various heads of damages claimable under estate claims were 
to be assessed by the judge. As such, judges had to use their discretion in assessing the 
same guided by the facts of each case, submissions of the parties, the Common Law 
principles and decided cases. Among the heads of damages claimable under estate claims, 
damages for loss of earning in lost years and loss of expectation of life were where judicial 
discretion was most needed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
79Children attaining the age (claim for loss of support by children) of majority or demise of elderly parent (claim for loss of support by 
parent) 
80Marriage of child (claim for loss of support by parent to unmarried deceased) 
81Dass, K.S., Quantum in Accident Cases. vol. 1, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Law Publishers, 1975), at 977. 
82Dass, S. Santhana, Personal Injury Claims, (Petaling Jaya: Alpha Sigma, 2000) at 120. See also Murtadza bin Mohammed Hassan v 
Chong Swee Pian [1980] 1 MLJ 216. 
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(a) Damages for loss of earning in lost years 
The award for loss of earning in lost years was one of the Common Law heads of damages 
claimable under estate claims. The award for loss of earning in lost years was intended to 
compensate the deceased of possible future earnings in the years of his expected working 
life
83
 which he would have earned had he did not succumb to the injuries. However, since 
deceased had passed away, this award was awarded to his estate. The method of 
assessment was not provided in section 8 of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). Therefore, judges 
had to use their discretion in arriving at a suitable figure by multiplying deceased’s annual 
loss (multiplicand) with his estimated working life lost (multiplier). The multiplicand was 
calculated by deducting deceased’s cost of living plus the cost for providing facilities 
appropriate to attain his standard of life from his prospective net earnings.
84
 The 
calculation multiplier is similar to the assessment of multiplier in ‘loss resulting from such 
death’ above. However, the court will only take into account the age of deceased without 
considering the age of claimant, prospect of remarriage and other factors. 
 
(b) The assessment for loss of expectation of life 
The award for loss of expectation of life was also one of the Common Law heads of 
damages claimable under section 8 CLA 1956 (rev 1972). It was awarded to compensate 
the deceased of the loss of the prospect of living the normal expectation of life. However, 
since the deceased passed away, his estate is entitled to claim the award in his behalf. The 
most difficult task which befalls on the judges was to determine whether deceased would 
have lead a happy life but for the injury and what were the considerations to be taken into 
                                                 
83Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., (1993), at 563. 
84Dass, K.S., Quantum in Accident Claims, vol. 3, (Kuala Lumpur: Asian Book Co. Sdn. Bhd., 1984), at 406. 
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account in the assessment. Various factors such as age,
85
lifestyle, earning capacity, family 
background, social standing
86
 and health
87
were taken into consideration. Since there was 
no specific rules to calculate the life’s expectation, judges normally awarded damages 
within the range from RM 3500 to RM 6000.
88
 The difficulty in assessing loss of 
expectation of life was commented by Cussen J in Lok Yin v Pat Thoo
89
 where he said: 
“I turn now to deal with the second head of claim – the claim for what 
been termed as ‘loss of expectation of life’. The amount to be given under 
this head is a matter of great difficulty – it cannot be arrived at by any 
method of calculation on real data such as I have employed when 
assessing damages under the first claim… Our law is identical with the 
corresponding English Act – the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1934. Section 4 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937 is the same section 
1 of the English Act. It is therefore proper for me to seek for assistance 
and guidance in the decisions of the English Courts in this question.” 
 
 
 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Section 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956are not the first attempt by the Malaysian legislature 
to regulate the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims. The 
                                                 
85See Trubyfield v G.W. Ry. Co. (1937) 4 All ER 614 where the court considered the age difference between the deceased in this case 
and Rose v Ford. 
86 See Burns v Edman (1970) 2 QB 541 where it was held that the life of a criminal might not be a happy one. 
87 See Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd, op. cit. where the plaintiff who was suffering from lung cancer was awarded £750 for loss 
of expectation of life. 
88 Syed Ahmad Alsagof, The Law of Tort in Malaysia and the Syari’ah, (Gombak, Syed Ahmad  S A Alsagof, 2004),  at 249. 
89(1948) 1 MLJ 26. 
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provision in sections 3 and 4 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937, sections 3 and 4 of the 
Civil Law Ordinance 1956 as well as sections 7 and 8 of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) already 
contained some form of statutory guidelines for judges in assessing damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims albeit not as extensive as the ones in section 7, 8 and 28A 
of the CLA 1956. The specific statutory provisions and conditions introduced by the 1984 
amendments unfortunately are a huge departure to the long accepted practices in assessing 
the damages. The amendments abolished several Common Law heads of damages while 
the assessment of many others is subjected to specific requirements and conditions. A 
majority of the requirements and conditions introduced by the CLAA 1984 have no 
Common Law or statutory origin. 
 
As a result, there are some who ventured to oppose and criticize the current CLA 1956. 
One of their main contentions was that the statutory reform introduced by the CLA 1956 is 
an attempt by the legislature to fetter the exercise of judicial discretion in personal injury 
cases. There were also opinions saying that the CLA 1956 had greatly reduced the amount 
of damages to be awarded by the courts in personal injury and fatal accident claims. The 
following chapters will discuss in detail whether there is any truth in these allegations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EFFECTS OF THE CLA 1956 ON JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
AND THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY 
CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents are claims for 
compensation (damages) for “hurt or damage done to a man’s person, such as a cut or 
bruise, a broken limb, or the like”1 which was caused by the accident. The cause of 
action for these claims arises when the negligent act or omission of the driver of the 
vehicle at fault causes injury and loss to the claimant. The injury or loss can be physical 
or psychological. The damages ranges from damages for pain and suffering due to 
physical injuries, loss of amenities, loss of expectation of life, loss of earning during the 
period of recovery, expenses and cost incurred, loss of consortium, loss of future 
earnings and loss of future earning capacity. In Malaysia, the only statutory provision 
which provides for the assessment of damages for personal injury claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents is section 28A of the Civil Law Act 1956.
2
In fact, the section is 
the only statutory provision which provides for the assessment of damages for personal 
injury claim in all type of cases.  In addition to this section, judges are also governed by 
the Common Law principles and decided cases.  
 
Historically, prior to the introduction of section 28A of the CLA 1956, there was no 
statutory provision providing for the assessment of damages for personal injury claims 
                                                 
1
Garner, Brian A., ed., “Black Law Dictionary”, 9th ed., (Minnesota: West Publishing, 2009)   
2(Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1956”. 
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in Malaysia. The assessment of damages was based on the Common Law principles 
and decided cases. Only in 1975 that our legislature saw it fit to introduce section 28A 
into the Civil Law Act 1956 (rev 1972)
3
 vide the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1975 
(Act A308).
4
 Section 3 of the CLAA 1975 lists down the compensation benefits 
received or to be received by the claimant which cannot be taken into consideration in 
assessing damages for personal injury claims.   
 
In 1984, more provisions were introduced to regulate the assessment of damages for 
personal injury claims. Section 5 of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984
5
 adds more 
provisions to section 28A of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). The section contains specific 
provisions on the assessment of damages for loss of expectation of life in personal 
injury claims and loss of future earnings. Despite the absence of specific wording, the 
section is also said to have indirectly affected the assessment of damages for pain and 
suffering, loss of pre-trial earnings and loss of future earning capacity.  
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to analyze whether section 28A of the CLA 1956 
have abolish or fetter the exercise of judicial discretion in personal injury claims arising 
out of motor vehicle accidents. It also endeavors to analyze whether the abolition or 
restriction (if any) imposed by the section have any effect in reducing the amount of 
damages being awarded by the courts in this type of claims. Therefore, the cases cited 
are confined to cases involving motor vehicle accidents only.
6
The above analyses are 
crucial in the attempt to answer the question of whether the CLA 1956 have indeed 
                                                 
3 (Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1956 (rev 1972)”. 
4 (Act A308)Hereinafter referred to as “the CLAA 1975”. The amendments are consolidated into the CLA 1956 (rev 1972).  
5(Act A 602). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLAA 1984”. The amendments are consolidated into the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). The 
amended Act is the current CLA 1956. 
6However, personal injury claims arising out of other cause of action are also cited occasionally due to their relevancy to the 
discussion at hand. 
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fettered judges’ discretionary power in its effort to reduce the amount of damages being 
meted out by the courts as alleged by many writers.  
 
Rather than discussing the assessment of damages for all individual heads of damages 
claimable under personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accident, this 
chapter only discusses the heads of damages which are regulated by the provisions in 
the CLA 1956. The heads of damages which are not regulated by the CLA 1956 are not 
discussed since they are still governed by the Common Law principles and decided 
cases.
7
 
 
Throughout the discussion in this chapter, should always be borne in mind that the term 
‘discretion’ used does not refer to judges assessing damages arbitrarily or according to 
their whim and fancies. The term ‘discretion’ refers to the fact that in assessing the 
amount of damages for personal injury judges have to factor in various elements 
including the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties as well as the law, legal 
principles, judicial precedence and norms governing the issue at hand judiciously. 
Since there is no mechanical, scientific
8
 or precise way of arriving at the amount of 
damages to be awarded, judges have to apply their own reasoning in arriving at an 
amount which is just and reasonable to the litigants. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7The assessment of damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities, claim for expenses incurred / will be incurred in the 
future and claim for property damages are not discussed. 
8Haslifah Hashim and Massita Mohamad, “Factors in Estimating Compensation in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death using 
Actuarial Approach”, 2011 International Conference on Financial Management and Economics, 2-3 July 2011, (Singapore: 
IACSIT Press, 2011), 334 -337, at 334. 
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3.2 ABOLISHING THE AWARD FOR LOSS OF EXPECTATION 
OF LIFE 
Loss of expectation of life is the loss of “prospect of an enjoyable, vigorous and happy 
old age”.9 Damages under this heading is awarded to compensate plaintiff’s suffering 
due to his awareness that his enjoyment of life and the number of years in which he 
would be able to enjoy his life had been diminished because of the injuries suffered.
10
 
The measure of damages is not the length of life which is lost, but the prospective 
happiness
11
 which is lost due to the injuries.
12
 
 
Historically, loss of expectation of life was not recognized as an independent head of 
damages in personal injury claims. The loss was assessed together with the assessment 
for pain and suffering. The first recognition for loss of expectation of life as an 
independent head of damages was given in Flint v Lovell.
13
 The decision was later 
reinforced by the decision in Rose v Ford.
14
Both Flint v Lovell
15
 and Rose v 
Ford
16however only recognize plaintiff’s right to claim damages loss of expectation of 
life in personal injury and fatal accident claims as an independent head of damages 
separate from damages for pain and suffering. They did not provide the method in 
which the loss is supposed to be assessed. There was also no statutory provision in 
respect of this head of damages. The assessment of damages under this head was 
developed by the case laws over the years. Judges have the discretion in deciding 
whether plaintiff was entitled to the award and the amount of damages to be awarded. 
                                                 
9Flint v Lovell (1935) 1 KB 354 (CA). 
10Lim, Heng Seng, Assessment of Damages in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Claims: Principles and Practices, (Kuala 
Lumpur: Marsden Law Book, 1995), at 78. 
11Benham v Gambling (1941) AC 157. 
12
Lord Wright in Rose v Ford (1937) AC 826 held; “A man has a legal right to his own life. I think he has a legal interest entitling 
him to complain if the integrity of his life is impaired by tortuous acts, not only in regard to pain and suffering and disability, but 
also in regard to the continuance of life for its normal expectancy. A man has a legal right that his life should not be shortened by 
the tortuous act of another. His normal expectancy of life is a thing of temporal value, so that its impairment is something for which 
damages should be given.” 
13Op. cit. In this case, a 69 years old plaintiff was awarded £4,400 to compensate the shortening of his life in view of the evidence 
given by his doctors that he would probably be dead within one year after the accident. 
14Op cit. The court allowed damages for loss of expectation of life as a separate head of damages under estate claims. 
15Op. cit. 
16Op. cit. 
64 
 
Generally, plaintiff’s age, family background, lifestyle, earning capacity, social 
standing and health were some of the considerations adopted by the judges in arriving 
at the monetary equivalence to the loss of plaintiff’s happy and fulfilled life.17Since 
there was not specific method of assessment, judges sometimes found it difficult to 
assess the loss. This fact was acknowledged by Viscount Simon LC in Benham v 
Gambling;
18
 
 “Such problem might seem more suitable for discussion in an essay on 
Aristotelian ethics than in the court of law” 
 
The statutory provision on the award for loss of expectation of life in England was 
introduced in 1983
19
 by section 1(1)(a) of the Administration of Justice Act 
1982.
20
However, rather than providing for the method for assessing the damages, the 
section abolishes the award altogether. Therefore, damages for loss of expectation of 
life for living plaintiff in personal injury claims can no longer be awarded in England.
21
 
 
Prior to 1984, there was no statutory provision governing the award for loss of 
expectation of life in Malaysia. The cause of action and the assessment of damages for 
this head of damages were adopted from the Common Law principles and decided 
cases. As such, the Malaysian judges also faced the same problem faced by the English 
judges in determining what constitute happy life and whether plaintiff would have 
enjoyed a happy life but for the injuries suffered. 
 
                                                 
17Verupillai, Jeyaratnam, Damages: Loss of Expectation of Life Survival and Deductibility, (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal, 
1984), at 10. 
18Op. cit. 
19Rutter, Michael F., Handbook on Damages for Personal Injury and Death in Singapore and Malaysia, 2nd ed., (Hong Kong: 
Butterworth, 1993), at 350. 
20 Hereinafter referred to as the AJA 1982 
21Rutter, Michael F., loc. cit. 
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The statutory provision relating to damages for loss of expectation of life in Malaysia 
was introduced by the CLAA 1984. Section 5(b) of the CLAA 1984 inserts subsection 
(2) to section 28A of the CLA 1956(rev 1972).
22
Since the head note to the section 
specifically states ‘damages in respect of personal injury’, the section operates only in 
respect of damages for loss of expectation of life for living plaintiff in personal injury 
claims. Section 28A (2)(a) and (b) of the CLA 1956 is an exact copy of section 1(1)(a) 
of the AJA 1982. It reads; 
(2) In assessing damages under this section –  
(a) no damage shall be recoverable in respect of any loss of 
expectation of life caused to the plaintiffs by the injury; (emphasis 
added) 
(b) if the plaintiff’s expectation of life has been reduced by the injury, 
the Court, in assessing damages in respect of pain and suffering 
caused by the injury, shall take into account any suffering caused 
or likely to be caused by awareness that his expectation of life 
has been so reduced; (emphasis added) 
 
The effects of para (a) to the section is very clear. It abolishes the award for loss of 
expectation of life from the list of damages claimable under personal injury claims in 
Malaysia. By virtue of this section, judges’ discretion in respect of awarding and 
assessing damages for loss of expectation of life in personal injury claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents is also abolished. Judges presiding over motor vehicle accident 
claim cases no longer have the discretion to decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to 
damages under this heading. Similarly, judges’ discretion assessing what constitutes a 
happy life, whether plaintiff would lead a happy life had he did not suffered the injuries 
                                                 
22The amended section now becomes section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956. 
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and what amount would reasonably be sufficient to compensate plaintiff’s suffering for 
the loss of a happy life is also abolished.  
  
Further, since the award for loss of expectation of life can no longer be awarded in 
personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents, it follows that the 
quantum of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff in this type of claim will also be 
reduced. By abolishing the award for loss of expectation of life from the list of awards 
claimable under personal injury claims, the section have taken away a portion of the 
total quantum of damages which initially available to the plaintiff under personal injury 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. 
 
However, despite the effects highlighted above, an analysis of the section further 
reveals that the effects of section are not as clear cut. The following points shows that 
section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956 have very minimal effect on the exercise of judicial 
discretion and the quantum of damages in personal injury claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents. 
 
3.2.1 Para (b) to the Section Allows for Loss of Expectation of Life  
The effect of para (a) on the award for loss of expectation of life is negated by para (b) 
of the section. Para (b) allows judges to compensate the plaintiff for the anguish 
suffered by him due to his awareness that his life expectancy had been reduced. Judges 
can award any amount which they consider reasonable to compensate the plaintiff for 
his suffering provided that the amount is assessed together with damages for pain and 
suffering caused by the injury and plaintiff is aware that his life expectation has been 
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diminished or reduced due to the injuries.
23
Since para (b) allows judges to award 
damages for loss of expectation of life (albeit being lumped together with damages for 
pain and suffering), the notion that judges’ discretionary power in awarding damages 
for loss of expectation of life in personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle 
accidents is abolished by section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956 is incorrect. The section 
merely abolishes the award for loss of expectation of life as an independent head of 
damages claimable under personal injury claims.
24
 It neither abolishes the award 
altogether nor does it abolishes the discretionary power of the judges to award the 
same.  
 
In addition to returning the discretionary power to award damages for loss of 
expectation of life in personal injury claims to the judges, para (b) seems to further 
intensify the need for such discretion in assessing the damages under this heading. 
Although the para allows judges to assess damages to compensate plaintiff’s suffering 
due to his awareness that his life expectation has been reduced together with damages 
for pain and suffering caused by the injury, it does not specify how the quantum is to be 
assessed. Section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956 does not provide the method for assessing 
the quantum of damages for either plaintiff’s pain and suffering caused by the injury25 
or the suffering due to his awareness that the life expectancy has been reduced, the need 
for judicial discretion is the assessment of damages to be awarded under the section is 
even more apparent when the two (2) set of damages are to be assessed together.  
 
                                                 
23Plaintiff must be compos mantis after the injury. Plaintiff who is in coma after the injury is not entitled to damages for loss of 
expectation of life. 
24Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at  349. 
25 In assessing damages for pain and suffering, the amount of damages to be awarded for injury to different part of the body and any 
resulting disabilities is almost entirely set by the judges without any legislative assistance. All the plaintiff need to do is to produce 
the proof of injuries verifiable by a medical expert either by way of factual description or opinion, and leave it to the judges to 
decide on quantum. Judges will take into consideration the gravity of injuries and disabilities, overlapping, age, state of health, 
income and prospect in life in deciding the quantum for his head of damages. 
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Section 28A (2)(b) of the CLA 1956re-established the method of assessing damages for 
loss of expectation of life in personal injury claims prior to Flint v Lovell
26
 and Rose v 
Ford.
27
The damages for loss of expectation of life is assessed together with damages 
for pain and suffering
28
 and judges have the discretion in assessing the quantum to be 
awarded.  
 
3.2.2 Minimal Effect of Para (a)  
Para (a) to the section also have minimal effect on the quantum of damages awarded in 
personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. This is primarily due to 
the fact that this head of damages is very rarely awarded. Although the award is 
claimable, there seems to be “an absence of claim for such loss of expectation of life to 
a living plaintiff in Malaysia”.29 The list of cases considered in Mallal’s ‘Digest of 
Malaysia and Singaporean Case Law’ also gives the impression that this head of 
damages is not generally awarded in personal injury claims in Malaysia. The same 
result was reached by J. Verupillai in his book. The researcher’s perusal of the 
collection of cases cited by Nasser Hamid in his Road Accident Citator,
30
  the cases 
reported in the Malayan Law Journal, the Current Law Journal and the Personal Injury 
Report archives also reveals that the award for loss of expectation of life was generally 
awarded in estate claims only. This fact was noted by the court in Lee Ann v Mohamed 
Sahari bin Zakaria,
31
 where Peh Swee Chin J commented;  
                                                 
26Op. cit. 
27Op. cit. 
28Rutter, Michael F.,op cit., at 347. 
29
Syed Ahmad Alsagoff, The Law of Tort in Malaysia and Syariah, (Gombak: Syed Ahmad S A Alsagoff, 2004), at 224.  See also 
Verupillai, Jeyaratnam, “Loss of expectation of Life and the Living Plaintiff”, (1982) 1 Malayan Law Journal, lxix – lxx, at lxix 
and Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at 350. 
30
Nasser Hamid and Hamid Ibrahim, eds., Road Accident Citator, (Petaling Jaya: Gavel Publications, 2007). 
31[1987] 1 MLJ 285. 
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“Curiously, the plaintiff, a living person made a rather unusual claim for 
damages for los of expectation of life which are almost invariably claimed 
for the estate of a deceased person.” 
 
J. Verupillai in his article opined that the rarity of damages for loss of expectation of 
life awarded under personal injury claims was probably due to the past practices of 
awarding general damages under a global figure.
32
Damages for loss of expectation of 
life was awarded together with other general damages such as pain and suffering His 
opinion was derived from decisions in Ti Huck &Anor. V Mohamed Yusof
33
 and Mat 
Desa bin Salleh v Ang Hock Lee & Anor.
34
 In these two (2) cases, the courts omitted to 
award damages for loss of expectation of life despite awarding damages for pain and 
suffering. J. Verupillai concluded that these cases are clear examples of the judges’ 
inclination to award damages for loss of expectation of life as part of the assessment for 
the damages for pain and suffering. 
 
The researcher however humbly submits that J. Verupillai’s opinion above is arguable. 
There is nothing in either Ti Huck & Anor. V Mohamed Yusof
35
and Mat Desa bin 
Salleh v Ang Hock Lee & Anor.
36
which indicate that judges in these cases intended to 
include the damages for loss of expectation of life in the assessment of damages for 
pain and suffering. Since there is a general practice of itemizing the heads of damages 
to be awarded even then, the judges would have itemized the damages for loss of 
expectation of life as a separate head had they intended to award it to the plaintiff. The 
absence of which supports the notion that judges, even prior to the introduction of 
                                                 
32
Verupillai, Jeyaratnam, op. cit., (1982), at lxix. 
33[1973] 2 MLJ 244. 
34[1979] 1 MLJ 62. 
35Op. cit. 
36Op. cit. 
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section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956, were not in the habit of awarding damages for loss of 
expectation of life in personal injury claims. 
 
Even in the rare cases where the courts had allowed damages for loss of expectation of 
life in personal injury claims, the amount of damages awarded was very minimal. It had 
been judicially accepted that that the award for loss of expectation of life should be a 
modest figure after taking into consideration the personal circumstances and age of the 
plaintiff.
37
. The judge Lee Ann v Mohamed Sahari bin Zakaria,
38
 for example 
considered RM 4000 as the ‘conventional figure’ in such a claim.39 
 
Considering the facts that damages for loss of expectation of life was rarely awarded 
under personal injury claims and the nominal value of the damages (in the rare case it 
was awarded), the introduction of section 28A (2)(a) of the CLA 1956 therefore has 
minimal effect in reducing the quantum of damages in personal injury claims arising 
out of motor vehicle accidents. 
 
 
3.3 ABOLISHING THE AWARD FOR LOSS OF PRE-TRIAL 
EARNINGS 
The cause of action for loss of pre-trial earnings arises when plaintiff who was injured 
by the tortfeasor’s negligent act is deprived of his income throughout the period of his 
disability.
40
In motor vehicle accident claims, the damages for loss of pre-trial earnings 
                                                 
37Lim, Heng Seng, op. cit., at 78.  
38Op. cit. 
39
The judge however awarded half of this figure considering that plaintiff was ninety (90) years old. 
40It falls under special damages since it is quantifiable based on plaintiff’s pre-injury income and the period in which he was unable 
to work up to the date of trial. 
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is awarded to the plaintiff to compensate him for the loss of his income caused by his 
inability to earn that income due to the injuries suffered during the accident. The 
assessment of damages is calculated by multiplying plaintiff’s income at the time of 
injury with the period of disability.
41
The period of disability starts from the date of 
injury to the date in which the plaintiff is able to resume his employment and able to 
earn
42
 or the date of trial.
43Plaintiff’s income is assessed deducting the amount payable 
for income-tax (if any) and expenses spent in earning that income
44
 from the  his total 
earning at the time of injury (which includes full or partial salary, business profit, 
increment, fringe benefits and any other source of income which contributes to his 
earnings)
45
Although the CLA 1956 does not contain any provision recognizing loss of 
pre-trail earnings as part of damages claimable under personal injury claims, it is 
recognized by the Common Law. Therefore, judges have the power to award damages 
for loss of pre-trial earnings in personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle 
accidents. 
 
Section 5(b) of the CLAA 1984 introduced section 28 (2)(d) to the CLA 1956 (rev 
1972).
46
Section 28A (2)(d) of the CLA 1956 provides; 
(d) In assessing damages for loss of future earnings the Court shall take 
into account that- 
(i) in the case of a person who was at the age of thirty years or 
below at the time when he was injured, the number of years’ 
purchase shall be 16; and 
                                                 
41Length of time in which he is unable to earn that income. 
42Applicable if plaintiff recovers and able to resume employment. 
43 Applicable if plaintiff is unable to resume incapacitate indefinitely and unable to resume employment. 
44Ibid. 
45Rutter, Michael F. op cit., at 112. 
46The amended section now becomes section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956. 
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(ii) in the case of any other person who was of the age range 
extending between thirty –one years and fifty-four years at the 
time when he was injured, the number of years’ purchase shall 
be calculated by using the figure fifty five (55), minus the age 
of the person at the time when he was injured and dividing 
the remainder by the figure 2.(emphasis added) 
 
Although literally, the section provides for the assessment of multiplier for loss of 
future earnings,
47
 the application of the section has the effect of abolishing damages for 
loss of pre-trail earnings from the list of damages claimable in personal injury claims.  
 
Prior to the CLAA 1984, the demarcation line between the multiplier for loss of pre-
trail earnings and the multiplier for loss of future earnings was very clear. The 
multiplier for loss of pre-trial earnings was calculated from the date of injury while the 
multiplier for loss of future earnings was assessed from the date of trial. The 
introduction of section 28A (2)(d) of the CLA 1956 has abolished this demarcation 
line. Since the section states that the assessment for the multiplier for loss of future 
earnings is to starts from the date of injury, it seems that the awards for loss of pre-trial 
earnings has merged into the award for loss of future earnings. Thus, abolishing the 
award for loss of pre-trial earnings in personal injury claims. This interpretation was 
adopted by K. C. Vohrah J in Nagarajan a/l Veerapan v Ananthan a/l ParamaSivam;
48
 
“Pre-trial loss of earnings for claims arising under the pre-amendment law 
were and may be claimed as special damages calculated from date of 
accident and date of trial. The provision of section 28A, made in 1984, 
                                                 
47Also known as post-trial loss of earnings. 
48[1989] 2 CLJ 1243. See also  decision by Abdul Malik Ishak J in Mohd Yusof Abdul Ghani v Tee Song Kee & Anor [1995]  3 CLJ 
738 and by KN Segara in Tan Swee Tiong v Khor Chin Hau [2002] 1 CLJ 486. 
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make no mention of this head of damages; and all relevant provisions for 
the purpose of calculating loss of future earnings refer to the age at the 
date of accident and not the age at the date of trial as the figure. It seems to 
me therefore that there can be no separate head for pre-trial loss.’ 
 
Similar sentiment was echoed in Dirkje Peiternella Halma v Muhd Noor bin Baharom 
& Ors.
49
The Supreme Court set aside the award for loss of pre-trial earnings which had 
been agreed upon by the parties and allowed the claim for loss of future earning 
capacity. The multiplier for the damages for loss of future earnings capacity was 
calculated from the date of the accident. Gun Chit Tuan SCJ held; 
“Counsel for the respondents submitted that the first issue to be considered 
by the court was the meaning of ‘future earnings’ in section 28A (2)(c). 
He also agreed with the view expressed by us in the Court that the 
previous distinction between pre-trial (past) and post-trial (future) loss of 
earnings is no longer applicable since the coming into force of the Civil 
Law (Amendment) Act 1984 on Oct 1984.” 
 
Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar in his article
50
also agrees with the notion that the 
award for loss of pre-trial earnings is abolished by section 28A (2) (d) of the CLA 
1956. He opined that that maintaining loss of pre-trial earnings and loss of future 
earnings as two separate heads of damages serves more academic importance rather 
than practical one. He argued that the only material difference between these two (2) 
                                                 
49[1990] 3 MLJ 103. 
50 Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, “Damages for loss of Earnings in Malaysia: the Need for a ‘Just’ Multiplier”, [2003] 3 
Malayan Law Journal, lxxxi – xcvi.  
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awards is the assessment of interest for the awards.
51
 Other than that, separating the two 
awards serves no practical purpose.  
 
Despite the above, it is humbly submitted that further analysis of section 28A (2)(d) of 
the CLA 1984 and recent cases shows a different interpretation of the section can be 
reached; that section 28A (2)(d) of the CLA 1956 does not in any way abolish the 
award for loss of pre-trial earnings. This interpretation is reached by applying the 
following reasoning; 
 
 
3.3.1 Dividing the Multiplier for Loss of Future Earnings 
There is nothing in section 28A (2)(d) of the CLA 1956 that specifies for the award for 
loss of pre-trial earnings to be abolished. In fact, there were several post 1984 cases 
which still allow loss of pre-trial earnings to be awarded. The courts in Asiah bte 
Kamsah v Dr Rajinder Singh & Ors.,
52
N Vijaya Kumar v Voon Chen Lim
53
and Soton 
Bili & Anor. V Khajijah Led & Ors.
54
managed to award damages for loss of pre-trial 
earnings along with damages for loss of future earnings while still adhering to the 
assessment of multiplier specified in section 28A(2)(d) of the CLA 1956. Such 
approach is possible by assessing the multiplier for loss of future earnings according to 
either para (d)(i) or para (d) (ii) to the section and dividing the it into two parts (the pre-
trial period and post-trial period). The two multipliers are then multiplied with suitable 
multiplicands for both heads of damages. By adopting this method, the award for loss 
                                                 
51Since pre-trial losses are awarded with interest while post- trial losses are not, merging both awards as loss of future earnings 
would be an injustice to the plaintiff. It will deprive him of the interest for damages for loss of pre-trial earnings. See Chang Chong 
Foo v Shivanathan [1992] 2 MLJ 473. 
52[2002] 1 MLJ 484. 
53[1989] 3 MLJ 255. 
54[2008] 9 CLJ 304. 
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of pre-trial earnings can still be awarded under section 28A (2)(d) of the CLA 1956 as a 
separate head of damages in personal injury claims. 
 
It should be noted that there is nothing in the section which prevent judges from 
adopting the above method. Maintaining the award for pre-trial loss of earnings by 
dividing the multiplier for loss of future earning into two parts does not in any way 
derogate the intention of the legislature to regulate the assessment of multiplier for loss 
of future earnings. Since the division between pre-trial loss and post-trial loss is made 
after the multiplier had been assessed, multiplier will remain as prescribed by the 
section only apportioned into pre-trial loss and future loss.  
 
 
3.3.2 Different Methods of Assessment  
The notion that the award for loss of pre-trail earnings is merged with the award for 
loss of future earnings is also made impossible by the different method of assessing the 
damages for these two heads of damages. The assessment of multiplicand and 
multiplier for the awards is completely different. While the former is capable of precise 
calculation, the latter is a hypothetical figure calculated after taking into consideration 
plaintiff’s earning projected future earnings and fringe benefits, retirement age, type of 
employment, health, education and social background, financial encumbrances, 
contingencies etc.  
 
Apart from the above, the fact that damages for loss of pre-trial earnings is recoverable 
without any deductions for negative contingencies, accelerated payment, receiving the 
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money lump-sum or investment value should the money is invested
55
makes the 
multiplicand under this head of damages slightly higher than those of loss of future 
earnings.  In fact, the courts had been very cautious in the assessment for pre-trial 
earnings since it may involve a substantial amount of damages and the risk of plaintiff 
delaying filing the claim in order to accumulate more pre-trial interest.
56
As such, to 
merge the assessment of damages for loss of pre-trial earnings with damages for loss of 
future earnings would be an injustice to the plaintiff since it would not only deprive 
him of the pre-trial interest on the pre-trial earnings, it would also deprive him of the 
multiplicand which he would have received as damages for loss pre-trial earnings. 
 
It is therefore concluded that section 28A (2)(d) of the CLA 1956 does not abolish the 
award for loss of pre-trial earnings. Judges still have the discretion to allow and assess 
damages for loss of pre-trial earnings provided that the assessment of multiplier both 
loss of pre-trial earnings and loss of future earnings are within the fixed multiplier 
provided in section28A(2)(d) of the CLA 1956. Further, since the award for loss of pre-
trial earnings can still be awarded albeit the need to deduct its multiplier out of the 
multiplier for loss of future earnings, section 28A(2)(d) of the CLA 1956 therefore has 
no effect on the amount of damages being awarded for loss of pre-trial earnings in 
personal injury claims. The same conclusions can also be extended in respect of 
personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55Rutter, Michael F., op cit., at 229. The multiplicand for loss of future earnings must be assessed by making suitable deductions for 
living expenses. The reductions for negative contingencies, accelerated payment, receiving the money lump-sum and investment 
value should the money is invested are also made. These reductions had been configured into the fixed multiplier in section 
28A(2)(d) of the CLA 1956. 
56Id., at 230. 
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3.4 INTRODUCING PRE-CONDITIONS FOR THE AWARD FOR 
LOSS OF FUTURE EARNINGS. 
The cause of action for loss of future earnings arises when the torfeasor’s negligent act 
caused injuries to the plaintiff to the extent that he is no longer able to work or even if 
he is able to work, unable to earn the same amount of income he expects to receive in 
the future had he did not suffer the injuries. The award is to compensate the plaintiff for 
the loss of his prospective earnings within the remaining of his working years which he 
will be deprived of. In motor vehicle accidents, the award for loss of future earnings is 
awarded to the plaintiff when the injuries and disabilities caused by the accident render 
him incapable of earnings or incapable of earning the same income he was earning 
prior to the accident indefinitely.  
 
Prior to the CLAA 1984, there is no statutory provision in Malaysia providing for the 
assessment of damages for loss of future earnings. The assessment for this head of 
damages was left at the discretion of the judges guided by the Common Law principles 
and decided cases. Judges have to make an estimation of the amount of damages to be 
awarded since the plaintiff’s future earnings are uncertain and cannot be arithmetically 
calculated with precision. The imprecision in the assessment was highlighted by Lord 
Reid in British Transport Commission v Gourley
57
; 
“If he had not been injured, he would have had the prospect of earning a 
continuing income, it may be, for many years, but there can be no 
certainty as to what would have happened. In many cases the amount of 
income maybe doubtful, even if he had remained in good health, and there 
is always the possibility that he might have died or suffered from some 
incapacity at any time. 
                                                 
57(1956) AC 185. See also Ngui Kee Siong v Guan Soo Swee & Anor. [1970] 2 MLJ 48. 
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The loss which he had suffered between the date of trial may be certain, 
but this prospective loss is not. Yet damages must be assessed as a lump 
sum once and for all, not only in respect of loss accrued before the trial but 
also in respect of prospective loss. Such damages can only be an estimate, 
often a very rough estimate of the present value of his prospective loss.” 
 
Section 5 of the CLAA 1984 introduced a new provision to section 28A of the CLA 
1956 (rev 1972). The new section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 reads; 
(c) in awarding damages for loss of future earnings the Court shall take 
into account- 
(i) that in the case of a plaintiff who has attained the age of fifty 
five years or above at the time when he was injured, no 
damages for such loss shall be awarded; and in any other 
case, damages for such loss shall not be awarded unless it is 
proved or admitted that plaintiff was in good health but for the 
injury and was receiving earnings by his own labour or any 
other gainful activity before he was injured;(emphasis added) 
 
The new provision made it compulsory for judges to satisfy themselves that the 
plaintiff is below the age of fifty five (55) years old at the date of injury, in good health 
but for the injury and was earning income prior to the injury before any damages for 
loss of future earnings under section 28A (2)(c) of the CLA 1956 can be awarded. The 
section has no equivalent provision in the AJA 1982.
58
 Unlike in Malaysia, Judges in 
                                                 
58
Reiss in his article commented “While the English Parliament felt it is best not to disturb the method being practiced by the 
courts in the assessment of this head of damages, the Malaysian Parliament believe that continued exercise of judicial discretion in 
this respect is responsible for uncertain and inflated awards.” Reiss, Seth M., “Quantum for Future Loss in Personal Injury and 
Fatal Accident Cases After the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984”, (1985), 2 Malayan Law Journal lxii – lxxi, at lxiv. 
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England have the discretion in respect of the factors to be considered in awarding 
damages for loss of future earnings. 
 
In order to analyse the effects of section 28(2)(c) of the CLA 1956 on judges’ 
discretionary power and the quantum of damages in personal injury claims arising out 
of motor vehicle accidents, the section is broken into three (3) parts; 
 
 
3.4.1 Condition (i): Below Fifty Five (55) Years Old 
Prior to the CLAA 1984, judges in Malaysia had a wide discretion to determine the 
maximum working age in which plaintiff can be compensated for loss of future 
earnings. There was no absolute maximum period limiting plaintiff’s working life. The 
calculation of plaintiff’s maximum working life depended on the nature of his 
employment, education, age, individual lifestyle, health and financial encumbrances. 
Although the retirement age is often held at fifty five (55) years old,
59
 judges were at 
liberty to allow the award for loss of future earnings to plaintiff who had passed this 
age should there be evidence to show that he was indeed working, capable of working 
or required to work beyond the normal retiring age of fifty five (55).
60
 
 
Section 28A (2)(c)(i)of the CLA 1956 statutorily adopt fifty five (55) years old as the 
maximum working life in the assessment of loss of future earnings.
61
Fifty five (55) 
                                                                                                                                              
 
59See Murtadza bin Mohamed Hassan v Chong Swee Pian [1980] 1 MLJ 216, Lai Wee Lian v Singapore Bus Service [1984] 1 MLJ 
325 and RJ Mc Guiness v Ahmad Zaini [1980] 2 MLJ 304. 
60Balan, P.,“Damages for Personal Injuries Causing Death: A Critical Survey”, (2004) Journal of Malaysian and Comparative Law, 
45 – 67, at 46.In Weng Kong v Yee Hup Transport Co. & Ors.[1966] 2 MLJ 234, the court adopted sixty five (65) years old as 
working age and awarded damages for loss of future earnings to a fifty five (55) years old plaintiff. Similarly, in Chinnakaruppan v 
Abdul Wahab bin Ahmad (Unreported) cited in Dass, K.S., Quantum in Accident Cases, vol. 1, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Law 
Publishers, 1975), at 30, plaintiff who was more than seventy (70) years old was awarded damages for loss of future earnings when 
he managed to prove that he was working as a gardener at the time of injury. 
61Lim, Heng Seng, op. cit., at 151. 
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years old is considered as the cut-off age for the award for loss of future earnings.  By 
virtue of this provision, judges no longer have the discretion to award damages for loss 
of future earnings for plaintiff who had attained or passed the age of fifty five (55) 
years old at the time of injury irrespective of whether thehewas working or capable of 
working beyond that age. The plaintiff in Tan bin Hairuddin v Bayeh a/l Belalat
62
 for 
example was denied claim for loss of future earning on account of him being fifty five 
(55) years old at the time of injury. The judge in this case held; 
“My opinion is that section 28A(2)(c) of the Civil Law Act 1956 is clear 
that a person age 55 or more at the time of injury was sustained cannot be 
awarded any damages for the loss of future earnings. The important date 
in the said provision is the date of injury and on that date the respondent / 
plaintiff was already more than 55 years old.” 
 
The cut-off age sometimes can lead to injustice to the plaintiff. In situations where 
plaintiff had attained the age of fifty five (55) years old but was still working at the 
time of injury, the application of section 28A (c)(i) of the CLA 1956 will prevent him 
from being awarded damages for loss of future earnings. Because of this injustice, 
some scholars had come up with a different interpretation of the section. K.S. Dass in 
his commentary of the CLAA 1984
63
 opined that section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 
does not take away the judges’ discretionary power to award damages for loss of future 
earnings for plaintiff who had passed the age of fifty five (55) years old. He claimed 
that since section 28A(2)(d) of the CLA 1956already provides for the assessment of 
multiplier for loss of future earnings for persons under the age of fifty five (55) years 
                                                 
62[1992] 2 CLJ 773.See also Lo Kit Pin v Fu Khet Nyuk (Deceased) Liew Nyuk Jin & Anor [1999] 1 LNS 32. 
63
Dass, K.S., Quantum of Damages in Personal Injury, Parliament v Common Law, a Critical Examination of the 1984 
Amendment to the Civil Law Act 1956, (Kuala Lumpur: Legal Circle Book Sdn. Bhd, 1997). 
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old,
64
 the term ‘in any other case’ in the second limb of section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 
1956 which requires plaintiff to prove that he was in good health and receiving 
earnings prior to the injury must have been specifically drafted to deal with persons 
who had passed the age of fifty five (55) years.
65
 To require a young person (below the 
age of fifty five (55)) to proof good health when he was clearly earning at the time of 
injury would ‘entail ridiculous result - injustice’.66 From the above analysis, KS Dass 
concluded that section 28 (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 only bar the award for loss of 
future earnings to plaintiff who was fifty five (55) years old. Judges however still retain 
the discretion to award damages for loss of future earnings to plaintiff who had passed 
the age of fifty five (55) years old provided that he can prove he was in good health and 
gainfully employed at the time of injury. 
 
In support of the KS Dass’s opinion, Michael F. Rutter commented that the question of 
whether plaintiff in personal injury cases in Malaysia can claim for post-retirement 
income (any earnings receive after the age of fifty five (55)) is still unanswered.
67
 He 
opined that section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 is so poorly drafted that it allows for 
ambiguity with regard to the status of plaintiff who was beyond the age of fifty five 
(55). He argued that the section did no abolish or put any limit to these persons. The 
section in fact is silent on this regard.
68
 
 
It is however submitted that KS Dass and Rutter’s opinion above is not without flaws. 
KS Dass’s opinion rests on a faulty interpretation of interpretation of section 28A 
(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956. KS Dass equated section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 
                                                 
64The multiplier for plaintiff who is thirty (30) years old and below is sixteen (16). The multiplier for those above the age of thirty 
(30) years old is calculated according to the formula of fifty five (55) minus the age at the time of accident divide by two (2). 
65Dass, K.S., op. cit., (1997), at 65. 
66Ibid. 
67Rutter, Michael F. op. cit., (1993), at 654. 
68Ibid. 
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with proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the same Act. By reading the sections in similar 
manner, KSDass failed to differentiate the phrase ‘any other person’ in proviso (iv)(a) 
to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 with ‘in any other case’ in section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the 
Act. It should be noted that while the phrase ‘any other person’ in proviso (iv)(a) to 
section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 may possibly be interpreted as referring to deceased who 
had passed the age of fifty five (55) years old, the phrase ‘in any other case’ in section 
28A(2)(c)(i) of the Act cannot be read as such. Unlike proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of 
the CLA 1956, section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the Act states ‘plaintiff who had attained the age 
of fifty-five years or above... no damages for such loss shall be awarded...’.Because of 
this provision, judges are clearly barred from awarding the award for loss of future 
earnings to persons who had attained or passed the age of fifty five (55) years old at the 
time of injury. It does not merely bar the award for loss of future earnings to plaintiff 
who was fifty five (55) years at the time of injury while allowing the award to those 
who had passed that age as claimed by KS Dass. 
 
KS Dass’s suggestion that “a living plaintiff who was fifty five (55) and above at the 
time of injury could claim for loss of future earnings”69 is unacceptable in light of the 
specific statutory prohibition. Edgar Joseph SCJ in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yok 
Eng
70
quoting Hasyim Yeop Sani SCJ in Mohammed Noor bin Othman &Ors. V Haji 
Mohammed Ismail bin Haji Ibrahim & Ors.
71
stated; 
“... it is trite law that where the words of a statute are clear, there is no 
room for court to go beyond the express language of the statute.”  
                                                 
69Dass, K.S., op. cit. (1997), at 65. 
70[1994] 3 MLJ 233. 
71[1988] 2 MLJ 82 at 84. 
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Since the provision in section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 is very clear and specific, 
there is also no question of ambiguity and uncertainty in the wording of the provisions 
as claimed by Rutter.  
 
Further, KS Dass’s interpretation of section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 is also 
questionable on the ground that it will lead to two (2) illogical results. First, it allows 
the award for loss of future earnings to plaintiff who had passed the age of fifty five 
(55) years old while barring it those who was fifty five (55) years old at the time of 
injury. Second, it allows judges to use their discretion in deciding the multiplier for loss 
of future earnings for plaintiff who had passed the age of fifty five (55) years old while 
prescribing specific formula for plaintiff who was below the age of fifty (55) at the time 
of injury. To do so will open up the possibility that plaintiff who had passed the age of 
fifty five (55) years old receiving more compensation then those below fifty five (55) 
years old. While a fifty four (54) years old plaintiff is only entitled to a maximum of six 
(6) months multiplier,
72
 a fifty six (56) years old claimant could be receiving more than 
that.
73
To assume that these two absurd effects are the effects the legislature had 
envisaged while drafting the CLAA 1984 is illogical. 
 
It is therefore submitted that section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 has indeed removed 
the judge’s discretion to award damages for loss of future earnings to plaintiff who had 
attained the age of fifty five (55) years old. The notion that the section is not applicable 
to plaintiff who had passed the age of fifty five (55)years old at the time of injury as 
suggested by KS Dass and Rutter is simply they effort to naturalized the effect of the 
provision on the plaintiff who was actually earning an income at the date of injury 
                                                 
72 Maximum multiplier for loss of future earnings for plaintiff aged fifty four (54) years old. 
73Since judges have the discretion to determine the multiplier for plaintiff who had passed the age of fifty five (55) years old, they 
are at liberty to award more than six (6) months multiplier for loss of future earnings. 
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despite attaining the age of fifty five (55) years old. To allow damages for loss of future 
earnings to plaintiff who had passed the age of fifty five (55) years old is a 
contradiction of the intention of the legislature. Since it is commonly accepted that the 
reason behind the 1984 amendment is to control the escalation of awards in personal 
injury claims due to among others, the awards for loss of future earnings for plaintiff 
who had attained the age of fifty five (55) years old,
74
 the Legislature was trying to 
prevent judges from allowing the award for loss of future earnings to plaintiff who had 
reached the age of retirement at the time of accident. As such, any other interpretation 
of the section would be flying in the face of the legislative intention. Hence, it is 
concluded that judges’ discretion in awarding damages for loss of future earning in 
personal injury claims is removed. At the same time, the same discretion in respect of 
personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents cases is also abolished.  
 
The introduction of this pre-condition in certain cases can also be said as a mere 
codification of existing practices of the local judges. Some of the pre-1984 cases 
indicated that judges sometimes had (but not as strict rule) taken fifty five (55) years 
old as the retiring age and assumed that a person’s earning would cease at that age.75In 
these cases, the introduction of the pre-condition that plaintiff must be below the age of 
fifty five (55) years old at the time of injury by section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 
have no effect on the exercise of judicial discretion. It merely abolishes the discretion 
which the judges had on its own generally chosen to disregard. 
                                                 
74Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Ibrahim bin Ismail & Anor. V Hasnah bin Puteh Imat [2004] 1 CLJ 797. 
75Balan, P., op. cit. (2004), at 46.Also seeParliamentary Debates, Senate, Sixth Parliament, Second Session, 3rd August 1984, at 134 
(Tuan Radzi Sheikh Ahmad).In Mat Jusoh bin Daud v Syarikat Jaya Seberang Takir Sdn. Bhd. [1982] 2 MLJ 71, Salleh Abbas FJ 
in deciding the multiplicand for loss of future earning capacity, assumed that the Plaintiff would be working until the age of fifty 
five (55) only and calculated the multiplier for the award with that assumption in mind. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Ahmad 
Nordin bin Haji Maslan & Anor.v Eng Ngak Hua &Ors. [1985] 2 MLJ 431 also noted that there was a general disposition among 
the local courts toward taking fifty five (55) years old as the retirement age. Because of this, the trial court’s finding that the 
deceased retirement age would be 65 was declared excessive and reduced to fifty five (55). A Brunei decision in RJ McGuinness v 
Ahmad Zaini [1980] 2 MLJ 304 also indicates that plaintiff would continue to work until the age of fifty five (55). Thus, implying 
that plaintiff’s retirement age would be at fifty five (55) years old. In the light of these pre-1984 cases, it is clear that the judges 
have always considered fifty five (55) as the retirement age even without having specific statutory provision and rarely award 
damages for loss of future earning beyond that age. 
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By limiting the award for loss of future earnings to plaintiff who is below the age of 
fifty five (55) years old only, section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 has the effect of 
reducing the quantum of damages being awarded by the courts under personal injury 
claims. A portion of damages which may be awarded to the plaintiff under the pre-1984 
rule is removed. The same effect can also be seen in the personal injury claims arising 
out of motor vehicle accidents.  
 
3.4.2 Condition (ii):  Good Health 
The second condition set by section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 before an award for 
loss of future earning can be awarded is the plaintiff must prove that he was in good 
health at the time of the injury. The term ‘shall’ in the section indicates that the 
requirement of good health is a condition precedent to the award. It can only be waived 
if plaintiff’s good health is voluntarily admitted by the defendant. In Sumarni v Yow 
Bing Kwong & Anor,
76
 the Court of Appeal reiterated the necessity of proving good 
health and held that the failure on the Appellant’s part to prove good health and the 
inability to work in the future precluded her from claiming the award for loss of future 
earnings. Similarly, Richard Malanjum JCA in Looi Gnan Peng v Bay Tong Hai,
77
 
held; 
“One of the other elements is that ‘damages for such loss shall not be 
awarded unless it is proved or admitted that the plaintiff was in good 
health but for the injury’. 
On perusal of the evidence adduced we are in agreement with learned 
counsel for the respondent that none of the witnesses called by the 
                                                 
76[2008] 3 CLJ 489. 
77[2005] 1 CLJ 685. 
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appellant including the appellant herself testified on her overall health 
condition. No doubt in the medical reports it was stated that her general 
condition was satisfactory or good. But that could only refer to her 
condition after the accident and not on her overall health. A simple 
question to the medical doctors called as witnesses on her overall health 
condition could have resolved the doubt. Since that was not done we are of 
the view that one element required for a successful claim remained 
unproved.” 
 
The condition of good health in section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 abolishes 
judges’ power to determine whether damages for loss of future earnings is to be 
awarded.  It also removed judges’ discretionary power to deduct the multiplier on 
account of plaintiff’s health. Once plaintiff’s good health has been proven or admitted, 
judges have to allow damages for loss of future earnings in full. 
 
However, the compulsory nature of proving good health which leads to the conclusion 
that judges’ discretion is abolished by section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 can been 
argued upon based on the following points; 
 
(a) The uncertainty in interpreting the term ‘good health’ 
Section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 does not provide the interpretation for the term 
good health. The term is also not defined by the interpretation section of the CLA 
1956,
78
 the Interpretation Act 1967 (Act 388) or by the Legislature in the Explanatory 
Statement to the CLAA 1984 Bill. In fact, the Legislature had specifically left the task 
                                                 
78Section 2 of the CLA 1956. 
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of defining the term to the judges. During the Parliamentary Debate on the CLAA 1984 
Bill, the then Deputy Home Minister in answering a question by Senator D.P Vijandran 
on the definition of the term good health commented;  
“I am of the opinion that this matter should be left to the judges to decide. 
It is not for me to interpret it here.”79 
However, despite the intention of the Legislature, none of the judges in the decided 
cases thus far had given a definite interpretation of the term.
80
 
 
The ordinary dictionary meaning of good health is “the state of being vigorous and free 
from bodily or mental disease”.81 This definition is however too strict to be followed 
since ‘free from bodily and mental disease’ would necessitate the absence of any 
disease; a state which is very difficult to achieve. Due to this, the judge in Osman 
Effendi b Mahmud & Anor. V Mohd Noh b Khamis,
82
opted the yardstick of questioning 
whether the state of plaintiff’s health interferes with his life, profession or 
employment.
83
 Should the plaintiff was able to lead a normal life, perform his duties 
and earn income at the time of injury, he is presumed to be in ‘good health’ to satisfy 
the requirement in the section.KN Segara J held; 
“In every motor accident case, where it has been established that the 
plaintiff had been gainfully employed immediately before the accident, 
there is always a presumption that plaintiff was in good health before the 
injury....” 
                                                 
79Parliamentary Debates, Senate, (op. cit), at 159(Tn Radzi bin Sheikh Ahmad). 
80Radhakrishnan, S., “Quantum of Damages in Personal Injury Claims”, (1995) 3 Malayan Law Journal, xxix – xl, at xxxiii.  
81Rajasooria, J. Edwin, “Necessity of Proving Good Health”, 9th July 2010, The Malaysian Bar 8th November 2010, 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=30358.> 
82[1998] 4 AMR 3687. 
83Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., at xxxiii. Also see Khoo, Guan Huat, “Assessment of Damages in Fatal Accident Claims and a 
Commentary of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984”, (1993)1 Malayan Law Journal cxxix- cxxxviii, at cxxxv. 
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Similar interpretation was adopted in Loh Hee Thuan v Mohd Zaini bin 
Abdullah,
84
where it was held that; 
“The fact that he had lead a normal life up to the time of the accident had 
led evidence that he was ‘receiving earnings by his own labour or other 
gainful activities before he was injured’ is sufficient in my view to satisfy 
the requirement if proof as stated in s. 28A(2)(c)(i) of the Act.”  
 
By virtue of this yardstick, although the plaintiff was suffering from some kind of 
illness, disease or medical problem at the time of the injury, he will still be entitle for 
the award for loss of future earnings if he manages to prove that he was gainfully 
employed prior to the injury or that his illness, disease or medical problem did not 
substantially affect his capacity to engage in remunerative activities. This is why in Loh 
Hee Thuan v Mohd Zaini bin Abdullah,
85
the plaintiff who have a history of diabetes 
mellitus, infarct in the right ganglia of the brain and hypertension was still considered 
in good health and was awarded the full multiplier under section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the 
CLA 1956. The judge did not consider his illness sufficient to constitute ‘poor health’. 
Once a plaintiff is considered to be in good health at the time of accident, he would be 
entitled to a full multiplier eventhough he is suffering from some kind of illness or 
disease which may affect his employment at a later date.  
 
It is therefore submitted that the absence of the definition for the term good health 
enable judges to use their own discretion to determine what constitute good health. It 
also allows judges the discretion to decide on the nature and extend of plaintiff’s illness 
which will justify declaring the plaintiff to be in poor health. Section 28A(2)(c)(i) of 
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85Op. cit. 
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the CLA 1956 merely made it compulsory for the plaintiff to prove good health but it 
does not take away the discretionary power of the judges to determine whether plaintiff 
is in ‘good heath’ to satisfy the requirement in the section. 
 
(b) The presumption of good health 
Apart from the above, the decisions in Loh Hee Thuan v Mohd Zaini bin Abdullah
86
and 
Osman Effendi b Mahmud & Anor. V Mohd Noh b Khamis
87
further support the notion 
that judges still have the discretion on the issue of proving good health by disregarding 
the condition that plaintiff’s good health needs to be specifically proven by the plaintiff 
or admitted by the defendant. Instead of requiring the plaintiff to prove the he was in 
good health at the time of injury, the judges in these two cases presumed that the 
plaintiff were in good health even without any proof on the same. The judge in Loh Hee 
Thuan v Mohd Zaini bin Abdullah
88
held; 
“I do not think that the words “proved or admitted” that the plaintiff was 
in good health as found in s. 28A (2)(c)(i) of the Act must mean that the 
plaintiff entire medical records must be tendered before the court could 
make an award for loss of future earnings. 
The fact that he had lead a normal life up to the time of the accident had 
led evidence that he was “receiving earnings by his own labour or other 
gainful activities before he was injured” is sufficient in my view to 
satisfy the requirement if proof as stated in s. 28A(2)(c)(i) of the Act.”  
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Similarly, in Osman Effendi b Mahmud & Anor. V Mohd Noh b Khamis,
89
KN Segara J 
held; 
“The requirement in law that it must be proved or admitted that plaintiff 
was in good health but for the injury, under section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the 
Civil Law Act 1956, was satisfied when a there was no challenges by the 
defendant whether specifically in his pleading or in his cross-examination 
of the plaintiff, as to the plaintiff health but for the injuries.  
In the present case, there had been no suggestion at all that the first 
plaintiff was suffering from any form of ill health before the accident. 
Therefore, it must be deemed to be admitted that the plaintiff was in good 
health but for the injuries.”  
 
The decisions in the above cases had shifted the burden of disproving good health to 
the defendant. In order to dispel the court’s  presumption of good health, the defendant 
have to first direct the mind of the court to the possibility that the plaintiff was 
suffering from some medical problem which may constitute ‘poor health’. Failure to do 
so will constitute an admission by the defendant of plaintiff’s good health. In Loh Hee 
Thuan v Mohd Zaini bin Abdullah, the judge held;
90
 
 “Since Mr Ramanathan had conceded that he did not raise the issue before 
the learned session court judge, it is my judgement that by his conduct he 
had ‘admitted’ that the plaintiff was in good health and that such conduct 
is sufficient in my view to satisfy the requirement of the word ‘admitted’ 
as stated in section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the Act.” 
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Judges’ discretion to presume that the plaintiff was good health is also supported by KS 
Dass and Altaf. KS Dass in his book argued that good health need not be proven or 
admitted. To require a plaintiff who was gainfully employed at the time of injury to 
prove that he was in good health is “a sheer waste of time” and “unnatural”.91 On 
similar vein, Altaf also opined that the pre-condition of proving good health “impose an 
unduly high burden of proof to qualify for an award in damages for loss of earnings.”92 
 
Recently, J. Edwin Rajasooria, a legal practitioner also commented that the approaches 
taken by the courts in Loh Hee Thuan v Mohd Zaini bin Abdullah
93
and Osman Effendi 
b Mahmud & Anor. V Mohd Noh b Khamis,
94
is preferable from practical point of view 
due to the difficulty in actually proving that the plaintiff was in good health. He 
explained that although the law does not require the plaintiff’s complete medical 
records to be tendered in court in order to prove good health, the requirement of 
proving good health is still very difficult to fulfil especially if the plaintiff does not 
have proper medical record, never seek medical treatment before or have sought 
medical treatment from many clinics and hospitals that it would be difficult to obtain a 
complete record to prove his good health. As such, it is “more practical and more 
realistic”95 to presume that a plaintiff who had been earning prior to the injury was also 
of good health. 
 
Based on the above, the effect of section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 in abolishing 
judges’ discretionary power seems to have been negated. Judges not only have the 
discretionary power to interpret the term good health, they also have the discretion to 
                                                 
91Dass, K.S., op. cit. (1997), at 65. 
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93Op. cit. 
94Op. cit. 
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presume that the plaintiff was in good health even without any specific evidence to the 
same.  
 
The presumption of good health however must be treated with caution. Despite the 
practicality of the approach, it can be seen as a direct contradiction of section 28A 
(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956.  Eventhough the courts in Loh Hee Thuan v Mohd Zaini bin 
Abdullah
96
and Osman Effendi b Mahmud & Anor.  v Mohd Noh b Khamis,
97
held that 
defendant only need to challenge the ‘good health’ in order to dispel the presumption of 
good health and trigger the requirement of proving good health, the decisions have 
clearly disregarded the compulsory nature of proving good health set in section 
28A(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956. The phrase ‘damages for such loss shall not be awarded 
unless it is proved or admitted that plaintiff was in good health but for the injury’ in the 
section clearly requires plaintiff’s good health to be strictly proven or admitted by the 
defendant. The section is clear and does not leave any avenue for other interpretation. 
Any attempt to depart from this pre-condition due to any reason, would be flying in the 
face of strict statutory provision. It is submitted that the courts in Loh Hee Thuan v 
Mohd Zaini bin Abdullah
98
 and Osman Effendi b Mahmud & Anor. V Mohd Noh b 
Khamis,
99
had chosen to exercise their discretion in interpreting the requirement of 
proving good health in the above manner in order to avoid hardship and inconvenience 
to the plaintiff.  
 
Therefore, as it stands, section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956, only accords judges with 
the discretion to interpret the term good health. This discretion is intentionally given by 
the legislature to the presiding judges. Judges however have no discretion to presume 
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that plaintiff was in good health without specifically proven by the plaintiff or admitted 
by the defendant. 
 
Further, since section 28A (2)(d) of the CLA 1956 provide specific multiplier for the 
assessment for loss of future earnings, the plaintiff will be entitle to the full statutory 
multiplier once he was declared to be ‘in good health’ eventhough he is suffering from 
some kind of medical problem which may affect his employment in the future. Unlike 
the situation prior to the 1984 amendment, judges nowadays have no discretion to 
reduce the multiplier to suit the plaintiff health condition. The pre-amendment cases 
showed that while poor health did not totally bar the plaintiff from receiving the award 
for loss of future earnings (unless it prevented him from earning altogether), the poor 
health was taken as one of the reason to reduce the multiplier for the award. In Yaakob 
Fong v Lai Mun Keong & Ors.
100
 For example, a fifty one (51) years old man with 
ischemic heart disease was awarded loss of future earnings. The multiplier however 
was only for six (6) months.  
 
Therefore, it is concluded that the introduction of the condition of proving good health 
have partial effect on the judge’s discretionary power in awarding the award for loss of 
future earnings in personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. Judges 
have no discretion in deciding whether plaintiff is entitle to the award. They must allow 
the award in full if the plaintiff manages to prove that he was in good health or the 
defendant concedes plaintiff’s good health. Judges however still retain the discretion to 
interpret what constitute good health which will enable them to allow the award for loss 
of future earnings to the plaintiff. Since the judges have to allow full multiplier for the 
award if the plaintiff manages to prove good health, the section also does not contribute 
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much in reducing the quantum for the award for future loss of earningsin personal 
injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. 
 
 
3.4.3 Condition (iii): Earning Income at the Time of Injury 
The third condition set out by section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 is the requirement 
that the plaintiff must be ‘receiving earning by his own labour or other gainful activity 
before he was injured’. The section has made it compulsory for the plaintiff to prove 
that he was employed and earning income prior to the injury before the award for loss 
of future earnings can be awarded. Prior to the introduction of this section, judges have 
a wide discretion in awarding damages for loss of future earnings even to persons who 
was not earning at the time of injury.
101
 
 
Similar to ‘good health’ the term ‘earnings’ is also not defined by the CLA 1956, the 
Interpretation Act 1967 (Act 388) or by the Legislature in the Explanatory Statement to 
the CLAA 1984 Bill. Nevertheless, ‘earnings’ has been commonly accepted as any 
payment connected to the employment as a measure of work being put in by the 
claimant
102
 for example salary,
103
 allowances,
104
 fringe benefits and business profit. 
Plaintiff claiming for loss of future earnings will have to prove that he was receiving 
some form of income before the injury. 
 
The problem in respect of this condition lies with the phrase ‘before he was injured’. 
The phrase has been interpreted as ‘at the time he was injured’. The interpretation was 
                                                 
101Yang Salbiah v Jamil bin Harun [1981] 1 MLJ 292 and Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar b Mohamed Said [1982] 2 MLJ 156.  
102NagarajanVeerappan v AnanthanParamaSivam&Anor [1989] 2 CLJ 153 (rep) [1989] 2 CLJ 1243. 
103See Chang Ming Feng &Anor. vJackson Lim @ Jackson AkBajut [1999] 1 MLJ 1. 
104 See MarappanNallanKaundar&Anor.vSitiRahmahbinti Ibrahim, op. cit. 
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provided by Court of Appeal in Dirkje Peiternella Halma v Muhd Noor bin Baharom 
& Ors.
105
and Tan Kim Chuan v Chandu Nair.
106
The Court of Appeal in Dirkje 
Peiternella Halma v Muhd Noor bin Baharom & Ors. held that the Legislature’s use of 
a continuous tense in ‘receiving earning’ indicates that the income is not a matter of 
past income but income which come from the claimant’s employment at the time he 
was injured.
107The term ‘before’ needs to be construed as a whole and not 
disjunctively. As such, the term must be read with due consideration of the rest of the 
wordings in the provision. The fact that the Appellant was on a two years no-pay leave 
when she was knocked down by the Respondent means that she was not earning at the 
time of injury despite still being employed.
108
The above interpretation was reinforced 
by Tan Kim Chuan v Chandu Nair
109
where the Supreme Court highlighted that since 
the legislature uses the phrase 'at the time when he was injured' after the phrase 'only 
the amount relating to his earnings as aforesaid', it is clear that the legislature intended 
that only the amount that the appellant was receiving at the time he was injured can be 
taken into account in the assessment of multiplicand for the award for loss of future 
earnings.  
 
As such, by virtue of section 28A (2)(c)(i) and (ii) of the CLA 1956 together with the 
two (2) Supreme Court decisions above, judges’ discretion to award loss of future 
earning to plaintiff who was a student, unemployed, on unpaid leave, just resigned from 
previous employment and waiting to start a new job or those who would have found 
employment in the immediate future is abolished. The abolition is due to the fact that 
                                                 
105Op. cit. 
106[1991] 1 MLJ 42. 
107 During the appeal, the counsel for the Appellant submitted that the term should be construed as ‘any time prior to the injury’.  
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109Op. cit. 
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they are not receiving income at the time of injury.
110
Abdul Hamid LP in delivering the 
judgement of the Supreme Court in Tan Kim Chuan v Chandu Nair,
111
 held; 
“...it is an essential pre-requisite that in awarding damages for loss of 
future earning or loss of earning capacity there must be a proof that the 
claimant was receiving earning by his own labour or other gainful activity 
before he was injured. It is abundantly clear that the legislature, it its own 
wisdom, decided that an injured person ought not to get any damages in a 
claim for either loss of future earnings or loss earning capacity unless 
before the accident (at the date of accident) he was in fact receiving 
earnings. To hold otherwise would mean that the court is creating a law to 
provide for something which clearly the legislature has no intention to 
do.”   
 
The introduction of section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 also causes a huge reduction 
in the amount of damages being awarded. Should the case of Yang Salbiah v Jamil bin 
Harun
112
is to be decided according to section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956, the 
plaintiff will not receiving any damages for loss of future earning considering that she 
was seven (7) years old and was not earning any income at the time of injury.
113
 
Similarly, the plaintiff in Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar b Mohamed Said
114
 will also be 
deprived of the damages for loss of future earnings considering that he was studying at 
the time of injury. Although the plaintiff was a trained teacher prior to him continuing 
his studies, the fact that he was not receiving income at the time of the injury will bar 
                                                 
110 The rigidity of this condition leads to many critiques from the legal spheres. The main objection to the application of this 
condition is it precludes claim by person whose commencement of employment or some other remunerative activity is imminent,110 
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111Op. cit. 
112Op. cit. 
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judges from awarding damages for loss of future earnings under section 28A (2)(c)(i) 
of the CLA 1956. 
 
 
 
 
3.5 REGULATING THE ASSESSMENT OF MULTIPLICAND FOR 
LOSS OF FUTURE EARNINGS 
Prior to the CLAA 1975, there was no statutory provision relating to the award for loss 
of future earnings in Malaysia. Although the award is recognized by the courts, the 
assessment was left in the hands of the judges guided by the Common Law principles 
and decided cases. The general method was to add up all of plaintiff earnings
115
at the 
time of trial, the value of fringe benefits
116
 and possible future salary increment,
117
 
benefits, bonuses or extra allowances. From that sum, deduct a portion for expenses 
incurred in earning the income,
118
 income tax,
119
 collateral benefits received due to 
inability to work and contingencies.
120
The outcome was to be regarded as the 
multiplicand
121
and to be multiplied with a suitable multiplier. 
 
The problem with the Common Law assessment of damages for loss of future earnings 
was that it required an extensive use of judicial discretion. Judges had to factor in the 
possible increase in plaintiff salary, fringe benefits, profits, bonuses and other income 
in order to come up with the annual multiplicand. The process necessitated an extensive 
use of discretion rather than actual precise calculation. More often than not it was 
                                                 
115 Annual salary or  business profits 
116 Bonuses, allowances, over-time pay, lodging, employer’s contribution in the Employee Provident Fund, insurances, clubs, 
company car etc. 
117Tan Cheong Poh & Anor. v Teoh Ah Keow [1995] 3 MLJ 89. 
118 Food, travelling expenses, tools, business expenses etc. 
119British Transport Commission v Gourley, op. cit. See also Dirkje Peiternella Halma v Muhd Noor bin Baharom & Ors., op. cit. 
where the Supreme Court deducted 12 % from the Appellant earnings for income tax. 
120Demotion, unemployment, economic recession, pre-mature death, sickness etc. 
121See Form D1 in Rutter, Michael F., (op. cit.), at 118 – 121. 
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‘inevitably a hit and run affair.’122 In Raja Mokhtar v Public Trustee123 for example, the 
possibility of the plaintiff, a public servant, being promoted to superscale C salary 
grade was considered in the assessment of his future earnings. The speculative nature 
of the assessment was even more apparent in situations where the plaintiff was not 
earning at the time of injury. Judges had to speculate plaintiff’s earning prospect 
without any evidence to his earnings. 
 
The introduction of the CLAA 1975 and the CLAA 1984 has made significant changes 
to the assessment of multiplicand for loss of future earnings. Other than the Common 
Law principles, judges now have to adhere to the statutory provisions in section 28A of 
the CLA 1956. The effects of these amendments on the exercise of judicial discretion in 
the assessment of multiplicand for loss of future earnings and the quantum of damages 
under this head of damages are discussed in detail below; 
 
3.5.1 Compensations Benefits to be Ignored 
The first legislative attempt to regulate the assessment of the multiplicand for loss of 
future earning is with the passing of section 3 of the CLAA 1975 to introduce section 
28A to the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). This section was later amended by the CLAA 1984 to 
become section 28A (1) of the CLA 1956. The content in the provision however 
remains the same. The section provides the list of compensation benefits a person 
would usually be receiving due to his injuries. They are compensation benefits from 
compensation funds such as Employee Provident Fund, pension,
124
gratuity, 
employment benefits, medical insurance, personal injury insurance etc. These 
                                                 
122Id., at 262. 
123[1970] 2 MLJ 151. 
124See Rasidin bin Partojo v Frederick Kiai [1976] 2 MLJ 214. 
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compensations benefits cannot be taken into consideration in the assessment of 
damages for loss of future earnings. Although they are benefits which arise from the 
same cause of action i.e the accident, they are not to be deducted from the assessment 
of damages for loss of future earnings. Section 28A (1) of the CLA 1975 reads; 
(1) In assessing damages recoverable in respect of personal injury which 
does not result in death there shall not be taken into account: 
(a) any sum paid or payable in respect of the personal injury under 
any contract of assurance or insurance, whether made before 
or after the coming into force of this Act; 
(b) any pension or gratuity, which has been or will or may be 
paid as a result of the personal injury; or 
(c) any sum which has been or will or may be paid under any   
written law relating to the payment of any benefit or 
compensation whatsoever in respect of the personal injury 
(emphasis added) 
 
The provision however does not bring any significant effect on the exercise of judicial 
discretion in the assessment of damages for loss of future earning or the quantum of 
damages under this head of damages. Judges in Malaysia, even prior to the introduction 
of this section by the CLAA 1975 never deduct the amount received from these 
compensation funds from the assessment of damages for loss of future earnings.
125
In A 
Lim Kiat Boon & Ors. v Lim Seu Kong & Anor.,
126
the court held that the defendant 
should not be allowed to benefit from gratuitous contribution given by the plaintiff’s 
employer to assist plaintiff during his recovery. Any benefits received by the plaintiff 
                                                 
125See Form D1 in Rutter, Michael F., (op. cit.), at 118 – 121. 
126[1980] 2 MLJ 39. 
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due to his injuries must not be deducted from the assessment of multiplicand for loss of 
plaintiff’s future earnings.127In Raja Mokhtar v Public Trustee128Raja Azlan Shah in 
refusing to deduct pension from the damages for loss of future earnings held; 
“If section 7(3) of the Civil Law Ordinance confers an advantage to 
claimants in respect of pensions rights in actions for death benefits, I do 
not see any difference that such pensions should not confer an equal 
benefit to claimants in actions for personal injuries at common law. In my 
judgment pension rights are ex gratia payments made to a government 
servant in respect of his past conduct and service out of the discretion of 
the Government and independent of the existence of any right of redress 
given to him against others. 
 
I am satisfied that the weight of authorities and public policy support my 
view that pensions are not to be brought into account in assessing damages 
at common law." 
 
As such, the introduction of section 28A (1) into the CLA 1956 (rev 1975) merely put 
on paper what had been the normal practice of our local courts. It does not bring 
anything new to the law on personal injury claims in Malaysia. 
 
                                                 
127 The court referred to Article 1122 of the Thirteenth (13th) Edition of McGregor on Damages which states; "The courts appear 
never to have taken into account, in the assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity, moneys gratuitously conferred from 
private sources upon the plaintiff as a mark of sympathy and assistance, and this approach is fully supported in Parry v Cleaver 
(1970) AC 1 by majority and minority alike…. Similarly, payments made by a sympathetic employer ought not to be taken into 
account." 
128Op. cit. See also Ti Huck & Anor. v Mohammed Yusof  [1973] 2 MLJ 62. 
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3.5.2 Deduction for Living Expenses 
The CLA 1956 requires that a portion which had been proven or admitted as being the 
plaintiff’s personal expenses to be deducted from the assessment of multiplicand for 
loss of future earnings. This deduction was introduced by section 5(b) of the CLAA 
1984 which inserted para (iii) to section 28A of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). Section 28A 
(2)(c)(iii) of the CLA 1956 states; 
(c) in awarding damages for loss of future earnings the Court shall take 
into account – 
(iii) any diminution of any such amount as aforesaid by such sum 
as is proved or admitted to be the living expenses of the 
plaintiff at the time when he was injured; 
 
The section removed the discretionary power of the judges in the assessment of 
multiplicand for loss of future earnings by making it compulsory for judges to deduct 
the amount normally used by the plaintiff for his daily living expenses from the 
assessment of multiplicand for loss of future earnings. Living expenses are expenses 
that a person incurs or spend on himself for his day to day existence. It includes food, 
lodging, transportation, medical expenses, vices, hobbies etc. A big portion of a 
person’s income is spent on living expenses while the rest goes to his dependant (if 
any) or saving.  In Chan Chong Foo & Anor. v Shivanathan,
129
 the Supreme Courts 
accepted the Respondent’s admission that he spent RM 60 per month on petrol to go to 
work and RM 5 per day for meals while at work (times 26 days) as ‘living expenses’ 
and deducted this figure from the assessment of multiplicand for loss of future 
                                                 
129[1992] 2 MLJ 473. Also see Chan Sau Chan v Choi Kong Chaw & Yap Yun Chan [1991] 1 CLJ 297 and Tan Tiew Yong & Ors  
v Wong Joon Hong & Anor. [2002] 7 MLJ 420. 
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earnings. The Court rejected the Respondent’s submission that living expenses are only 
to be deducted in fatal claims. Harun Hashim J held; 
“It will be seen that the same language is used in both s 7(3)(iv)(c) and s 
28A(2)(c)(iii). It follows that the legislature intended that the same 
principle be applied in both cases, that is to say, in respect of a 
dependency claim for loss of earnings arising out of a fatal accident and in 
respect of a claim for loss of future earnings for personal injury. We are 
accordingly of the view that the term 'living expenses' in s 7 and s 28A 
bear the same meaning.” 
 
The introduction of section 28A (2)(c)(iii) of the CLA 1956 has been regarded  as a 
controversy
130
 since it is a total departure from the Common Law principle. Previously, 
living expenses are not deducted from the assessment of damages for loss of future 
earnings.
131
 
 
It is humbly submitted that the effect of section 28A (2)(c)(iii) of the CLA 1956 in 
removing the discretionary power of the judges is not absolute. Despite the compulsory 
nature of the provision, there are several post-1984 cases which still maintained the 
pre-1984 practices of not deducting living expenses from the assessment of 
multiplicand. In Marappan Nallan Kaundar & Anor. v Siti Rahmah binti Ibrahim,
132
 
Harcharan Singh v Hassan bin Ariffin
133
  and Ismail bin Haji Manap & Yg Ln v Onn 
Swee Imm,
134
 for example, the assessment of multiplicand for loss of future earnings 
was done without deducting living expenses from the plaintiff’s monthly earnings. The 
                                                 
130 Balan, P., “Deduction of Living Expenses From Damages for Loss of Future Earnings”, (1992) 4 Journal of Malaysian and 
Comparative Law, 229 – 235, at 229.  
131Id., at 230. 
132Op. cit. 
133[1990] 2 CLJ 393. 
134[1992] 2 CLJ 1157. 
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judges in these cases refused to deduct plaintiff’s living expenses from the assessment 
of multiplicand for loss of future earnings since the living expenses were not proven by 
the defendant, thus failed to meet the requirement in the section.  
 
The importance placed by the judges on the requirement of proving or admitting living 
expenses in these cases can be view as an excuse to maintain the Common Law 
practices of not deducting plaintiff’s living expenses from the assessment of 
multiplicand in order to prevent unjust deduction on the multiplicand. Since the natural 
meaning of the term ‘living expenses’ is not confined to expenses in earning income, it 
will be unjust to the plaintiff if the expenses for his day to day existence is also to be 
deducted from the multiplicand. Therefore, it is submitted that the judges in the above 
three (3) cases had to find a way to depart from such unjust effect of the provision. 
Hence, the emphasis on defendant’s failure to satisfy the requirement of proving living 
expenses. Since living expenses are expenses which are common and incurred by 
everybody, even without them being specifically proven or admitted, the judges can 
justifiably make some deduction for the same by way of judicial notice should they 
choose to do so. The Kuala Lumpur High Court in Chan Sau Chan v Choi Kong Chaw 
& Yap Yun Chan
135
  adopted this method and deducted RM 1000 for living expenses 
even though it was not clear whether such expenses were proven or admitted. 
 
Even in cases where living expenses is deducted from the assessment of multiplicand 
for loss of future earnings, the compulsory deduction has minimal effect in reducing or 
controlling the quantum of damages being awarded by the courts. This is due to the fact 
that the term ‘living expenses’ is often interpreted as ‘expenses in earning income.’ The 
deduction for ‘living expenses’ in Chan Chong Foo & Anor. v Shivanathan, 136 for 
                                                 
135 [1991] 1 CLJ 297 
136Op. cit. 
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example was deduction for the amount spent on petrol and food at work. These 
expenses are expenses spent for producing income. Since the Respondent is no longer 
working after the accident, he will not be incurring these expenses in the future; thus 
they should rightfully be deducted from the assessment of multiplicand for loss of his 
future earnings. The Muar High Court in Tay Chan &Anor. V South East Asia 
Insurance Bhd.
137
 also interpreted ‘living expenses’ in para (iii) to section 28A(2)(c) of 
the CLA 1956 as the expenses ‘in earning a living’, not plaintiff’s whole day to day 
expenditure.
138
. 
 
Therefore, eventhough the judges in Chan Chong Foo & Anor. v Shivanathan,
139
 and 
Tay Chan & Anor. v South East Asia Insurance Bhd.
140
  adhered to the compulsory 
requirement of deducting living expenses from the assessment of multiplicand, the 
amount held to be plaintiff’s living expenses were generally confined to the amount 
spent on expenses in producing income. Since deduction for expenses in producing 
income is a deduction which is already recognized by the Common Law as part of 
necessary deductions in the assessment of multiplicand for loss of future earnings,
141
 
the judges in these cases were simply continuing the commonly accepted practices of 
the local courts. Even prior to the introduction of section 28A (2)(c)(iii) of the CLA 
1956, judges, by virtue of the Common Law principle have no discretion to include 
expenses in producing income as part of the multiplicand. By interpreting ‘living 
expense’ as ‘expenses in earning income,’ the judges has render section 28A (2)(c)(iii) 
                                                 
137[1993] 3 MLJ 760.InAzam b. Kasman & Anor. v Ramachandran a/l Muthusamy & Anor. [1996] MLJU 26, the High Court also 
deducted an amount admitted by the 1st Plaintiff as the expenses spent on food and petrol for going to work. 
138
Richard Talalla J held,“As to loss of earnings, the view I take is that the living expenses to be deducted under s 28A (2)(c) of the 
Civil Law Act 1956 are not the whole of the first plaintiff's expenses of living but the expenses reasonably incurred by him in 
earning his living, such as the extra cost of having his meals and refreshment while at work, which cost would not ordinarily have 
been incurred had he stayed at home. To hold otherwise and deduct the whole of the living expenses will, to my mind, give a 
meaning to the words 'living expenses' in the said section which can lead to absurd and unjust consequences and which, it would 
seem, could not have been what the Parliament had in mind when it enacted the legislation.  
139Op. cit. Also see Chan Sau Chan v Choi Kong Chaw & Yap Yun Chan [1991] 1 CLJ 297 and Tan Tiew Yong & Ors v Wong Joon 
Hong & Anor. [2002] 7 MLJ 420. 
140Op. cit. In Azam b. Kasman & Anor.v Ramachandran a/l Muthusamy & Anor. [1996] MLJU 26, the High Court also deducted an 
amount admitted by the 1st Plaintiff as the expenses spent on food and petrol for going to work. 
141 See Lim v Camden and Islington AHA (1980) AC 174. 
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of the CLA 1956 redundant and merely a statutory node to the existing practices. The 
section therefore merely abolishes the discretion which the judges have chosen to 
disregard in the first place. It have no significant effect on the exercise of judicial 
discretion and the quantum of damages in personal injury claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents in Malaysia. 
 
3.5.3 Prospect of Future Increase in Plaintiff’s Earnings is to be Ignored 
The most apparent effect of the CLA 1956 with regard to the assessment of 
multiplicand for the award for loss of future earnings is brought by section 5(b) of the 
CLAA 1984. The section amended section 28A of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) by 
introducing section 28A (2)(c)(ii) of the CLA 1956.The new section reads; 
(c) in awarding damages for loss of future earnings the Court shall take 
into account – 
(ii) only the amount relating to his earnings as aforesaid at the time 
when he was injured and the Court shall not take into account 
and prospect of the earnings as aforesaid being increased at 
some time in the future. (emphasis added) 
 
The effects of section 28A (2)(c)(ii) of the CLA 1956 are two-folds. First, it excludes 
future increases from the assessment of multiplicand for loss of future earnings
142
 and 
second, the section made it compulsory for judges to consider only plaintiff’s earnings 
‘at the time of injury’ as the basis of calculating the multiplicand. Judges no longer 
                                                 
142 Prior to the introduction of para (ii) to section 28A (2)(c) of the CLA 1956, not only plaintiff’s current earnings are taken in to 
account, future increase such as promotional prospect, annual salary increment, future bonuses, overtime, allowances and fringe 
benefits were also taken into consideration in the assessment of multiplicand. In Yeap Cheong Hock v Kajima-Taisei Joint Venture 
[1973] 1 MLJ 230.For example, the High Court allowed RM 500 hike on the plaintiff’s monthly salary at the time of injury after 
considering the possibility of his promotional prospect. Similarly in Teoh Suan Seng v Lew Meng Shin &Anor. [1982] 2 MLJ 289, 
the Plaintiff’s annual salary increment was considered when assessing the multiplicand for loss of future earnings. 
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have the discretion to factor in any possible increase in the plaintiff’s earning in the 
future in the assessment of multiplicand.
143
As a result, the High Court in Chew Sheong 
Yoke v Lawrence Su Chu Seng & Anor.
144rejected the Appellant’s appeal on loss of 
future earnings and maintained that any increase in plaintiff’s earning must be 
excluded
145
from the assessment of multiplicand for loss of future earnings. 
 
Apart from abolishing judge’s discretion to add the prospect of increase in plaintiff’s 
future earnings in the assessment of multiplicand, the introduction of section 28A 
(2)(c)(ii) of the CLA 1956 also greatly affects the quantum of damages being matted 
out by the judges under personal injury claims. Since future increases in plaintiff’s 
earnings are not to be taken into account in the assessment of multiplicand, the 
multiplicand is reduced to only the amounts plaintiff was receiving at the time of 
injury. Had the case of Yeap Cheong Hock v Kajima-Taisei Joint Venture
146
 is decided 
after the 1984 amendment took effect, the damages for loss of future earnings will only 
be assessed based on the plaintiff’s earnings at the time of injury. The additional RM 
500 increase will not be added to the assessment of multiplicand since this amount is 
the projected future earnings. 
 
There are however a few attempts to depart from literal interpretation of the term ‘only 
the amount relating to his earnings as aforesaid at the time when he was injured’. 
Instead of excluding any increase in plaintiff’s income after the injury, some judges 
have opted to interpret it as being any increase in plaintiff’s earnings after the trial. 
                                                 
143 Prior to the introduction of para (ii) to section 28A (2)(c) of the CLA 1956, the plaintiff’s current income was assessed at the 
time of trial and not at the time of injury.(see Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar b Mohamed Said [1982] 2 MLJ 156) Since the pre-trial 
earnings are calculated based on plaintiff’s earnings at the time of injury, post-trial earnings was calculated based on plaintiff’s 
earning at time of trial. Although generally the earnings at these two (2) periods are more or less the same, there are cases which 
show a marked difference in the amount received especially if the case took a long time to be tried. As such, this difference must be 
taken into consideration. For example, in Chang Ming Feng v Jackson Lim @ Jackson ak Bajut [1999] 1 MLJ 1, the Plaintiff 
received RM 1657 for basic salary and RM 775.28 for off-shore allowances at the time of injury. His basic salary however was 
increased to RM 2009 but allowances reduced to 247.78 at the time of trial.  
144[1996] MLJU 40. 
145Which includes flying allowances, gratuity and pension. 
146
Op. cit 
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Thus, allowing the judges the discretion to asses any increase in plaintiff earnings from 
the date of injury to the date of trial in the assessment of multiplicand. This 
interpretation found favours with the Miri High Courts in Chang Ming Feng v Jackson 
Lim @ Jackson ak Bajut.
147
 The assessment of multiplicand for loss of future earnings 
in this case was based on plaintiff’s salary at the time of trial and not his salary at the 
time of injury.
148
 The same interpretation was also adopted by the High Court in Ang 
Soon Seng v Noraini bte Doralik & Anor.
149
where Suriyadi J held; 
“The phrase 'any prospect of the earnings as aforesaid being increased at 
some time in the future', as promulgated in the above provision is central 
to the matter at hand. The above phrase must refer to a scenario where the 
likelihood of an increase in salary in the near future is uncertain and open 
to speculation, unlike the current case where the increase of his basic 
salary was certain. That being so, I was not prevented from taking into 
account an actual and calculable increment for purposes of calculating and 
awarding damages for loss of future earnings.” 
 
Although the grounds for the decisions in Chang Ming Feng v Jackson Lim @ Jackson 
ak Bajut.
150
 and Ang Soon Seng v Noraini bte Doralik & Anor.
151
 are not without merit, 
the decisions were a clear departure from the generally accepted interpretation of 
section 28A (2)(c)(ii) of the CLA 1956.
152
Since the wordings in the section are clear 
and concise, they should be literally applied. Any departure from the literal 
interpretation of the wordings cannot be accepted as an authority in applying said 
                                                 
147Op. cit. 
148 There was a slight increase in Plaintiff’s salary at the time of trial compared to the time of injury. 
149[2003] 5 MLJ 456. 
150Op. cit. 
151 Op. cit. 
152S. Santhana Dass in his book Personal Injury Claims,(Petaling Jaya: Alpha Sigma, 2000) opined that the decision in Chang 
Ming Feng v Jackson Lim @ Jackson akBajut, op. cit., is against the clear wording of section 28A(2)(c)(ii). A judge is totally 
prohibited from taking into consideration any increase in plaintiff’s earnings after the time of injury irrespective of whether the 
earnings is actual or speculative. 
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section. Further, the effect of this ‘alternative interpretation’ is only relevant if there is 
any increase in plaintiff’s income between the date of injury to the date of trial. If there 
is no difference in plaintiff’s earnings between the two (2) dates, the above 
interpretation is not relevant. 
 
It can be concluded that the introduction of section 28A (2)(c)(ii) of the CLA 1956 
have totally taken away the judges’ discretion to include the increase in plaintiff’s  
future income in the assessment of multiplicand. The prohibition had significantly 
reduced the amount of damages being awarded for loss of future earnings since the 
assessment is only based on plaintiff earnings at the time of injury.  
 
 
 
3.6 REGULATING THE AWARD FOR LOSS OF FUTURE 
EARNING CAPACITY 
The award for loss of earning capacity is one of the Common Law heads of damages 
recognized by the local courts. This head of damages is however not specifically 
provided for under the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) or the CLA 1956. Nevertheless, it is 
undisputed that this head of damages is part of the damages claimable under personal 
injury claims. The question here is whether the CLA 1956 have any effect on the 
assessment of the award, especially in respect of the exercise of judicial discretion and 
quantum of damages.  
 
The effect of section 28A of the CLA 1956 on the assessment of damages for loss of 
future earning capacity was analysed by the Supreme Court in Dirkje Pietenella Halma 
109 
 
v Mohd Nor bin Baharom & Ors.
153
 The Court allowed the alternative claim for loss of 
future earning capacity since the Appellant was not receiving earning at the time she 
was injured to satisfy the requirement of the award for loss of future earnings. Although 
the Court did not specifically mentioned that section 28A (2) is to be applicable for the 
assessment of loss of earning capacity, the fact that the court took into account the 
Appellant’s salary before she took unpaid leave and adopted the statutory multiplier 
indicated that the Court intended to adopt the provisions in the section in assessing 
damages for loss of future earning capacity. Gunn Chit Tuan SCJ held; 
“…appellant is entitled to be compensated for her loss of earning capacity. 
In this case there is evidence that she was earning $1,270 per month and 
there is also evidence that after the accident she was practically a 
vegetable and would have to be nursed for the rest of her life. In other 
words she has suffered a total loss of earning capacity for the rest of her 
working life.  
In this case the appellant has suffered total loss of earning capacity. Such 
loss in her case would last for the rest of her working life which is 
roughly another 30 years. Taking into account all past and future 
contingencies, the fact that the appellant was earning $1,270 per month, 
her ages at the time of the accident and the multiplier fixed by the 
legislature in the case of loss of future earnings,…” 
 
The provisions in section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956 was also adopted in Tan Kim 
Chuan v Chandu Nair.
154
The appellant in this case was denied the claim for loss of 
earning capacity on the ground him being unemployed at the time of injury. The 
                                                 
153Op. cit. 
154Op. cit. See also Shanmugam Gopal v Zainal Abidin Nazim & Anor.[2003] 3 MLJ 76. 
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Supreme Court in this case went a step further to point out that the legislature had 
intended for section 28A (2) of the CLA 156 to govern the award for loss of future 
earnings as well as loss of future earning capacity. Abdul Hamid Omar LP said; 
“We reiterate that s. 28A (2)(c)(ii) which states that only the amount 
relating to his earnings as aforesaid at the time when he was injured and 
the Court shall not take into account any prospect of earnings aforesaid 
being increased at some time in the future makes the intention of the 
Legislature abundantly clear and indeed the Legislature had the prospect 
of future earnings (whatever be the label attached to it) in mind when the 
law was enacted.” 
The court in Chong Chee Khong & Anor v Ng Yeow Hin
155
 also of similar opinion 
where it was decided that the 1984 amendment had placed the necessity of proving that 
the claimant was receiving earning as before the injury as a prerequisite for the award 
for loss of earning capacity.
156
 
 
By virtue of the above decisions Altaf opined that section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956 is 
intended to govern the assessment of all damages relating to future earnings. The 
distinction between loss of future earnings and loss of future earning capacity 
according to him was put to an end by the incorporation of the section.
157
The 
                                                 
155[1997] 5 MLJ 786. 
156KamalanathanRatnam JC stated “Before the Civil Law Act 1956 was amended in 1984, it mattered not whether the plaintiff was 
in employment or not at the time of the accident so long as the court was satisfied from evidence adduced that there was a real or 
substantial risk that his earning capacity would be affected in the future. However, after the amendment, it is an essential 
prerequisite of s 28A (2)(c)(i) that in awarding damages for loss of future earning capacity, there must be proof that the claimant 
was receiving earnings by his own labour or other gainful activity prior to the accident. In this respect I rely on the clear 
enunciation if this principle by the (then) Supreme Court in Tan Kim Chuan & Anor v Chandu Nair [1991] 2 MLJ 42 where in the 
then Lord President, Abdul Hamid Omar LP said at p 44:... We reiterate that s 28A(2)(c)(ii) which states that ‘only the amount 
relating to his earnings as aforesaid at the time when he was injured and the court shall not take into account any prospect of 
earnings aforesaid being increase at sometime in the future’, makes the intention of the legislature abundantly clear and indeed the 
legislature had the prospect if future earnings (whatever label attached to it) in mind when the law was enacted. The use of the 
words ‘whatever label attached to it’ in my view provides for an awards of loss of earning capacity not withstanding the fact that 
evidence discloses no loss of future earnings.” 
157Muhammad AltafHussainAhangar, op. cit., (2003), at lxxxvii. 
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assessment for the award is subject to the same conditions in section 28A (2)(c) of the 
CLA 1956 and the multiplier is to be calculated as per section 28A (2)(d) of the Act. 
 
On this point, it is humbly submitted that despite the above, the question of whether the 
award for loss of future earning capacity is also governed by section 28A (2) of the 
CLA 1956 is still open to arguments. Contrary to the learned Abdul Hamid Omar LP’s 
interpretation of section in Tan Kim Chuan v Chandu Nair.,
158
there is nothing in the 
wording of the section which gives the impression that it is meant to govern the 
assessment for loss of future earning capacity. The CLA 1956 specifically mention that 
para (i),(ii) and (iii) to section 28A(2)(c) and para (i) and (ii) to section 28A(2)(d)  of 
the Act deal with the assessment of damages for loss of future earnings. Eventhough 
the terms ‘shall not be awarded’ in in para (i) and ‘shall not take into account’ in para 
(ii) in section 28A(2)(c) of the CLA 1956 indicate that the conditions of below the age 
of fifty five (55), in good health and receiving earnings before the injury are the  pre-
requisite before an award under the section can be made, the opening sentence to 
section 28A(2)(c) of the Act clearly states ‘in awarding damages for loss of future 
earnings’. As such, the three (3) conditions are specifically enacted for the award for 
loss of earnings. Similarly, section 28A (2)(d) of the CLA 1956 also confine itself to 
the award for loss of future earnings only. The opening sentence to the section states ‘in 
assessing damages for loss of future earnings’. Unless the plurality in the term 
‘earnings’ is to be read as referring to earning capacity as well, it is difficult to 
comprehend how the assessment of loss of future earning capacity is to be read into the 
section as opined above. 
 
                                                 
158Op. cit. 
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The term ‘future earnings’ cannot be read as to include ‘future earning capacity’. The 
terms are distinct from one another. ‘Future earnings’ refers to plaintiff earnings in the 
future, either in forms of monthly salary, fringe benefits, bonuses, allowances, business 
profits etc. ‘future earning capacity’ on the other hand is the ability, capability or 
aptitude to generate or produce an income in the future. Therefore, since the task of the 
court is to give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute when the words 
are clear and unequivocal, ‘future earning capacity’ cannot be lumped together with 
‘future earnings’.  
 
Similarly, the obvious dissimilarities between the assessment of the awards for loss of 
future earnings and loss of future earning capacity also made it abundantly clear that 
these awards are two separate heads of damages. While the damages for loss of future 
earnings is awarded to compensate the real and assessable loss
159
 to the plaintiff’s 
income when the injury suffered prevents him from working indefinitely, damages for 
loss of future earning capacity is awarded in situations where the claimant face the 
possibility of losing his job or getting a less paid job in the future (although not 
immediately after resuming employment),
160
 where claimant’s capacity to earn is 
diminished
161
 or where the claimant is unemployed or an infant.
162
 As such, these two 
(2) heads of damages cannot possibly be lumped under the same provision unless 
specifically stated as such. Abd. Wahab J in Asainar bin Sainudin & Anor. v Mohamad 
Salam bin Sidik
163
 held that the provisions in section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956 only 
regulates claims for loss of expectation of life and loss of future earnings only and does 
not extend itself to other head of claims.
164
 
                                                 
159Ngooi Ku Siong v Aidi Abdullah[1985] 1 MLJ 30. 
160Moeliker  v  A Reyrolle & Co. Ltd. (1977) 1 All ER 9. 
161Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood  [1983] 2 MLJ 324. 
162Yang Salbiah v Jamil bin Harun, op. cit. 
163[2002] 5 MLJ 104. 
164 Nasser Hamid, Personal Injury & Fatal Accident Claims: Civil Law Act 1956, (Petaling Jaya: Gavel Publications, 2008), at 129. 
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“The limitation under s 28A (2) of the Act apply in respect of loss of 
expectation of life caused by the injury and the assessment and awards of 
damages for loss of future earnings. No mention was made of other head 
of damages that cannot be categorized as loss of future earnings, such as 
cost of nursing care, pampers and wheelchairs. Thus it is clear that on the 
face of it, s 28A (2) of the Act effects claims for loss of expectation of life 
and loss of future earnings only, and does not purport to affect other head 
of damages.” 
 
Perusal of the relevant local literature relating to the claim for loss of future earning 
capacity
165
 reveals that the discussions on the assessment of the loss are mainly 
confined to the issue of whether the condition of ‘receiving earnings before the injury’ 
is also applicable for the claim for loss of earnings capacity. The decisions in Dirkje 
Pietenella Halma v Mohd Nor bin Baharom & Ors.,
166
 Tan Kim Chuan v Chandu 
Nair
167
and Chong Che Khong & Anor. v Ng Yeow Hin
168
 are also limited on the similar 
issue. Although section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956 was quoted in all three (3) cases, the 
Courts made no mention of whether the conditions  that plaintiff must be below fifty 
five (55) years old and of good health at the time of injury are also applicable for the 
assessment of this head of damages. Only the portion that relates to earnings was 
referred to. It is therefore submitted that the Dirkje Pietenella Halma v Mohd Nor bin 
Baharom & Ors.,
169
Tan Kim Chuan v Chandu Nair
170
 and Chong Che Khong & Anor. 
v Ng Yeow Hin
171
were not to be read as declaring that the entire section 28A(2) of the 
CLA 1956 is applicable in the assessment of damages under this heading. The cases 
                                                 
165Balan, P. “Loss of Future Earnings, Loss of Earning Capacity and the Civil  Law (Amendment) Act, 1984”, 17 (1990) Journal of 
Malaysian Comparative Law, 169 – 180, Dass, S. Santhana, op.cit., (2000), Balan P., op. cit., (2004), Muhammad Altaf Hussain 
Ahangar, op. cit., (2008), Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, op. cit., (2003), Rutter, Michael F., op. cit. 
166Op. cit. 
167Op. cit. 
168Op. cit. 
169Op. cit. 
170Op. cit. 
171Op. cit. 
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only adopted the requirement of earning income at the time of injury into the 
assessment of damages for loss of future earning capacity. 
 
Since neither the wordings in section 28A(2) of the CLA 1956 or the decision in the 
above three (3) cases can be an absolute authority on the rule that section 28A(2)(c) of 
the CLA 1956 also governs the assessment of award for loss of future earning capacity, 
the assessment of the damages to a certain point is clearly still at the discretion of the 
judges guided by the Common Law principles and decided cases. Judges have the 
discretion to determine the monetary compensation which will compensate the plaintiff 
of the loss of his capacity to earn his living and the length of time in which he would be 
suffering said loss. The determinations of both are subjective, speculative and 
necessitate a large application of judges own reasoning. As Brown J in Moeliker v A 
Reyrolle& Co Ltd.
172
 rightfully said; 
“Clearly no mathematical calculation is possible… 
The starting point should be the amount which a plaintiff is earning at the 
time of trial and an estimate of the length of the rest of his working life. 
This stage of assessment would not have been reached unless the court 
have already decided that there is a ‘substantial’ or ‘real’ risk that a 
plaintiff would loss his present job at some time before the end of his 
working life, but now will be necessary to go on and consider (a) how 
great this risk is and (a) when it may materialize, remembering that he 
may lose a job and be thrown in the labour market more that once (for 
example if he takes a job and finds that he cannot manage it because of his 
disabilities). The next stage to consider how far he would be handicapped 
                                                 
172Op. cit. 
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by his disability if he is thrown in the labour market, that is what would be 
his chance of getting a job, and an equally well paid job.” 
 
Having argued that the award for loss of future earning capacity is not subject to the 
conditions in section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956, The researcher however unable to 
concur with P. Balan, Rutter and KS Dass that the assessment of damages for loss of 
earning capacity is still entirely at the discretion of the judges guided by the Common 
Law principles. The researcher to some extend agrees with Altaf’s opinion that to 
conclude that judges still have the absolute discretion in assessing damages for loss of 
future earning capacity while subjecting that discretion in assessing damages for loss of 
future earning to the conditions in section 28A(2)(c) of the CLA 1956 is unjust.
173
The 
researcher however regrettably unable to agree with Altaf’s conclusion that section 28A 
(2) of the CLA 1956 is “all comprehensive” and that the three conditions in the section 
are also applicable for the assessment of loss of future earning capacity. If the 
Legislature’s intention is to include the assessment for loss of future earning capacity 
into the section, the researcher believes it would have done so explicitly, in clear and 
concise word.  
 
On this point, the researcher humbly submits that the judges’ discretion in assessing 
damages for loss of future earning capacity is limited by the decisions in Dirkje 
Pietenella Halma v Mohd Nor bin Baharom & Ors.,
174
Tan Kim Chuan v Chandu 
Nair
175
and Chee Khong & Anor. v Ng Yeow Hin.
176
The cases introduce a condition of 
receiving earning at the time of injury of in the assessment of loss of future earning 
capacity.  Plaintiff who was not earning any income at the time of injury is prevented 
                                                 
173 Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, op. cit., (2003), at lxxxix. 
174Op. cit. 
175Op. cit. 
176Op. cit. 
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from being awarded damages for loss of future earning capacity. This new condition, 
although a departure from the Common Law, is understandable since the court need to 
ascertain that the claimant is actually earning at the time of injury and the injury would 
hinder his capacity to earn similar income in the future. The court also would need to 
ensure that the claimant have the capacity to work and would indeed be working but for 
the injury. To allow a child or persons who have yet to earn income the damages for 
loss of future earning capacity will subject the award to guesswork and uncertainty, 
something akin to the award for ‘loss years’ which was abolished by the CLA 1956. 
Section 3 of the CLA 1956 allow modification to be made to the Common Law 
principle in the assessment of damages should the courts deem it necessary. The 
inclusion of the requirement of earning income at the time of injury as a pre-requisite to 
the award for loss of future earning capacity does not necessitate the whole section 28A 
(2) of the CLA 1956 is to be adopted in assessing this head of damages.  
 
To conclude, the restriction imposed on the exercise of judicial discretion in the 
assessment of damages for loss of future earning capacity is not due to the provision in 
the CLA 1956. Section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956 is not applicable in respect of this 
head of damages. The judges are still at liberty apply their discretion in the assessment 
of the same provided that they are satisfied that plaintiff was receiving earnings at the 
time of injury. Nevertheless, the imposition of the condition of receiving earning at the 
time of injury has a big impact on the quantum of damages. Since judges now are not at 
liberty to allow the  award for loss of future earning capacity to plaintiff who was not 
earning at the time of injury, the amount of damages being awarded for personal injury 
claims  arising out of motor vehicle accidents is clearly reduced. The courts’ rejection 
of plaintiff’s claim for damages for loss of future earning capacity in Tan Kim Chuan v 
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Chandu Nair
177
and Chee Khong & Anor. v Ng Yeow Hin.
178
were  clear examples of 
this reduction. 
 
 
 
3.7 FIXING THE MULTIPLIER FOR THE AWARD OF LOSS OF 
FUTURE EARNINGS 
The term multiplier and years purchase are used interchangeably. It refers to the period 
or the duration of the loss. In personal injury claims, multiplier is used in assessing 
damages for loss of future earnings, loss of future earning capacity, future nursing care, 
medicine and other expenses claimable as special damages. “Multiplier reflect not only 
the number of years for which the loss will last but also the elements of uncertainty 
contained in that prediction and the fact that the plaintiff will receive immediately a 
lump sum which he is expected to invest.”179The assessment of multiplier depends on 
the type of damages being awarded. Multiplier for loss of future earnings and earning 
capacity depend on plaintiff expected working life, retirement, age, education and type 
of work. The multiplier for nursing care, medication and other expenses on the other 
hand may depend on plaintiff life expectancy, age and the effects of the injury on 
plaintiff’s life expectancy. However, since the purpose of this research is to analyze the 
effects of the CLA 1956 on the application of judicial discretion and the quantum of 
damages, only the effects of the introduction of section 28A of the CLA 1956 on the 
assessment of the award for loss of future earnings and loss of future earning capacity 
will be dealt with.  
                                                 
177Op. cit. 
178Op. cit. 
179Devaney, Margaret, “Comparative Assessment of Personal Injuries Compensation Schemes: Lesson for Tort Reform”, (2009) 
13.3 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 24th August 2010, <http://www.ejcl.org/133/art133-2.pdf> 
118 
 
3.7.1 Loss of Future Earnings 
The Malaysian legislature had departed from the long accepted Common Law method 
of assessing the multiplier for loss of future earnings by fixing a statutory multiplier 
which is based solely on the age of the plaintiff. This departure was brought by the 
CLAA 1984. Prior to this amendment, there is no definite rule for the assessment of 
multiplier for loss of future earnings. Judges have the discretion to assess the multiplier 
for loss of future earnings
180
 by taking into consideration plaintiff’s employment, 
health, skills and education level, retirement age, normal life expectancy and age at the 
date of trial.
181
Negative contingencies which may reduce the length of multiplier such 
as the possibility of poor health, possibility of plaintiff recovering from his injury and 
able to earn his pre-injury earnings, demotion and economic down-turn were also taken 
into consideration.
182
 There were a few common methods employed in assessing the 
multiplier; by extracting the multiplier from comparable cases, by deducting one third 
from the amount arrived at using the formula plaintiff’s age of retirement minus his age 
at the date of trial or by applying the annuity table. Neither methods are satisfactory 
and sometimes lead to over or underestimation of the loss. 
183
 
 
Section 5(b) of the CLAA 1984 was enacted to amend section 28A of the CLA 1956 
(rev 1972).  The amendment introduced section 28A (2)(d)(i) and (ii) to the CLA 1956. 
Section 28A (2)(d)(i) and (ii) of the CLA 1956 is reproduced below;  
(d) In assessing damages for loss of future earnings the Court shall take 
into account that- 
                                                 
180Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, op. cit., (2003), at xci.  
181See Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Heath Authority, op. cit. 
182The multiplier was adjusted according to the possible effect of these contingencies onto the future earning claims. 
183Reiss, Seth M., op. cit. lxvii.  
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(i) in the case of a person who was at the age of thirty years or 
below at the time when he was injured, the number of years’ 
purchase shall be 16; and 
(ii) in the case of any other person who was of the age range 
extending between thirty –one years and fifty-four years at the 
time when he was injured, the number of years’ purchase shall 
be calculated by using the figure fifty five (55), minus the 
age of the person at the time when he was injured and 
dividing the remainder by the figure 2. (emphasis added) 
 
The primary effect of this amendment is the abolition of judge’s discretionary power in 
assessing the multiplier for loss of future earnings. By virtue of the above provision, the 
factors which were commonly considered in the pre-1984 assessment of multiplier are 
already configured and “built into the statutory formula”.184 Plaintiff who was thirty 
(30) years old or lesser at time of accident is entitle to sixteen (16) years of multiplier. 
For those beyond the age of thirty (30) years old, the multiplier is assessed by deducting 
plaintiff’s age at the time of injury from the figure of fifty five (55). The balance is then 
to be divided by two (2). The total will range between the maximum period of twelve 
(12) years and minimum of six (6) months depending on plaintiff’s age at the time of 
injury. The Legislature did not provide the reason for fixing sixteen (16) years as the 
maximum length of multiplier. However, since sixteen (16) years was the maximum 
length of multiplier commonly awarded in England at the time, it is possible that the 
multiplier was adopted from the English cases.
185
 
 
                                                 
184Per Edgar Joseph Jr. SCJ in Chan Chin Ming v Lim YokEng, op. cit. 
185Bar Council Malaysia, “Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984”, (1984) 2 Current Law Journal, 209 – 216, at 212. 
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The compulsory nature of the section leaves no avenue for judges to depart from the 
fixed multiplier in the assessment of damages for loss of future earnings. The Court of 
Appeal in Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor.
186
was very 
adamant on this point.  The multiplier is fixed and cannot be altered by the judge in any 
way. 
“Further, the language of the statues is imperative. It says `the number of 
years’ purchase shall be 16. The mandatory tenor of this phrase employed 
by Parliament to convey its message excludes any pretended exercise of 
judicial power to substitute some other multiplier for that intended.” 
 
Other than abolishing the judge’s discretion in the assessment of multiplier, the 
introduction of section 28A (2)(d)(i) and (ii) of the CLA 1956 also has huge impact on 
the amount of damages being awarded under personal injury claims. Prior to the 
introduction of the fixed multiplier, the amount of damages awarded for loss of future 
earnings were higher due the judges’ discretion in assessing the multiplier. There are 
many instances where long multiplier
187
 was awarded to plaintiff whose working life 
could not have been very long. In Wong Kong v Yee Hup Transport Co &Ors
188
for 
example, a fifty five (55) years old plaintiff was awarded thirteen (13) years and six (6) 
months of multiplier comprising of 42 month pre-trial loss and 10 years post-trial loss 
of earnings.
189
 The judge in The Hwa Seong v Chop Lim Chin Moh & Anor.,
190
 
awarded eight (8) years multiplier for loss future earnings to a fifty three (53) years old 
plaintiff.
191The multiplier was arrived at by deduction ¼ from the plaintiff’s probable 
                                                 
186Op. cit. 
187See Chong Sow Ying v Official Administrator, op.cit.,  Yaacob v Sintat Rent a Car Services (M) Sdn. Bhd & Anor, and  Low Kow 
v Arthur Mortson (unreported) cited in Dass, K.S., op. cit., (1975), at 816. 
188[1966] 2 MLJ 234. 
189If section 28A (2)(d)(i) and (ii) of the CLA 1956 is applicable to this case, the plaintiff will not be able to claim for loss of future 
earnings since he was already fifty five (55) years old at the time of the injury. 
190[1981] 2 MLJ 341. 
191 If section 28A (2)(d)(i) and (ii) of the CLA 1956 is applicable to this case, the plaintiff will only be awarded 1 year multiplier 
based on the calculation of fifty five (55) minus fifty three (3) divided with two (2). 
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life expectancy of 65 years.
192
  The judge in this case did not make any distinction 
between working age and life expectancy. Thus, implying that plaintiff would be 
working as long as he live.  
 
3.7.2 Loss of Future Earning Capacity 
The statutory multiplier in section 28A (2)(d)(i) and (ii) of the CLA 1956 has also been 
adopted in the assessment of loss of future earning capacity. The Supreme Court in 
Dirkje Pietenella Halma v Mohd Nor bin Baharom & Ors.
193
awarded the statutory 
multiplier of sixteen (16) years for loss of future earning capacity to the Appellant who 
was twenty five (25) years old at the time of the accident. In Sivakumar A/l Avolasamy 
v Chan Hoong Kok,
194
 the Johor Bharu High Court applied section 28A (2)(d)(ii) of the 
CLA 1956 and awarded a multiplier of eleven and a half (11.5) years for loss of future 
earning capacity to the plaintiff who was thirty two (32) years old at the time of the 
accident. 
 
Prior to Dirkje Pietenella Halma v Mohd Nor bin Baharom & Ors.,
195
the assessment of 
loss of future earning capacity was done either lump sum or via multiplication method. 
The lump sum method was usually applied in cases involving young children or person 
who was unemployed at the time of injury where the multiplicand cannot be assessed 
due to absence of any evidence of earnings. As such, the award will be based on the 
judge’s assessment of the disadvantages that the plaintiff would be suffering in the 
labour market as well as contingencies.
196
The multiplication method on the other hand 
                                                 
192 The ¼ deduction was for contingencies. 
193Op. cit. 
194[2012] MLJU 48. 
195Op. cit. 
196Dass, S. Santhana, op.cit., (2000), at 114. 
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was usually applied when there was evidence of plaintiff’s earnings at the time of 
injury. The multiplicand was calculated according to the plaintiff’s earnings and 
personal expenses while the multiplier was calculated based on the nature of plaintiff’s 
employment, age and future contingencies. In Ong Ah Long v Dr. S Underwood,
197
for 
example, the court awarded a fifty two (52) years old surgeon six (6) years multiplier 
after taking sixty (60) years as his estimated active working life. 
 
It is however submitted that the assessment for loss of earning capacity should not be 
subjected to the statutory multiplier in section 28A (2)(d)(i) and (ii) of the CLA 1956. 
Unlike the assessment for loss of future earning where the calculation of multiplier and 
multiplicand can be based on plaintiff’s income and the nature of his employment at 
time of injury, loss of future earning capacity is very subjective. It is not a loss that the 
claimant is actually suffering at the date of injury or date of trial. David Kemp in his 
book
198
stated: 
“In this [handicap in the labor market] class of case, the multiplier / 
multiplicand approach cannot be used. For since the plaintiff is not 
suffering from a current loss, there is no relevant multiplicand to be 
ascertained. The court has to assess the probability and the gravity of 
plaintiff’s future loss owing to his handicap in the labor market.”  
 
Based on above, a parallel observation can be made as for the calculation of multiplier. 
Since the loss is not current, it would be a matter of guesswork as to when the claimant 
will actually be suffering the loss. Thus, making the calculation of multiplier based on 
the fixed table in section 28A (2)(d) of the CLA 1956 impossible. Take for example a 
                                                 
197[1983] 2 MLJ 324. Also see Krishnan & Anor. v Chow Wing Khuan [1987] 2 MLJ 691. 
198 Kemp; David, The Quantum of Damages, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), at 184. 
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thirty five (35) years old labourer who suffered severe injury to his leg. His doctor also 
predicts that he will suffer osteoarthritis in the future as the result of the injury. He 
would undoubtedly be entitle for damages for loss of future earning capacity since the 
osteoarthritis will hinder his capacity to work in the future. However, to calculate the 
multiplier according to section 28A (2)(d)(ii) of the CLA 1956 (fifty five (55) minus 35 
thirty five (35) and divide by two(2)) would be allowing for more than he would have 
lost. Since his capacity to earn will only be affected in the future (exact date unknown), 
assessing the multiplier from the date if injury can be considered as an 
overcompensation. 
 
3.7.3 Fix multiplier v Annuity Table 
As mention earlier, one of the methods adopted by the judges to determine the award 
for loss of future earnings prior to 1984 was by adopting the annuity table. An example 
of annuity table is the Murphy and Dunbar Annuity Table.
199
 After determining the 
multiplicand and the multiplier, the judge will read against the annuity table. An 
example will better illustrate application of annuity table. Take a case where the judge 
had determined that the plaintiff was receiving a salary worth RM 510 a month 
(multiplicand). Using the annuity table, the award for loss of future earnings would be 
RM 63,523.52 at sixteen (16) years multiplier. Similarly should the judge decide on 
eighteen (18) years multiplier, the annuity table will show that the dependant is entitle 
to RM 71, 540.29. The case of Lee Boon Kiat v Ng Sing,
200
 is an example of a case 
where annuity table was applied. 
  
                                                 
199
 See Appendix for an extract from the Murphy and Dumbar Annuity Table 
200[1982] 1 MLJ 229. 
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It is humbly submitted although sections 28A (2)(d)(i) and 28A(2)(d)(ii) of the CLA 
1956 were enacted with the intention of controlling the amount of damages for loss of 
future earnings by introducing the statutory multiplier,
201
 the sections only manage to 
limit the length of multiplier, it does not reduce the quantum being awarded by the 
courts. Should the direct multiplication method is compared to the annuity table, a 
simple mathematical calculation will show that the annuity table method produces much 
lower quantum compared to the direct multiplication method. Take the above scenario 
as an illustration, if the case was decided after 1984 amendment, the plaintiff will be 
entitle to RM 97,920 using the direct multiplication method using the fixed multiplier of 
sixteen (16) years, instead of only RM 63,523.52 using the annuity table.
202
Even if the 
multiplier is increased to eighteen (18) years, the amount of quantum awarded under the 
annuity table method scheme would still be lower than the quantum arrived at by using 
the fixed multiplier. As such, the CLA 1956 does not in any way helps to reduce the 
quantum of damages being awarded for personal injury claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents. 
 
The monetary effect of annuity table and direct multiplication methods was discuss in 
detail in Asainar bin Sainudin & Anor. v Mohamad Salam bin Sidik
203
where the judge 
concluded that the application of direct multiplication using the statutory multiplier 
generates more monetary value that the annuity table. As such, even if the fixed 
multiplier is limited to a maximum of sixteen (16) years, the amount of damages is 
definitely higher than the amount arrived at using annuity table. The judge held: 
“The straight calculation over an expected lifetime, which in this case is 
56 years' purchase, results, as illustrated above, in overpayment. It ignores 
                                                 
201
 See Ibrahim bin Ismail & Anor. v Hasnah bin Puteh Imat, op. cit. 
202See also comment made by the Bar Council in Bar Council of Malaysia, op. cit.  
203Op. cit. 
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the basic prudence that a lump sum would be placed in an interest bearing 
account. Its strength is that the interest derived could help to cover the 
costs of unpredictable inflation. Yet the calculations show that the interest 
earnings over the period to be very substantial. On the other hand, the 
annuity calculation is very precise, but by its precision, it fails to allow for 
the probability of inflation, and even the possibility that the recipient could 
live longer than foreseen when the calculations were made. This last could 
mean that if the recipient actually lives longer than expected, he may face 
the prospect of having nothing at all left to rely on.” 
 
The introduction of section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956 in short have taken away the 
discretionary power of the judges to assess the multiplier for loss of future earnings. 
The imperative nature of the section leaves no avenue in which judges may apply their 
own discretion whether to reduce or to increase the length of multiplier. Judges 
however still have the discretion in assessing the multiplier for loss of future earning 
capacity, guided by the Common Law principles and decided cases. The abolition of 
the discretionary power in the assessment of multiplier for loss of future earnings does 
not bring much effect in controlling the amount of damages being awarded. Compared 
to the use of annuity table, the use of the statutory multiplier in section 28A (2)(d) of 
the CLA 1956 1956 yields more quantum. 
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3.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Section 28A of the CLA 1956 affects the exercise of judicial discretion in the 
assessment of damages for personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents 
in three (3) ways. The first is by maintaining the discretionary power, second by 
maintaining the discretionary power albeit with some statutory regulations and third by 
codifying the existing practices of the judges. 
 
The assessment of damages for loss of future earning capacity and loss of expectation 
of life is still very much at the discretion of the presiding judges. Despite the argument 
that section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956 is also applicable in assessing damages for loss 
of future earning capacity, there is nothing in the provision which specifically states as 
such. The condition that plaintiff must be earning income at the time of injury is not 
imposed by the section. Although it was adopted from section 28A (2)(c) of the CLA 
1956, the condition is imposed through judicial precedence, not through application of 
the CLA 1956. The assessment of damages for loss of expectation of life in personal 
injury claims is also discretionary on the judges. Judges are only barred from awarding 
this award as a separate heading. They are not prevented from assessing and including 
it in the award for pain and suffering. Since section 28A of the CLA 1956 does not 
regulate the method in which the damages for loss of expectation of life is to be 
assessed, judges still have discretion to assess the same. 
 
The exercise of judicial discretion in the assessment of damages for loss of pre-trial 
earnings and loss of future earnings has been somewhat affected by the provision in 
section 28A of the CLA 1956.  There are several elements in the assessment of these 
heads of damages where judges’ discretionary power is abolished by the provisions in 
section 28A the CLA 1956. The assessment of multiplier is strictly regulated by section 
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28A of the Act and leave little avenue for judicial discretion. Similarly, the condition of 
earning income before the injury also abolishes judges’ discretionary power in 
awarding damages for loss of future earnings to plaintiff who was not earning income 
at the time of the injury. On the other hand, the conditions of good health and below the 
age of fifty five (55) years old in section 28A (2)(c) of the CLA 1956 are worded in 
such a way that they leave some areas open to judges’ interpretation. These 
interpretations lean towards allowing judges to use their discretion.  
 
The provision in section 28A(2) of the CLA 1956 which prevents judges from 
deducting the compensation benefits received from the assessment of damages and 
made it compulsory to deduct plaintiff’s living expenses from the assessment of 
multiplicand can be considered as a mere codification of the existing practices. Judges, 
even prior to the introduction of section 28A (1) of the CLA 1956 in 1975 had never 
taken into consideration the benefits received due to the injuries while assessing the 
multiplicand for loss of future earnings. Similarly, judges also have always deducted 
cost for producing income from the multiplicand even prior to the introduction of 
section 28A (2)(iii) of the CLA 1956. Therefore, the introduction of these elements in 
the assessment of damages for loss of future earnings is merely the CLA 1956 giving a 
statutory node to the existing practice. The Act just put on paper what had been the 
practice of the local judges. 
 
With regard to the effect of section 28A of the CLA 1956 on the quantum of damages 
in personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents, only the prohibition 
against considering future increases in plaintiff’s income and the requirement of 
earning income before the injury result in apparent reduction in the quantum of 
damages being awarded. The fixed multiplier as discussed above yield more damages if 
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compared to the application of annuity table. The above discussion shows that the 
introduction of section 28A falls short of its reformatory goal which is to reduce the 
amount of damages being awarded by the courts.  
 
In conclusion, section 28A of the CLA 1956 neither totally abolish the discretionary 
power of the judges in assessing damages nor reduce the quantum of damages for 
personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. If one look close enough 
at the effects of the application of the section, one will see that the ambiguity in the 
wordings of the provisions and the absence of specific interpretation for the phrases 
used in the section allow for judges to exercise their discretion. Whether or not the 
ambiguity or the absence of interpretation is intentional is another question altogether. 
 
 
 
 
3.9 COMPARATIVE TABLE OF CLA 1956 (REV 1972) AND CLA 
1956 WITH REGARDS TO PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 
 
CLA 1956 (rev 1972) 
 
 
CLA 1956 
 
Under Common Law, the award for loss 
of expectation of life awarded as a 
separate heading. The assessment is up to 
the judge’s discretion. 
 
The award for loss of expectation of life 
as a separate heading is abolished by 
section 28A (2)(a). It is however assessed 
as part of pain and suffering under section 
28A (2)(b) provided that the plaintiff was 
aware of the loss. The assessment is up to 
the judge’s discretion. 
 
Under Common Law loss of pre-trial 
earnings awarded as separate heading. The 
multiplier is from the date of injury to the 
Although loss of pre-trial earnings is lump 
into the assessment of loss of future 
earnings, it can still be awarded as a 
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date of judgment. 
 
separate heading. The multiplier is from 
the date of injury to the date of judgment. 
The period however is deducted from the 
statutory multiplier for loss of future 
earnings in section 28A (2)(c). 
 
 
Loss of Future Earnings allowed under 
Common Law.  
- No pre-condition.  
- Compensation benefits from other 
compensation funds are not taken 
into consideration. 
- Only expense in earning / 
producing income was deducted 
from the assessment of 
multiplicand 
- The assessment of multiplier is 
based on plaintiff’s earning at the 
time of trial. Any increase or 
decrease in plaintiff’s earnings at 
the time of trial is factored in into 
the assessment based on judges’ 
discretion. 
-  The assessment of multiplier is 
based on judges’ discretion guided 
by the Common Law principle. 
 
Loss of Future Earnings provided in 
section 28A (2)(c). 
- 3 pre-conditions must be fulfilled. 
Plaintiff must be below fifty five 
(55) years old, receiving earning 
and in good health at the time of 
injury. 
- Compensation benefits from other 
compensation funds are not taken 
into consideration. 
-  Living expenses is to be deducted 
from the assessment of 
multiplicand.  
- Future increase in income is not 
considered. The assessment of 
multiplicand is based on plaintiff’s 
earnings at the time injury. 
- The assessment of multiplier is 
based on the statutory prescribed 
method. 
 
 
Loss of Future Earning Capacity allowed 
under Common Law 
- The unemployed and minors are 
allowed to claim.   
- Prospect of future increase in 
income is taken into account. 
- Assessment of multiplier and 
multiplicand is up to the judge’s 
discretion. 
 
 
Loss of Future Earning Capacity not 
provided for but still allowed under 
Common Law. 
- Only those who are receiving 
earning at the time of injury is 
allowed to claim. 
- Assessment of multiplier and 
multiplicand is up to the judge’s 
discretion. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECTS OF THE CLA 1956 ON JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
AND THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN FATAL ACCIDENT 
CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents are claims for 
compensation (damages) for the loss suffered by the accident victim (the deceased), his 
estate or his dependants due to the victim’s wrongful death. The cause of action arises 
when the negligent act or omission of the driver of the vehicle at fault causes the 
demise of the deceased. It exists irrespective of whether the deceased died 
instantaneously or survived for some time before succumbing to his injuries.
1
 Damages 
under fatal accident claims can be divided into four (4) main categories; damages 
awarded to the deceased’s estate,2 damages for loss of support awarded to the 
deceased’s dependants,3 damages for loss of services and consortiums awarded to 
deceased spouse or parents
4
 and bereavement.
5
 Although the right to these damages 
arises from the same cause of action, the damages does not overlap since they are only 
available to specific persons as provided in the Civil Law Act 1956.
6
 In Malaysia, the 
only statutory provision which provides for the assessment of damages for fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents are sections 7 and 8 of the CLA 
                                                 
1 Lim, Heng Seng, Assessment of Damages in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Claims: Principles and Practices, (Kuala 
Lumpur: Marsden Law Book, 1995), at 109.  
2 Also known as estate claims. Where the deceased did not die instantaneously, the pain and suffering, loss of amenities, loss of 
earnings as well as expenses which he bears between the time of injury and death would entitle him to claim for compensation. 
After the deceased die, this right of action is vested on his estate. 
3 Also known as dependency claims. Where the deceased’s death causes financial loss to his dependents due to cessation of 
financial support. The dependents are entitled to be compensated for the loss suffered. This right of action is independent of the 
right of action vested on deceased’s estate. 
4 Also known as claims for loss of service and consortium. 
5 Claim for the grief, sorrow and emotional anguish suffered by deceased’s close relatives. 
6 (Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1956”. 
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1956.  The same sections also provide for the assessment of damages in other type of 
fatal accident claim actions.  In addition to these sections, judges are also governed by 
the Common Law principles and decided cases.  
 
The Civil Law Enactment 1937
7
 was the first statutory provisions in Malaysia which 
recognizes the causes of actions under fatal accident claims.
8
 Section 3 provides the 
cause of action for damages for loss of support by deceased’s dependants while section 
4 allows deceased’s estate to substitute the right of action which originally belongs to 
the deceased (subject to some exceptions). Apart from providing for the cause of 
actions, section 3 and 4 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937 also contained provisions on 
the measure of damages, the beneficiaries to the claims, person who can bring the 
actions, the limitation period and the benefits which are not to be taken into 
consideration in the assessment of damages. The actual method of assessing the 
damages however was left to the discretion of the judges guided by the Common Law 
principles and decided cases. 
  
The Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1975
9
 and the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984
10
 
brought several changes in respect of the assessment of damages for fatal accident 
claims. These amendments are consolidated into the Civil Law Act 1956 (rev 1972)
11
 
to form the current CLA 1956. These changes are mainly adopted from the provisions 
in the English Administration of Justice Act 1982 (cap 53)
12
 with several 
                                                 
7 (F.M.S no 3 of 1937). Introduced the English Common Law to the Federated Malays States (Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negeri 
Sembilan). The provisions in the Enactment were extended to the Unfederated Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu 
and Johor) via the Civil Law (Extension) Ordinance 1951(F. of M. No 49 of 1951). The Civil Law Enactment 1937 was repealed 
and substituted with the Civil Law Ordinance 1956 (F. of M. No 5 of 1956), the Civil Law Act 1956 (Act 67)(rev 1972)  and later 
the CLA 1956. 
8 The provisions in the Civil Law Enactment 1937 were adopted from the Fatal Accident Act 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. cap.93) 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Fatal Accident Act 1846”) and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (cap 
41)(hereinafter referred to as “the Law Reform 1934”) in England.  
9 (Act A308). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLAA 1975”. The amendments were consolidated into the CLA 1956 (rev 1972).  
10 (Act A602). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLAA 1984”. The amendments were consolidated into the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). The 
amended Act is the current CLA 1956. 
11 (Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1956 (rev 1972)” 
12 (cap 53). Hereinafter referred to as “the AJA 1982”. 
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distinctiveness which are purely of our own making. The amendments especially the 
CLAA 1984 are not well received by the legal community in Malaysia. They are said to 
have altered many aspects of the law relating to the assessment of damages for loss of 
support and estate claims to the detriment of the claimants. 
 
Using similar approach as the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the effects of 
sections 7 and 8of the CLA 1956 on the assessment of damages in fatal accident claims 
arising out of motor vehicle accidents. It analyses the provisions from the perspective 
of the exercise of judicial discretion as well as the quantum of damages in the effort to 
answer the question of whether the CLA 1956 have abolish or fetter judges’ 
discretionary power in its effort to reduce the amount of damages being mated out by 
the courts as claimed. It also analyse whether the abolition or restriction (if any) 
imposed by the sections have any effect in reducing the amount of damages being 
awarded by the courts.            
 
As in the previous chapter, it must be emphasis that the cases cited in this chapter are 
also confined to cases involving motor vehicle accidents only.
13
 The discussion is also 
restricted to the heads of damages which are affected by the provisions in the CLA 
1956. The heads of damages which are not affected by the CLA 1956 are not discussed 
since they are beyond the scope of this research. Again, it should always be borne in 
mind that the term ‘discretion’ used throughout this chapter refers to the fact that in 
assessing the amount of damages for personal injury judges have to factor in various 
elements including the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties as well as the 
law, legal principles, judicial precedence and norms governing the issue at hand 
judiciously and not according to their whim and fancies. 
                                                 
13However, personal injury claims arising out of other cause of action are also cited occasionally due to their relevancy to the 
discussion at hand. 
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4.2 ABOLISHING THE AWARD FOR LOSS OF SERVICES AND 
CONSORTIUM 
Under the Common Law, parents or husband whose child or wife passed away due to 
an accident are entitle to claim compensation for the loss of services and society 
rendered to them by their child or wife. The damages claimable were known as 
damages for loss of service and consortium. The introduction of section 2(a) of the 
CLAA 1984 to amend section 7 (3) of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) have abolished these 
heads of damages from being awarded under fatal accident claims in Malaysia. The 
amended proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 reads:  
(iii) No damages shall be awarded to a parent of the ground only of his 
having been deprived of the services of a child; and no damages shall 
be awarded to a husband on the ground only of his  having been 
deprived of the services or society of his wife. (emphasis added) 
 
The abolition of the awards for loss of services and consortium can also be found in 
section 2 of the AJA1982. Other than abolishing the awards for loss of services and 
consortium, proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 also have some effects on the 
exercise of judicial discretion and the quantum of damages under fatal accident claims.  
] 
 
4.2.1 The Abolition of the Award for Loss of Service of Child or Wife  
Loss of services of a children or wife is defined as the loss suffered by the parents of a 
deceased child or the husband of a deceased wife in term of the performance of various 
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duties in their capacity as a child or wife.
14
 The ‘service’ is viewed as something that 
the parents or husband is depending on the deceased
15
 such as their services at home.
16
 
The quantum awarded was based on the judge’s estimation of a reasonable value of the 
service. It can either be calculated lump sum or based on multiplication method. All of 
which is done by applying the judge’s discretion to the fact of the case guided by the 
Common Law principles and decided cases. The task of estimating the value of the 
service is a difficult one especially when there is no monetary indicator for the value of 
service rendered. Judges usually will have to make an estimation of the value of the 
service by basing it on the prevalent rate of helper at that time and locality.
17
  
 
This head of damages is abolished by proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956.  
Judges now have to “disregard any contribution in terms of money or money's worth 
from the deceased child or wife”18 in the assessment of damages for fatal accident 
claims. Peh Swee Jin in Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor. (Suing as the Administrators of the 
Estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, Deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor
19
commented: 
“It is interesting to note in passing that after the date of the accident in this 
case, any claim for loss of consortium (society) and of services from a 
deceased wife was also abolished by the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 
1984.” 
 
                                                 
14 It originates from the proprietary right of a master towards his servant. A master may bring an action against the tortfeasor for the 
beating and maiming of his servant to recover damages for the loss of the servant’s service.This right was extended to persons ‘in 
the service of his domestics’. See Witt, John Fabian, From Loss of Service to Loss of Support: the Wrongful Death Statutes, the 
Origin of Modern Tort Law and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 23 March 2012, 
<http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Faculty/Witt_From_Loss_of_Services_to_Loss_of_Support.pdf> 
15 In Lee Sai Cheong v Wan Lim Cheong(1962) MLJ 259, the Court of Appeal rejected the claim for loss of service of a chid 
by deceased parents on the ground that the parent had failed to prove the loss the service which the child perform for the parent. 
Although deceased assisted his father to look after the father’s stock of building materials, the fact that the father did not employ 
other people to take over deceased’s job after his demise indicate that the father did not suffered any loss of deceased’s service. 
16 See Hay v Hughes [1975] 1 QB 790 and Chong Pik Sing & Anor v Ng Mun Bee & Ors [1985] 1 MLJ 433. 
17 Dass, S. Santhana, Personal Injury Claims, (Petaling Jaya: Alpha Sigma, 2000), at 50. 
18 Radhakrishnan, S., “Quantum of Damages in Personal Injury Claims” (1995) 3 Malayan Law Journal, xxix – xl, at xxxvi. See 
also Khoo, Guan Huat, “Assessment of Damages in Fatal Accident Claims and a Commentary of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 
1984”, (1993)1 Malayan Law Journal cxxix – cxxxviii, at cxxxiv. 
19 [1997] 3 MLJ 693. 
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Unfortunately, the effect of proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 in respect of 
judicial discretion in the assessment of damages and the quantum of damages for loss 
of services of child or wife is not as clear. Although judges are not allowed to award 
damages for loss of services of child or wife, their discretion in this respect is not 
totally abolished. Reason being; 
 
(a) Section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 
The effect of proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 on the discretionary power 
of the judges however is somewhat negated by section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. The 
phrase ‘together with any reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful act’ 
in section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 made it possible for judges to assess and award 
damages to compensate the cost to replace the services which were provided by the 
child or the wife. This was evidenced by the decision in Neo Kim Soon (Administrator 
of the estate of Phanna Mannechuang, deceased) v Subramanian a/l Ramanaidu & 
Anor.
20
 Mahadev Shankar JCA held:  
“It is a different matter altogether where a husband has not only lost his 
wife, but has also been put to monetary loss which has been the direct 
result of the negligence. Such loss in our view continues to be recoverable. 
We say this because s 7 (3) as it is presently worded not only empowers 
the court to compensate the claimant for any ‘loss of support’ but also for 
any reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful act’.”  
                                                 
20 [1995] 3 MLJ 435. See also Chong Pik Sing & Anor. v Ng Mun Bee & Ors [1985] 1 MLJ 433 and the decision by the Court of 
Appeal in KDE Recreation Bhd. v Low Han Ong & 6 Ors. (Rayuan Sivil No W-04-4-02) 
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Similar sentiment was echoed by in a Court of Appeal case of Hum Peng Sin v Lim Lai 
Hoon & Anor.
21
 Gopal Sri Ram in his judgement held: 
“In my judgment, what proviso (iii) to s 7(3) of the Act prohibits is an 
award for the loss of consortium or services where that is the sole head of 
claim. In my judgment the third proviso does not prohibit an award for the 
loss of the services provided by a wife when such a claim is coupled with 
another head of claim for either actually engaging a housekeeper.” 
 
 
In the event the parents or husband of a deceased child or wife manages to prove that 
they had incurred monetary loss which was caused by the need to replace the child or 
the wife’s services, judges are at liberty to assess and awards damages for this loss 
under section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. The most common losses which fall under this 
category are losses due to the cost of engaging the service of helper, housekeeper and 
baby sitter. The Court of Appeal in Sodah bt Haji Saad (sebagai isteri dan waris 
kepada Haji Abdullah bin Ahmad, simati) v Saleh bin Bakar & Anor.
22
exercised its 
discretion in assessing the loss of services of a husband by taking into account the 
husband’s age at the time of his demise and the fact that the loss being claimed was the 
husband’s assistance at home such as sweeping and going to the market for groceries. 
The damages was assessed based on the cost for employing part-time helper in rural 
areas as well as the longer life expectancy of a people living in those areas. Similarly, 
in Hum Peng Sin v Lim Lai Hoon & Anor.,
23
 the cost of hiring a maid to replace the 
service of a wife was assessed by taking into consideration wife’s age at the time of her 
demise, her probable retirement age and probable monthly salary of a maid.
24
 
                                                 
21 [2001] 4 MLJ 232. 
22 Rayuan Sivil No K-04-270-2004. 
23 [2001] 4 MLJ 232. 
24 The Court held: “For the cost of hiring a maid to replace the services rendered by the deceased, I think that a multiplier of ten is 
just. I derive this by subtracting 40 (the age of the deceased at the date of her death) from 55 (the age at which she would have 
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As such, proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 only abolishes the discretionary 
power of the judges to award damages for loss of service and to assess what constitute 
as reasonable value for service rendered by the child or wife. It does not prevent the 
judges from awarding damages to compensate the parents or husband for the expenses 
incurred in replacing the service once rendered by the child or wife.  
 
(b) The Introduction of the Award for Loss of Service of Husband 
The decision in Sodah bt Haji Saad (sebagai isteri dan waris kepada Haji Abdullah bin 
Ahmad, simati) v Saleh bin Bakar & Anor.
25
 brought up an interesting point with regard 
to this issue. The Supreme Court observed that proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 
1956  seems to have widened the judge’s power under fatal accident claims by allowing 
a new head of damages to emerge; loss of service of husband. Literal interpretation of 
proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 suggests that since the proviso deals solely 
with the loss of the services of a child or wife, it only abolishes the right of  parents or 
husband to claim for the loss of service their child or wife. The proviso does not extend 
to the loss of service of a husband. In allowing damages for loss of service of a husband 
to a wife when her husband was killed in a motor accident, the learned Gopal Sri Ram 
JCA held: 
“Be it noted that it does not say that no damages shall be awarded to a 
wife on the ground only of her having been deprived of the services or 
society of her husband. If Parliament had intended to extend the proviso to 
                                                                                                                                              
retired), multiplying the difference by two and dividing the product by three. In other words, 55 - 40 x ⅔= 10. Now, for the 
multiplicand, I consider a sum of RM200 per month to be adequate. The total sum amounts exactly to RM24,000 that is 200 x 10 x 
12 = 24,000. I would round this off at RM23,000 taking into account the various vicissitudes.” How the Court considered the 
‘adequacy’ of RM 200 as multiplicand was however not explained. Similarly the reason why deceased retirement age was taken 
into consideration as a factor in determining the multiplier was also left unexplained. Since a child, wife or mother’s service to the 
household does not end when she retires: it is incomprehensible how fifty-five was taken as the maximum ‘service’ age. 
25 Op. cit. 
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wives, it could have easily done so by employing the word “spouse”. Yet 
it has chosen not to do this. It follows, in my judgment, that a wife is 
entitled to recover damages for the services performed by her husband 
before his death. Statute apart, the common law makes no distinction in 
this regard between the loss of services rendered by a wife or a husband. 
All that the common law requires is that the loss should result from the 
relationship between the dependants and the deceased. And it admits of 
compensation for the loss of gratuitous services rendered by the deceased. 
Support for these propositions may be found in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 
18th edition page 1603.” 
By virtue of the above interpretation, judges now have the discretion to assess and 
award damages for loss of services of husband.  
 
The ‘creation’ of this new cause of action is however arguable considering that it has 
neither Common Law origin nor statutory recognition. A wife under Common Law has 
no cause of action for the loss of services of her husband. The inferior status of a wife 
under the under the old custom does not entitle her to be compensated for the loss of 
services rendered to her by her husband.
26
 Since the award for loss of service of 
husband has never been recognized as part of the damages in fatal accident claims by 
the Common Law, it is only reasonable that section 2 of the AJA 1982 did not 
mentioned anything about abolishing a wife’s right to claim damages for loss of 
services of her husband.  
 
                                                 
26 Blackstone reasoned out the above by saying: “The inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care or assistance of the 
superior as the superior is held over to have in those of the inferior, and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury. The wife 
cannot recover damages for beating her husband for she hath no separate interest in anything during her coverture. The child hath 
no property in his father or guardian, as they have on him, for the sake of giving him education and nurture... And so, the servant 
whose master is disabled... suffers no injury and is therefore entitled to no action for any battery of imprisonment which such 
master may have to endure.” 
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Similarly, since our law on personal injury and fatal claims are based on the English 
Common Law, the cause of action for loss of services of husband has never been 
accorded to the wives in Malaysia. Therefore, there is no reason for our Legislature to 
include the abolition of the award for loss of services of husband into proviso (iii) of 
the CLA 1956. Something which had never existed need not be abolished. As such, it is 
submitted that despite the Supreme Court decision in Sodah bt Haji Saad (sebagai 
isteri dan waris kepada Haji Abdullah bin Ahmad, simati) v Saleh bin Bakar & Anor.
27
, 
above, proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 cannot be read as creating a new 
head of damages for loss of service of husband. 
 
Nevertheless, damages for loss of services of husband can be awarded under section 
7(3) of the CLA 1956.  The term ‘together with any reasonable expenses incurred as a 
result of the wrongful act’ allow judges to award damages to a wife provided that she 
can prove that she had suffered monetary loss in order to replace the services once 
rendered by her deceased husband. As such, despite the faulty reasoning for allowing 
damages for loss of services of husband in Sodah bt Haji Saad (sebagai isteri dan 
waris kepada Haji Abdullah bin Ahmad, simati) v Saleh bin Bakar & Anor.,
28
the 
sentiment behind it is correct. In situation where a wife suffered monetary loss due to 
expenses incurred in replacing the service of her husband, judges have the discretion to 
award damages to compensate the expenses incurred.  
 
As such, it is concluded that proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 only 
abolishes the discretionary power of the judges to award damages for loss of service of 
child or wife as a separate head of damages. The abolition does not carry much effect 
on the discretionary power of the judges or the quantum of damages since the effects of 
                                                 
27 Op. cit. 
28 Op. cit. 
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the abolition is negated by section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 which allows parents or 
husband to be compensated for any ‘reasonable expenses’ incurred in replacing the 
service rendered by their child or wife. The discretion remains since the section does 
not specify how the amount which constitute ‘reasonable expenses’ is to be assessed. 
Section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 also allows judges to use their discretion in awarding 
damages to a wife to compensate her for the expenses incurred to replace the services 
rendered by her husband. Since damages for loss of services of husband has never been 
recognized before, the introduction of proviso (iii) to section 7(3) and section 7(3) of 
the CLA 1956 seems to have widened the discretionary power of the judges in fatal 
accident claims. Section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 therefore retains the discretionary power 
of the judges in the assessment of damages for fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents. 
 
Since judges are allowed to assess and award damages to compensate the loss of 
services rendered by the child, wife and husband, the effect of proviso (iii) to section 
7(3) of the CLA 1956 in reducing the quantum of damages awarded under fatal 
accident claims is limited to cases where the services rendered by the child, wife and 
husband were not replaced or to cases where the parents, husband or wife did not incur 
any loss in replacing the services rendered by their child, wife or husband. In situations 
where the services were replaced and loss incurred in order to replace the services, the 
quantum of damages for fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents 
remains the same as before the introduction of the CLA 1956. 
141 
 
4.2.2 The Abolition of the Award for Loss of Consortium  
The claim for loss of services of wife is usually brought together with the claim for loss 
consortium.
29
 Consortium is the comfort, society and services of one spouse.
30
  “It is 
the companionship, love affection, comfort, mutual services, sexual intercourse – all 
belong to the married. Taken together to make up the consortium.”31 It is a Common 
Law head of damages available only to the husband for the loss of society and 
consortium of his wife in the event where the wife was injured and unable to provide 
the same service or consortium to the husband.
32
 A wife however has no similar right to 
claim under Common Law.
33
  
 
In theory, the abolition of the award for loss of consortium of wife by proviso (iii) to 
section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 also abolishes judges’ discretion in assessing and 
awarding the damages. Judges no longer have the discretion to assess what constitute 
the reasonable value of a wife’s consortium. The reality however is different. The 
provision has no effect on either the exercise of judicial discretion or the quantum of 
damages being awarded in fatal accident claims. The application of section 7 of the 
CLA 1956 is confined to losses resulting from death. It follows that the abolition of the 
award for loss of consortium in proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the Act is also confined 
to loss of consortium suffered by a husband as the result of his wife’s demise. Loss of 
consortium of wife however has never been recognized under the Common Law or 
adopted by any statute as part of damages claimable under fatal accident claims.  
 
                                                 
29 Pengarah Institut Penyelidikan Perubatan v Intra Devi [1988] 1 MLJ 18. 
30 Dass, S. Santhana, op.cit. (2000), at 47. 
31 Per Birket J in Best v Samuel Fox & Co Ltd (1951) 2 All ER 116, 125 CA  
32
 The cause of action originates from a Latin expression: ‘per quod servitium et consortium amisit’, translated as ‘in consequence 
of which he lost her society and services’. Similar to loss of service, los of consortium is also based on the husband’s position as a 
master of the household: hence the element of service. The cause of action however gradually weaned from service to the element 
of consortium. 
33 Best v Samuel Fox & Co Ltd., op. cit. 
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Loss of consortium under Common Law is only available in personal injury claims. A 
husband is allowed to bring a separate action against the defendant independent of his 
wife’s personal injury suit in order to claim for the loss of consortium of his wife due to 
the injuries suffered by his wife. The same right is not accorded to the husband when 
his wife dies.
34
 When the Fatal Accident Act 1846
35
 was enacted to allow a claim to be 
filed for losses resulting from the death of another person, the Act did not recognize the 
award for loss of consortium as part of damages in fatal accident claim. The provisions 
in Fatal Accident Act 1846 limit themselves to pecuniary losses suffered by deceased’s 
dependants due to deceased demise. It does not extend to other types of losses.
36
 As 
such, loss of consortium remained a creature of the Common Law, hence limited only 
to loss of consortium in the event of the wife being injured, not deceased. Since any 
person claiming for damages accorded by the Common Law or the Fatal Accident Act 
1846 must adhere to the principles enumerated in the decided cases or the provisions in 
the Act,
37
 a husband is barred from claiming loss of consortium for his wife’s demise as 
it is not provided for under the Common Law and no legislative provision had ventured 
to give statutory right to the claim.  
 
Similarly, when the Malaysian Parliament adopts the provisions in the Fatal Accident 
Act 1846 into section 4 of the Civil Law Enactment 1937, the application of the section 
is also limited to the assessment of the award for pecuniary loss suffered by the 
dependants only. It does not extend to other type of fatal claim damages under 
Common Law. As such, loss of consortium of wife had never been recognized or 
                                                 
34 Clerk & Lindsell On Torts, 13th edi. page 450 paragraph 843 as cited in Dass, K.S., Quantum in Accident Cases. (vol. 1) (Kuala 
Lumpur: Malaysian Law Publishers, 1975) at 41. 
35 (9 & 10 Vict. cap.93). Hereinafter referred to as “the Fatal Accident act 1846”. 
36 Lord Wright in Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd. (1942) 1 All ER 657 held: “The Act 1846, section 2 provides 
that the action is to be for the benefit of the wife or other member of the family and the jury (or judge) are to give such damages as 
may be thought proportioned to the injury resulting to such parties from the death. The damages are to be based on the reasonable 
expectation of pecuniary benefit or benefit reducible to money value...” 
37 Rutter, Michael F., Handbook on Damages for Personal Injuries and Death in Singapore and Malaysia, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: 
Butterworth Asia, 1993) at 597. 
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awarded in fatal accident claims in Malaysia. In Chong Pik Sing v Ng Mun Bee,
38
 the 
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and disallowed the award for loss 
of consortium on the ground that such an award would be “contrary to the authorities 
and the law”.39 Perusal of local literature and case laws also did not reveal any case 
which directly deals with the award for loss of consortium in fatal accident claims other 
than in Chan Ah Fong & Ors. v Goh Kim.
40
The court in this case allowed $3250 to the 
husband for loss of consortium. Detail of the claim and judgment were however 
unavailable. As such the grounds for allowing such award cannot be ascertained.  
 
Since a husband’s right for the award for loss of consortium in fatal accident claim is 
neither recognized under Common Law nor the earlier revision of the CLA 1956, the 
abolition of this head of damages by proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 19456 is 
immaterial. The provision merely abolished something which has never been 
recognized by the law. Judges, even with the discretionary power given to them would 
not be able to assess and award damages for loss of consortium in fatal accident claim. 
Proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 therefore has no effect on the exercise of 
judicial discretion in the assessment of damages in fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents. Similarly, it also has no effect in reducing the quantum of 
damages awarded under this claim. 
 
 
 
                                                 
38Op. cit. 
39 The court however maintained the award for los of service since it can constitute part of the pecuniary loss which a wife 
gratuitously rendered to her husband. 
40 Kuala Lumpur Civil Suit No 278 of 1971 (unreported) as cited in Dass, K. S., op. cit., (1975), at 41.  
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4.3 ABOLISHING AWARD FOR LOSS OF EXPECTATION OF 
LIFE 
Similar to the award for damages for loss of expectation of life in personal injury 
claims, the award for damages for loss of expectation of life in fatal accident claims is 
also awarded to compensate for the deprivation of one’s normal life and the enjoyment 
thereof.
41
 However, since the deceased had succumbed to his injuries, the cause of 
action is vested on his estate. The award therefore becomes part of the awards in estate 
claims. The assessment of damages is based on whether the court perceive that the 
deceased will lead a predominantly happy and fulfilling life had he did not succumbed 
to the injury. The award is abolished by section 3 of the CLAA 1984 which amended 
section 8(2)(a) of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). The new section 8(2)(a) of the CLA 1956 
reads: 
Where a cause of action survive as aforesaid for the benefit of the estate of 
a deceased person, the damages recoverable for the benefit of the estate of 
that person- 
(a) shall not include any exemplary damages, any damages for 
bereavement made under subsection (3A) of section 7, any 
damages for loss of expectation of life and any damages for 
loss of earning in respect of any period after that person death; 
(emphasis added) 
 
Unlike section 28A (2)(a) of the CLA 1956, section 8(2)(a) of the CLA 1956 has no 
corresponding provision in the AJA 1982.
42
 The wording in section 8(2)(a) of the CLA 
1956 clearly prohibits the deceased’s estate from claiming damages for loss of 
                                                 
41 Dass, K.S., op. cit. (1975), at 35. 
42 Section 1(1)(a) of the AJA 1982 limits itself to claim for personal injury only.   
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expectation of life in any form. The abolition of the award is primarily due to the fact 
that the amount awarded under this heading is small. It would be insignificant if 
compared to the amount awarded under other head of damages.
43
 As such, it would be 
futile and superfluous to continue allowing for this head of damages under fatal 
accident claims.
44
  
 
Together with abolishing the award for loss of expectation of life in fatal accident 
claims, section 8(2)(a) of the CLA 1956 also abolishes judges’ discretion to assess what 
constitute a ‘predominantly happy life’, to determine whether deceased would have 
lead a predominantly happy life had he did not succumbed to the injuries and to award 
damages under this heading.  
 
Despite its effect in abolishing judges’ discretionary power in the assessment of 
damages for loss of expectation of life in fatal accident claims, section 8(2)(a) of the 
CLA 1956 does not contribute much in reducing the quantum of damages under this 
heading. Previously, damages for loss of expectation of life was rarely awarded as a 
separate head of damages. It was usually included as part of the award for loss of 
support.
45
 This was evidenced in Amar Singh v Chin Kiew,
46
 where Thompson J. held: 
“in cases of this sort damages recovered for loss of expectation of life 
must be taken into account in assessing damages for loss of support” 
                                                 
43 Parliamentary Debates, Representative, Sixth Parliament, Second Session, 18th July 1984, 3319 (YAB Radzi Sheikh Ahmad). 
44 The inability to mathematically assess the loss of the prospect of a happy life in term of monetary value is also one of the reasons 
behind the abolition. The Manitoba Law Reform Commission in its Working Paper, Rationalizing Actionable Fatalities Claims and 
Damages, June 1977 cited in Verupillai, Jeyaratnam, Damages: Loss of Expectation of Life Survival and Deductibility, (Singapore: 
Malayan Law Journal, 1984), at 13 stated “Lord Wright in the case of Rose v Ford (1937) AC 826 gives us the theoretical basis for 
the claim, but he does not go one step further and lay down precise guidelines for the actual assessment of damages for the loss of 
expectation of life.” 
45 Dass, K.S., op. cit., (1975), at 983. 
46 (1960) 26 MLJ 77. Similarly, in Liew Moi & Anor. v Dil Bahadur Bura & Ors. (1963) 27 MLJ 22, the court refused to allow the 
claim for loss of expectation of life as a separate head of damages. The award was considered merged in the award for loss of 
dependency in section 7. The merger is even more evidenced in the case of Wong Kuee v Pahang Lin Siong Motor Co. Ltd. (1962) 
28 MLJ lxxxiii where the amount for the award for loss of support was set aside since the amount to be awarded for loss 
expectation of life and pain and suffering was smaller than the amount for the award for loss of support. As such it is clear that the 
amount awarded for loss of expectation of life was generally regarded as part of the award for loss of support that in event both 
head of damages were awarded, the award for loss of expectation of life will not be awarded at all. 
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Even in cases where the damages was awarded as a separate head of damages, the 
amount was very minimal. Perusal of the cases shows that the judges had always 
awarded a moderate sum for loss of expectation of life. The amount usually in the 
region of RM 3000 to RM 6500.
47
 It started at RM 2500 to RM 3000 in the fifties 
(1950’). The quantum progressed to the region of RM 3000 to RM 350048 in the sixties 
(1960’) and seventies (1970’), RM 400049 in the eighties (1980’) and RM 5000 to RM 
6500
50
 in the nineties (1990).  
 
Therefore, it is submitted that although the abolition of the award for loss of 
expectation of life in fatal accident claims by section 8(2)(a) of the CLA 1956 has 
indeed bar the exercise of judicial discretion under this head of damages, it however 
does not contribute much in reducing the quantum of damages awarded by the courts. 
The judges, despite having a wide discretion in awarding damages under this heading 
had adhered to what Thomson CJ termed as ‘judicial legislation’ in Lee Sai Cheong v 
Wan Lim Cheong
51
and awarded a relatively moderate and almost consistent award 
throughout the years. 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 See cases cited in Verupillai, Jeyaratnam, op.cit., at 33 -36. Also see Parliamentary Debate, op. cit., at 3319, where YAB Radzi 
Sheikh Ahmad said that the award for loss of expectation of life was generally at RM 4500. 
48 See Lee Sai Cheong v Wan Lim Cheong, op. cit., reduced the award from RM 5000 to 3000Thomson CJ held at 262 “I would say 
that in this country at the present time this court should express the view that the conventional figure in the case of a young adult 
should be RM3000 and that view should be accepted by the judges.” See also Foon Moon Yeow v Tan Sek Kee & Ors[1973] 2 MLJ 
119 and Seenivasan & Anor v Lim Yew Seng (1961) MLJ 22. 
49 See Chiang Boon Fatt v Lembaga Kemajuan Negeri Pahang & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 89 and Thangavelu v Chia Kok Bin [1981] 2 
MLJ 277. 
50 See Noorianti Zainol Abidin & Ors v Tang Lei Nge, [1990] 2 MLJ 242, Chua Kim Suan (Adminsitratrix of the Estate of Teoh Tek 
Lee) & Anor v Government of Malaysia & Anor[1994] 1 MLJ 394 and Lee Cheng Yee (suing as Administrator of the Estate of Chia 
Miew Hein) v Tiu Soon Siang (t/a Tiyor Soon Tiok & Son Co) & Anor. [1998] 2 MLJ 253. 
51 Op. cit. 
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4.4 INTRODUCING THE AWARD FOR BEREAVEMENT 
The award for bereavement is awarded to compensate deceased’s close relatives for the 
grief, sorrow, sadness and emotional suffering suffered due deceased’s demise. It was 
first introduced in Malaysia by section 2 (a) of the CLAA 1984. The section originated 
from section 2(a) of the AJA 1982.
52
 Section 2 (a) of the CLAA 1984 introduced 
section 7(3A) of the CLA 1956. Section 7(3A) of the CLA 1956 reads: 
An action under this section may consist of or include a claim for 
damages for bereavement and, subject to subsection (3D), the sum to be 
awarded as damages under this subsection shall be ten thousand ringgit. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Other than introducing the award for bereavement as the new head of damages 
claimable under fatal accident claims, The CLA 1956 also ensures that the damages for 
bereavement is awarded only to specific person
53
 and at a fixed amount.
54
 It also 
provides specific method for dividing the damages among the beneficiaries.
55
 Judges 
have no discretion to in these regards. The absence is reflected in the specific nature of 
the provisions in sections 7(3A) to 7(3E) of the CLA 1956. Judges have no discretion 
to allow persons not listed under subsection 3B to claim, to vary the quantum of 
damages  or to decide how the RM10,000 damages is to be divided between the 
beneficiaries. 
 
The absence of any discretionary power to vary the quantum of damages to be awarded 
for bereavement had caused two (2) attempts to change the statutory quantum in section 
                                                 
52 Also see Parliamentary Debate, op. cit. at 3324, where YAB Radzi Sheikh Ahmad said that the AJA had substituted the award 
for loss of expectation of life with the award for bereavement. 
53 Section 7(3B) of the CLA 1956 specify that the award for bereavement can only be awarded to deceased’s spouse and parents 
(provided that deceased is a minor and unmarried).  
54 Section 7(3A) of the CLA 1956 specify that the quantum of damages to be awarded for bereavement is RM 10,000. The amount 
is fixed and variable only by the Yang Dipertuan Agong. See section 7(3D) of the CLA 1956. 
55 Section 7(3C) of the CLA 1956 specify that the damages must be divided equally between deceased’s parents. 
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7(3A) of  the CLA 1956 using the ‘back door’. In Hazimah Muda & Anor v Ab Rahim 
Ab Rahman & Anor.
56
 deceased’s two wives appealed against the decision of the 
Session Court claiming that since both of them are deceased’s legal spouses, they each 
have separate action against the defendant for the amount specified in section 7(3A) of  
the CLA 1956.
57
 Another attempt of this nature was brought up for appeal to the 
Federal Court in Wan Bte Mahmood  dan Che Gayah bte Hashim v Abdul Zamri bin 
Abdul Rahman
58
 where the counsel for the appellant contended that the Legislature had 
used the word ‘spouse’ in singular because non-Muslim cannot have more than one 
wife. Section 7 (3A) however should be read together with section 4(3) of the 
Interpretation Act 1967
59
 in situations involving Muslim polygamous marriages to 
allow plurality to be read into a word with singular meaning. Therefore, each wife 
should be entitled to RM 10,000 each. 
 
Although the above appeals were dismissed by the respective courts
60
 the appellants 
arguments are not without merits. Since the term ‘spouse’ is not defined by the 
interpretation section of the CLA 1956 or section 7(11) of the Act, referral can be made 
to the Interpretation Act 1967. Thus, allowing for the possibility that the term ‘spouse’ 
to be read as providing for more than one wives. Section 4(3) of the Interpretation Act 
1967 states: 
Words and expressions in the singular include the plural, and words 
and expressions in the plural include the singular (emphasis added) 
                                                 
56 [2001] 5 CLJ 511. 
57 The trial court allowed their claim for bereavement but directed that the RM10,000 was to be divided equally between the two of 
them. 
58 (Federal Court Notis Usus No 08-108-2006) as cited in Nasser Hamid, Personal Injury & Fatal Accident Claims: Civil Law Act 
1956, (Petaling Jaya: Gavel Publications, 2008), at 7.  
59 (Act 388). Hereinafter referred to as “the Interpretation Act 1967”. 
60 Muhammad Kamil Awang J in Hazimah Muda & Anor v Ab Rahim Ab Rahman & Anor, op. cit. and Datuk S. Augustine Paul in 
Wan Bte Mahmood  dan Che Gayah bte Hashim v Abdul Zamri bin Abdul Rahman, op. cit. held that the intention of the CLA 1956 
is to limit the award for bereavement for spouse at RM10,000 without taking into consideration of the plurality of the spouses 
under personal or customary law.  Datuk S. Augustine Paul in his judgement held: "Whether it is morally wrong is not our 
business. You raise it in Parliament.” 
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Applying this section to subsection 7(3B) of the CLA 1956 would enable the 
singularity of the term ‘spouse’ to be read as plural, thus, allowing judges to award RM 
10,000 to each wives in a polygamous marriages. The ‘plurality’ of the term ‘spouse’ if 
read in this manner will not contradict section 7(3A) since each wife would still be 
entitle to only RM 10,000 for bereavement.  
 
It is puzzling why the Legislature in its wisdom omitted to specify whether wives in a 
valid Muslim polygamous marriage must share the RM 10,000 knowing well that 
Muslims are allowed to have more than one wives and Muslims constitute the majority 
of the local populations. The issue become even more puzzling considering that section 
7 (3C) of the CLA 1956 specifically provides that the RM 10,000 is to be divided 
equally between deceased’s parents. Since there is nothing in the whole CLA 1956 
which prevents the Legislature to provide for the same provision in respect of 
deceased’s wives, the absence of the provision puzzling. Why would the Legislature 
distinguished between parents and wives?  
 
The introduction of section 7(3A) of the CLA 1956 has increase the quantum of 
damages in fatal accident claims. Although the amount to be awarded for bereavement 
is limited to RM 10,000, this amount is still an addition to the quantum of damages 
considering that bereavement has never been awarded prior to the CLA 1956. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the CLA 1956 does not accord the judges with discretion 
in respect of the award bereavement in fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accident. In addition, rather than reducing the quantum of damages in this type 
of claims, the Act had increased it by allowing the additional RM 10,000. 
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4.5 INTRODUCING THE AWARD FOR LOSS OF SUPPORT 
The dependants of a motor accident victim are entitled to claim for the loss of financial 
support suffered as the result of the victim’s demise.61 This head of damages is known 
as damages for loss of support or loss of dependency. The award is provided by 
sections 7(1) and 7(3) of the CLA 1956. The sections are the result of section 2 of the 
CLAA 1984. The amended provisions have some effects on the discretionary power of 
the judges in the assessment of damages for loss of support and the quantum of 
damages under this head of damages. These effects are best illustrated by breaking 
them into the following sub-headings: 
 
4.5.1 Substituting the Measure of Damages  
Section 2(a) of the CLAA 1984 substituted the measure of damages in section 7(3) of 
the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) from being the amount that the court ‘thinks proportioned to 
the loss resulting from the death’ to being the amount to ‘compensate... for any loss of 
support suffered…”.62 The new section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 reads:  
(3) The damages which the party who shall be liable to under Subsection 
(1) to pay to the party for whom and for whose benefit the action is 
brought shall, subject to this section be such as will 
compensate the party for whom and whose benefit the action is 
brought for any loss of support suffered together with any 
reasonable expenses incurred as result of the wrongful act, 
neglect or default for the party liable under section 1;... 
(emphasis added) 
                                                 
61 Dass, S. Santhana, op. cit., (2000), at 119. 
62 Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at 766. 
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The substitution of the measure of damages from ‘loss resulting from the death’ to ‘loss 
of support’, is an attempt by the Legislature to further clarify the award to cover only 
the pecuniary losses suffered by the dependants by virtue of them being dependants of 
the deceased.
63
 It includes any “pecuniary provisions which furnishes a livelihood, a 
source of means of living, subsistence, sustenance, maintenance or living.”64 Therefore, 
the judges’ discretion in assessing and awarding damages under this section is limited 
only to the financial loss suffered by deceased’s dependants in their capacity as 
dependants. It does not extend to the financial loss which was not for the benefit of the 
dependants. This effect was seen in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng,
65
 where the 
Supreme Court gave the term ‘loss of support’ a restrictive interpretation66 by limiting 
it to “financial loss which he sustained as dependants and not in any other way”.67 The 
plaintiff who was receiving RM 750 from her deceased son prior to his demise was 
awarded only RM 375 per month as multiplicand for loss of support under sections 7(1) 
and (3) of the CLA 1956. The Court was unable to allow her the extra RM 375 since 
the money was not for her benefit, but was for the upkeep of deceased’s siblings. Since 
deceased’s siblings were not ‘dependants’ by virtue of the sub-sections (2) and (11) of 
the same section, they were not entitled to the award for loss of support under sections 
7(1) and (3) of the CLA 1956. 
 
However, to conclude that the so called ‘restricted interpretation’ of damages for ‘loss 
of support’ in section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 differs greatly from the interpretation of 
damages ‘proportioned to the loss resulting from the death’ in the section 7 (3) of the 
CLA 1956 (rev 1972) to the extent that it abolishes the judges’ discretion in assessing 
                                                 
63 Clause 2 of the Explanatory Statement to the Civil Law (Amendment) Bill explained that the changes made to section 7 of the 
Act were made in order to provide “for a more definitive statement of the purpose of the dependency claim...” 
64 Per Jeffry Tan in Muhammad bin Hashim v Teow Teik Chai [1996] 1 CLJ 615. 
65 [1994] 3 MLJ 233. See also Muhammad bin Hashim v Teow Teik Chai, op. cit. 
66 Balan, P., “Damages for Personal Injuries Causing Death: A Critical Survey”, (2004) Journal of Malaysian and Comparative 
Law, 45 – 67, at 58. 
67 Id. at 59. 
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damages under the section is not entirely correct. Although the wording in section 7(3) 
of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) seems to allow judges to compensate deceased’s 
dependants of any damages as it thinks fit proportionated to the loss suffered due to the 
death of the deceased, the section never conferred an absolute discretion to the judges 
to award everything and anything so long as it is proportionated to the loss. ‘Loss 
resulting from the death’ in section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) had been 
judicially accepted as the loss of financial support suffered by deceased’s dependants. 
The term was defined as compensation for “benefit in money or money’s worth arising 
out of the relationship which would have accrued to the person for whom the action is 
brought from the deceased if the deceased had survived but has been lost by reason of 
his death”.68 Therefore, substituting the measure of damages from ‘loss resulting from 
the death’ to ‘loss of support’ has no apparent effect on judges’ discretion in assessing 
and awarding damages for loss of support. Despite the differences in the wording, the 
interpretation and application of the two (2) measures of damages is the same. 
 
Peh Swee Chin SCJ in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng v Lim Yoke Eng,
69
 noted the 
redundancy of substituting the measure of damages and held that the introduction of the 
phrase ‘loss of support’ in section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 “has not added anything new 
to the state of law, but only incorporated what the court had always decided before such 
an addition, that such damages were in fact loss of support.”70 The substitution of the 
measure of damages is “not intended to change the nature of or to limit the scope of 
damages which are recoverable in a dependency claim.”71It only give a statutory nod to 
what had always been in practice prior to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 and nothing 
more. It does not in any way abolish or restrict the judges’ discretion in the assessment 
                                                 
68 Per Lord Diplock in Malyon v Plummer (1963) 2 All ER 344. 
69 Op cit. 
70 Dass, S. Santhana, “Chan Chin Min v. Ibrahim Ismail - the Unsettled Dispute as to Whether the Court Has the Authority to 
Reduce the Statutory Multiplier in Dependency Claims”, (2006) 3 Current Law Journal i-xliii. 
71 Lim, Heng Seng, op. cit., at 183. 
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of damages in fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents since the 
restriction has already been set in place by the judges themselves. 
 
Similarly, since judges had always interpreted damage ‘proportioned to the loss 
resulting from the death’ as damages for loss of support, substituting the measure of 
damages also brought no monetary effect to the amount of damages being awarded by 
the courts in fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. 
 
4.5.2 Confining the Awards to Statutory Dependants 
The persons who are entitle to be awarded with damages for loss of support under 
section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 are listed in sections 7(2) and (11) of the Act.
72
 Section 
(2) of the CLA 1956 reads: 
(2) Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, 
parents and child, if any, of the person whose death has been so 
caused and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor of the 
person deceased. (emphasis added) 
The CLA 1956 is very stringent with regard to the beneficiaries to the award for loss of 
support. Only deceased’s spouse, parent and child are considered as ‘statutory 
dependants’ and entitled to claim for damages under this heading. The Act even went 
further to define the exact meaning of each and every relationship in section 7(11) of 
the Act: 
(11) In this section unless the context otherwise requires –  
                                                 
72 These sub-sections are not amended by the CLAA 1984. The provisions in these two sub-sections remain the same as per the 
CLA 1956 (rev 1972).  
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  “parent” includes father, mother, grand-father, and grand-mother; 
  “child” includes son, daughter, grandson, grand-daughter, stepson 
and stepdaughter; 
  Provided that in deducing any relationship referred to in this sub-
section any illegitimate person or any person who has been 
adopted, or whose adoption has been registered, in accordance 
with the provision of any written law shall be treated as being or 
as having been the legitimate offspring of his mother and reputed 
father or, as the case may be, of his adopters.   
 
The effects of these two sub-sections on the exercise of judicial discretion in the 
assessment of damages for loss of support are two (2) folds. First, they prohibit judges 
from awarding the damages to persons not listed under section 7(2) and 7(11) of the 
CLA 1956. Second, they prohibit judges from allowing persons not listed under the 
sections to benefit from the award even when the claim was filed by persons entitle to 
receive the award. Peh Swee Chin SCJ discussed these effects in length in the case of 
Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng.
73
 He concluded that the damages for loss of support 
is limited only to the portion of deceased’s contribution which is used by the statutory 
dependants for their upkeep. Since siblings are not included as ‘statutory dependants’ 
under section 7 (2) of the CLA 1956, judges have no discretion to include the portion of 
deceased’s contribution which was used for his siblings in the assessment of damages 
for loss of support. This is irrespective of the fact that the siblings were actually 
depending on the deceased for their livelihood. The same view was also adopted by 
Edgar Joseph Jr. SCJ in his dissenting opinion: 
                                                 
73 Op. cit. 
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“… the loss suffered must be persona to the class of defendants specified 
in section 7(2) so that a loss suffered by any other person not falling 
within that class must be excluded.” 
 
The absence of judges’ discretion in determining the beneficiaries to the award for loss 
of support had caused some hardship on the claimants. Because of this hardship, the 
judges in Chong Sin Sen v Janaki a/p Chellamuthu (suing as the widow of Muniappa 
Pillai a/l Maritha Muthoo, deceased, on behalf of herself and the dependants of the 
deceased)
74
 and Joremi bin Kimin & Anor v Tan Sai Hong
75
insisted that judges still 
have the discretion to allow a ‘wife’ in customary marriage to receive damages for loss 
of support. The High Court in Chong Sin Sen v Janaki a/p Chellamuthu (suing as the 
widow of Muniappa Pillai a/l Maritha Muthoo, deceased, on behalf of herself and the 
dependants of the deceased)
76
in deciding whether a widow whose marriage was a 
customary marriage and not registered according to the Law Reform (Marriage and 
Divorce) Act 1976
77
 was a ‘wife’ according to section 7(2) of the CLA 195678 held that 
since there is no requirement in the CLA 1956 that the term ‘wife’ is to be confined to a 
woman whose marriage was solemnized and registered under the prevailing law 
relating marriage and divorce,
79
 a ‘wife’ should include those married under customary 
rites. The Court of Appeal in Joremi bin Kimin & Anor v Tan Sai Hong
80
also shared 
the same opinion. It was held that the validity of a customary marriage under the Law 
Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 have no bearing on the wife’s entitlement to 
claim for loss of support under section 7(3) of the CLA 1956.  
 
                                                 
74 [1997] 3 AMR 2217. 
75 [2001] 1 AMR 675 (CA). 
76 Op. cit. 
77 Applicable only to non-Muslims. See section 3 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. 
78 Unlike the terms ‘parent’ and ‘child’, the terms ‘wife’ and ‘husband’ are not defined in section 7(11) of the Act. 
79 Dass, S. Santhana, op. cit.(2000), at 128. 
80 [2001] 1 AMR 675 (CA). 
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The absence of specific interpretation of the term ‘wife’ and ‘husband’ in section 7(11) 
of the Act allow judges the discretion to interpret the terms in their natural meaning, 
which include wife and husband of customary marriages. The courts in both cases 
acknowledged that the purpose of section 7(2) of the CLA 1956 is to protect the 
dependants of the deceased and not to determine the legal status of the spouse. Thus, in 
deciding whether a wife or husband is a ‘wife’ or ‘husband’ in pursuance of section 
7(2) of the CLA 1956, the judges are not in any manner deciding on the validity of the 
marriage.
81
 Therefore, the judges still have the discretion to award damages for loss of 
support to ‘wife’ and ‘husband’ who are not married to the deceased according to the 
prevailing law on marriage. 
 
It is however humbly submitted that the decisions in the above cases are not entirely 
reliable to prove that judges have the discretion to interpret ‘wife’ and ‘husband’ as to 
include persons who are not married under the prevailing law of marriage. The 
decisions can be challenged on two grounds. First for their reliance on the definition of 
‘wife’ and ‘married woman’ under the  Married Woman Act 1957 and the Income Tax 
Act 1967. Although both Acts includes those women who had undergone customary 
marriage as wife and married woman, the definitions in these two Acts should be 
confined to the Act only and should not be used to construe the word in the CLA 1956. 
Second, for their reference to section 34 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 
1976. The section states that the Act cannot be used to invalidate a valid marriage 
merely on the ground of non-registration. The courts in both cases viewed both 
marriages as valid customary marriages, thus, their non-registration did not affect their 
validity as well as the plaintiffs’ status as wives. On this point, it should be noted that 
                                                 
81 Sidhu, Balwant Singh, “Married or Not Married? – That is The Question”, (2002) 3 Malayan Law Journal, cxxix – cxlii at 
cxxxiii.  
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although the marriage in Joremi bin Kimin & Anor. v Tan Sai Hong,
82
 was solemnized 
in Singapore according to Chinese custom, it was not solemnized on the authority of a 
valid marriage license as required by section 21(1) Woman Charter 1980. Similarly, in 
Chong Sin Sen v Janaki a/p Chellamuthu,
83
 other than the absence of registration, there 
was also no evidence that the marriage was duly solemnized by a priest at any temple 
appointed according to the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. There was 
nothing to indicate that the marriages were valid customary marriages. The plaintiffs 
were not ‘wife’ even under customary law.  
 
Therefore, it is concluded that by virtue of the provisions in section 7(2) of the CLA 
1956, judges have no discretion to assess and award damages for loss of support in fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents to persons not listed as ‘statutory 
dependants’. Judges also have no discretion to extend the definition of the term wife, 
husband, parents and child to any persons who are not defined as wife, husband, 
parents and child under by section 7(11) of the CLA 1956. 
 
Section 7(2) and 7(11) of the CLA 1956 have some effect on the quantum of damages 
in fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. Since judges are barred 
from awarding damages for loss of support to persons who are not ‘statutory 
dependants’, the damages awarded is confined to deceased’s contribution to the 
‘statutory dependants’ only.  Therefore, Section 7(2) and 7(11) of the CLA 1956 clearly 
put a limitation to the quantum of damages to be awarded under this heading.  
 
However, the inclusion of grandfather and grandmother in the definition of parents as 
well as grandson and granddaughter in the definition of child in section 7(11) of the 
                                                 
82 Op. cit. 
83 Op. cit. 
158 
 
CLA 1956 may have some effect in increasing the quantum of damages being awarded 
for loss of support. While this specific interpretations removes the need for the judges 
to use their discretion in defining who constitutes ‘parent’ and ‘child’ under the Act, 
they allow judges to award damages for loss of support to deceased’s grandparents and 
grandchildren in the presence of deceased’s parents or children. This was evidenced in 
Esah bte Ishak & Anor. v Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor.
84
 Deceased’s grandparent in this 
case was awarded damages for loss of support along with deceased’s parents since they 
are part of the statutory dependants under section 7(2) and 7(11) of the CLA 1956. This 
latitude has clearly widened the scope of dependency
85
  and operates in contradiction to 
the general principle under the law of inheritance which states that grandparent have no 
claim for inheritance in the presence of parent.
86
 As such, the provision in section 7(2) 
and 7(11) of the CLA 1956 allow judges to award bigger quantum by allowing 
deceased’s grandparent who normally would be depending on their children 
(deceased’s parent) for financial support, to claim for loss of support. Similarly 
deceased’s grandchildren are also allowed to receive damages for loss of support along 
with their parents (deceased children).  
 
 
4.5.3 Loss of Support vs. Loss of Actual Support 
Despite the intention of the Legislature to provide a more definitive measure of 
damages, both the CLAA 1984 and the CLA 1956 do not define what constitutes ‘loss 
of support’. Judges have been adopting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
phrase in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng 
87
which is the financial loss suffered by the 
dependants in their capacity as dependants. The loss is restricted to “pecuniary 
                                                 
84 [2006] 6 MLJ 1. 
85 Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, Damages Under Malaysian Tort Law: Cases and Commentary, (Petaling Jaya: Sweet & 
Maxwell Asia, 2009) at 98. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Op. cit. 
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provision which furnishes a livelihood, a source of means of living, subsistence, 
sustenance, maintenance or living, and the "loss of support" means the pecuniary 
benefit lost; a consequence of the death of the provider.”88 As such, ‘loss of support’ 
section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 is interpreted as the loss of actual day to day support 
suffered by the dependants due to cessation of financial contribution from the deceased.  
 
On this point, it is submitted that although the learned Supreme Court judges in Chan 
Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
89
 limit ‘loss of support’ to loss of financial contributions 
which provide for the dependants day to day living (loss of actual support)
90
 there is 
nothing in the Common Law and section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 which requires it to be 
just so. Under the Common Law, as long as the dependants manage to prove financial 
contribution from the deceased, there is no need to them to show that they are actually 
depending on the deceased’s monetary contribution for their livelihood. It is also not 
necessary for the dependants to show that they actually need deceased’s whole 
contribution for their livelihood.
91
 Similarly, section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 also did not 
specify the need to prove actual dependency.  The section only requires the dependant 
to show that they are the statutory dependants, they were receiving financial support 
from the deceased and the fact that deceased was below fifty five (55), of good health 
and was earning prior to his demise.
92
 As such, dependants who were not actually 
depending on the deceased for their livelihood or have been receiving financial support 
from someone else after deceased’s demise are still entitle for loss of support under 
                                                 
88 Per Jeffrey Tan JC in Muhammad bin Hashim v Teow Teik Chai, op. cit. quoting Peh Swee Chin SCJ in Chan Chin Ming v Lim 
Yoke Eng, op.cit. 
89 Op. cit. 
90 Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, “Dependability of Dependency Claims: the Malaysian Perspective” [2004] 1 MLJ xxii – 
xxxiii, at xxv. 
91 Balan, P., op. cit. (2004), at 59. 
92 Proviso (vi)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. 
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section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. Jeffrey Tan JC in Muhammad bin Hashim v Teow Teik 
Chai 
93
 chose to disregard the ‘loss of actual support’ rule by stating that:   
“The test for support is the direct benefit to the claimant, not vicarious, but 
the claimant need not prove he was dependant on the financial support. A 
requirement that a claimant must be dependant on the support from a 
deceased will not be giving the natural meaning to plain and ordinary 
words in s. 7(3). The finding by the learned Judge that the loss of support 
was not proved as the appellant was not dependant on the deceased could 
not be supported as the appellant's direct benefit from the RM700, as a 
member of that family was never considered.”94 
 
Similarly, in Low Kim Yan v Tay Guat Hian & Ors.,
95
 the court allowed the award for 
loss of support to the plaintiff and disregarded the fact that plaintiff had been receiving 
financial assistance from her brother in-law after the demise of her husband and 
suffered no actual loss of support .  
  
In line with the above decisions, P. Balan opined that once the dependants managed to 
prove that deceased had provided a certain sum of money for them, the court should not 
concern itself with what they did with the money.
96
 Favourably citing the trial judge 
decision in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
97
 and the High Court’s decision in 
Muhammad bin Hashim v Teow Teik Chai,
98
 Balan commented that the requirement for 
the dependants to be depending on the deceased’s contributions for their day to day 
                                                 
93 Op. cit. Also see Rebecca Mathew v Syarikat Kerjasama Serbaguna Gema Wong Siong Bhd. [1990] 1 MLJ 443. 
94 The trial court in this case had dismissed plaintiff’s claim for loss of support resulting from his son’s demise on the ground that 
plaintiff had failed to prove that he was actually depending on his son for his livelihood. This decision was later on reversed by the 
High Court. The High Court’s decision indicates that the definition of loss of support is not restricted to actual loss of support 
suffered by the plaintiff 
95 (1960) MLJ 261. 
96 Balan, P., op. cit, (2004) at 59. 
97 Op. cit. 
98 Op. cit. 
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existence is not the natural meaning to the plain and ordinary words in section 7(3) of 
the CLA 1956.
99
   Altaf is also of similar thought. He observed that the plaintiff in 
Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
100
 should be awarded the full RM 750 multiplicand. 
To limit the interpretation of loss of support to loss of actual support is similar to 
making the wording in section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 redundant and meaningless.
101
  
 
As there is no requirement to calculate the multiplicand based on actual dependency 
(no requirement to prove loss of actual support), judges in assessing damages for loss 
of support under section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 retain their discretion in assessing the 
amount of multiplicand to be awarded. The same traditional rule of net income minus 
deceased’s personal use is still applicable. Judges is at liberty to assess the 
multiplicand as he sees fit and reasonable based on the given facts. A millionaire 
parents of a twenty five (25) years old deceased is entitle for loss of support for 
sixteen (16) years similar to a wife and small children of a twenty nine (29) years old 
deceased who depend solely on the deceased for their livelihood. As such, it is humbly 
submitted that despite the introduction of the award for ‘loss of support,’ section 7(3) 
of the CLA 1956 does not abolish the exercise of judicial discretion in the assessment 
of damages in fatal accident claim arising out of motor vehicle accident. The section 
also has minimal effect in reducing the quantum of damages since it does not require 
the dependants to prove loss of actual support. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 Balan, P., op. cit. at 59. 
100 Op. cit. 
101 Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, op. cit, (2004) at xxv. 
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4.6 INTRODUCING PRE-CONDITIONS FOR THE AWARD FOR 
LOSS OF SUPPORT 
Proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 introduces three (3) pre-conditions 
before an award for loss of support can be awarded. This proviso was introduced by 
proviso (iv)(a) to section 2(a) of the CLAA 1984. Unlike the other amendments 
introduced by the CLAA 1984, proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 does 
not originate from the AJA 1982. In fact, Malaysia is the only country among the many 
which patented the law on fatal accident claims based on the AJA 1982 which have this 
proviso. Proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 states: 
(iv) in assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the 
death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the 
damage under this section the Court shall – 
 (a) take into account that where the person deceased has attained 
the age of fifty five years at the time of his death, his loss of 
earnings for any period after his death shall not be taken into 
consideration; and in the case of any other person deceased, his 
loss of earnings for any period after his death shall be taken into 
consideration if it is proved of admitted that the person deceased 
was in good health but for the injury that caused his death and 
was receiving earnings by his own labour or other gainful 
activities prior to his death; (emphasis added) 
 
Before an award for loss of support can be awarded the court must be satisfied that the 
deceased was below the age of fifty five (55) years old, in good health and was earning 
income prior to his demise. It should be noted that the conditions are similar to those in 
section 28A (2)(a)(i) of the CLA 1956. As such, to avoid the risk of repeating the 
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discussion in respect of the same conditions, cross-reference to item 3.4 in chapter 3 is 
encouraged. 
 
4.6.1 Condition (i): Below Fifty Five (55) Years Old 
Prior to the introduction of proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956, there was 
no cut-off age for the award for loss of support set by any statute. Judges had the 
discretion to award damages for loss of support regardless of deceased’s age. In Chong 
Sow Ying v Official Administrator,
102
 the court allowed the claim for loss of support 
under section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) by the wife of a sixty one (61) years old 
deceased who was still in active employment at the time of his death. Similarly, the 
dependants of deceased farmer aged sixty (60) years old at the time of death were also 
allowed damages for loss of support Yaacob v Sintat Rent a Car Services (M) Sdn. Bhd 
& Anor.
103 Judges also had the discretion to assess deceased maximum working age in 
which he would have supported his dependants had he did not succumbed to his 
injuries. 
 
Proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 put a stop to judge’s discretion to 
determine the maximum working life of a deceased. The proviso statutorily adopts the 
age of fifty five (55) as the general age of retirement.
104
 It assumes that a person will 
stop working at the age of fifty five (55) years old and no longer able to contribute to 
his dependants. Judges are barred from awarding damages for loss of support if the 
deceased had reached or passed the age of fifty five (55) years old at the time of his 
demise. The abolition of judges’ discretion is absolute. Damages for loss of support 
                                                 
102 [1984] 1 MLJ 185. 
103 [1983] 2 MLJ 283. See also cases cited in Dass, K.S. op. cit, (1975) at 1099. 
104 Lim, Seng Heng, op. cit., at 151. 
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cannot be awarded even in situations where there is evidence to prove that deceased 
was actually supporting his dependants. This is irrespective of the age and financial 
condition of the dependants or the fact that they are totally depending on the deceased 
thus compelling the deceased to work beyond the age of fifty five (55).
105
 
 
The notion that judges’ discretion has been abolished by the proviso is objected by KS 
Dass. He is of the opinion that provisos (iv)(a) and (d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 
provides for two (2) types of dependants. The types are categorized according to the 
age of the deceased at the time of his demise; dependants of deceased who was below 
the age of thirty years old and dependants of deceased who age between thirty one (31) 
to fifty five (55) years old. Since these types of dependants have been provided for by 
provisos (iv)(a) and (d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956, it stand to reason that the 
phrase, ‘any other person’ in the second part of proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the 
CLA 1956  refers to the deceased who had attained or passed the age of fifty five (55) 
years old at the time of his demise.
106
 Therefore, the cut-off age is not applicable to 
dependants of a deceased who was fifty five years old or above if they can prove that 
deceased was earning income and in good health prior to his demise. In this situation, 
judges have the discretion to award damages for loss of support to the dependants. 
Judges will also have the discretion to assess the multiplier and multiplicand for the 
damages.
107
 
  
On this point it is submitted that while KS Dass’s interpretation above to some extend 
helps to prevent the injustice caused to the dependants who were barred from receiving 
damages for loss of support by virtue of deceased being fifty five (55) years old and 
                                                 
105 See Parvaty & Ors v  Liew Yoke Khoon [1984] 1 MLJ 183 
106 Dass, K.S., Quantum of Damages in Personal Injury, Parliament v Common Law, A critical Examination of the 1984 
Amendment to the Civil Law Act 1956, (Kuala Lumpur: Legal Circle Book Sdn. Bhd, 1997), at 63. 
107 Id., at 65. 
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above, the interpretation nevertheless may lead to very odd results. First, it allows 
judges the discretion to award damages for loss of support to the dependants of a 
deceased who had already passed the age of fifty five (55) years old but bar judges 
from awarding the same to the dependants of a deceased who was fifty five (55) years 
old at the time of his demise. Second, it allows judges the discretion to assess damages 
for the dependants of a deceased who had passed the age of fifty five (55) while 
limiting the assessment of damages to the dependants of a deceased who was below the 
age of fifty five (55) years old to the method prescribed in proviso (iv)(d) to section 
7(3) of the CLA 1956. This interpretation opens up the possibility that dependants of a 
deceased who had passed the age of fifty five (55) years old could be receiving more 
compensation then those below fifty five (55) years old. While the dependants of a 
deceased who was fifty four (54) years old are only entitle to a maximum of six (6) 
months multiplier,
108
 the dependants of a deceased who was fifty six (56) years old 
could be receiving more than that.
109
Such results are clearly unjust to the dependants of 
a deceased who was fifty five (55) years old or below.  
 
It is therefore concluded that KS Dass’s interpretation cannot be the correct 
interpretation of provisos (iv)(a) and (d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 as intended by 
the Legislature. It is merely an attempt to depart from the effects of the provisos on the 
judges’ discretion to award damages for loss of support to the dependants of a deceased 
who had passed the age of fifty five (55) years old. KS Dass interpretation is flawed 
and cannot be the basis in arguing that judges still have the discretion in determining 
the maximum working age for a deceased in the claim for loss of support. Judges have 
                                                 
108 See proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. Six (6) months is the maximum multiplier for loss of support for dependent 
of a decease who was fifty four (54) years old at the time of demise. 
109Since judges have the discretion to determine the multiplier for dependents of a deceased who had passed the age of fifty five 
(55) years old, they are at liberty to award more than six (6) months multiplier for loss of support. 
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no discretion to extend the award to the dependants of a deceased who had reached or 
passed the age of fifty five (55).  
 
The condition of below the age of fifty five (55) can also be seen as the Legislative 
effort to codify what had been the general practise of the courts. The pre-1984 cases 
show that judges had generally (but not as strict rule) adopted fifty five (55) as the 
maximum working age.
110
 The Federal Court in Ahmad Nordin b Hj Maslan & Anor v 
Eng Ngak Hua & Ors
111
 for example held that deceased’s retirement age should have 
been fixed at fifty five (55) instead of sixty five (65). The CLA 1956 merely gives a 
statutory nod to the existing practices adopted by the judges.  
 
Other than the above, it is also submitted that the introduction of the condition have 
minimal effect in reducing the quantum of damages in fatal accident claims arising out 
of motor vehicle accidents. The reduction only affects the quantum of damages to be 
awarded to the dependants of a deceased who have reached the age of fifty five (55) 
years old. It does not have any effect on the quantum of damages for to be awarded to 
the dependants of a deceased who have yet to reach the age of fifty five (55) years old. 
The negligible effect of this condition is more apparent since the judges have been 
adopting fifty five years old as the retirement age even prior to the introduction of 
proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956.  
 
                                                 
110 Parliamentary Debate, Representative, op. cit. at 3321, where YAB Radzi Sheikh Ahmad said that the courts in Malaysia had 
been using fifty five (55) as the normal retirement age in calculating the multiplier for future losses.  
111 [1985] 2 MLJ 431. See also Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin [1981] 2 MLJ 167, Murtadza bin Mohammed Hassan v Chong 
Swee Pian [1980] 1 MLJ 216 and K Ratnasinggam v Kow Ah Dek & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 297. 
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4.6.2. Condition (ii):  Good Health 
The second condition set by proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 before 
damages for loss of support can be awarded is the condition of good health. The 
proviso requires either the dependants to prove that deceased was in good health prior 
to his demise or the defendant to admit that the deceased was in good health prior to his 
demise. The effect of proviso (iv)(a) of section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 is two-folds. It 
imposes the condition that deceased must be in good health prior to the award for loss 
of support. It also made it compulsory that deceased’s good health must be proven by 
the dependants or voluntarily admitted by the defendant.  
 
Similar to section 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956, although the term ‘shall’ in the 
proviso act as a condition precedent prior to the award, the absence of specific 
interpretation to define ‘good health’ still leave some flexibility for judges to exercise 
their discretion
112
 in the assessment of damages for loss of support. In fact, the 
Legislature deliberately leaves the task of determining what constitute ‘good health’ in 
the hands of the judges.
113
 Based on the above, it is clear that the introduction of 
proviso (iv)(a) of section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 is not a bar to the exercise of judicial 
discretion in the assessment for loss of support in fatal accident claims.  
 
As in award for loss of future earnings, the requirement of proving or admitting good 
health is also viewed as unnecessary complication to the process of claiming damages 
for loss of support. There were cases which held that the requirement of good health 
need not be strictly proven or admitted.
114
 Deceased will be presumed to be in good 
health unless challenged by the defendant. Although this presumption is clearly in 
                                                 
112 See discussion in item 3.4.2 , supra. 
113 Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Senate, Sixth Parliament, Second Session, 3rd August 1984, at 159 (Tn Radzi bin Sheikh Ahmad 
answer to question from Tn D.P. Vijandran) 
114 See Loh Hee Thuan v Mohd Zaini bin Abdullah [2003] 1 AMR 332 and Osman Effendi b Mahmud & Anor. v Mohd Noh b 
Khamis [1998] 4 AMR 3687. 
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contradiction of the proviso, it is adopted in view of the difficulties in obtaining proof 
of deceased good health.
115
 KS Dass was in complete agreement with this presumption. 
He commented that it is a ‘sheer waste of time’116 to prove good health. It is sufficient 
for the dependants to prove that deceased was earning income at the time of accident. 
He argued a person who was earning income would automatically be of good health. 
As such, there is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended to impose such 
unnatural conditions.  
 
On this point it is submitted that proviso (iv)(a) of section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 does 
not give any discretion to the judges to presume that the deceased was in good health. 
Despite the “pain of adducing evidence to show that deceased was in good health prior 
to the accident,”117  the wording in the proviso is very clear an unequivocal. It leave no 
avenue for judges to presume that deceased was in good health without it being proven 
by the dependants or admitted by the defendant. Judges have to apply the law; it is not 
their task to rectify the problem in the application of the law.  
 
4.6.3 Condition (iii): Earning Income at the Time of Injury  
The third condition in proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) in the CLA 1956 is the 
requirement that decease must be ‘receiving earning by his own labour or other gainful 
activity prior to his death’. Dependants claiming damages for loss of dependency will 
have to prove that the deceased was employed and receiving income from that 
employment at the time of his demise.  
 
                                                 
115 Rajasooria, J. Edwin, “Necessity of Proving Good Health”, 9th July 2010, The Malaysian Bar, 8th November 2010, 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=30358>. 
116 Dass, K.S., op. cit., (1997), at 65. 
117 Ibid. 
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It is submitted that similar to the effect of this condition on the award for loss of future 
earnings, the condition of earning income before the demise in proviso (iv)(a) to 
section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 in reality did not have much effect on the discretionary 
power of the judges in assessing the award for loss of support or on the quantum of 
damages awarded. Judges, even prior to the introduction of the proviso generally 
require the dependants to prove the source and the amount of deceased income prior to 
his demise. This exercise served two purposes; first, it satisfies the general requirement 
for the dependants to prove loss occasioned by death by substantiating the claim with 
proof of earnings and second, to serve as the upper limit for the figure to be adopted as 
the multiplicand.
118
 As such, similar to proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 , 
the dependants claiming loss of support under the old section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 
(rev 1972) were also required to proof that the deceased was earning income at the time 
of his demise.
119
 As such, the imposition of proviso (iv)(a) of section 7(3) of the CLA 
1956 merely put on paper what had generally been the practice of the judges even prior 
to the 1984 amendment. 
 
Despite the compulsory nature of the requirement of proving that deceased was earning 
income at the time of his demise, judges sometimes takes upon themselves to award 
loss of support to dependants even when there is no evidence to prove deceased was 
earning.  Usually in cases where deceased was the sole bread winner for the 
dependants, there is a possibility that the judge will consider allowing loss of support 
even without specific proof of income in view of obvious dependency factor. In 
Mahmood bin Kailan v Goh Seng Choon & Anor.
120
for example, Suffian LP held that it 
would be reasonable for the court to assume that the deceased had earned some money 
                                                 
118 Lim, Heng Seng, op. cit., at 143. 
119 Without which there will be difficulties in determining the dependents’ loss since there is no prove to substantiate the 
dependents’ claim that there were depending on the deceased and that deceased demise had caused them pecuniary losses. 
120 [1976] 2 MLJ 239. 
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because at the time of the accident, he had a wife and children to support and he was 
the sole bread winner.
121
 This presumption further negate the effect of proviso (iv)(a) to 
section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 on the exercise of judicial discretion in the assessment of 
damages and the quantum of damages being awarded.  
 
 
 
4.7 REGULATING THE ASSESSMENT OF MULTIPLICAND FOR 
THE AWARD FOR LOSS OF SUPPORT 
Multiplicand in the award for loss of support is the annual sum that represents the 
dependants’ losses at the time of the deceased demise.122 It is the dependants’ annual 
loss of pecuniary benefits resulting from the cessation of deceased contribution. Prior to 
the enactment of the CLAA 1975 and the CLAA 1984, judges had a wide discretion in 
assessing the amount to be regarded as the multiplicand for loss of support. Judges 
generally assessed deceased’s contribution to the dependants by taking into account 
deceased’s earnings at the time of death, fringe benefits, positive123and  negative124 
contingencies in earnings, taxes, contribution in the employee provident fund, living 
expenses, expenses in earning income, saving and any other factors which may affect 
deceased earnings.
125
 At the same time judges also considered the factors which may 
affect the amount of deceased’ contributions to the dependants such as the number of 
                                                 
121 Nathan, RK., Practical Approach to Assessment of Liability and Damages in Tort, (Singapore, Malayan Law Journal Pte. Ltd., 
1986), at 299. 
122 Chin, Anthony and Alfred Choi, eds., Law, Social Science and Public Policy: Towards a Unified Framework (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 1998) at 72. 
123 Salary raises, promotions, increments, bonuses, overtime and fringe benefits such as accommodations, clubs company car etc. 
124 Salary decrease, demotion, economic recession, unemployment etc. 
125 Rutter, Michael F., (op. cit.), at 601. 
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dependants, dependants’ need, class of dependants126 etc. Lord Diplock in Malyon v 
Plummer,
127
 outlined the steps for assessing multiplicand:  
“… (a) to ascertain what annual benefit in money or money’s worth in fact 
accrued to the person for whom the action is brought from the deceased 
and arising out of the relationship before the death of the deceased, (b) to 
assess the extend (if any) to which that benefit would be likely have 
increased or diminished in value in the future if the deceased had lived…” 
 
The CLAA 1975 and CLAA 1984 introduced several changes in section 7 of the CLA 
1956 (rev 1972). The new provisions in the CLA 1956, list down the items that judges 
should and should not take into consideration in the assessment of the same. To some 
extent, the new provisions have taken away the discretionary power of judges to 
consider the variables which they would normally considered in the assessment of 
multiplicand for loss of support in fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle 
accidents. The abolition however is not absolute. The exercise of judges’ discretion is 
still required in certain aspects of the assessment. There are also parts of the new 
provisions where they are merely a statutory codification to the existing practice. It 
should be noted that the CLA 1956 imposes the same regulatory provisions to regulate 
the assessment of multiplicand for loss of support and loss of future earnings. As such, 
the items discussed below are similar to item 3.5 in chapter 3. To avoid the risk of 
repeating the discussions, cross-reference to item 3.5 in chapter 3 is encouraged. 
 
 
                                                 
126 Deceased’s contributions to his parent are usually smaller compared to his contribution to his wife and children.  
127 Op. cit. 
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4.7.1 Compensations Benefits to be Ignored 
Proviso (i) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 lists down the compensation benefits 
received by the dependants upon deceased’s demise which should not be taken into 
consideration when assessing the award for loss of support. Although these benefits are 
benefits which results from deceased’s demise, the amount received must not be 
deducted from the amount to be assessed for loss of support. Proviso (i) to section 7(3) 
of the CLA 1956 states: 
Provided that - 
(i) in assessing the damages there shall not be taken into account - 
(a) any sum paid or payable on the death of the person deceased 
under any contract of assurance or insurance, whether made 
before or after the coming into force of this Act; 
(b) any sum payable, as a result of the death, under any written law 
relating to employees' provident fund;  
(c) any pension or gratuity, which has been or will or may be paid 
as a result of the death or
128
 
(d) any sum which has been or will or may be paid under any 
written law relating to the payment of any benefit or 
compensation whatsoever, in respect of the death; (emphasis 
added)
129
 
 
By virtue of this proviso, judges are prevented from taking into consideration any 
benefit received by the dependants by way of insurance compensations, saving in 
                                                 
128 Para (b) and (c) was introduced by the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). 
129 Para (d) was introduced by the CLAA 1975. 
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deceased’s employee provident fund, deceased’s pension, gratuity or any compensation 
benefit received or to be received by the dependants as a result of deceased demise in 
the assessment of damages for loss of support.  
 
Similar to the effects of section  28A(1) of the CLA 1956, the provisions in proviso (i) 
to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 also did not bring significant effect on the exercise of 
judicial discretion in the assessment of damages for loss of support in fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents or the amount of damages being awarded 
by the courts under this head of damages.. Judges even without proviso (i) to section 
7(3) of the CLA 1956 had always disregarded these death benefits from the assessment 
of damages. The proviso merely put on paper what had been the general practice of the 
judges even before the CLA 1956. It abolishes the discretion which the judges had 
chosen to disregard. At the same time, it also does not have any effect in reducing the 
quantum of damages in fatal accident claims. Judges never deduct the benefits from the 
assessment of damages for loss of support even prior to the CLA 1956. 
 
4.7.2 Deduction for Living Expenses  
Apart from specifying the benefits which are not to be considered in the assessment of 
multiplicand, the CLA 1956 also laid down the item which must be specifically 
deducted from deceased’s earnings before the earnings can be calculated as 
multiplicand. Section 2(a) of the CLAA 1984 introduced proviso (iv)(c) to section 7(3) 
of the CLA 1956. The new section reads: 
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Provided that - 
(iv) in assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the 
death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the 
damages under this section the Court shall- 
(c) take into account any diminution of any such amount as 
aforesaid by such sum as is proved or admitted to be the 
living expenses of the person deceased at the time of his death; 
(emphasis added) 
 
Proviso (iv)(c) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 made it compulsory for judges to 
deduct a portion which represents deceased’s living expenses from the assessment of 
multiplicand. This portion needs to be proven by the defendant or admitted by the 
dependants as deceased’s living expenses. The proviso takes away judges’ discretion in 
determining whether deceased’s living expenses is to be deducted from the assessment 
of multiplicand by making it a compulsory amount to be specifically deducted. 
 
Proviso (iv)(c) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 however still maintain the judges’ 
discretion in interpreting ‘living expenses’. Although the proviso specifies that 
deceased’s living expenses must be deducted from the assessment of multiplicand, it 
does not define what constitutes ‘living expenses’ and how the amount is to be 
assessed. This task is left to the discretion of the judges. The most common method is 
by obtaining detailed expenditure of deceased expenses from the dependants. Judges 
discretion is more apparent in situations where the deceased’s contributions to the 
dependants also include the expenses for items which the deceased shared with his 
dependants such as payment for house, car, food, utilities etc. In Minachi v Mohd Yusof 
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bin Zakaria
130
for example, the judge had to deduct a portion out from the total 
deceased’s contribution to the dependants since that portion was considered as the 
portion used for deceased’s food at home. Therefore, it is concluded that judges still 
retain their discretion in assessing the multiplicand for loss of support in fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents.  
 
Further, proviso (iv)(c) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 is also another codification of 
judges’ existing practice. Deduction for deceased’s living expenses has always been 
made even prior to the introduction of proviso (iv)(c) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. 
In Panicker v Chee May Kwong
131
 and Koo Wah v Wong Ying Choon,
132
 the courts 
adopted the principle in Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries
133
 and Lim v 
Camden and Islington Area Health Authority
134
 that deceased’s living expenses such as 
food and other necessities is to be deducted from the assessment of multiplicand for 
loss of support. Other than food and clothes, expenses which the deceased spend on 
hobbies, entertainment, alcohol, tobacco and other luxuries are also considered as 
‘living expenses’ and also deducted from the multiplicand.135 As such, the proviso 
merely codifies the existing practice
136
 of the judges and does not add anything new to 
the law on fatal accident claims.  
 
It is however puzzling to see the need for codifying deduction for living expenses when 
other deductions such as income tax, employee provident fund, expenses in producing 
the income or any compulsory payment such as those of personal or educational loan 
are not included as part of the deductibles. Had the intention of the Legislature is to 
                                                 
130 [1978] 2 MLJ 256. 
131 (1958) MLJ 136. 
132 [1965] 2 MLJ 21. 
133 (1942) 1 All ER 657. 
134 Op. cit. 
135 Rutter, Michael F., (op. cit.), at 610.  See also Adsett v West (1983) 3 WLR 437 where McCullogh J held that “There can be no 
doubt that the cost of the victims pleasure must also be deducted”. 
136 Id. at 645 – 646.  
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itemized the deductibles in the assessment of multiplicand for loss of support, they 
should have included these expenses in proviso (iv)(c) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 
as well.  Thus, does this mean that the judges have the discretion not to deduct these 
deductibles in the assessment of multiplicand? The answer is no. Similar to living 
expenses, these expenses are also deceased’s personal expenses and not part of the 
contribution to the dependants. They must be deducted from the assessment of 
multiplicand. As such, even without proviso (iv)(c) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 
judges are still obliged to deduct living expenses and any other expenses spent by the 
deceased from the assessment of multiplicand for loss of support in fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accident.  
 
4.7.3 Prospect of Future Increase in Deceased’s Earnings is to be Ignored  
The most notable effect of the CLA 1956 on the exercise of judicial discretion in the 
assessment of multiplicand for loss of support in fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents and the quantum of damages under this head of damages is the 
effect of proviso (iv)(b) to section 7(3) of the CL A1956. section 2(a) of the CLAA 
1984 introduced this proviso to the CLA 1956. The proviso reads: 
Provided that - 
(iv) in assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the 
death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the 
damages under this section the Court shall— 
(b) take into account only the amount relating to the earnings as 
aforesaid and the Court shall not take into account any 
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prospect of the earnings as aforesaid being increased at any 
period after the person's death; (emphasis added) 
 
Proviso (iv)(b) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 prohibits the judges from taking into 
account any possible future increases in deceased’s earning in assessing damages for 
loss of support. With the introduction of this proviso, only the amount received by the 
deceased as his earning
137
 at the time of his demise will be the basis for the assessment 
of multiplicand. The proviso abolishes the judges’ discretion to include any probable 
future increases in deceased’s earning including yearly increments, bonuses, 
commissions or other benefits in the assessment of multiplicand. As such the prospect 
of promotion and salary increases which were considered by the judges in K 
Ratnasingam v Kow Ah Dek 
138
and Nani d/o Nagoo v Wayne Gary Williams
139
 are no 
longer relevant for cause of action arising after 1
st
 October 1984. 
 
The prohibition against taking into consideration possible future increase in deceased’s 
earning by proviso (iv)(b) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 also greatly affects the 
quantum of damages being awarded by the courts. Since only deceased’s earning at the 
time of his demise can be taken as the basis for the assessment of multiplicand, the 
multiplicand for loss of support in fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle 
accidents is reduced to only the amount the deceased  was receiving at the time of his 
demise.  
 
 
 
                                                 
137 Inclusive of any fringe benefits received at the time of his demise. 
138 Op. cit. 
139 [1984] 2 CLJ 51. 
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4.8 FIXING THE MULTIPLIER IN THE AWARD FOR LOSS OF 
SUPPORT 
Multiplier in the award for loss of support refers to the period in which the dependants 
is expected to receive the contributions from the deceased had the deceased did not die. 
Prior to the introduction of proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956, the 
assessment of multiplier is “entirely an arbitrary matter of speculation”.140Judges was 
entitled to select the multiplier ‘at his discretion’ and the case laws were not in 
uniformity.
141
Thus, making it difficult to find a clear and authoritative guide for the 
assessment of the same. The assessment is usually based on the deceased's expectation 
of life, maximum working age, nature of employment, dependant’s needs together with 
allowances for contingencies, accelerated payment and the accrual of interest if the 
money is invested.  
 
Section 2 of the CLAA 1984 introduced proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 
1956. The proviso introduces the statutory multiplier to replace the Common Law 
assessment of multiplier. The statutory multiplier only uses the deceased’s age at the 
time of his demise as the basis of the assessment. Proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the 
CLA 1956 reads: 
Provided that- 
(iv) In assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the 
death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the 
damages under this section the Court shall-... 
(d) take into account that in the case of a person who was of the 
age of thirty years old and below at the time of his death, 
                                                 
140 Per Lord Goddard in Heatley v Steel Co. of Wales Ltd. (1953) 1 All ER 489. 
141 Dass, K.S, op. cit., (1975) at 977. 
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the number of years’ purchase shall be 16; and in the case of 
any other person who was of the age range extending 
between thirty one years and fifty four years at the time of 
his death, the number of years purchase shall be calculated 
by using the figure 55, minus the age of the person at the 
time of death and dividing the remainder by the figure 2. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 fixed sixteen (16) years as the 
maximum multiplier and six (6) months as the minimum multiplier.  Dependants of a 
deceased who was below the age of thirty (30) years old are entitled to sixteen (16) 
years multiplier.  The multiplier for dependant of a deceased who was in between the 
age of thirty one (31) and fifty five (55) years old vary depending on deceased’s age at 
the time of death. The multiplier is calculated using the formula of fifty five (55) minus 
deceased’s age at the time of his demise and divide by two (2).  
 
The term ‘shall’ proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 removes judge’s 
discretion in the assessment of multiplier for loss of support in fatal accident claims 
arising out of motor vehicle accidents. It made it compulsory for judges to adopt the 
statutory multiplier in assessing the damages under this heading. Judges no longer have 
the discretion to assess the multiplier according to the Common Law considerations. 
The contingencies of life and the consideration of receiving money lump sum had 
already been configured and built by the Legislature into the statutory 
formula.
142
Judges also have no discretion to decide on the length of multiplier to be 
                                                 
142 Per Edgar Joseph Jr. SCJ in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng, op. cit.  
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awarded.  Edgar Joseph Jr. in his dissenting judgment in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke 
Eng
143
 commented:  
“To my mind, it is manifestly clear, that in enacting the detailed provisions 
of proviso (d) to s 7(3)(iv), Parliament had intended to take away the 
discretion of the court to select the appropriate multiplier, in assessing loss 
of earnings of a deceased person in respect of any period after his death, 
for purposes of a claim for loss of support under s 7(1).” 
 
The absence of judges’ discretion in assessing the multiplier was also emphasis by the 
Court of Appeal in Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor.
144
 The 
Court was very adamant in saying that the statutory multiplier in proviso (iv)(d) to 
section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 is fixed and cannot be altered by the judge in any way. 
“Further, the language of the statues is imperative. It says the `the number 
of years’ purchase shall be 16. The mandatory tenor of this phrase 
employed by Parliament to convey its message excludes any pretended 
exercise of judicial power to substitute some other multiplier for that 
intended. As such, the dissenting view in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng 
should be adopted.” 
Thus, the statutory multiplier provided in proviso (iv)(d) is considered as compulsory in 
assessing damages for loss of support.  Any attempt to vary the multiplier will amounts 
to ‘flying in the face of the mandatory provisions’.145 
 
                                                 
143 Op. cit. 
144 [2004] 1 CLJ 797. 
145 Per Edgar Joseph Jr SCJ in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng, op. cit. 
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The fixed multiplier sometimes leads to over and under compensation. To allow similar 
multiplier for claim for loss of support by parent of an unmarried deceased and by wife 
or young children for example would be an over-compensation to the parents and 
under-compensation to the wife and children. The length of dependency by parent 
cannot be the same as those of wife and children. While parents’ dependency would 
normally base on the parents’ age, the dependency of a wife and children are about the 
same as deceased’s working life. Because of this, the courts on several occasions had 
departed from the statutory multiplier method and maintained the pre-amendment 
practices of using their discretion in assessing the multiplier for the award for loss of 
support. The Supreme Court in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
146
 held that the 
statutory multiplier in proviso (iv)(d) of section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 is not applicable 
in claim for loss of support by parents of unmarried deceased. Peh Swee Chin SCJ in 
delivering the majority decision stated that: 
“Having regard to the state of the general system of the law before the 
coming  into force of sub-para (d) on 1 October 1984, sub-para (d) seems 
to be tailor made for a claim by a spouse and children as dependants in 
respect of a deceased spouse, because under the general system of law, 
both before or after the enactment of sub-para (d), the duration of a claim 
for loss of support is usually as long as the deceased’s loss of earnings 
which would have been earned had the deceased lived. 
On the other hand the state of general system of law relating to a parent’s 
claim as a dependants for loss of support in respect of an unmarried child 
before the enactment of sub-para (d) was that such loss of support would 
either ceased or be reduced  considerably on the almost inevitable 
contingency of subsequent marriage of such unmarried child.”  
                                                 
146 Op. cit. 
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In relation to the above, it is of upmost importance to consider whether judges, after 
the introduction proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956, have the power to 
depart from the statutory multiplier and apply their discretion in determining the 
multiplier according to the fact of the case. Three interesting decisions should be 
considered on this issue. In Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng,
147
 the Supreme Court 
had to decide whether the parents of a twenty five (25) years old unmarried deceased 
is entitled to the sixteen (16) years old statutory multiplier. The majority were of the 
view that the statutory multiplier is not applicable in the claim for loss of support by 
parents of an unmarried child considering the possibility of child subsequent marriage. 
In these instances the general system of law prevailing prior to the 1984 amendment 
(the loss of support would either cease or reduce considerably on the almost invariable 
contingency of the subsequent marriage of the child) is still applicable.
148
 Had the 
Legislature intended to depart from the general system of the law, they would have 
made it abundantly clear in the statute. Since there is no indication of such intention, 
the court is still at liberty to reduce the multiplier to suit the case.  
 
In Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors
149
 the Court of Appeal while 
deciding an appeal for a claim by deceased’s widow, adhered to the fixed multiplier 
provided in proviso (iv)(d) of section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 but deducted 1/3 from the 
total award for contingencies. The Court adopted the reasoning in Chan Chin Ming v 
Lim Yoke Eng
150
 and held that since there was no indication that the Legislature 
intended to depart from the general system of law of making deduction for 
contingencies in life and accelerated payment, the 1/3 deduction is still applicable. 
                                                 
147 Op. cit. 
148 Per Peh Swee Chin SCJ in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng, op. cit. 
149[1998] 4 MLJ 512.  
150 Op. cit. 
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In 2004, the Court of Appeal via Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & 
Anor & Anor.,
151
 reconsidered the decision in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng.
152
 and 
held that proviso (iv)(d) of section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 intends to take away the 
discretionary power of judges in determining the multiplier for loss of support and to 
prevent the high awards in personal injury. Thus, to allow departure from the statutory 
multiplier as decided in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
153
 would amount to re-
writing the statutes. The Court of Appeal went even further to say that Chan Chin 
Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
154
 was wrongly decided and it was the solemn duty of the Court 
as the apex court in the matter of personal injury motor accident claim to correct the 
wrong. The judgement was later on followed by Cheng Bee Teik & Ors v Peter a/l 
Selvaraj & Anor
155
 where it was held that since the provision regarding multiplier in 
proviso (iv)(d) of section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 is clear, it is not open for the court to 
interpret it otherwise.  
 
On this point it is submitted that after a through reading of Chan Chin Ming v Lim 
Yoke Eng
156
 and Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor & Anor.,
157
 
the grounds behind the decisions were sound despite being in total contradiction to one 
another. The researcher however failed to comprehend the justification of the 1/3 
deduction applied in Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors.
158
Although the 
court in this case was bound by the decision of the Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke 
Eng,
159
it failed to consider and appreciate the reasoning in Chan Chin Ming v Lim 
                                                 
151 Op. cit. 
152 Op. cit. 
153 Op. cit. 
154 Op. cit. 
155 [2005] 4 MLJ 301.  
156 Op. cit. 
157 Op. cit. 
158 Op. cit. 
159 Op. cit. 
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Yoke Eng.
160
 The departure from proviso (iv)(d) of section 7(3) of the CLA 1956  in 
Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
161
 was based on the possibility that a subsequent 
marriage will reduce or stop deceased’s contribution to the parents, the same reasoning 
cannot be applied to the plaintiff in Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & 
Ors.
162
Deceased in Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors.
163
 would have 
definitely continue to support his wife and children throughout his working life, not to 
mention the possibility of an increase in the dependency due to the possible  increase 
cost of living, education and sustenance as the children grow. Further, the Appellant in 
Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors.
164
 had forwarded a sound argument 
that since contingencies and vicissitudes of life had been configured into the statutory 
multiplier,
165
 further deduction on the same ground after adopting the statutory 
multiplier would be a double jeopardy and improper.  
 
Since the grounds forwarded in both Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
166
 and Ibrahim 
Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor.
167
 were both sound, the answer to the 
question of whether judges have the discretion to depart from the fixed multiplier in 
proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 in assessing the damages for loss of 
support in fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents would depend 
on the answers to the following questions: 
                                                 
160 Op. cit. 
161 Op. cit. 
162 Op. cit. 
163 Op. cit. 
164 Op. cit. 
165 Balan, P., op. cit., (2004), at 62. 
166 Op. cit. 
167 Op. cit. 
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4.8.1 Does Proviso (iv) to Section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 Provides for Loss of 
Earnings or Loss of Support? 
The question of whether proviso (iv) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 provides for loss 
of earnings or loss of support arise due to the differences in the wordings used in section 
7(3) and proviso (iv) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. While the phrase ‘loss of 
support’ appears in section 7(3) of the CLA 1956, proviso (iv) to the section uses ‘loss 
of earning’. The differences in wording brings to mind the possibility that the statutory 
multiplier in proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) is not intended by the Legislature to be used 
in assessing damages for loss of support.   
 
Although judges have generally disregarded the differences in the wording of the 
provisions and adopted the statutory multiplier while assessing damages for loss of 
support, a different interpretation however can be accorded to proviso (iv) to section 
7(3) of the CLA 1956. The deliberate use of use of the phrase ‘loss of earning’ instead 
of ‘loss of support’ indicates that the proviso is specifically worded to cater for the 
assessment of deceased’s earnings where the earnings are to be used in assessing the 
damages for loss of support. This interpretation is in line with the explanation provided 
by Part 2 of the Explanatory Statement to Civil Law Amendment Bill 1984. The 
Explanatory Statement states: 
Clause 2 of the Bill amends section 7 of the Act... It also provides for the 
method of assessing the loss of earning of the deceased person in respect 
of the period after his death. 
Instead of providing for the assessment of damages for loss of support, it is submitted 
that proviso (iv) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 actually intents to provide for the 
assessment deceased’s earnings which later to be used in assessing damages for loss of 
support. Therefore, the statutory multiplier in proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 
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1956 is only compulsory on in respect of assessing deceased’s earnings and not to be 
applied in assessing  damages for loss of support.  
 
To use the same method of assessment in assessing deceased’s earnings and damages 
for loss of support is incorrect. Deceased’s earnings and loss of support are two 
different subject matters. Therefore, the method of assessment is also different. The 
assessment of deceased’s earnings only requires deduction for the expenses spent for 
earning that income. The assessment of damages for loss of support on the other hand 
requires deduction for expenses spent in earning that income together with deductions 
for deceased’s day to day living expenses, savings or expenses spent on person not 
named in section 7(2) CLA 1956. Therefore, to use the same method of assessment for 
loss of deceased’s earning and damages for loss of support would be wrong. 
 
S. Santhana Dass commented that there is nothing to indicate that loss of earning and 
loss of support are the same or that the assessment for damages for loss of support must 
be based on proviso (iv) to section 7(3) of the CLA 19656. Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke 
Eng
168
 had been rightly decided according to the plain and natural meaning of the 
section.
169
While the legislature intends to regulate the assessment of multiplier to be 
used for assessing deceased’s earning, there is no indication that the same regulation is 
to be extended for the assessment of damages for loss of support. Peh Swee Chin SCJ in 
Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
170
 had rightfully held:  
“Let us examine sub-para (d) reproduced above, it deals with first, the 
assessment of loss of earnings, and not be it noted, loss of support. They 
are related to each other but are yet distinctly apart, for it will be 
                                                 
168 Op. cit. 
169 Dass, S. Santhana, op. cit., (2006), at xxiv. 
170 Op. cit. 
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remembered that the earnings of the deceased, or the amount of such 
earnings by the deceased by virtue of his death merely the starting point in 
assessing the loss of support sustained by the dependants, before taking 
into account of personal expenses of the deceased and contingencies, see 
Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries (No. 2) (1942) AC 601 at 
p. 617.”171 
 
Similar approach was also adopted in Lien Hock Seng & Anor v Sakkarai a/l Mokiah & 
Anor.
172
 where Abd. Wahab J held that the loss of support cannot be equated to loss of 
earning since loss of support (in that particular case) refers to the loss suffered by the 
parents of the deceased. The fact that the two terms are sometimes understood referring 
to loss of support had led to the whole confusion on the issue of fixed multiplier.  
 
It is therefore submitted that the different phrases used in section 7(3) and proviso (iv) 
to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 allows judge to exercise their discretion in determining 
the multiplier for damages for loss of support in fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents. Judges are only bound to follow the statutory multiplier while 
assessing decease’s earnings. They still have the discretion to assess the multiplier for 
loss of support. Judges are at liberty to increase or reduce the multiplier for loss of 
support based on the fact of each case provided that the earnings used as the basis for 
the assessment of multiplicand is assessed using the statutory multiplier in proviso 
(iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. 
                                                 
171 Based on the above reasoning, it is not surprising when he continued to say that “sub-para (d) seems to be tailor-made for a 
claim by a spouse and children” and not parents of unmarried deceased since the loss of support suffered by spouse and children is 
normally pegged to the working life of the deceased. Thus, the multiplier for loss of support for spouse and children would be 
similar to the calculation for loss of earnings in proviso (iv). The same cannot be said for loss of support for parents of unmarried 
deceased due to the contingency of subsequent marriage. 
172 [1998] 3 MLJ 251. 
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4.8.2 Is Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng No Longer Applicable? 
Apart from the above, the notion that judges have the discretion to depart from the 
statutory multiplier provided in proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 
originates from the Supreme Court’s decision in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke 
Eng.
173
Although the majority of the judges follows the compulsory multiplier rule as 
decided by the Court of Appeal in Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & 
Anor.,
174
 the decision in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng.
175
 is still a valid decision. 
The Supreme Court, prior to June 24
th
 1994 stood at the apex of the Malaysian court 
structure. It was later renamed as the Federal Court by virtue of the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act (Act A885).
176
 By virtue of it being decided by the highest court, it 
falls to reason that the decision in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
177
 is binding on 
the lower courts and carries more weight compared to Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v 
Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor.
178
 
 
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal currently stands as the apex court in all matters 
relating to motor vehicle accident claims. Section 96(a) of the Court of Judicature Act 
1965 (Act 91) provides that any appeal to the Federal Court in pursuance of section 97 
of the same act is confined to matters relating to the Constitution and cases brought to 
the High Court in its original jurisdiction.  Since the High Court only have appellate 
jurisdiction over matters in respect of motor vehicle accident claims, the Federal Court 
have no jurisdiction to hear these cases. Therefore, Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v 
Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor.
179
was also decided by the highest court.  
                                                 
173 Op. cit. 
174 Op. cit. 
175 Op. cit. 
176Bahagian Teknologi Maklumat Pejabat Ketua Pendaftar Mahkamah Persekutuan Malaysia, Malaysian Judiciary, Malaysian 
Court Official Website, 2004, 3th February 2010 
<http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/courts/maljudiciary.shtml> 
177 Op. cit. 
178 Op. cit. 
179 Op. cit. 
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The lower courts are bound by the decisions in both cases. VT Singham J in 
Marimuthu Velappan v Abdullah Ismail
180
 noted this quandary and held:  
“Based on the doctrine of stare decisis, this court cannot disregard the 
majority decision in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng, but have to 
dutifully observe and follow the ratio decidendi and at the same time 
respect the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ibrahim Ismail, Cheng Bee 
Teik and Noraini Omar.” 
 
Thus, we see decisions like the ones in Esah bte Ishak (a mother and legal dependants 
of Nazri bin Ahmad Ramli, deceased) & Anor v Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor and
181
 
Azizah Zainuddin (menuntut sebagai baju dan orang tanggungan yang sah 
Kamaruddin bin Alias, si mati) v Krishnasamy a/l Muniasamy dan satu lagi
182
 which 
followed Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
183
 while Manogaran a/l Meeramuthu & 
Anor v Fauziah bte Mat Isa
184
and Noraini bte Omar (wife of deceased, Ku Mansur bin 
Ku Baharom and mother of the deceased, Ku Amirul bin Ku Mansur) & Anor. v 
Rohani Said and another appeal
185
 followed Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah 
Puteh Imat & Anor.
186
 
 
It is submitted that even if the Court of Appeal currently stands as the highest court on 
all matter relating to motor vehicle accident claims, Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v 
Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor.
187
 cannot be regarded as the final authority in this matter. 
                                                 
180 Op. cit. 
181 [2006] 7 CLJ 353. 
182 [2006] 2 MLJ 91. 
183 Op. cit. 
184 [2005] 5 MLJ 34. 
185 [2006] 3 MLJ 150. 
186 Op. cit. 
187 Op. cit. 
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Both Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors.
188
 and Teoh Teik Chai v 
Muhammad bin Hasyim
189
 were also decided by the Court of Appeal. Thus, of similar 
stature to Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor.
190
 These cases are 
also binding on the inferior courts. As such, judges in the inferior courts have the 
option to choose either the decisions in Takung Tabari v Government of Sarawak& 
Ors
191
 and Teoh Teik Chai v Muhammad bin Hasyim
192
 which follow Chan Chin Ming 
v Lim Yoke Eng
193
 or the decision in Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat 
& Anor.
194
 
 
The researcher also humbly submits that there is no definitive answer to the question 
of whether Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng
195
 has been overruled by Ibrahim Ismail 
& 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor.
196
The researcher disagree with the 
conclusion arrived by Farheen Bhaig and Asgar Ali
197
 that by virtue of the decision in 
Dalip Bhagwan Singh v Public Prosecutor,
198
 the decision in Ibrahim Ismail & 15 
Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor. should prevails over Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke 
Eng,
199
 Takung Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors.
200
 and Teoh Teik Chai v 
Muhammad bin Hasyim
201
merely by reason of it being the later decision. One should 
not forget that to enable a court to depart from the decision of another court of similar 
                                                 
188 Op. cit. 
189 Op. cit.. 
190 Op. cit. 
191 Op. cit. 
192 Op. cit. 
193 Op. cit. 
194 Op. cit. 
195 Op. cit. 
196 Op. cit. 
197 Fardeen Bhaig Sadar Bhaig and Ashgar Ali Ali Mohammed, “Civil Claim Involving Motor Vehicle Accident: Whether Court of 
Appeal the Apex Court”, (2009) 1 Malayan Law Journal, xxii-xxxviii.  
198 [1998] 1 MLJ at 14 where Peh Swee Chin observed “when two decision of the Federal Court conflict, on a point of law, for the 
same reasons, the later decision prevail over the earlier decision.” 
199 Op. cit. 
200 Op. cit. 
201 Op. cit. 
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stature, the court must show that it is right to do so i.e. that the former decision is 
“wrong, uncertain, unjust, outmoded or obsolete in the modern conditions”.202  
 
S. Santhana Dass had rightly pointed out that it is difficult safely say that Ibrahim 
Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor.
203
 have the right to depart and 
overrule Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng,
204
 Takung Tabari v Government of 
Sarawak& Ors
205
 and Teoh Teik Chai v Muhammad bin Hasyim.
206
 Reason being, 
none of the exceptions enumerated in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd 
207
 and 
London Tramways v London County Council
208
 can be rightfully attribute to these 
cases; neither was there conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal to choose from 
nor the decision in these three (3) cases were given per incuriam.
209
As such, it can be 
concluded that although Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor. was 
rightfully decided based on the argument forwarded in the judgment, it cannot 
abrogate the decision in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng.
210
  Chan Chin Ming v Lim 
Yoke Eng,
211
  together with Takung Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors
212
 and 
Teoh Teik Chai v Muhammad bin Hasyim.
213
 still stand as a valid authority allowing 
judges to exercise their discretion in the assessment of multiplier for loss of support in 
fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents.  
 
                                                 
202 Dalip Bhagwan Singh v Public Prosecutor, op. cit. 
203 Op. cit. 
204 Op. cit. 
205 Op. cit. 
206 Op. cit. 
207 Op. Cit. 
208 (1898) AC 375. 
209 Dass, S. Santhana, op. cit., (2006), at xlii. See also reasons given by Dass to dispute the arguments provided in Ibrahim bin 
Ismail & Anor v Hasnah bt Puteh Imat, op. cit. against Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng, op. cit. 
210 Op. cit. 
211 Op. cit. 
212 Op. cit. 
213 Op. cit. 
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Although there were several applications for leave to file an appeal in pursuant of rule 
137 of the Rule of Federal Court 1995
214
 filed over motor vehicle accident claims such 
as in Abdul Gaffar bin Md. Amin v Ibrahim bin Yusuff & Anor,
215
 Sia Cheng Soon & 
Anor v Tengku Ismail bin Tengku Ibrahim
216
 and Anantha Kiruisan PSR @ Anantha 
Krishnan & Anor v Teoh Chu Thong,
217
 the Federal Court still maintain that the Court 
of Appeal is the apex court in motor vehicle accident claims. Rule 137 cannot in any 
way be “use to bring a case originating from the subordinate courts to the Federal Court 
and that originating in the Session Court must end at the Court of Appeal”.218 Thus, we 
are not given the option bringing a personal injury motor accident claims into the 
attention of the Federal Court to resolve the issue of these conflicting decisions once 
and for all. 
 
It is therefore concluded that judges’ discretion in assessing the multiplier for damages 
for loss of support in fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents is not 
abolished by proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. The confusions caused by 
the different phrase used in section 7(3) and proviso (iv) to the section as well as the 
conflicting decisions in Ibrahim Ismail & 15 Anor. v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor. and 
Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng.
219
 allows judges to exercise their discretion. 
 
 
  
                                                 
214 The Rule allow an application for leave to appeal to the Federal Courts to be made “for the removal of doubts it is declared that 
nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the court to hear any application or to make any 
order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court.” 
215 [2008] 3 MLJ 771(FC). 
216 [2008] 3 MLJ 753. 
217 [2008] 4 MLJ 672. 
218 Per Zulkifli Ahmad Makinudin FCJ in Anantha Kiruisan PSR @ Anantha Krishnan & Anor v Teoh Chu Thong, op. cit. 
219 Op. cit. 
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4.9 ABOLISHING THE AWARD FOR LOST OF EARNING IN 
LOST YEARS 
The award for loss of earning in lost years is a Common Law head of damages. It arises 
from deceased’s right to claim for loss of future earnings in the years which he would 
have normally worked had he did not die. Since deceased had passed away, the cause 
of action is vested on his estate. The introduction of award for loss of earnings in lost 
years was fairly recent. It was introduced as part of damages recoverable in estate 
claims by Picket v British Rail Engineering Ltd.
220
 and Gammell v Wilson.
221
 The 
decisions in these cases were later adopted in Malaysia through cases such as 
Thangavelu v Chia Kok Bin
222
 and Yap Ami & Anor. v Tan Hui Pang.
223
  
 
The introduction of section 8(2)(a) of the CLA 1956 by section 3 of the CLAA 1984 
abolishes the award for loss of earning in lost years. Along with it is the judges’ 
discretion to assess the damages for the same. Section 8(2) of the CLA 1956 read: 
(2) Where a cause of action survive as aforesaid for the benefit of the 
estate of a deceased person, the damages recoverable for the benefit of 
the estate of that person- 
(a) shall not include any exemplary damages, any damages for 
bereavement made under subsection (3A) of section 7, any 
damages for loss of expectation of life and any damages for 
loss of earning in respect of any period after that person 
death; (emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
220 (1979) 1 All ER 774. 
221 (1981) 2 WLR 248. Note that although the decision concerned the loss of years for living plaintiff. 
222 Op. cit. 
223 [1982] 2 MLJ 316. 
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By abolishing the award for loss years the Legislature manages to reduce the quantum 
of damages in fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents which was 
(among others) caused by the award for loss earnings in lost years.
224
 Cases such as 
Thangavelu v Chia Kok Bin,
225
 Hassan bin Muhamad v Teoh Kim Seng
226
 and Mariah 
bte Mohhammad v Abdullah b Daud
227
 all showed quite large amount of damages 
being awarded for loss of earnings in lost years. Section 8(2) of the CLA 1956 not only 
abolishes the judges’ discretion to assess and award damages for loss of earnings in lost 
years, it also reduces the quantum of damages in fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents. 
 
 
 
 
4.10 CONCLUSIONS 
Similar to sections 28A of the CLA 1956, section 7 and 8 of the CLA 1956 also contain 
several provisions which directly affect the exercise of judicial discretion in the 
assessment of damages for fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents 
in Malaysia.  Compared to section 28A, the effects of section 7 and 8 of the CLA 1956 
are more extensive. The effects can be categorized into three (3) parts. First is total 
abolition of the power, second maintaining the power albeit with some statutory 
regulation and third merely codifying the existing practices of the judges with regard 
the exercise of such power. 
                                                 
224 The high award for loss years was due to three reasons: it allowed for loss of future earnings being handed out to deceased or 
injured person who was an infant or unemployed, probable duplicity in compensation for the dependents of deceased in cases 
where the dependents were also claiming for loss of future earnings for lost years under estate claim together with loss of support 
and the possibility that the award exceeded deceased’s actual earnings. 
225 Op. cit. The damages  for loss of earnings for lost years under was awarded at RM13,456.80: 
226 [1987] 1 MLJ 328. The damages  for loss of earnings for lost years under was awarded at RM14,954.65. 
227 [1990] 1 MLJ 240. The damages  for loss of earnings for lost years was awarded at RM 31,150. 
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The judges’ power to exercise their discretion is totally abolished in respect of the 
assessment of damages for loss of earning in lost years, loss of expectation of life and 
loss of consortium of wife. The abolition is the result of section 8(2)(a) and proviso (iii) 
to section 7(3)of the CLA 1956. Since these heads of damages are totally abolished by 
the provisions in the Act, judges’ discretion in awarding and assessing damages under 
these heading is similarly removed.  
 
The award for bereavement is another area in which judges’ discretion is totally 
removed. Section 7(3A) and (3B) of the CLA 1956 do not allow judges the discretion 
to assess the amount of damages to be awarded and to determine the beneficiaries to the 
award. The absence of specific interpretation of the term ‘spouse’ however may open 
up the possibility that for judges to exercise their discretion to increase the quantum of 
damages to be awarded. Although so far the two (2) attempts towards this effect had 
been rejected by the courts, the possibility for judges to exercise their discretion is still 
open due to the absence of specific interpretation of the word used in the provision. 
 
The award for loss of support on the other hand falls within the second category. The 
CLA 1956 introduce specific provisions in section 7 of the CLA 1956 which 
specifically regulate some elements in the assessment of damages for example the cut-
off age of fifty five (55) years old, the condition of proving deceased’s good health, the 
statutory multiplier in assessing deceased’s earnings and the prohibition against 
including any increase in deceased’s earning in the assessment of multiplier. 
Nevertheless, despite the strict statutory provisions, there are still many avenues in 
which judges can still exercise their discretion. These avenues were discussed in length 
above. The abolition of the award for loss of services by proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of 
the CLA 1956 is also another area in which judges can still exercise their discretion. 
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Although the award is abolished by the proviso (iii) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956, 
judges can still asses and award damages to compensate the loss of services under 
section 7(3) of the Act. 
 
The third category is reflected in the abolition of the awards for loss of consortium of 
wife. Although the award for loss of consortium is ‘abolished’ by the proviso, the 
‘abolition’ is a mere technicality since the award had never been recognized either in 
the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) or the Common Law. As such, the CLA 1956 is abolishing an 
award which never exists in the first place. Similarly, the substitution of loss resulting 
from death in section 7(3) with loss of support, the prohibition against taking into 
consideration the compensation benefits received by the dependants upon deceased’s 
demise in the assessment of damages for loss of support as well as the compulsory 
deduction for deceased living expenses are just codification of existing practice of the 
courts. Therefore, the introduction of the provisions which causes these effects has no 
apparent effect on judges’ discretionary power in assessing damages in fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents.  
 
With regard to the effects of section 7 and 8 of the CLA 1956 on reducing the quantum 
of damages in fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents in Malaysia, 
the only provisions which have significant impact on the quantum are the provisions 
which abolishes the award for loss of earning in lost years and prohibits the inclusion of 
any increase in deceased’s earning in the assessment of multiplier for loss of support.  
 
The abolition of the award for loss of expectation of life claimed under estate claims 
also affects the quantum of damages being awarded under fatal claims. The effect 
however is not significant. This is due to the fact that the amount awarded under this 
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heading over the years was generally moderate; ranging from RM 2500 to RM 6500 
only. As such, barring judges from awarding damages for loss of expectation of life in 
fatal accident claims leaves minimal impact in reducing the amount of damages 
awarded. Similarly, the introduction of the award for bereavement as a new head of 
damages under fatal accident claims and the imposition of strict statutory control over 
the assessment of the award also do not carry much effect on the quantum of damages 
being awarded by the courts. Since the amount of damages to be awarded as 
bereavement is fixed at RM 10,000, the effect of section 7(3A) on the quantum of 
damages is not significant. 
 
From the above discussion it is evident that all is not well with the current provisions in 
the CLA 1956 with respect to the fatal accident claims. Instead of being the provision 
to guide judges in the assessment of awards, the provisions in section 7 and 8 of the 
CLA 1956 on certain occasions create more confusion in its application. Despite the 
claims that the Act fetters judges’ discretion in the assessment of fatal claims, we can 
still see many areas in which judicial discretion is still applicable or in some cases 
necessary. Hence, it is clear that abolishing or fettering judicial discretion is not the 
result intended by the Legislature while enacting the CLAA 1975 and CLAA 1984.  
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4.11 COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THE CLA 1956 (REV 1972) AND 
THE CLA 1956 WITH REGARDS TO FATAL ACCIDENT CLAIMS 
 
CLA 1956 (rev 1972) 
 
 
CLA 1956 
 
Loss service of child and wife and loss of 
consortium of wife provided under 
Common Law and section 7(3). 
 
 
Loss of service of child and wife and loss 
of consortium of wife totally abolished by 
proviso (iii) to section 7(3). Judges 
however can still allow damages to 
compensate the monetary loss suffered in 
order to replace the service of the child or 
wife under special damages. 
 
 
Loss of expectation of life provided under 
Common Law and section 8. The 
assessment is up to the judge’s discretion. 
 
 
Loss of expectation of life abolished 
totally by section 8(2)(a).  
 
- 
 
 
Bereavement is provided by section 7(3A) 
but limited RM 10,000 and strictly for 
persons listed in section 7 (3B). 
 
 
Loss of resulting from death provided 
under section 7(3) 
- No condition.  
- Compensation benefits from other 
compensation funds are not taken 
into consideration. 
- Only expense in earning / 
producing income was deducted 
from the assessment of 
multiplicand 
- The assessment of multiplier is 
based on judges’ discretion after 
considering deceased’s earning at 
the time  of demise as well as any 
possible future increase or 
decrease in deceased’s earnings  
- The assessment of multiplier is 
based on judges’ discretion guided 
by the Common Law principle. 
 
 
Loss of support provided in section  7(3): 
- 3 conditions must be fulfilled. 
deceased must be below fifty five 
(55) years old, receiving earning 
and in good health at the time of 
injury. 
- Compensation benefits from other 
compensation funds are not taken 
into consideration. 
-  Living expenses is to be deducted 
from the assessment of 
multiplicand.  
- Future increase in income is not 
considered. The assessment of 
multiplicand is based on deceased 
earnings at the time injury. 
- The assessment of multiplier is 
based on the statutory prescribed 
method. 
  
 
Loss of earning in lost years  allowed 
under Common Law and section 8(1) 
 
Loss of earning in lost years is totally 
abolished by section 8(2)(a). 
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CHAPTER 5 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE ASSESSMENT OF INTEREST 
FOR DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND FATAL 
ACCIDENT CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF MOTOR VEHICLE 
ACCIDENTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The award for interest for damages is a common feature in personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents in Malaysia. Similar to the award 
for damages, the award for interest is also a relic of the English Common Law and 
statutes. Section 11 of the Civil Law Act (Act 67)
228
 is the primary statutory provision 
granting the judges the power to award interest for damages. This section, coupled 
together with several other provisions in the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91),
229
 
the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 (Act 92)
230
 and the Subordinate Courts Rules Act 
1955 (Act 55)
231
 allow judges to exercise their discretion in assessing and awarding 
interest for damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents.  
 
The provisions relating to the assessment of interest for damages was amended 
recently. The Rules of Courts 2012
232
 was enacted to replace the Rules of High Court 
1980
233
 and the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980.
234
 Currently, section 11 of the CLA 
                                                 
228 Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1956”. 
229 Hereinafter referred to as “the CJA 1964”. 
230 Hereinafter referred to as “the SCA 1948”. 
231 Hereinafter referred to as “the SCRA 1955”.  
232
 [PU(A)205/2012]. Hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of Court 2012”. 
233 [PU (A) 50/1980]. Herein after referred to as “the RHC 1980 (repealed)”.  
234 [PU (A) 328/1980]. Hereinafter referred to as “the SCR 1980 (repealed)”.  
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1956, Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 and the Practice Direction 1/2012
235
 
are the main provisions which regulate the assessment of interest for damages. The 
provisions are generally accepted as providing for compulsory interest, the interest rate 
as well as prohibiting compounded interest. Unfortunately, despite the intention to 
create single uniformed rules for the assessment of interest for damages, there are 
several issues relating to judges’ discretionary power in awarding interest, assessing the 
interest rate and awarding compounded interest which still needs to be addressed. 
These issues arise due to the uncertainty in interpreting section 11 of the CLA 1956, 
Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 and the Practice Direction.  
 
This chapter discusses the assessment of interest for damages in personal injury and 
fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents and several related issues on 
the subject. It starts with defining interest, types and purposes of interest followed by 
the historical background on the award of interest for damages.  The discussion mainly 
focuses on and the case of Jefford & Anor. v Gee.
236
and section 3 (1) of the English 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934.
237
 The second part of this chapter 
deals with the law of interest in Malaysia. The discussion is separated into two sections; 
pre-Rules of Court 2012 and post-Rules of Court 2012. This chapter ends with the 
discussion on judges’ discretionary power in awarding interest, assessing the interest 
rate and awarding compounded interest.  
 
This chapter is confined to the assessment of interest for damages in personal injury 
and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents only. It does not deal 
with interest on contract debt, interest in suits where the Government is a party, interest 
on legacies or other types of civil suits where interest is applicable. The cases cited are 
                                                 
235 Hereinafter referred to as “the Practice Direction”. 
236 (1970) 2 QB 130. 
237 Hereinafter referred to as “the Law Reform 1934”. 
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as far as possible only relate to personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents. There are however instances where other type of cases are 
cited due to necessity and suitability to the discussion but with moderation. 
 
 
 
5.2 DEFINITION, TYPES AND PURPOSES OF INTEREST  
5.2.1 Definition of Interest 
There are two (2) general definitions of interest. First, an amount which is agreed to be 
paid on a loan called principal and second, the damages to be paid for non-payment of a 
debt or a sum of money on an appointed day.
238
 The second definition is applicable for 
interest in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle 
accidents. Interest in these claims is regarded as the compensation for any loss or 
damages suffered as the result of being kept out of the money which ought to have been 
paid
239
 to the plaintiff upon delivery of the judgment by the court. Lord Wright in 
Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd.
240
 said: 
“The essence of interest is that it is a payment which become due because 
the creditor has not had his money at the due date. It may be regarded 
either as representing the profit he might have made if he had had the use 
of the money, or conversely the los he suffered because he had not that 
use. The general idea is that he is entitled to compensation for the 
deprivation. From that point of view it would seem immaterial whether the 
                                                 
238 Dass, K.S., The Law on Interest, (Batu Pahat : New Law Publishers, 1980), at 1. 
239 Per Lord Herschell in London, Chatham & Dover Railway Co. v South Eastern Railway Co. (1893) AC 429. See also Lim Yik 
Hua v Eastern & Oriental Hotel [1988] 3 MLJ 151 and Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar b Mohamed Said [1982] 2 MLJ 156.  
240 (1947) AC 390. 
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money was due to him under a contract express or implied or a statute or 
whether the money was due to any other reason in law.” 
 
5.2.2 Types of Interest 
There are two (2) types of interest in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising 
out of motor vehicle accidents; pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. Pre-judgment 
interest is interest awarded over damages which is awarded for the period which spans 
between the date the cause of action arose until the date of judgment. The purpose of 
this award is to compensate the plaintiff for being kept out of the money which he is 
entitled to. Since the defendant had the use of the money which legally belongs to the 
plaintiff from the date of the accident until the date of the judgment, he must 
compensate the plaintiff accordingly.
241
  
 
Post-judgment interest is interest awarded on the judgment sum starting from the date 
of judgment
242
 until the date of realization of the judgment sum by the defendant. It is 
the interest that accrues prior to actual payment of the judgment sum. Since a 
successful plaintiff have the right to the judgment sum once the judgment is delivered, 
he should be compensated for the time between the rendering of the judgment and the 
payment of the judgment sum. 
 
                                                 
241 Lee Guan Par v Hotel Universal Sdn. Bhd. [2005] 4 MLJ 589. 
242 Not the date judgment is entered. 
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5.2.3 Purposes of Interest 
The purpose of awarding interest in personal injury and fatal accident claims in motor 
vehicle accidents are three (3) folds; to compensate the plaintiff for the delay in 
receiving the compensation,
243
 to prevent unjust enrichment to the defendant as the 
result of withholding payment of the judgment sum
244
 and to pressure the defendant to 
satisfy the judgment as soon as possible so as not to deny the plaintiff his compensation 
for the loss suffered. The imposition of interest will force the defendant and the 
insurance company insuring the vehicle at fault not to delay the proceedings on sham 
pleas
245
 and to expedite payment of judgment sum so as to ensure that the plaintiff will 
be compensated accordingly at the earliest possible time. The rationale behind the 
awards of interest for damages was explained by Lord Herschell L.C in London, 
Chatham & Dover Railway Co. v South Eastern Railway Co.
246
 where he held:  
“…that when money is owing from one party to another and that other is 
driven to have recourse to legal proceedings on order to recover the 
amount due from him, the party who is wrongfully withholding the money 
from the other ought not in justice to benefit by having that money in his 
possession and enjoying the use of it, when the money ought to be in the 
possession of the other party who is entitled to its use” 
 
Similarly, in Harbutts ‘Plasticine’ Ltd. v Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd.,247the  English 
Court of Appeal held: 
“…the basis of an award of interest is that the defendant has kept the 
plaintiff out of his money; and the defendant had that use of it himself. 
So he ought to compensate the plaintiff accordingly.” 
                                                 
243 See Hyde v Price (1837) p. Coop 193. 
244 Ogus, A. I., The Law of Damages, (London: Butterworth, 1973), at 96. 
245 Jai, Janak Raj, Motor Accident Claims Law and Procedures, (Delhi : Universal Law Publishing, 2000), at 118.  
246 Op. cit. 
247 (1970) 2 WLR 198 at 212. 
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5.3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AWARD FOR 
INTEREST 
5.3.1 The Common Law  
Historically, the judicial perceptions relating to the award for interest for damages was 
interwoven with the stigma attached by religion and the notion of taking usury.
248
 The 
early English cases relating to the award for interest for damages were riddled with 
inconsistencies between the prohibition of interest and the need for the same. The 
advance in commercial transactions in the seventeenth (17
th
) and eighteenth (18
th
) 
centuries
249
 and the gradual weaning of the traditional perceptions
250
 within the society 
at the time also failed to encourage judges to award interest for damages in civil suits. 
Interest was awarded only in contract,
251
 in cases “where debt was secured by bill of 
exchange or where a promise to pay interest was implied from a usage of trade or the 
like.”252 
 
The judges’ reluctance to award interest was also apparent in personal injury and fatal 
accident cases. Before 1970, judges were not in the practice of awarding interest for 
damages for the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of 
judgment. Interest was only awarded for damages for the period between the date of 
judgment and date of realization of the judgment.
253
 The courts reluctance to award 
                                                 
248 Per Mason CJ and Wilson J in Hungerfords v Walker, (1989) 84 ALR 119. 
249 Ogus, A. I., op. cit. at 97. 
250 McGregor, Harvey, McGregor on Damages, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), at 530.  
251 Originally, under contract, no interest can be awarded if the obligation was not certain or capable of being made certain. Only in 
cases ‘where there is contract of payment of money on a certain day, as on the bills of exchange, promissory notes etc; where there 
has been an express promise to pay interest, or where, from the course of dealing between the parties, it may be inferred that this 
was their intention, or where it can be proved that money has been used and interest has actually been made’ that interest might be 
awarded. See Lord Ellenborough decision in De Havilland v Bowerbank (1807) 1 Camp. 50. 
252 Dass, K.S., op.cit., at 1 and Luntz, Harold, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death, 3rd ed., (Melbourne: 
Butterworth, 1990), at 481. Cases such as Eddow v Hopkins (1780) 1 Douglas 376, Page v Newman (1829) 9 B.& C. 378 and 
Higgins v Sargents (1832) 2 B. & C. 348 proved that the English courts were reluctant to allow interest on money which the 
defendant should have paid to the plaintiff unless some contractual or statutory right to interest exist. 
253 By virtue of the Judgment Act 1838. The House of Lords in London, Chatham & Dover Railway Co. v South Eastern Railway 
Co. op. cit., noted that the practice of not allowing interest was so well engrained in the English system that only legislation could 
affect any change in it. 
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interest persisted even after the introduction of section 3 of the Law Reform 1934.
254
 
Only in the Admiralty Courts that the aversion for awarding interest for damages was 
slightly relaxed.
255
 
 
5.3.2 The Early English Provisions on Interest  
The earliest piece of legislation which provides for the award of interest for damages is 
the Civil Procedure Act 1833 and the Judgment Act 1838. Both of these Acts however 
have their own shortcomings. Although the Civil Procedure Act 1833 was enacted to 
supplement the areas in which the Common Law already acknowledged the award for 
interest,
256
  the provisions in the Act were too narrow and failed to bring any significant 
change to the law governing interest.
257
 The Judgment Act 1838 on the other hand only 
allows for interest on damages for the period from spanning from the date of judgment 
to the date of realization of the judgment sum.
258
 As such, the application of this section 
cannot be extended to the period prior to the date of judgment.  
 
The judges’ reluctance to award interest for damages and the shortcomings found in the 
Civil Procedure Acts 1833 and the Judgment Act 1838 were noted by the English 
Parliament. In 1934, the Law Reform Committee published a report
259
 to encourage the 
award for interest for damages especially in personal injury and fatal accident claims. 
                                                 
254 T.S.T, “Interest in Damages in running-Down Cases” [1966] 1 Malayan Law Journal xxxi- xxxiii at xxxi.  
255 See The Northumbria (1869) L.R. 3 A. & E. 6, Re Dundee(1827) 2 Haag. Adm. 137 and The Amalia, (1864) 5 New Rep. 164 
256 Section 28 of the Act for example allowed for interest for action on debt in special circumstances such as in cases where the debt 
was a fixed sum under written contract payable at the specific time or if otherwise made payable by a demand in writing fixing a 
certain date and notifying the debtor that in default interest would be claimed. Section 29 allowed interest in actions of trover and 
trespass de bonis asportatis.   
257 Lord Herschell in London, Chatham & Dover Railway Co. v South Eastern Railway Co. op. cit. held;“When Lord Tenterden 
dealt with the allowance of interest in thus statute he certainly introduced a language which kept such claims within narrow limits; 
speaking for myself they seem to be too narrow for the purpose of justice.” 
258 Post-judgment interest. Section 17 of the Judgment Act 1838. 
259 Cmnd. 4546. 
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The suggestion in the Law Reform Committee Report was realized into section 3(1) of 
the Law Reform 1934.
260
 The section reads:  
In any proceedings tried in any Court of Record for the recovery of any 
debt or damages, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that there shall be 
included in the sum for which judgment is given interest as such rate as it 
thinks fit on the whole or any part of the debt or damages for the whole or 
any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and 
the date of the judgment: 
Provided that nothing in this section— 
(a) shall authorize the giving of interest upon interest; or 
(b) shall apply in relation to any debt upon which interest is 
payable as of right whether by virtue of any agreement or 
otherwise; or 
(c) shall affect the damages recoverable for the dishonor of a bill of 
exchange. 
 
The section provided a general provision empowering judges with the discretion to 
award interest for damages in all cases.
261
 This discretionary power was not limited to 
cases in which the plaintiff has contractual or statutory right to interest only.
262
  The 
section accorded judges with the discretion to decide whether to award interest for 
damages or not, to assess the rate of interest to be awarded, to determine on which part 
of the debt or damages the interest is to be awarded and to decide the period in which 
the interest is to be awarded.  
 
                                                 
260
 The section was later repealed and superseded by section 15 (4) and (5) of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 (cap 53). 
 
261 McGregor, Harvey, op. cit., at 531. 
262 Butler v Forestry Commission, unreported (1979) CA no 338. 
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Despite the discretionary power given to the judges above, there were three pertinent 
points to be noted; first, the section only allowed for simple interest. Judges were not 
given the discretion to award compounded interest. The prohibition originated from the 
traditional perception against the practice of usury. At the same time it also prevented 
unjust enrichment to the plaintiff. Plaintiff was entitled to simple interest only.  Second, 
the section was not applicable for cases in which award for interest was payable as of 
right. This was to complement the practice of the Common Law which already 
acknowledged plaintiff’s right to interest in cases where there was already an obligation 
to pay interest. Third, the section placed a limit to the discretionary power of the judge 
to decide on the period in which interest was to be awarded. Judges were only allowed 
to award interest for damages within the period spanning from the date in which the 
cause of action arose to the date of judgment. The power was not extended to the period 
after the date of judgment. This was due to the existence of section 17 of the Judgment 
Act 1838 which already made it compulsory for judges to award interest on judgment 
sum from date of judgment is pronounced  to the date of realization of the judgment.
263
  
 
Unfortunately, despite the power granted by section 3 of the Law Reform 1934, the 
judges were still reluctant to award interest for damages for tort or in personal injury 
and fatal accidents claims.
264
 Even in admiralty courts where interest has generally 
been awarded on damages, there was no reported case where the section was applied.
265
  
 
The English court’s reluctance to invoke section 3(1) of the Law Reform 1934 to award 
interest for damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims was rectified by 
                                                 
263 See Parson v Mather & Platt Ltd. (1977) 2 All ER 715. 
264 T.S.T., op. cit., at xxxi and xxxii. 
265 In The Aizkarai Mendi (1938) P. 263. 265 for example, the plaintiff’s contention that interest should run from the date of accident 
namely when the cause of action accrued to the date of judgment as provided in section 3(1) of the Law Reform 1934 was rejected. 
Instead, Langton J. chose to follow the general practice of the court allowing interest from the date of the report of the registrar 
adjudicating the claim, i.e., interest on judgment debt. Also see The Theems (1938) P 197. 
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section 22 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969.
266
 For convenience, section 22 (1) 
and (2) of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 is reproduced below: 
(1) Where in any such proceedings as are mentioned in subsection (1) of 
this section [section 3 of the Act of 1934], judgment is given for a 
sum which (apart from interest on damages) exceed £200 and 
represents or includes damages in respect of personal injuries to the 
plaintiff or any other person, or in respect of a person’s death, then 
(without prejudice to the exercise of the power conferred by that sub-
section in relation to any part of that sum which does not represent 
such damages) the court shall exercise such power so as to include in 
that sum interest on those damages or on such part of them as the 
court consider appropriate, unless the court is satisfied that there are 
special reasons why no interest should be given in respect damages. 
(emphasis added) 
 
(2) Any order under this section may provide for interest to be calculated 
at different rates in respect of different parts of the period for which 
interest is given, whether that period is the whole or part of the period 
mentioned in subsection (1) of this section. 
 
The section made it compulsory for judges to award interest in all personal injury and 
fatal accident claims where the award exceeds £200. Judges however still have the 
discretion to assess the rate of interest to be awarded, to determine on which part of the 
damages the interest is to be awarded and the period in which the interest is to be 
                                                 
266 Hereinafter referred to as “the AJA 1969”.  The section was later repealed and superseded by section 15 (4) and (5) of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1982 (cap 53). 
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awarded. Judges also have the discretion withhold interest when there are special 
reasons to do so.  
 
 
5.3.3 The rule in Jefford & Anor. v Gee
267
 
Despite the power to award interest on damages granted by section 3(1) of the Law 
Reform 1934 and section 22 of the AJA 1969, none of these provisions provide the 
method in which the interest should be assessed. The English judges were left with 
almost unguided discretion. Recognizing the problem, Lord Denning in Jefford v 
Gee,
268
  laid down the following principles to regulate the assessment of the rate of 
interest and period in which the interest is to be awarded:
 269
 
(a) On special damages such as loss of salary, medical expenses and the 
loss of  personal effects, interest should be awarded from date of 
accident to the date of trial
270
 at half of the appropriate rate;
271
  
(b) No interest on future earnings or other future loss272 since ex hypothesi 
the loss has yet occurred. Furthermore plaintiff is receiving 
compensation in advance of his anticipated loss;
273
 
(c) On interest for pain and suffering and loss of amenities, interest should 
be awarded at appropriate rate from date of service of writ to the date 
of trial;
274
 
                                                 
267 (1970) 2 QB 130. 
268 Op. cit. 
269 Dass, S. Santhana, Personal Injury Claims, (Petaling Jaya: Alpha Sighma Sdn. Bhd., 2000), at 66. 
270 Since the purpose of awarding interest is to compensate the plaintiff for the deprivation of the use of his money, the interest for 
special damages is to run at the moment the money was lost to him. Plaintiff who had been deprived of the use of his money either 
starting from the date he was unable to work, date of payment of hospital bills or date of accident where plaintiff’s personal effects 
were damaged must be compensated at the time these losses occurs.  However, since it would be too complicated and detailed to 
calculate full interest for exactly every single date of loss, a broad time line was suggested i.e.; date of accident, at half of the 
normal rate 
271 ‘Appropriate interest rate’ is the rate payable on money in court placed on short-term investment account. See Chew, Leslie et 
all., “A Comparative Analysis of Various Aspects in the Law of Personal Injuries in Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore” (2008) 3 
Malayan Law Journal i-ivii, at xxix. 
272 See Clarke v Rotax Aircraft Equipment Ltd. (1975) 3 All ER 794 where it was decided that no interest is to be awarded for loss 
of future earning capacity. 
273 Ogus, A. I., op. cit., at 102. 
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(d)  With regard to fatal accident, the interest should be awarded in lump 
sum that is from the date of service of the writ.
275
 
(e) In exceptional circumstances “as and when one party or the other had 
been guilty of gross delay” the court may diminish or increase the rate 
at which interest is awarded. 
(f) The court should itemize the damages and the judgment should state 
the rate of interest and the period for which it is awarded. 
 
The discussion on section 3(1) of the Law Reform 1934 and the rule in Jefford v Gee
276
 
above is crucial in laying the foundation for the following sub-chapters on Malaysian 
provisions, practices and issues with regard to the award of interest. Although the Law 
Reform 1934 is not applicable in Malaysia, the pre-1956 cases are still affected by the 
Act by virtue of English cases which were decided according to the Act being cited and 
applied in Malaysia.
277
 Similarly the rule in Jefford v Gee
278
 are now considered as an 
established rule in Malaysia and applied as a matter of course. 
 
 
 
5.4 MALAYSIAN PROVISIONS REGARDING INTEREST  
The primary provision on interest for damages in Malaysia is section 11 of the CLA 
1956. The section is almost an exact copy of section 3(1) of the Law Reform 1934 with 
                                                                                                                                              
274 Since non-pecuniary damages cannot the properly divided into pre and post-trial losses, the losses is to be calculated in lump 
sum and interest should follow. 
275 Interest for damages for pain and suffering as well as loss of support becomes payable not at the time of loss but ‘from the 
time defendant ought to have paid…but did not’; that is at the date of the writ is served. The Court in this case rationalized its 
decision by pointing out that since interest ‘should be awarded to the plaintiff for being kept out of money which ought to have 
been paid to him,’ defendant ought to have paid once the writ is served. Hence the interest should run from the date of writ is 
serve at normal rate.  
276 Op. cit.  
277 Rutter, Michael F., Handbook on Damages for Personal Injuries and Death in Singapore and Malaysia, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: 
Butterworth Asia, 1993) at 392. 
278 Op. cit.  
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the exception of the omission of the word ‘of Record’. Section 11 of the CLA 1956 
reads: 
In any proceedings tried in any Court for the recovery of any debt or 
damages, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that there shall be included 
in the sum for which judgment is given interest as such rate as it thinks 
fit on the whole or any part of the debt or damages for the whole or 
any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose 
and the date of the judgment: (emphasis added) 
Provided that nothing in this section— 
(a) shall authorize the giving of interest upon interest; 
(b) shall apply in relation to any debt upon which interest is 
payable as of right whether by virtue of any agreement or 
otherwise; or 
(c) shall affect the damages recoverable for the dishonor of a bill of 
exchange. 
 
Section 11 of the CLA 1956 also carries the same effect as section 3(1) of the Law 
Reform 1934. It is a general provision which allows judges to have the discretion to 
decide whether interest is to be awarded in cases involving recovery of debt or 
damages.
279
 At the same time, it also grants similar discretion to the judge in 
determining the interest rate, the portion of the debt or damages where interest is to be 
awarded and the period in which interest is to be assessed. This power is however 
limited to the debt or damages awarded for the period starting from the dates of the 
cause of action arose to the date of judgment.  
                                                 
279 The discretionary nature of the award for interest in personal injury and fatal accident claims is further emphasis by the absence 
of any equivalent provision to section 22 of the AJA 1969. Our local judges are not under any obligation to award interest in 
personal injury claims. This is recognized by Salleh Abbas FJ in Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar bin Mohamed Said, op. cit. when he held 
that; “The ordering of interest to be included in a sum for damages is a judicial discretion. Section 11 of the Civil Law Act gives 
fairly wide discretion to the court to order interest on the sum adjudged by the court in cases where claimant succeeds in 
proceedings for the recovery of debt or damages.”  
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Section 11 of the CLA 1956 is to be read together with Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules 
of Court 2012.
280
 The provision reads: 
Subject to rule 12A, except when it has been otherwise agreed between the 
parties, every judgment debt shall carry interest at such rate as the 
Chief Justice may from time to time determine or at such other rate 
not exceeding the rate aforesaid as the Court determines, such interest 
to be calculated from the date of judgment until the judgment is 
satisfied. (emphasis added) 
 
Pursuant to this provision, the Chief Justice, via the Practice Direction issued the 
following directive: 
Bagi menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang diberikan kepada  saya di bawah 
Aturan 30, kaedah 6(2);Aturan 42, kaedah 12; Aturan 44, kaedah 18(1b) 
& (2); Aturan 44, kaedah 19, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012, saya 
dengan ini mengarahkan kadar bunga di bawah peruntukan-peruntukan di 
atas ditentukan pada kadar 5 % setahun. 
 
Arahan Amalan ini berkuatkuasa mulai 1 Ogos 2012. 
 
In the exercise the powers conferred upon me under Order 30, Rule 6 (2); 
Order 42, Rule 12; Order 44, Rule 18 (1b) & (2); Order 44, Rule 19, Rules 
of the Court 2012, I hereby direct the interest rate under the provisions of 
the above specified at a rate of 5% per annum.  
 
                                                 
280 The Rules of Court 2012 replaces the RHC 1980 and SCR 1980 effective from 1st August 2012. It unifies the Rules and Court 
Forms applicable for High Court and Session Courts’ civil proceedings into one Rules of Court. See press statement issued by 
Attorney General Chamber,  Che Wan Zaidi bin Che Wan Ibrahim “Siaran Akhbar Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012”, 2 July 2012,  
Malaysian Bar, 4th December 2012, 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/notices_for_members/siaran_akhbar_kaedah_kaedah_mahkamah_2012.html > 
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The Practice Direction will take effect from 1 August 2012.  
 
Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 and the Practice Direction provide for that 
a maximum interest rate of five (5) percent per annum
281
 is to be calculated on 
judgment debt starting from the date of judgment to the date where the judgment sum is 
realized. The rate however is variable at the discretion of the presiding judge provided 
that the new rate does not exceed five (5) percent.
282
The Practice Direction also gives 
the Chief Justice the discretion to determine and vary the maximum interest rate.
283
 The 
Rules of Court 2012 abolishes the SCR 1980
284
 and the HRC 1980.
285
 
 
However, despite the forethought and considerations of the Rules Committees in 
enacting the Rules of Court 2012, there are a few areas in which the application of the 
rule as well as the Practice Direction is still unclear, especially with regard to the 
followings:  
 
5.4.1 Which Provision Governs the Pre-judgment Interest? 
Prior to the introduction of the Rules of Court 2012, the assessment of interest at the 
High Court and Subordinate Courts was governed by the RHC 1980 and SCR 1980 
respectively. The RHC 1980 unfortunately only provided for post-judgment interest. It 
did not provide for pre-judgment interest. Nevertheless, the High Court’s judges had 
been awarding pre-judgment interest at the rate of three (3) to four (4) percent for 
special damages from the date of cause of action arose to date of judgment and six (6) 
                                                 
281 Unless agreed by the parties. 
282 This power is similar to Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980 (repealed) and Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 (repealed) which 
provided for a maximum rate of four (4) percent per annum. The rate was variable at the discretion of the judge provided that the 
new rate does not exceed four (4) percent. 
283 Prior to the Rules of Court 2012, the Rules Committees was empowered by section 4(g) of the Subordinate Court Rules Act 
1955 (Act 55)(rev. 1971) and section 16 of the CJA 1964 to make rules relating to the rate of interest. This power is discretionary. 
284 For Subordinate Courts, Order 28 Rule 18 of the SCR 1980 (repealed) provided for pre-judgment interest. Order 29 Rule 12 of 
the SCR 1980 (repealed) provided for post-judgment interest. 
285 For High Court, Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 (repealed) provided for post judgment interest. There was no provision for 
pre-judgment interest in the RHC 1980 (repealed). 
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to eight (8) percent for general non-pecuniary damages from the date of writ to the date 
of judgment.
286
  
 
The SCR 1980 on the other hand contained Order 28 Rule 18. The provision provided 
for pre-judgement interest for Subordinate Courts. It reads:  
In any action for the recovery of debt or damages, the Court may, if it 
thinks just, order that there shall be included in the sum for which 
judgment is given interest at such rate not exceeding 4 per centum on 
the whole or any part of the debt or damages for the whole or any 
party of the period between the date when the cause of action arose 
and the date of the judgment: (emphasis added)  
 
Provided that nothing in this rule:  
(a) shall authorize the giving of interest upon interest:   
(b) shall apply in relation to any debt upon which interest is 
payable as of right whether by virtue of any agreement or 
otherwise: or 
(c) shall affect the damages recoverable for the dishonor of a bill of 
exchange. 
   
Order 28 Rule 18 of the SCR 1980 gave the discretion to the Subordinate Courts’ 
judges to award pre-judgment interest. This discretionary power however was limited. 
Although judges have the discretion to decide on the rate of pre-judgment interest, rate 
                                                 
286
 See Murtadza bin Mohammed Hassan v Chong Swee Pian, op. cit., Chan Lye Huat v Tan Ong Kong [1985] 2 MLJ 112, Lau Ee 
Ee v Tan King Kwong [1986] 1 MLJ 308, Lee Ann v Mohammad Sahari bin Zakaria [1987] 1 MLJ 252, Santhanaletchumy 
Subramaniam v. Zainal Saad & Anor. [1994] 4 CLJ 192, Athmalingam Muniandy & Anor v. Khu Li Huang [2011] 2 CLJ 619 and 
Lau Kung Kai v Abu Serah bin Bol & Anor. [2008] 10 CLJ 245. 
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cannot exceed four (4) percent per annum.
287
Judges also were not allowed to award 
compounded interest, interest on contractual debt and interest for damages for dishonor 
bill of exchange. However, after the SCR 1980 was repealed by the Rules of Court 
2012. The provision governing the pre-judgment interest for Subordinate Courts was 
also repealed. 
 
Other than repealing the RHC 1980 and SCR 1980, the Rules of Court 2012 also 
introduce a new provision to govern the award for interest. Order 42 Rule 12 of the 
Rules of Court 2012 specifically states that interest on judgment debt is to be calculated 
from the date of judgment to the date of realization of the judgment sum by the 
defendant i.e. post-judgment interest. It however does not provide anything for the 
period between the date when the cause of action arose to the date of the judgment i.e. 
pre-judgment interest. The Practice Direction also does not contain any provision on 
pre-judgment interest. As such, there is nothing in the current court’s rules which 
provides for pre-judgment interest.  
 
5.4.2 Whether the pre-judgment interest is totally at the discretion of the judges?  
The absence of any provision to govern the pre-judgment interest is not new. As 
mentioned above, the High Court was not governed by any provision in respect of the 
assessment of pre-judgment interest even before the introduction of the Rules of Court 
2012. The absence of any specific provision in the Rules of Court rule however does 
not mean that the award for interest totally unregulated by any statutory provision. 
 
Section 11 of the CLA 1956 provides for the award for interest on damages for the 
period between the cause of action arose to the date of judgment i.e. pre-judgment 
                                                 
287 Initially, the rate was set at eight (8) percent per annum. The rate was reduced to four (4) percent in 2011 vide the section 2 of 
the Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Rules 2011(PU (A) 211/2011). The amendment was gazetted on 29th June 2011. 
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interest. As such, in the absence of any provision in the Rules of Court 2012 and the 
Practice Direction, section 11 of the CLA 1956 can be applied with regard to pre-
judgment interest. The term ‘may’ in the section convey the discretionary nature of the 
provision. Section 11 of the CLA 1956 grants judges the discretion to award pre-
judgment interest as and when they see it fit to do so. Judges also have the discretion to 
decide on the interest rate, the part of damages and the period in which the interest is to 
be awarded.  
 
It is therefore concluded that the absence of specific provision in the Rules of Court 
2012 governing the assessment of pre-judgment interest, the fact that Order 42 Rule 12 
of the Rule of Courts 2012 is only applicable for post-judgment period and the 
discretionary nature of section 11 of the CLA 1956 all lead to the conclusion that 
judges currently have a wide discretion in respect of pre-judgment interest This 
discretion is only restricted by provisos (a) to (c) to section 11 of the CLA 1956. As 
such, other than prohibiting judges from awarding compounded interest, interest on 
contractual debt and interest for damages for dishonor bill of exchange, judges 
currently have a wide discretion with regard to pre-judgment interest for damages in 
personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. 
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5.5 THE MANDATORY OBLIGATION TO AWARD INTEREST  
Under Common Law, no interest is recoverable unless ‘some contractual or statutory 
right to interest’ exists.288 It should follow that plaintiffs in personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents have no absolute right to interest 
on damages unless it is made compulsory by the statutes. Unlike section 17 of the 
Judgment Act 1838 and section 22 of the AJA 1969
289
 in England, there is nothing in 
our local provisions prior to Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 1012 which 
specifically direct the judges to award interest. As such, judges are not obligate to 
award interest for damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff also has no absolute right to interest unless and until 
interest is ordered by the judge. 
 
The introduction of Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Courts 2012
290
 creates some 
confusion to an otherwise clear stand above.  The phrase ‘every judgment debt shall 
carry interest…’ in the provision raises the possibility that interest on damages is 
mandatory. The term ‘shall’ signifies that interest must be awarded and judges have no 
discretion to deny the successful plaintiff interest on damages. Therefore, it is crucial 
that the question of whether the judges’ discretion to award interest for damages has 
been abolished by Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Courts 2012 or in other word 
whether interest on damages is an absolute right of the successful plaintiff in personal 
injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents is resolve. The 
answer to the above questions can be found by looking at the following; 
                                                 
288 Dass, K.S., op. cit., (1980), at lxxxv. Also see London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co v South-Eastern Railway Co., op.cit.  
289 The sections make it compulsory for the English courts to award interest in all personal injury and fatal accident cases. 
290 Similar mandatory effect can be seen in Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 (repealed) and Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980 
(repealed). 
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5.5.1 Statutes 
As concluded above, the award for pre-judgment interest is currently governed by 
section 11 of the CLA 1956.  The section allows judges the discretion to award interest 
for damages from the date the cause of action arose until the date of judgment i.e. pre-
judgment interest. This discretionary power is absolute. Judges are not under any 
obligation to award interest unless and until they see it just to do so. This rule was 
highlighted in New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd v Ong Choon Lin (t/a Syarikat Federal 
Motor Trading.
291
 The Supreme Court endorsed the trial court’s decision in not 
awarding pre-judgment interest on the ground that the power under section 11 of the 
CLA 1956 is discretionary and the Court saw no reason to review the trial judge’s 
decision as it was assumed that the judge had exercised his discretion judiciously. 
There is no obligation on the judges to award pre-judgment interest especially when 
there are special reasons why no interest should be given. Similarly, section 11 of the 
CLA 1956 also allows judges the discretion to decide on the rate of interest to be 
awarded. There is no maximum or minimum rate imposed. This discretion was also 
found in Order 28 Rule 18 of the SCR 1980. The provision also did not confer any right 
to the plaintiff with regard to interest unless and until it is ordered by the judge. The 
term ‘may’ in the provision retained the discretionary power of the judges and imposed 
no obligation on them to award pre-judgment interest.  
 
The clarity with regard to judges’ discretionary power to award pre-judgment interest 
however does not extend to post-judgment interest. The wording in Order 42 Rule 12 of 
the Rules of Court 2012 which states that “every judgment debt shall carry interest 
at the rate as the Chief Justice may from time to time determine…” raises the 
                                                 
291 Op cit. 
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possibility that the Rules Committees
292
 intends to make it mandatory for judges to 
award post-judgment interest by placing the imperative terms ‘every judgment’ and 
‘shall’ in the provision. The imperative nature of the provision also gives the 
impression that all successful plaintiffs in personal injury and fatal accident claims 
arising out of motor vehicle accidents have an absolute right to receive post-judgment 
interest.  
 
The mandatory nature of post-judgment interest can also be found in the now repealed 
court’s rule i.e., Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 and Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 
1980. Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 governed the post-judgment interest for High 
Court. The provision reads:  
Every judgment debt shall carry interest at the rate of 4 per centum per 
annum or at such other rate not exceeding the rate aforesaid as  the Court 
directs (unless the  rate has been otherwise agreed upon between the 
parties), such interest to be calculated from the date of judgment until the 
judgment is satisfied. (emphasis added) 
 
Almost in the same words, Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980 provided for post-
judgment interest for Subordinate Courts. The provision reads: 
Every judgment debt shall carry interest at the rate of 4 per centum per 
annum, or at such other rate not exceeding the rate aforesaid as the Court 
shall direct (unless the rate has been otherwise agreed upon between the 
parties), such interest to be calculated from the date of judgment until the 
judgment is satisfied. (emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
292 Rules Committee and the Subordinate Courts Rules Committee. 
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These provisions stated ‘every judgment debt shall carry interest at the rate of 4 per 
centum…’ The term ‘shall’, raised the presumption that judges were obligated to award 
post-judgment interest and plaintiffs were entitled to the same as of right.
293
  
 
The notion that post-judgment interest is mandatory has deep-rooted origin. From the 
historical point of view, the Malaysian Legislature seems to have always intended to 
make post-judgment interest mandatory upon the judges and the absolute right of the 
successful plaintiff. An analysis of the provisions that preceded Order 42 Rule 12 of the 
Rules of Courts 2012, Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 and Order 29 Rule 12 of the 
SCR 1980 indicates that awarding pre-judgment interest had always been made 
mandatory upon judges by statutory provisions and court’s rules. Order 34 Rule 41 of 
the Rules of Supreme Courts 1937 for example reads:   
The Court shall, on the trial of any action in which interest is recoverable 
or in the hearing of any application for judgment in such action give 
judgment for interest at the rate, if any agreed upon by the parties, and 
if no rate has been agreed upon, at such rate not exceeding six per centum 
per annum, as the Court or judge thinks fit. (emphasis added) 
The mandatory nature of post-interest was further strengthened by Order 39 Rule 13 of 
the same rule of court. The provision stated: 
Unless it has been otherwise agreed between the parties, every judgment 
debt shall carry interest at the rate of 6 per centum per annum or at such 
rate not exceeding the rate aforesaid as the court of judge directs, such 
interest to be calculated from the date of judgment until the judgment is 
satisfied. (emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
293 Dass, K.S., op. cit., at 11. See also Yeo Yang Poh, “A Matter of Interest”, (1986) 2 Malayan Law Journal clxxiii – clxxxix, at 
clxxvii where he concluded that the effect of Order 42 Rule 12 of the HCR 1980 is that “interest is to be imposed on every 
judgment (“shall”) unless the court otherwise orders.” 
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The Rules of the Supreme Court 1937 was later superseded by the Rules of Supreme 
Courts 1957. Order 40 Rule 11(2) of the Rules of Supreme Courts 1957 established the 
mandatory effect of post-judgment interest by stating that “every judgment for the 
payment of money shall bear interest…” KS Dass contended that although the 
mandatory nature established by the Rules of the Supreme Court 1937 was reduced to 
discretionary by Order 40 Rule 11(1) of the Rules of Supreme Courts 1957, the 
application of Rule 11(1) was limited to pre-judgment interest only. Since Rule 11(2) is 
not confined to any specific period, it was applicable to post-judgment interest. The 
courts were obligated to award post-judgment interest by virtue of the term ‘shall’ in 
the provision.
294
 For convenience purpose, the provision in Order 40 Rule 11 is 
reproduced below: 
(1) In any proceedings tried in the Supreme Court for the recovery of any 
debt or damages, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that there shall 
be included in the sum for which judgment is given interest as such 
rate as it thinks fit on the whole or any part of the debt or damages for 
the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause 
of action arose and the date of the judgment: 
  Provided that nothing in this section— 
(a) shall authorize the giving of interest upon interest; 
(b) shall apply in relation to any debt upon which interest is 
payable as of right whether by virtue of any agreement or 
otherwise; or 
(c) shall affect the damages recoverable for the dishonor of a bill of 
exchange. 
                                                 
294 Dass, K.S., op. cit., at 8. 
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(2) Every judgment for the payment of money shall bear interest at the 
rate of six per cent per annum. (emphasis added) 
 
The mandatory effect of Order 40 Rule 11(2) of the Rules of Supreme Courts 1957 on 
post-judgment interest was further emphasized by Order 42 Rule 16 of the same rule of 
court. The provision stated: 
 Every writ of execution for the recovery of money shall be indorsed with 
a direction to the sheriff, or other officer or person to whom the writ is 
directed, to levy the money really due and payable and sought to be 
recovered under the Judgment or order, stating the amount, and also to 
levy interest thereon, if sought to be recovered at the rate of 6 per cent 
per annum, from the time when the judgment or order was entered or 
made, provided that in cases where there is an agreement between the 
parties that more than 6 per cent interest shall be secured by the judgment 
or order, then the endorsement may be accordingly to levy the amount of 
interest so agreed. (emphasis added) 
 
Therefore, by virtue of Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980, Order 29 Rule 12 of the 
SCR 1980, Order 34 Rule 41 of the Rules of Supreme Courts 1937, Order 39 Rule 13 
of the Rules of Supreme Courts 1937, Order 40 Rule 11(2) of the Rules of Supreme 
Courts 1957 and Order 40 Rule 11(2) of the Rules of Supreme Courts 1957 awarding 
post-judgment interest was mandatory upon the presiding judges. It also became the 
absolute right of the plaintiffs.  
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KS Dass however is of the opinion that there is nothing in Order 42 Rule 12 of the 
RHC 1980 and Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980
295
 which create mandatory 
obligation on the judges to award post-judgment interest or allowed interest as of right 
to the litigants.
296
 He argued that the mandatory nature of these provisions was 
irrelevant since the provisions themselves were invalid on the ground of them being 
substantively ultra vires.
297
 Both of these provisions had exceeded the power conferred 
by their enabling Act; the CJA 1964 and the SCA 1948. Since section 25 (2) read 
together with para 7 of the CJA 1964 and section 99A read together with para 21 of 3
rd
 
schedule of the SCA 1948 only confer power to the judges to award interest as an 
additional power, the CJA 1964 and SCA 1948 do not in any way make it compulsory 
for judges to award interest. Copies of the above provisions are reproduced below: 
Section 25 (2)CJA 1964: 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) the High Court 
shall have the additional powers set out in the Schedule: 
Provided that all such powers shall be exercised in accordance with any 
written law or rules of court relating to the same. 
Para 7 of the CJA 1964: 
Power to direct interest to be paid on debts, including judgment debts, or 
on sums found due on taking accounts between parties, or on sums found 
due and unpaid by receivers or other persons liable to account to the 
Court. 
                                                 
295 Note that since the wordings in Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 and Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980 are substantially 
similar to Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 especially with respect to the terms ‘every judgment’ and ‘shall’ the same 
arguments applies with regard to the effect of Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 on the issue of mandatory pot-judgment 
interest. 
296 Dass, K.S., op. cit., at 9. . 
297 Id., at 9. 
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Section 99A of the SCA 1948: 
In amplification and not in derogation of the powers conferred by this Act 
or inherent in any court, and without prejudice to the generality of any 
such powers, every Sessions Court and Magistrates' Court shall have the 
further powers and jurisdiction set out in the Third Schedule. 
 
Para 21 of 3
rd
 schedule of the SCA 1948: 
Power to direct interest to be paid on debts, including judgment debts or 
on sums found due on taking accounts between parties or on sums found 
due and unpaid by receivers or other persons liable to account to the court. 
 
KS Dass also opined that in enacting Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 and Order 29 
Rule 12 of the SCR 1980, the Rules Committees had acted beyond the power conferred 
by their enabling Acts. Since both section 16(i) of the CJA 1964 and section 4(g) of the 
SCRA 1955 only grant the discretionary power to the Rule Committees to regulate the 
rate of interest, the Committees has acted beyond the power conferred to them when 
they imposed the mandatory post-judgment interest in Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 
1980 and Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980. This line of arguments was agreed upon 
by the High Court of Kuching in Pelita Leisures Sdn. Bhd. v Tsai Chee Jung.
298
 Copies 
of section 16(i) of the CJA 1964 and section 4(g) of the SCRA 1955 are reproduced 
below: 
 
Section 16(i) of the CJA 1964: 
Rules of court may be made for the following purposes: 
(i) for regulating the rate of interest payable on all debts, including 
judgment debts, or on the sums found due on taking accounts 
                                                 
298 [2007] 8 MLJ 205. 
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between parties, or on sums found due and unpaid by receivers 
or other persons liable to account to the Court: 
Provided that in no case shall any rate of interest exceed eight per 
centum per annum, unless it has been otherwise agreed between 
parties; 
 
Section 4(g) of the SCRA 1955: 
Subject to any rules of court made under the Courts of Judicature Act 
1964 (Act 91), the Committee may make rules for the following purposes: 
(g) for regulating the rate of interest recoverable on debts, 
including judgment debts, or on the sums found due on taking 
accounts between parties: 
Provided that in no case shall any rate of interest exceed eight per 
centum per annum, unless it has been otherwise agreed between 
parties; 
 
KS Dass’s attack on the validity of Order 42 Rule 12 RHC 1980 and Order 29 Rule 12 
SCR 1980 was however disputed by Yeo Yang Poh.
299
 Yeo Yang Poh’s main 
contention rest on the fact that the enabling provision in section 25(2) and para 7 of 
CJA 1964 is subject to other existing provisions or rules of courts. As such, the 
discretionary power granted by the section is subject to the mandatory power by the 
Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980.
300
 The position in the Subordinate Courts is a bit 
tricky since section 99A and para 21 of the 3
rd
 Schedule to the SCA1948 do not contain 
similar proviso as in section 25(2) of the CJA 1964. However, according to Yeo Yang 
Poh, since all power of the court must be exercised in accordance with other provisions 
and rules, the application of section 99A and para 21 of the 3
rd
 Schedule must also be 
                                                 
299 Yeo, Yang Poh, op. cit., at clxxviii. 
300 See proviso to section 25(2) of the CJA 1964.  
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subjected to Order 29 Rule 12 SCR 1980. He further elaborated that the discretionary 
power conferred by section 16(i) and section 4(g) of the SCRA 1955 is confined only to 
the fact that the Rule Committees cannot be forced to make rule in pursuance to the 
sections. It does not limit the power of the Committees from making any rule as they 
see fit in the attempt to regulate interest. He concluded that by virtue of the above 
arguments, Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 and Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980 
were not ultra vires. Thus, the validity of these provisions cannot be the ground for 
arguing that awarding post-judgment interest is not mandatory on the judges or not the 
right of the successful plaintiffs. 
 
On this point, the researcher humbly submits that looking at the provisions as well as 
the reasoning given by the writers above, too much attention has been given to the term 
‘shall’ that we forget “that rules of procedure could not create substantive rights”.301 
Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012, Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980, Order 
42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980, Order 34 Rule 41 and Order 39 Rule 13 of the Rules of 
the Supreme Courts 1937 and Order 40 Rule 11(2) and Order 42 Rule 16 Rules of the 
Supreme Courts 1957 are merely rules of procedure. They cannot impose mandatory 
post-judgment interest. Therefore, the provisions in these rules should not be read as 
granting absolute right to post-judgment interest to all successful plaintiffs in personal 
injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. “Any form of 
interpretation to give mandatory effect to rules of procedure would be against 
procedural jurisprudence”.302  
 
The right to interest originates from the provisions conferring additional power to High 
Courts and Subordinate Courts in section 25 (2) read together with para 7 of the CJA 
                                                 
301 Per Hamid Sultan JC in Pelita Leisures Sdn. Bhd. v Tsai Chee Jung, op. cit. 
302 Ibid. 
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1964 and section 99A read together with para 21 of 3
rd
 schedule of the SCA 1948. 
Since these provisions only provide that the courts shall have the power to direct 
interest, it should be read as an enabling provisions without any obligatory effect. The 
term ‘shall’ in Order 42 Rule 12 RHC 1980 and Order 29 Rule 12 of SCR 1980 should 
also be read in the same vein. Hamid Sultan JC in Pelita Leisures Sdn. Bhd. v Tsai 
Chee Jung
303
 to the researcher’s mind had correctly interpreted the term ‘shall’ as (even 
in statutes) not necessarily conveying mandatory or imperative obligation. It may be 
interpreted as conferring discretionary power only. He referred to Re Davis,
304
 where 
Starke J opined: 
“The word ‘shall’ does not always impose an absolute and imperative duty 
to do or omit the act prescribed. The word is facultative: it confers a 
faculty or power. … The word ‘shall’ cannot be construed without 
reference to its context.” 
 
Similarly to State of UP v Babu Ram,
305
 where Subba Rao J opined: 
“The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus: when a 
statute uses the word ‘shall’, prima facie it is mandatory, but the court may 
ascertain the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the 
whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the 
Legislature the court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of 
the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it 
one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity 
of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the 
circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the 
non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with 
                                                 
303 Op. cit.  
304 [1947] 75 CLR 409. 
305 AIR [1961] SC 751. 
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the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial 
consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of 
the legislation will be defeated or furthered.” 
 
It should also be noted that before the enactment of the Rules of Supreme Courts 1937 
and the Rules of Supreme Courts 1957, the earliest piece of uniformed legislation 
which regulated the award of interest in civil suits in Malaysia was section 207 of the 
Civil Procedure Code (Cap 15) 1918.
306
 The section gave clear discretionary power to 
the judgess to award interest for pre-trial, pre-judgment and post-judgment period.
307
 
The section provided that the courts, in addition to pre-trial and pre-judgment period, 
may award interest for post-judgment period up to the date of payment or any earlier 
date at a maximum rate of eight (8) percent per annum. The section reads: 
(i) Where and in so far as a decree for the payment of money, the Court 
may in the decree order interest at such rate, not exceeding eighteen per 
cent per annum, as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the 
principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of decree in 
addition to any interest, which shall in no case exceed eighteen per cent 
per annum, adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the 
institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the Court 
deems reasonable, not exceeding eight per cent per annum, on the 
aggregate sum so adjudged from the date of the decree to the date 
of payment or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit. 
 
(ii) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further 
interest on such aggregate sum as forsaid from the date of the decree 
                                                 
306 Loh, Siew Cheang, “Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rule of High Courts 1980, and All That”, (1987) 2 Malayan Law Journal ccx-
ccxxxiv, at ccxv.  
307 See Tara Singh v T.M. Banerji Sewa Singh 7 F.M.S.L.R 58. 
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to the date of payment or other earlier date, the court shall be deem 
to have refused such interest, and separate suit therefore shall not lie. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Aside from granting power to the courts to award interest in all civil suits, there was 
nothing in the provision which made post-judgment interest mandatory. Sub-section (ii) 
reiterated the discretionary nature of post-judgment interest by stating that should the 
judge refuse to allow post-judgment interest, no further suit may be file on the matter of 
interest.  
 
As such, it is clear that other than the provisions in the Rules of Court 2012, the RHC 
1980, the SCR 1980, the Rules of Supreme Courts 1937 and the Rules of Supreme 
Courts 1957, all of which are merely rules of procedures, there is no primary Act which 
imposes mandatory pre-judgment interest and provides that the pre-judgment interest as 
the absolute right of the plaintiffs. Therefore, it is concluded that notion that post-
judgment is mandatory was made under the mistaken interpretation of the term ‘shall’ 
in Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012, Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 
and Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980. Judges are under no obligation to award post-
judgment interest in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents. Plaintiffs are entitled to post-judgment interest only when judges 
choose to award the same. 
 
On the other hand, even if the term ‘shall’ does carry a mandatory effect with regard to 
post-judgment interest, it is submitted that judges still retain the discretion to decide on 
the rate of interest. There is nothing in Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 
which indicates that the rate of interest is fixed at the rate which the Chief Justice 
230 
 
determined. The five (5) percent per annum is the maximum rate that judges may allow 
for post-judgment interest. Judges is at liberty to vary the rate to any amount as they see 
fit. As such, should judges decide that the facts of the case justifies no post-judgment 
interest, they can always award zero (0) percent interest. By virtue of allowing zero (0) 
percent interest they have discharged their duty to award post-judgment interest 
although at zero (0) percent. 
 
5.5.2 Rationale 
Aside from the above, the answer to the question of whether awarding interest in 
personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents is 
mandatory upon the judges can also be derived using logic. Theoretically, many believe 
that interest is compulsory because plaintiffs’ right to damages arises at the date when 
the cause of action arose or at the very least the date the writ was issued.
308
 Since 
interest is awarded to compensate the plaintiffs for the delay in receiving the damages 
due to them, plaintiff’s right to interest should also arise at the same time. The learned 
RK Nathan J in the final point of his judgment in Tan Phaik See v Multi Purpose 
Insurance Berhad,
309
 endorsed similar notion by saying that a plaintiff is entitled to ‘his 
judgment debt’ once his suit was filed. The insurance company should be held 
accountable for withholding the damages owed to the plaintiff.  
 
On this point, it is humbly submitted in order to determine whether judges are required 
to award interest (thus, making interest an absolute right of the plaintiffs), it is of 
upmost importance to first determine whether the damages is plaintiffs’ to begin with. 
Since the defendants’ liability to pay damages in fault-based personal injury and fatal 
                                                 
308 Cane, Peter, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law, (Butterworth : London, 1993), at 123. 
309 [2004] 6 MLJ 474.  
231 
 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents depends on the decision of the 
court, unless and until the issue of liability
310
 had been decided by the court, there is no 
obligation on the defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs. The pronouncement of 
liability is the act which establishes the plaintiffs’ right.311 As such, damages does not 
belongs to the plaintiffs until the final pronouncement of liability. This negates the 
theory that plaintiffs’ right to damages in fault-based personal injury and fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents arises at the date the cause of action arose 
or the date the writ is filed. There is no issue of keeping the plaintiffs out of their 
damages
312
 since the damages is yet to become plaintiffs’ until final judgment is 
delivered.  
 
Arguing on the same ground, the notion that awarding interest is mandatory upon the 
judges was also challenged by T.S.T.
313
 T.S.T, in his article asked some rather 
provocative questions in relation to the rationale submitted by the plaintiff in G 
Sivarajan v Swee Lam Estate (M) Ltd, op. cit.
314
 In his submission, plaintiff’s counsel 
submitted that a plaintiff’s right to interest is derived from the “inequity of keeping the 
plaintiff out of the use of money legitimately due to him for unconscionably long time.” 
In respond to this submission, T. S. T. asked “whose iniquity?”, “whose money?” and 
“whose conscience?” do the plaintiff referred to. Since “an award of interest is not to 
compensate a successful party for any damage done but for him being kept out of his 
money,”315 T.S. T. concluded that defendant’s conscience is clear as there is no 
inequity of keeping the money from the plaintiff as long as the final judgment is yet to 
be delivered. Therefore, interest is not the absolute right of the plaintiff. Judges cannot 
be compelled to award interest. 
                                                 
310 Who caused the accident. 
311 Ex parte Fewing (1883) 25 Ch. D 338 
312 Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at 414. Unless the liability has been conceded or agreed upon by the parties prior to the date of 
judgment.    
313 T.S.T., op.cit., at xxxiii. 
314 [1966] 1 MLJ xvii. 
315 Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in United Malayan Banking Corp v Sykt Perumahan Luas Sdn. Bhd. [1991] 3 MLJ 181.  
232 
 
 
At the same time, it is also humbly submitted that the plaintiffs’ right to interest by 
virtue of ‘judgment debt’ as mentioned by R K Nathan J in Tan Phaik See v Multi 
Purpose Insurance Berhad
316
 above is also arguable. The argument originates from the 
definition of the term ‘judgment debt’ itself. The term ‘judgment debt’317 which gives 
rise to plaintiff’s right to his damages basically depends on whether there is an 
obligation on the defendants to pay the damages to the plaintiffs. Since the Session 
Court and the High Court in the case had rejected the plaintiff’s claim for loss of 
dependency, there was no obligation on the defendant’s insurer to pay damages to the 
plaintiff. The obligation only arose after the appeal was allowed by the Court of 
Appeal. Thus, it is perplexing why the learned judge commented that it was 
‘inequitable for the defendant’s insurer to sit on the moneys due to injured person and 
accrue interest on that sum for their own benefit’318 when the obligation to pay arose 
after the appeal was allowed. 
 
Plaintiffs’ right to interest in fault-based personal injury and fatal accident claims 
arising out of motor vehicle accidents must be distinguished from their right to interest 
under contract. Defendants’ liability in contract is apparent and ascertainable via the 
contract signed. In cases where the plaintiffs had been kept from the use of his money, 
judges should award interest at a commercial rate on the basis that if the money had 
been paid to the plaintiff, he would have had the use of it.
319
 However, in personal 
injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents, there is no 
‘iniquity’ to the plaintiff since the damages is yet to be determined prior to the 
                                                 
316 Op. cit.  
317 Idris Yusoff J in Perumal a/l Manickam v Malaysian Co-Operative Insurance Society Ltd. [1995] 2 MLJ 144. referred to 
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and Oxford Companion to Law, held that the term ‘debt’ is defined as a sum ‘payable in respect of a 
liquidated money demand, recoverable by action’ and ‘that which is owed by one person to another, particularly money payable 
arising from and by reason of a prior promise or contract’ respectively.  As such, the term ‘debt’ generally has one or other of two 
meanings: it can mean obligation to pay money or it can mean a sum of money owed.   
318 Per RK J Nathan, in Tan Phaik See v Multi Purpose Insurance Berhad., op. cit. 
319 See Kemp v Tolland (1956) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 681. 
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judgment. Plaintiffs have no absolute right to interest until judgment is pronounced.
320
 
Raja Azlan Shah J (as he was then) in Yee Boon Heng v Tan Chwee
321
 also 
distinguished plaintiffs’ right to interest in contract and personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents by saying: 
“The popular reason advanced for the proposition that interest should be 
paid is that the plaintiff is in a worse position by withholding money 
which is legitimately due to him. It is contended that in practically every 
case when a writ is filed against a defendant he should have admitted the 
claim and have paid the appropriate sum for damages, and failure to do 
that would entitle the plaintiff to interest. In my view, that is a 
simplification of the matter. The criterion in all contested running-down 
cases is the question of liability and the assessment of damages. It is 
unlike the case for recovery of a debt where the amount owing is 
ascertainable.” 
 
Furthermore, generally, the ‘actual defendant’ in personal injury and fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents is the insurance company insuring the 
vehicle at fault. It is only reasonable that the company requires the issue of quantum 
and liability to be settle before paying the damages.
322
 It would not be equitable for the 
insurance company to be liable for interest before the quantum and liability have been 
ascertained. As such, interest is not the absolute right of the plaintiff unless final 
judgment had been given. In a Singaporean case of Lim Cheng Wah v Ng Yaw Kim
323
 
                                                 
320 See Ban Pet Hock v Ong Ah Ho[1966] 2 MLJ 253, Choor Singh J in dismissing the plaintiff’s application for interest under 
section 8 of the Singapore Civil Law Ordinance (in pari materia with section 11 of the CLA 1956), held that the defendant’s 
position in suits for personal injury motor accident claims and contract are not similar. 
321 Op cit.  
322 Section 96 of the Road Transport Act 1987 (Act 333) states that the insurance company has a statutory duty to satisfy the 
judgment once the plaintiff obtained the same against the defendant (person insured by the policy) and a notice had been sent to the 
insurance company. The insurer will be bound by section 96 and their undertaking in the policy to satisfy the judgment by paying 
direct to the plaintiff after the existence of liability of insured or his authorized driver toward the plaintiff had been established 
either via court judgment, arbitration or agreement (consent settlement). 
323[1985] 2 MLJ 82. 
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the court held that the award of interest on the amount for which the judgment is given 
is fully within the discretion of the court. Only after the final pronouncement of 
judgment or in situations where defendant admits his liability at appropriate stage prior 
to the judgment that the plaintiff’s right to interest arises, the compensation becomes 
his. The courts however still retain the discretion to determine the rate of interest to be 
paid.  
“In every case, whether it be one on contract or tort, where a judgment for 
payment of a certain sum is given against a defendant it is given on the 
basis that the defendant should have admitted the claim and paid the 
appropriate sum at the appropriate time, i.e. when it is due and payable. In 
the case of a claim for a liquidated sum under a contract, the precise 
amount is ascertained and once liability is established judgment will be 
given for that amount. In the case of a claim for damages -- it may be one 
on tort or on contract both the liability and the quantum will have to be 
determined and once determined, judgment will be given accordingly. In 
both cases if judgment is given, it is given on the basis that the plaintiff 
is entitled to the sum adjudged and should have been paid by the 
defendant. Section 9 of the Civil Law Act applies to "recovery of any debt 
or damages", and there is nothing in this section to suggest that recovery 
of damages in a tortious claim should be excluded. An award of interest on 
the amount for which judgment is given is a matter fully within the 
discretion of the Court. In a claim for damages on tort, if the defendant 
admits liability at the appropriate stage and assessment of the quantum 
is delayed owing to no fault of the defendant, the Court will no doubt 
take this into account in deciding whether or not to award interest.” 
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In conclusion, it is humbly submitted although the provision in the Rules of Court 2012 
is expressed in the imperative ‘shall’, it is certainly not the intention of the Rules 
Committees to impose compulsory interest in all personal injury and fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. To do so would be contrary to the 
discretionary power granted by section 11 of the CLA 1956, section 25(2) read together 
with para 7 to the CJA 1964 and section 99A read together with para 21 of the 3
rd
 
schedule to SCA 1948. Since there is no equivalent provision in Malaysia to section 22 
of AJA 1969 or section 17 of the Judgment Act (1838), interest remains at the 
discretion of the presiding judge and only become the plaintiff’s right once the judge 
orders it to be paid. The discretion which the courts have is “as unfettered as any 
discretion can be”.324 
 
 
 
5.6 ASSESSING THE INTEREST RATE  
Interest rate is defined as the price of money.
325
 Just like the price of any goods, the rate 
of interest is derived based on the interplay of market forces depending on the supply of 
and demand for money.
326
 The local judges have been steadfast in applying the rules in 
Jefford v Gee.
327
 Interest is to be awarded at the appropriate rate for pain and suffering 
and loss of amenities from the date of service of writ, half of the appropriate rate on 
special damages from the date of the accident to date of trial and no interest for future 
losses. The problem however lies in what constitutes ‘appropriate rate’ and whether 
judges have the discretion to vary the rate? The problems were recognized by the 
                                                 
324 Per Raja Azlan Shah J in Yee Boon Heng v Tan Chwee, op cit.  
325 Syed Ahmad Idid, “Interest”, [1993] 1 Malayan Law Journal, l – lvi, at li. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Op. cit. 
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Penang High Court in Sinnatamby Seahomes Sdn. Bhd. v Perwira Habib Bank 
Malaysia Bhd.
328
 The judge referred to Halsbury’s Law of MalaysiaVol. 1 for the 
definition of appropriate rate:  
“As to the rate of interest, it has been said that there is no such thing as a 
correct or proper rate or ordinary rate of interest. The award should be 
realistic, and there is no distinction between the interest awarded on a 
limitation fund in an Admiralty action and that awarded on damages for 
personal injuries.” 
 
The answer to the question of whether judges have the discretion to vary the rate is best 
explored by analyzing the followings: 
 
5.6.1 Pre-Judgment Interest Rate 
Prior to the introduction of the Rules of Court 2012, the discretionary power of the 
Subordinate Courts judges was regulated by the SCR 1980 when a maximum rate of 
four (4) percent per annum was imposed by Order 28 Rule 18 of the SCR 1980. 
However, the term ‘may’ in the provision signified that although the maximum rate was 
fixed, judges still have the discretion to vary it provided that the new rate does not 
exceed four (4) percent. Unlike the SCR 1980, there was no provision regulating pre-
judgment interest in the RHC 1980. Section 11 of the CLA 1956 remains the only 
provision governing pre-judgment interest for the High Court. The High Court had been 
allowing pre-judgment interest at the rate not exceeding eight (8) percent per annum.
329
 
The High Court’s judges have the discretion to vary this rate since there was nothing in 
the local legislation which prevented them from doing so. 
                                                 
328 [2001] 2 MLJ 450 
329 See Abdul Wahab Jam Jam v Abdul Wahab bin Abdullah [2008] 7 CLA 741, Noor Famiza bte Zabri & Anor. v. Awang bin 
Muda & Anor. [1994] 2 CLJ 418, Maimunah bte Hassan (Sebagai Wakil Harta Pusaka Rozita Bte Khamis) & Anor. v. Marimuthu 
s/o Samanathan & Anor.  [1993] 1 CLJ 119 and Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar b Mohamed Said, op. cit.  
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The introduction of the Rules of Court 2012 in August 2012 has amended the rule 
governing the assessment of interest rate. Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 
does not contain any provision relating to pre-judgment interest. Therefore, currently, 
High Court and Subordinate Courts are not governed by any court’s rule in respect of 
the assessment of pre-judgment interest rate. The only available provision in respect of 
pre-judgment interest rate is section 11 of the CLA 1956. Since there is no longer any 
maximum pre-judgment interest rate applicable, judges have a wide discretion to 
determine the rate of pre-judgment interest to suit the circumstance of the case.  
 
It is submitted that the absence of specific court’s rule on the assessment of pre-
judgment interest rate is deliberate. It serves two purposes. It stops the arguments on the 
validity of the maximum pre-judgment interest rate
330
 as well as maintains the 
discretionary power of the High Court’s judges331 to determine the rate. The 
discretionary power is now extended to the Session Courts’ judges. Based on the above, 
it is concluded that the discretionary power of the judges to determine the rate of pre-
judgment interest which originates from section 3 of the Law Reform 1934 and 
developed by the case of Jefford v Gee
332
 is still intact. Section 11 of the CLA 1956 is 
merely an enabling provision which allows judges to award pre-judgment interest. 
Instead of restricting, the section actually solidifies the discretionary power of the 
judges to determine the rate for pre-judgment interest on damages in personal injury 
and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. 
 
                                                 
330
 The validity of the maximum four (4) percent pre-judgment interest rate set by Order 28 Rule 18 of the SCR 1980 was often 
argued upon. Supra, at 389 - 391. 
331 The RHC 1980 had omitted any provision for pre-judgment interest for the High Court. The omission was deliberate since the 
predecessors to the RHC 1980, i.e., Rules of Supreme Court 1937 and the Rules of Supreme Courts 1957 provided for pre-
judgment interest although no specific rate was stated. 
332 Op. cit. 
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5.6.2 Post-Judgment Interest Rate 
Traditionally, Malaysian judges rarely venture to assess the rate of post-judgment 
interest. The rates prescribed in the SCR 1980 and the HRC 1980 were commonly 
accepted as the rate for post-judgment interest in personal injury and fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents.
333
 This was acknowledged by the Sibu 
High Court in Lau Kung Kai v Abu Serah bin Bol & Anor.
334
  where Hamid Sultan JC 
held: 
“However, the court normally awards 8% per annum in respect of 
judgment sum from the date of judgment until the date of realization.
335
 
 
Dato' Syed Ahmad Idid
336
 in his article commented that the Malaysian judges “have not 
been called upon to exercise much imagination or sophistication when granting interest 
or in determining the rate of interest”. The Supreme Court’s judges in New Zealand 
Insurance Co Ltd v Ong Choon Lin (t/a Syarikat Federal Motor Trading)
337
 for 
example awarded interest at the rate of eight (8) percent per annum
338
 post-judgment 
interest merely on the ground that there is “no direction from the learned judge that a 
lower rate be used”.339 The judges’ reluctance to depart from the rate prescribed in the 
RHC 1980 and SCR 1980 can be attributed to the mandatory nature of the term ‘shall’ 
in Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980 and Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980. Both of 
these provisions stated ‘every judgment debt shall carry interest at the rate of four (4) 
                                                 
333 See Abdul Wahab Jam Jam v Abdul Wahab bin Abdullah, op.cit, Noor Famiza bte Zabri & Anor. v. Awang bin Muda & Anor., 
op. cit. , Maimunah bte Hassan (Sebagai Wakil Harta Pusaka Rozita Bte Khamis) & Anor. v. Marimuthu s/o Samanathan & Anor., 
op.cit.  
334 Op. cit. See also See Lau Ee Ee v Tang King Kwong [1086] 1 MLJ 308, Mahat bin Abdul Majid v Lau Kui [1986] 2 MLJ 191, 
Yaakub Foong v Lai Mun Keong [1986] 2 MLJ 317, Nani v WG Williams [1986] 2 MLJ 68, Lee Ann v Mohamed Sahari bin 
Zakaria [1987] 1 MLJ 252. 
335 The eight (8) percent rate was prior to the 2011 amendment which reduces the rate to four (4) percent. 
336 Syed Ahmad Idid, op. cit. 
337 Op. cit. 
338 The case was decided prior to the amendment to the interest rate in 2011. Hence the eight (8) percent rate was still applicable.  
339 In Chang Min Tat in Murtadza bin Mohamed Hassan v Chong Swee Pian, op. cit. choose to follow the decision in Foong Nan v 
Sagadevan, [1971] 2 MLJ 24 and interpreted ‘appropriate rate’ as 6% due to “the absence of any advice for any increase from this 
rate”.  
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per centum per annum…”.340 The term ‘shall’ was often read as restricting judges’ 
discretion to award the rate of post-judgment interest to the rate prescribed in the 
provisions only. In fact, there had been an attempt to insinuate that the rate prescribed 
in the provisions was compulsory rate for all post-judgment interest. The Respondent in 
Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar bin Mohamed Said,
341
 relied on the general practices of the local 
courts as well as the mandatory nature of the term ‘shall’ in Order 42 Rule 12 of the 
RHC 1980
342
 argued that not only post-judgment interest was mandatory, the maximum 
rate of eight (8) percent per annum was similarly compulsory.
343
 Yeo Yang Poh also to 
some extend seemed to advocate the notion that the rates prescribed in the Rules were 
mandatory. He commented that should judges award post-judgment interest without 
specifying the exact rate for the same, the rate specified in Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 
1980 and Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 will be automatically implied.
344
 
Unfortunately he did not elaborate further on the basis of his opinion. As such, the 
reason behind the above opinion remained uncertain.
345
     
 
The provision in Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 is almost an exact copy 
of Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980 and Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980.
346
 The 
provision gives the discretion to the Chief Justice to determine the rate to be applied. It 
also gives the discretion to the preceding judges to depart from the rate prescribed by 
the Chief Justice should they see it necessary to do so, provided that the new rate does 
not exceed the prescribed rate. Unfortunately, the use of the term ‘shall’ in the 
provision raises the possibility that the rate prescribed by the Chief Justice is mandatory 
for all post-judgment interest. At the same time, the wording in the Practice Direction 
                                                 
340 Supra at 214-215 
341 Op.cit. 
342 Similar argument can be used with regard to Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980 since the provision is similarly worded.  
343 The argument however was rejected by the Federal Court.  
344 Yeo, Yang Poh, op. cit., at clxxviii. 
345 Yeo, Yang Poh, id., at clxxix. 
346 The only difference is, while Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 gives the power to determine the maximum interest 
rate to the Chief Justice, Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980 and Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 specifically fixed a maximum 
rate of four (4) percent per annum. 
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also seems to negate the discretionary power of the judges to assess pre-judgment 
interest rate. The Practice Direction is worded in such a way that it can be read as 
making the five (5) percent interest compulsory for all post-judgment.
347
  
 
On this point it is submitted that despite the arguments above, the power to assess post-
judgment interest is always been discretionary upon the presiding judges. This had been 
recognized by the Federal Court in Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar bin Mohamed Said.
348
 In 
rejecting the Respondent’s submission for a mandatory eight (8) percent post-judgment 
interest, Salleh Abbas FJ held:  
“Although the Order is expressed in imperative “shall”, it is certainly not 
intended to be so; because to give effect would be incompatible with the 
discretionary power of the Court to order interest under s. 11 of the Civil 
Law Act 1956. We do not think that O. 42 r. 12 can override the provision 
of the Act. This Order can only mean that the Court may order interest at 
8% if the Court thinks that circumstances justify such rate. In no sense 
must this order be understood as obliging the Court to award interest at 
8% and 8% only. We cannot therefore accept the submission of Counsel 
for the respondent and as such the award of interest by the learned Judge is 
upheld” 
 
While agreeing with the above decision on two points; first, on the principle that post-
judgment interest rate should remain at the discretion of the presiding judge and second, 
that Order 42 Rule 12 of RCH 1980 did not have any effect in making the eight (8) 
percent rate compulsory, it is with utmost respect submitted that the decision was 
flawed on one aspect. Salleh Abbas FJ had based his argument on the discretionary 
                                                 
347 “… Saya degan ini mengarahkan kadar bunga di bawah peruntukan-peruntukan di atas ditentukan pada kadar 5% setahun.” 
“I hereby direct the interest rate under the provisions of the above specified at a rate of 5% per annum.”(translate) 
348 Op.cit. 
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power to assess interest provided by section 11 of the CLA 1956. According to him, 
since section 11 of the CLA 1956 has given judges’ the discretion to assess interest, 
Order 42 Rule 12 of RHC 1980 cannot limit this power by making the eight (8) percent 
rate compulsory. It is humbly submitted that section 11 of the CLA 1956 is not a bar for 
Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980.
349
 As discussed earlier, section 11 of the CLA 1956 
and Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980are applicable for two (2) separate periods. As 
such, the two provisions do not overlap. The discretionary power granted to the judges 
to assess pre-judgment interest rate in section 11of the CLA 1956 therefore cannot be 
extended to post-judgment interest rate.  
 
The discretionary power should be derived from either section 25(2) read together with 
para 7 of the CJA 1964
350
 or the provision in Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 itself. 
25(2) read together with para 7 of the CJA 1964 only gives the power to the judges to 
award interest. It does not provide any specific rate for the interest. At the same time, 
the phrase ‘or at such other rate not exceeding the rate afore said’ in Order 42 Rule 12 
of the RHC 1980 signify that judges may award post-judgment interest a rate they think 
suitable depending on circumstances of the case provided that the amount does not 
exceed four (4) percent. Since Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 had been replaced 
with Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Courts 2012 with almost similar wordings, the 
same argument above can be extended to the provision in Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules 
of Courts 2012. Therefore, judges are not under any obligation to award post-judgment 
interest at the rate prescribed by the Chief Justice in the Practice Direction. They still 
have the discretion to assess the rate according to the facts of the case provided that the 
new rate does not exceed the prescribed rate. 
 
                                                 
349 Also not applicable to Order 29 Rule 12 SCR 1980 which govern post judgment interest for Subordinate Courts.  
350 For Subordinate Courts it is section 99A read together with para 21 to the SCA 1948. 
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To conclude, it is always assumed that due to the different circumstance in all personal 
injury and fatal accidents claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents and the 
discretion given to the judges in determining interest, the award of interest in Malaysia 
vary from case to case. The reality however is far from that. Based on decided cases 
thus far, the judges seem to have considered the rate of interest as mechanical. This 
undoubtedly negates the spirit behind the award for interest. Judicial discretion should 
run free in relation to the determination of interest rate. Judges must be encouraged to 
depart from the common prevalent rate should the circumstances of the case warrant it. 
It can either be within the five (5) percent rate or lower, as commented by Hamid Sultan 
JC in Lau Kung Kai v Abu Serah bin Bol & Anor.:
351
 
“However, the court normally awards 8% per annum in respect of 
judgment sum from the date of judgment until the date of realization. That 
does not necessarily mean that the court cannot award higher rate of 
interest within the parameters of the law taking into consideration the 
prevailing rates of interest.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.7 COMPOUNDED INTEREST 
Compounded interest
352
 is interest which is assessed on principal sum together with the 
accumulations of other interest.
353
 While simple interest is calculated based on 
principal sum only, compounded interest is interest awarded on top of interest on 
principal sum already awarded. The issue on compounded interest arises only in respect 
                                                 
351 Op. cit. 
352 Also known as interest upon interest, compound interest or compounding interest. 
353 Syed Ahmad Idid, op. cit., at l. 
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of the assessment of post-judgment interest; whether judges in assessing post-judgment 
interest should assess the post-judgment interest over damages awarded during pre-
judgment and post-judgment period together with the pre-judgment interest? In other 
word, whether the pre-judgment interest is to be assessed as part of the ‘judgment debt’ 
in which post-judgment interest is to be awarded? 
 
It is generally assumed that the law prohibits the award for compounded interest. This 
assumption however is not conclusive. So far there is no authoritative judgment on this 
matter.
354
 Judges are split into two camps on the issue of simple and compounded 
interest; one in favour of the simple interest while another allowing for compounded 
interest. The introduction of the Rules of Court 2012 also does not offer any solution to 
the problem. Since the provision in Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 is 
almost similar to the provisions in Order 29 Rule 42 of the SCR 1980 and Order 42 
Rule 12 of the RHC 1980, the same quandary still persist even with the introduction of 
the new court’s rule.  
 
Section 11 of the CLA 1956 is often cited as the provision which prohibits judges from 
awarding compounded interest.
355
 The argument is based on proviso (a) to the section 
which states ‘nothing in this section shall authorize the giving of interest upon 
interest.’356 In Yeng Hing Enterprise Sdn. Bhd. v Datuk Dr Ong Poh Kah357 the Kota 
Kinabalu Supreme Court presided by Lee Hun Hoe Cj (Borneo), Seah and Mohamed 
Azmi SCJJ held: 
                                                 
354 Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at 429. Sees also comment made by Salleh Abas FJ in Terengganu State Economic Development 
Corporation v Nadefinco Ltd. [1982] 1 MLJ 365 where he said “there seems to be a dearth of local authorities concerning the issue 
I am now called upon to decide.” 
355 See Davidson, W.S.W, “Claims For Interest On Delayed Contract Payments By Way of General or Special Damages - An 
Opinion”, (1993) 1 Current Law Journal, xxxvii,  Pawancheek Marican, “The Arbitrator’s Power to Award Interest”, (1997) 1 
Malayan Law Journal lxix – lxxiv and Dass, K.S., op. cit.,(1980). 
356 The proviso is similar to the proviso found in Order 28 Rule 18 of the Subordinate Court Rules 1980. 
357 [1988] 2 MLJ 60. See also Balasubramaniam v Venkitasan [1986] 2 MLJ 55  and Citibank NA v Lee Chew Kok & Anor Civil 
Suit No D3-23-2277-87 Kuala Lumpur High Court (27 April 1989) cited in Mallal’s Digest of Malaysia and Singapore Case Law 
1808-1988, 4th ed., vol. 2 , (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 1994) 
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“Having regard to the provisions of section 11 of the Civil Law Act 1956 
and in particular proviso (a) which forbids the giving of interest upon 
interest...” 
 
Similarly, in Foo Sey Koh & Ors. v Chua Seng Seng & Ors.,
358
 the court allowed post-
judgment interest from only the principal sum still owing to the plaintiff. The pre-
judgment interest was not included in the assessment of the sum in which the post-
judgement interest was assessed on. Shankar J in his judgment held: 
“It is well established that in all cases where in the opinion of the court, 
the payment of a just debt has been improperly withheld and it seems to be 
fair and equitable that the party in default should make compensation by 
the payment of interest, it is incumbent upon the court to allow interest for 
such time and at such rate as the court may think right. The law precludes 
that granting of interest upon interest.” 
 
Recently, however, judges in several cases were seen to have adopted a different 
approach to the issue of compounded interest. The basis of the departure from the 
general presumption that compounded interest is prohibited rests on three (3) main 
points: 
 
5.7.1 Restrictive interpretation of proviso (a) to section 11 of the CLA 1956 
Proviso (a) in section 11 of the CLA 1956 is interpreted as only prohibiting judges from 
using the section as the authority for allowing compounded interest. The proviso does 
not extend to prevent the judges from awarding compounded interest in toto. By 
applying this interpretation, judges are not totally prohibited from awarding 
                                                 
358 [1986] 1 MLJ 501.  
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compounded interest.
359
 Should the judges are able to find any reason or authority 
which allows compounded interest, the same can be awarded. This interpretation was 
accepted in Re Woo Yoke San @ Woo Yoke Sam; Ex P Ocbc Bank (M) Bhd v Crescent 
Court Management Corp.
360
The Kuala Lumpur High Court held that while section of 
the 11 of the  CLA 1956 deals with the power to awards interest on debt and damages, 
it does not declare that interest upon interest or compounded interest is illegal or 
invalid. Judges have the discretion to award compound interest provided that they can 
find other authority which allows such award. Ramli Ali J stated: 
“Section 11 effect is just enabling provisions giving powers to the court to 
award interest for the whole or any part of the period “between the date 
when the cause of action arose and the date of judgment”. Proviso (a) of 
the said s.11 specifically states that the provision does not authorize the 
giving of interest upon interest. What it means is that s. 11 is not an 
authority for awarding interest upon interest. If the award of interest upon 
interest is to be made then the court has to find other form of authority to 
do so but not on the authority of s.11.” 
 
Similar interpretation was also adopted by the court in Singapore in dealing with 
section 12 of the Civil Law Act (cap 43) which is in pari materia with section 11 of the 
CLA 1956. In The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v Reliance National Asia Re Pte. Ltd.
361
 
Chan Seng Onn J held the following: 
“Section 12 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed) did not expressly 
prohibit the court from granting compounded interest per se or from 
granting damages assessed with reference to the actual compounded 
                                                 
359 Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at 429. 
360 [2006] 5 MLJ 638. 
361 [2009] 2 SLR 385. 
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interest lost or foregone by the plaintiff who had suffered those damages 
as a result of a debt. The courts in Singapore had an unfettered discretion 
to award simple or compounded interest as damages which was 
appropriate to justly compensate any loss suffered. 
 
As such, it seems that judges are starting to depart from the traditional approach 
relating to compounded interest. Section 11 of the CLA 1956 is no longer considered as 
the provision which prohibits the award of compounded interest. By virtue of this new 
interpretation of the section, compounded interest is no longer prohibited. 
 
5.7.2 The broader interpretation of term ‘judgment debt’ 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the award for post-judgment interest is regulated 
by Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012. The provision allows post-judgment 
interest to be awarded on ‘judgment debt’. Since the term ‘judgment debt’ is not 
defined, it is generally assumed that it refers to the judgment sum (damages) awarded 
by the courts. This judgment sum is not inclusive of the pre-judgment interest. 
 
Perusal of the local cases however shows that in several cases, the interpretation of 
term ‘judgment debt’ in Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 and Order 29 Rule 42 of 
the SCR 1980
362
 had been widened to represents the judgment sum (damages) and the 
pre-judgment interest. By merging the judgment sum and pre-judgment interest to form 
‘judgment debt’, judges are allowed to award post-judgment interest for both the 
                                                 
362Since the Rules of Court 2012 is fairly recent (it was gazette in August 2012), there is no case relating to the application of the 
provision with respect of compounded interest reported. However, since the wordings in the provision is similar to Order 42 Rule 
12 of the RHC 1980 and Order 29 Rule 12 of the SCR 1980, the decisions which concerns with the application of the repealed 
Rules are still relevant.  
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judgment sum and pre-judgment interest.
363
 Thus, allowing for compounded interest. 
The same was stated by the Kuala Lumpur High Court in Trans Elite Equipment Rental 
Sdn. Bhd. v Psc-Naval Dockyard Sdn. Bhd.
364
 The plaintiff in this case appealed against 
the Senior Assistant Registrar’s decision in not allowing post-judgment interest on the 
pre-judgment interest. The issues before the court were whether the post- judgment 
interest was to be imposed on ‘judgment debt’ which included judgment sum and pre-
judgment interest and whether there was a bar against granting compounded interest. 
Abdul Malik Ishak J in allowing the appeal held that the judgment sum and the pre-
judgment interest make up for ‘judgment debt’ and post-judgment interest was to be 
awarded on the ‘judgment debt’. He offered the following reasons for his decision:  
“(1) that both the principal sum claimed and the pre-judgment interest 
(which represents damages for the period which the plaintiff could 
not use the principal sum) merged into the judgment debt on 24 June 
2002 and that could be the date of judgment. 
 
(2)  that this is prescribed by statute, namely, O 42 r 12 of the RHC and 
that there is no room, at all, for the exercise of discretion by the 
learned SAR to award post-judgment interest on only the principal 
sum and not the judgment debt; and 
 
(3)   that the award of post-judgment interest on both the principal sum 
claimed and also the pre-judgment interest are practiced in our 
country as well as in Singapore.” 
 
                                                 
363 Yeo, Yang Poh, op. cit., at clxxxviii. 
364 [2003] 4 MLJ 30. 
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Similar interpretation was also adopted by the Penang High Court in Tan Phaik See v 
Multi Purpose Insurance Bhd.
365
 Upon succeeding in his appeal for loss of support by 
the Court of Appeal, the Appellant claimed for the total judgment sum, cost, interest on 
the judgment sum as well as interest over the interest on the total judgment sum 
(compounded interest) amounting to RM 299, 104. The Respondent paid RM 278, 269. 
The Respondent refused to pay the balance and argued that the balance was 
compounded interest which was prohibited under section 11 of the CLA 1956. The 
High Court allowed the Appellant’s appeal for the balance on the ground that 
‘judgment debt’ consists of the principal sum and pre-judgment interest. As such, the 
post-judgment interest must be assessed on this ‘judgment debt’. RK Nathan J held: 
“To my mind, once the defendant had agreed that the amount due to the 
plaintiff as at 30 September 1994 was the principal sum of RM 197,443 
and the interest of RM 29,616 amounting to RM 197,779 the said total 
become a debt due and owing to the plaintiff from the defendant. In other 
words the interest had merged with the damages awarded, as a new 
judgment debt owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. 
 
The plaintiff is therefore entitled by law that is O 42 R 12 of the Rules of 
the High Court 1980, which states that every judgment debt shall carry 
interest at the rate of 8% per annum, to the said interest at 8% on the 
unpaid judgment debt.”366 
                                                 
365 [2004] 6 MLJ 474. 
366 It is however submitted that the above decision should be treated with caution. Although it allows the award of compounded 
interest for personal injury and fatal accident claims, one very significant point in this judgment need to be considered. The learned 
RK Nathan in his decision mentioned; “When the defendant paid a sum of RM 266,482 out of the total of RM 278,269, the 
defendant had in other words acknowledged that the damages and interest had merged to form a fresh judgment sum. It would have 
been otherwise if the defendant had only paid the principal sum of RM 167,443 specifically and the accrued admitted interest of 
RM 29,616 specifically. Here by paying a cheque for RM 266,482 the defendant had not specifically raised the issue of interest 
being paid upon interest. 
Its seems like the decision to allow the appeal for compounded interest in this case was based on the fact that the respondent had 
‘admitted’ the appellant’s entitlement for compounded interest by paying a sum which exceed the principal sum and interest on 
principal sum (pre-judgment and post-judgment interest). It was not due to the obligation to merge judgment sum and interest on 
judgment sum to create a ‘judgment debt’. By paying RM 266,482 out of the total of RM 278,269 claimed by the appellant, the 
respondent had agreed to the appellant’s claim for compounded interest and thus was estopped from pleading against it in the 
appeal.  
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The broad interpretation of the term ‘judgment debt’ allows judges to award 
compounded interest. Unless and until the term is properly defined, judges will have the 
discretion to award compounded interest under Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 
2012.  
 
5.7.3 Limited application of section 11 of the CLA 1956.  
The notion that compounded interest is prohibited is also negated by the limited 
application of section 11 of the CLA 1956. Section 11 of the CLA 1956 is applicable 
for pre-judgment interest only. It does not extend to post-judgment interest.
367
 Although 
the esteemed KS Dass suggested that proviso (a) to section 11 of the CLA 1956 
conveys the general intention of the Legislature to prohibit compounded interest for 
type of interest,
368
 the literal interpretation of the section does not support his 
suggestion. Section 11 of the CLA 1956 specifically states ‘the period between the date 
when the cause of action arose and the date of the judgment’ i.e. pre-judgment interest. 
Had the Legislature intends the section to include post-judgment interest, it would have 
either omitted the phrase or extend it to include period after judgment until date of 
realization.  
 
Furthermore, section 3(1) of the Law Reform 1934 from which section 11 of the CLA 
1956 is patented from was also limited to pre-judgment interest. Since the section co-
                                                                                                                                              
The learned judge did not comment on whether the appellant would still be entitled to compounded interest had the respondent only 
pay the principal sum and the interest on principal. He did however mentioned something to the effect that had it not been the due 
to the defendant own agreement to the compounded interest, he would not have come to the decision. As such, it is therefore 
submitted that the basis for allowing compounded interest in this case was due to the respondent being estopped from arguing what 
they had initially agreed upon rather than the merger of the principal sum and pre-judgment interest to create ‘judgment debt’. 
Consequently, it is further submitted that this decision should be restricted to the particular fact of the case namely defendant 
having accepted the compounded interest by paying more than the principle amount and not as an authority to support that the term 
‘judgment debt’ in Order 42 Rule 12 of the RHC 1980 (repealed) is a merger of principal sum and pre-judgment interest. Therefore, 
the decision also cannot be used as an authority to support that the term ‘judgment debt’ in Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Courts 
2012 is also a merger of judgment sum and pre-judgment interest. 
367 Yeo, Yang Poh, op.cit., at clxxvii. 
368 Dass, K.S., op cit., (1980), at 17.  
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exist together with section 17 of Judgment Act 1838 which specifically provides for 
post-judgment interest, the application of section 3(1) of the Law Reform 1934 cannot 
be extended to post-judgment interest. 
 
Based on the above, any attempt to impute additional power to section 11 of the CLA 
1956 cover post-judgment interest would be contrary to the literal interpretation of the 
section as well as the origin of the provision. Consequently, since proviso (a) to section 
11 of the CLA 1956 is applicable only to pre-judgment interest, the proviso cannot be 
the authority against compounded interest as compounded interest is awarded via post-
judgment interest. In a Singapore case of The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v Reliance 
National Asia Re Pte. Ltd.,
369
 the court in dealing with the question of whether section 
12 of the CLA (cap 43)
370
 have removed the power of the High Court to direct pos-
judgment interest to be paid on compounded basis held: 
“Has s 12 also taken away or emasculated the power of the High Court to 
direct compounded interest to be paid on (a) debts or damages from date 
of judgment till date of satisfaction of the judgment sums awarded (ie, 
post-judgment interest); (b) sums found due on taking accounts between 
parties; and (c) sums found due and unpaid by receivers or other persons 
liable to account to the court? I do not think so. 
Although s 12(2)(a) of the Civil Law Act makes clear that the section 
itself does not authorise the giving of compounded interest for debts 
and damages covering the pre-judgment period, it does not expressly 
prohibit the court from granting compounded interest per se or from 
granting damages assessed with reference to the actual compounded 
                                                 
369 Op. cit. 
370 Imparimateria with section 11 of the CLA 1956. 
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interest lost or forgone by the plaintiff who has suffered those damages. I 
do not think that s 12 of the Civil Law Act is meant to be exhaustive 
concerning the power of the courts to award interest on debts and damages 
in any specified manner, ie, only on a simple basis and on no other.” 
 
In conclusion, judges in many occasions had departed from the traditional view that 
compounded interest is totally prohibited. Although the law does not specifically allow 
the judges to award compounded interest, there is also nothing in it which prevents 
judges from allowing compounded interest. The judges therefore have the discretion to 
award compounded interest in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents if they find it fair, reasonable and necessary to do so. In the 
words of Salleh Abbas FJ in Terengganu State Economic Development Corporation v 
Nadefinco Ltd.:
371
 
“The fact that the court is not authorized does not mean that it is prevented 
from doing so.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
Salleh Abbas J’s observation in Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar b Mohamed Said,372 on the effect 
of the Law Reform 1934 can be referred to with regard to the award for interest for 
damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle 
accidents in Malaysia;  
                                                 
371 Op. cit. 
372 Op. cit. 
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“Prior to the passing of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1934, under common law the court had always had discretion to award 
interest as a compensation for a party who has been deprived of the use of 
its money to which it is legally entitled. The enactment of the judicial 
discretion by the statute simply gives statutory effect thereto…” 
 
The enactment of various provisions and rules of procedures merely give a statutory 
nod to the long accepted Common Law practices of allowing judges to exercise their 
discretion. Section 11 of the CLA 1956 confers statutory power to the judges to 
exercise their discretion in awarding pre-judgment interest. Since currently there is no 
other specific provision or rule of procedures governing pre-judgment interest, judges 
have the discretion in determining whether or not pre-judgment interest is to be 
awarded, at what rate, on which part of damages and for which period (between date of 
cause of action arise to date of judgment).   
 
 
The discretionary power is also extended to post-judgment interest. The term ‘shall’ in 
the provision and the Chief Justice’s directive in the Practice Direction should not be 
read as making post-judgment interest mandatory. Similarly, Order 42 Rule 12 of the 
Rules of Court 2012 and the Practice Direction only place a ceiling rate of five (5) 
percent. Judges still have the discretion to vary this rate provided that the new rate does 
not exceed five (5) percent.  
 
The uncertainties and confusions with regard to the issues highlighted in this chapter 
are the result of fragmentary and piecemeal development of the law on interest in 
Malaysia. Lack of consistent and well-argued decisions further complicate the 
problems. The best way forward is to amend the all the provisions relating to the law on 
253 
 
interest to suit and complement each other. The provisions must also be defined 
correctly to avoid wrong interpretation and application. The uncertainty in the 
interpretation and application of the provisions not only leads to injustice to the parties 
involved but also to the insurance companies who have to pay the judgment sum as 
well as the interest for all personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accident. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EFFECTS OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN 
SINGAPORE AND BRUNEI ON JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND 
THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND 
FATAL ACCIDENTCLAIMS ARISING OUT OF MOTOR 
VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Initially, the law on the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident 
arising out of motor vehicle accidents in Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia were more or 
less similar to each other. The similarities were due to their common origin. Aside from 
adopting the English Common Law the statutory provisions in the three (3) countries 
were also patented from the Fatal Accident Act 1846
1
and the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934
2
 in England. The introduction of the Civil Law 
(Amendment) Act 1975
3
 and the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984
4
 to amend the Civil 
Law Act 1956 (Rev 1972)
5
 in Malaysia put an end to the similarities in the law. The 
differences in the law between the three (3) however were later reduced by the 
introduction of the Civil Law Act
6
 and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act.
7
 
These Acts bring the statutory provisions on the assessment of damages for personal 
                                                 
1 (9 & 10 Vict. cap.93). Hereinafter referred to as “the Fatal Accident Act 1846. 
2 (cap 41). Hereinafter referred to as “the Law Reform 1934”.  
3 (Act A308). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLAA 1975”. 
4 (Act A602). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLAA 1984”. The CLAA 1975 and the CLAA 1984 were consolidated with the CLA 
1956 (Rev 1972) to form the current Civil Law Act 1956 (Act 67).  
5 (Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1956 (rev 1972)”. 
6 (cap 43). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA (cap 43)”. 
7 (cap 160). Hereinafter referred to as “the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act”. 
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injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents in Singapore and 
Brunei closer to the provisions in Civil Law Act 1956.
8
  
 
The CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act are the results of 
the massive statutory revamps in Singapore and Brunei respectively. They contain 
almost the same provisions as in the CLA 1956. At the same time, there are also many 
provisions in the CLA 1956 such as provisions on the assessment of damages for loss 
of future earnings and loss of support which are not available in the CLA (cap 43) and 
the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. The assessment of these heads of 
damages in Singapore and Brunei are still in the hands of the judges guided by the 
Common Law principles and decided cases. Nevertheless, despite not having certain 
provisions which are available in the CLA 1956, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act still have some effects on the exercise of judicial 
discretion in the assessment of damages as well as quantum of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents.
9
  
 
Again, it must be born in mind that the following discussion is not intended to discuss 
the assessment of all heads of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims in 
Singapore and Brunei. This chapter, like the previous three (3) chapters deals solely 
with effects of the statutory provisions on the discretionary power of the judges in 
assessing damages as well as the quantum of damages in personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents in Singapore and Brunei. The 
discussion includes an analysis of the strength and weaknesses of the provisions CLA 
(cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. Comparative analyses of 
                                                 
8 (Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1956”. 
9 The amount of damages being awarded in Brunei are claimed to be very high, unmatched and unprecedented in Malaysia and 
Singapore and perhaps on the rest of Common Law world. See Chew, Leslie et al., “A Comparative Analysis of Various Aspects in 
the Law of Personal Injuries in Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore”, (2008) 3 Malayan Law Journal, i-xliii, at 19. 
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the provisions in these Acts with the provisions in the Malaysian CLA 1956 are also 
included. 
 
The discussion in this chapter will focus only on the heads of damages which are 
governed by the provisions in the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act. The assessment of damages for heads of damages not regulated by the 
CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act will not be discussed 
as they are in the hands of the presiding judges guided by the Common Law principles 
and decided cases. They are beyond the scope of this research. There are however 
several instances where the discussion includes some of the heads of damages which 
are not provided for in either the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act.
10
 This is necessary for the purpose of making complete comparative 
analyses of the provisions in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei since the CLA 1956 
contains some provisions which are not found in the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. 
 
 
6.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON PERSONAL INJURY 
AND FATAL ACCIDENT CLAIMS IN SINGAPORE 
The assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents in Singapore is governed by the CLA (cap 43). The Common 
Law principles and decided cases serve as guides on matters which are not provided for 
                                                 
10 For example the assessment of damages for loss of support and loss of future earnings. 
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by the CLA (cap 43). The decisions in English cases are however are relevant only on 
questions of principles of assessment and not the actual quantum of damages.
11
  
 
6.2.1 The English Common Law  
The general reception of the English law
12
 in Singapore is by virtue of the Letters 
Patent establishing the Court of Judicature at Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and 
Melacca
13
 in 1826 which came into effect on 20 March 1827.
14
 Prior to the introduction 
of the Charter of Justice, there was a period of legal uncertainty where no proper 
legislative instrument available to govern the island.
15
 Although the Charter of Justice 
merely established a court system
16
 modelled by the English courts without specifying 
that the English law was to be the territorial law in Singapore, a series of decisions after 
the introduction of the Charter concurred that the English Common Law, equity and 
statutes were to be the prevailing law of the land.
17
The reception however was 
subjected to three conditions: 
                                                 
11 Rutter, Michael F., Handbook on Damages for Personal Injuries and Death in Singapore and Malaysia, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: 
Butterworth Asia, 1993) at 10 – 17. 
12 Chan, Helena HM, The Legal System of Singapore, (Singapore: Butterworth, 1995), at 6.  
13 Also known as the Second Charter of Justice. Hereinafter referred to as “the Charter of Justice”. The ‘reception’ of English Law 
in Singapore is still a point of contention. Some argued that the reception of English Law in Singapore begins when Sir Thomas 
Stanford Raffles was granted the authority to establish factories on the island. By virtue of the English Common Law, when British 
subjects settled in a territory which has no local legal system, the English Law would apply. On the other hand, since Singapore 
was part of Johor Sultanates, the law of the land at that time would be the local law applicable in Johor. As such the English Law 
was not ‘received’ by virtue of Raffles settlement but by virtue of specific instrument such as the Second Charter of Justice. In 
response to Mohan Gopal opinion in the article “English Law in Singapore: The Reception That Never Was” [1983] 1 Malayan 
Law Journal xxv – xxxiv, that the English Law was never formally introduced in Singapore, Andrew Phang Boon Leong in his 
article “English Law in Singapore : Precedent, Construction and Reality or ‘The Reception That Had To Be’” [1986] 2 Malayan 
Law Journal civ – cxx, argued that the existing case laws, the language of the Charter and the attitude of the colonial judges 
towards the English Law all support the notion that English Law was indeed imported to Singapore by the Second Charter of 
Justice.   
14 The Charter was however dated 27 November 1826. 
15 Phang, Andrew Boon Leong, The Development of Singapore Law, (Singapore: Butterworth, 1990), at 34. Although Raffles had 
made some attempts at law making by enacting several Proclamations in 1819 and ultimately the Raffles’ six Regulations in 1823 
after the island was placed under Bencoolen’s jurisdiction, the Proclamations and Regulations were ultra-vires since Raffles was 
only granted the authority to established a factory on the island. While the factory was within the Bencoolen’s jurisdiction, Raffles 
have no authority to place the entire island under the same law. Even after the island was ceded to the East India Company in 1924, 
the establishment of Court of Request and Resident’s Court in Singapore by John Crawford was still illegal since the company have 
no power to establish a legally constitutes courts in Singapore as the Treaty of Cession 1824 was not ratified by the English 
Parliament until 1926.  
16 The Charter extended the jurisdiction of the Recorder’s Court in Penang to Singapore and Melacca. 
17 See R v Willans (1856) 3 Ky 16. Also see Rutter, Michael F, Applicable Law in Singapore and Malaysia, (Singapore: 
Butterworth, 1989), at 116. 
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a. The law must be of common and general policy. Any law which 
was specific and designed to cater to the circumstances in England 
was not applicable.
18
 
b. The law must be suitable to the local circumstances, custom, 
religion and legislations. Statutes, cases law or principles which 
were not suitable or would (if applied) caused injustice and 
oppression were either rejected or modified to suit local conditions 
and needs.
19
  
c. Only those laws which stood as at 27 November 1826 were to be 
applied. 
 
In reference to English statutes, it is clear that only those statutes of general application 
which were already in application in England prior to 27 November 1826 and not 
repugnant to the local condition in Singapore were applicable. The situation however 
was not so clear with regard to the Common Law. Despite Walter Woon,
20
 Andrew 
Phang
21
 and Rutter’s22 opinions that the “cut-off” date23 also governed the Common 
Law, there were many decisions where judges seemed to adopt the developments in the 
Common Law even after the “cut-off” date.24 The intricate tie between the courts in 
Singapore and the Common Law was further complicated by Article 100 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 1980 and the Judicial Committee Act
25
 
which made all decisions of the House of Lords (up until the colonial period) and the 
                                                 
18 See Choa Choon Neo v Spottiswoode (1869) 12 Ky 216 and Yeap Cheah Neo v Ong Cheng Neo (1875) LR 6 PC 381. 
19 However, it was argued that the condition is only applicable to the areas of family law and related issues. The law relating to 
commercial, contract, evidence and other commercial interest, the English law will prevail. For detailed discussion see Chan, 
Helena HM, op. cit., at 9.   
20 Woon, Walter, ed., The Singapore Legal System, (Singapore: Longman, 1989), at 120. 
21 Phang, Andrew Boon Leong, op cit., (1990), at 40. 
22 Rutter, Michael F, op. cit., (1989), at 117. 
23
 27 November 1826. 
24 The continuous application of Common Law and English decisions in Singapore probably due to convenience and comity which 
arise out of the long standing deference and reliance on the English principles and cases. See Rutter, F. Michael, op.cit., (1989) at 
117. 
25 (Cap 148). 
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Privy Council (on all appeals from Singapore) binding on the judges under the doctrine 
of stare decisis or binding precedent.  
 
Section 3 of the Application of English Law Act
26
 finally managed to resolve the 
issue.
27
 The section allows the continuous application of the English Common Law and 
principles of equity applicable in England as at 12
th
 November 1993 which has been 
part of the law in Singapore as at 12th November 1993. The application of the 
Common Law and principles of equity however must be suitable to the circumstances 
in Singapore and its inhabitants. Any further developments in the Common Law after 
12
th
 November 1993 will not affect the courts in Singapore. The passing of this Act sets 
the Common Law principles applicable for the assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims in Singapore slightly apart from those applicable in 
Malaysia. While the Malaysian judges can only apply the Common Law principles 
administered in England up to 7
th
 April 1956,
28
 the Singaporean judges are allowed to 
apply the Common Law principles applicable in England up to 12 November 1993.
29
 
Thus, allowing the Singapore judges the benefit of the development in the Common 
Law principles up to 12 November 1993. 
 
6.2.2 The Civil Law Act 
The first ever statutory provision relating to the assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims were enacted vide the Civil Law Act.
30
 Similar to the 
                                                 
26 (Cap 7A). 
27 During the Second Reading of the Application of English Law Bill in Parliament in October 1993, Professor S. Jayakumar, the 
Minister for Law, described the Bill as “one of the most significant law reform measures since independence”. See Singapore 
Parliament Reports, Vol 61, 12 October 1993, col 609. 
28 Section 3 of the CLA 1956. Different “cut-off” dates are applicable to Sabah and Sarawak. 
29 Chew, Leslie et al., op. cit., at iii. 
30 (Cap 30). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA (cap 30)”.  
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Malaysian Civil Law Enactment 1937,
31
 the Law Reform 1934 and the Fatal Accident 
Act 1846 - 1976 also played important roles in the formation of the CLA (cap 30). The 
CLA (cap 30) gave statutory recognition to two (2) causes of actions under fatal 
accident claims; the estate claim
32
 and the claim for loss of support.
33
 Similar to the 
Civil Law Act 1937, the CLA (cap 30) also did not contain any provision on the 
assessment of damages for personal injury claims.  The CLA (cap 30) was later 
superseded by the CLA (cap 43) in 1985.
34
 The provisions relating to the assessment of 
damages for estate claims and loss of support in section 8 and 12 of the CLA (cap 30) 
are adopted by the CLA (cap 43). 
 
The statutory reforms on the law relating to the assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims in England brought by the AJA 1982 were not adopted 
by the CLA (cap 43) until 1987. The passing of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 
1987
35
 on 1
st
 May 1987
36
 amended the CLA (43) and made the provisions relating to 
the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accidents claims in the Act 
almost similar to the provisions in the AJA 1982 and the CLA 1956. The amendment 
was primarily an attempt by the Singaporean Legislature to keep abreast with the 
development in the law on assessment of damages in personal injury and fatal accident 
claims in England.
37
 The amended CLA (cap 43) abolishes the awards for loss of 
earnings in lost years
38
 and loss of expectation of life.
39
 It introduces a new head of 
                                                 
31 (F.M.S. no 3 1937). 
32 Section 8 of the CLA (cap 30) is identical to the provisions in the Law Reform 1934 which provides damages claimable by the 
estate of the deceased person. 
33 Section 12 of the CLA (cap 30) is a carbon copy of the Fatal Accident Act 1846 which allows dependants of a deceased person to 
claim for the loss of financial support suffered due to deceased’s demise. 
34 The latest edition to the CLA (cap 43) is the 1999 Edition which was done via the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1998 (Act 45 of 
1998) that came into force on 1st January 1999.   
35 (Act 11 of 1987). The Act was consolidated into the CLA (cap 43) forming the current CLA (cap 43). 
36 Republic of Singapore Government Gazette, Subsidiary Legislation Supplement, No 19, 30 April 1987, S 128/87. 
37 See statement by the Second Minister of Law of Singapore, Professor S. Jayakumar during the second reading of the Civil Law 
(amendment) Act 1987 on 4th March 1987. 
38 Section 10(3) of the CLA (cap 43). 
39 Section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43). 
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damages known as bereavement
40
 and made several amendments to the provisions 
relating to the assessment of damages for loss of support.
41
 Similar to the CLA 1956, 
the CLA (cap 43) also chose to omit the provision which allows for interim or 
provisional payment in personal injury cases. 
 
The provisions in the CLA (cap 43) can be distinguished from the CLA 1956 by the 
absence of any provision regulating the assessment of multiplier and multiplicand for 
loss of support and loss of future earnings. It also has no provision for the abolition of 
damages for loss of service and consortium of wife as well as damages for loss of 
service of child. The assessments of damages under these headings are still governed 
by the Common Law principles and decided cases. 
 
The latest amendment to the provision on the assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims in the CLA (cap 43) was done in 2009 via the Civil 
Law (Amendment) Act 2009
42
that came into force on 1
st
 March 2009. The Act 
amended sections 20, 21 and 22 of the CLA (cap 43). Other than inserting several new 
provisions in respect of the assessment of damages for loss of support in section 20 and 
22 of the CLA (cap 43), the Act increased the quantum of damages for bereavement 
and transferred of the power to vary the quantum damages for bereavement from the 
President of Singapore to the Minister for Law. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Section 21 (1) of the CLA (cap 43). 
41 Section 20 and 22 of the CLA (cap 43). These amendments however are not as extensive as section 7 of the Malaysian CLA 
1956. 
42 (Act 7 of 2009). 
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6.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON PERSONAL INJURY 
AND FATAL ACCIDENT CLAIMS IN BRUNEI 
Unlike Malaysia and Singapore, Brunei is technically not part of British Colony. 
However, due to its status as British Protectorate, the country had a very strong tie with 
England
43
 especially with regard to its legal and judicial system. Although Brunei’s 
dependence on England came to an end with the termination of the protectorate status 
in 1971, the tie between Brunei and England continued until it 1984 when it became a 
fully independent nation. Similar to its neighboring countries, Brunei’s law on the 
assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents is also heavily influenced by the English law. Other than the 
Common Law, Brunei also applied several English statutes dealing with personal injury 
and fatal accident claims such as the English Fatal Accident Act 1846 - 1976, Fatal 
Accident (Damages) Act 1908, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and 
Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935. These Acts were applicable 
by virtue of the Application of Law Act.
44
 The Acts however were replaced by the 
Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act in 1991.  
 
6.3.1 The English Common Law 
The English Common Law and rules of equity were introduced in Brunei by the Court 
Enactment of 1906 and 1908.
45
 The Enactments also introduced the Straight Settlement 
law which provided for the law on criminal procedures, penal codes, civil codes and 
                                                 
43 The relationship between Brunei and England started when the Sultan of Brunei sought the help of British Government in 
fighting pirates along the coast of Brunei. Both countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce in 1856 which among 
others allowed English official to hear cases involving British subject in the presence of local judge.  After becoming a British 
Protectorate in 1888, British judges were allowed to hear all cases involving British subjects on their own. By virtue of 
Supplementary Protectorate Agreement signed between the Brunei Sultanate and Britain in 1906 a British Resident was appointed 
to advise the Sultan on all matters other than religion and custom. For details see Azrimah binti Hj. Ayob, “Legal System In Brunei 
Darussalam After The Signing of The Supplementary Agreement 1905/1906 between Brunei and Great Britain”, National Day 
Seminar 2006, 7 March 2012, bruneiresources.com <http://www.bruneiresources.com/pdf/nd06_azrimah.pdf> 
44 (cap 2). Hereinafter referred to as “the Application of Law Act”. 
45 Black, Ann E. and Bell, Gary F. ed., Law and Legal Institution of Asia: Tradition, Adaptation and Innovations, (Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 299. 
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rule of contract.
46
 However, it was only after the introduction of the Application of 
Laws Act that the English Common Law and rules of equity were formally received in 
Brunei. The Application of Laws Act also allowed the adoption of English’s statutes of 
general application applicable in England as at 25 April 1951. By virtue of this Act, the 
laws and decisions of the English courts as at 25 April 1951 were binding on the judges 
in Brunei as long as they were not contrary to local circumstances, statutes or prior 
decisions.
47
 The “cut-off” date was not absolute. The judges in Brunei on several 
occasions had applied some post-1951 statutes especially when there was lacuna in the 
local law. The court in Baiduri Bank Bhd. v Pengiran Datin Hajah Za'baedah bte PRW 
Pg Hj Metussin & Anor.
48
 for example held that English Property Act is applicable 
when there is no relevant statute or case could be found in Brunei.  
 
The Application of Law Act allowed suitable changes and amendments to be made to 
the English law being adopted in Brunei in order to suit local circumstances. In Chen 
Fung Ying & Ors v Chee Hatt Sang,
49
 the court, in deciding whether the English Fatal 
Accident Acts 1846 – 1976 and the Law Reform 1934 were applicable as a whole in 
Brunei by virtue of the Application of Law Enactment, held that although a statute must 
be imported as a whole, the Application of Law Enactment does not prevent the local 
legislator from enacting new law which may amend part of the imported statute.  
                                                 
46 Hoffman, Thomas and Lucia Siebers, ed., World Englishes – Problems, Properties and Prospect, (Philadelphia: Benjamin 
Publishing Company, 2009), at 158. 
47 Cheong, Diana PP, “Administrative Accountability and the Law in Brunei Darussalam”  TINJAUAN, Policy and Management 
Review No 1, 2002, The Centre for Strategic and Policy Studies, 7 Dec 2011,  <http://www.csps.org.bn/senior_researcher.html> 
48 [2001] BLR 241. 
49 [1982] 1 MLJ 370. While referring to a Privy Council’s decision in a Singaporean case of Shaik Sahied bin Abdullah Bajerai v S 
S T Sockalingam Chettiar (1933) AC 342, Robert CJ held: “I accept that the effect of that decision is that if an English Act is to be 
deemed to have been imported into Brunei, by virtue of the 1951 Enactment, the whole of that English Act or none of it would be 
so imported. This does not, however, mean that a subsequent written law enacted in Brunei may not amend the English Act which 
has been imported as a whole, so as to leave parts of it thereinafter in force. I see, therefore, no objection in principle to the method 
[sic] view reached by Pickering J that it is possible for part of an English Act to be in force in Brunei provided that originally the 
whole Act was incorporated into Brunei law and part of it later excised by some Brunei enactment.” 
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6.3.2. Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act 
Unlike Malaysia and Singapore, Brunei has no Civil Law Act. The assessment of 
damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims is governed by the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. The Act originated from the Emergency (Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries) Order 1991 which came into force on 1
st
 February 
1991.
50
 The Order abolished the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act
51
 and the law 
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act.
52
 Most importantly, the Emergency Order also 
abolished all pre-1951 English legislations relating to personal injury and fatal accident 
claims which were applicable in Brunei by virtue of the Application of Law Act.
53
 As 
such, the English Fatal Accident Act 1846 - 1976, Fatal Accident (Damages) Act 1908, 
Law Reform 1934 and Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 are no 
longer applicable in Brunei starting from 1
st
 February 1991.
54
 The Common Law 
principles are still applicable in the absence of specific provision in the Fatal Accidents 
and Personal Injuries Act. 
 
The provisions in the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act are almost similar to 
the CLA 1956 and the CLA (cap 43). Other than providing for the statutory causes of 
action for claims for loss of support
55
 and estate claims,
56
 the Act abolishes the awards 
for loss of earnings in lost years
57
 and loss of expectation of life.
58
 The Act also 
introduces the award for bereavement.
59
 Similar to the CLA (cap 43), the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act does not contain provisions regulating the 
                                                 
50 Brunei is governed under the State of Emergency since 1962. The proclamations of emergency were renewed every two (2) years 
according to section 83 of the Constitution of Brunei. The proclamations enable any emergency order or any subordinates 
instruments conferred by any emergency order to have the force of law.  
51 (cap10)(1984 ed.). 
52 (cap 53)(1984 ed.).  
53 Section 23 of the Emergency (Fatal Accident and Personal Injuries) Order 1991. 
54  Lee, Yew Choh, “Recent Legal Development in Brunei Darusssalam”, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies [1993] 668-677, at 
668. 
55 Sections 3 and 4 of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. 
56 Section 11 of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act . 
57 Section 11(3)(a)(ii) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act . 
58 Section 12 of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act . 
59 Section 4 of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act . 
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assessment of multiplier and multiplicand loss of support and loss of future earnings. It 
also does not abolish the award for loss of service and consortium of wife and loss of 
service of child. The assessments of damages under these headings are still at the 
discretion of the judges governed by the Common Law principles and decided cases. 
However, unlike the CLA 1956 and the CLA (cap 43), the Fatal Accidents and 
Personal Injuries Act contains provisions allowing for interim or provisional payment 
in personal injury cases which is similar to section 6 of the AJA 1982.  
 
 
 
6.4. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS  
The CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act have very minimal 
provision relating to the assessment of damages for personal injury claims. The 
assessment of damages for the majority of the awards is discretionary upon the 
presiding judges guided by the Common Law principles and decided cases. Unlike the 
Malaysian judges who are bound by the provisions in section 28A of the CLA 1956, 
judges in Singapore and Brunei have a wide discretion in assessing damages for loss of 
pre-trial earnings,
60
 loss of future earnings,
61
 loss of future earning capacity,
62
 pain and 
suffering and loss of amenities.
63
 
                                                 
60 See Tan Teck Boon v Lee Gim Siong (2011) SGHC 169 (Singapore) and Karuppiah Nirmala v Singapore Bus Services Ltd 
[2002] 3 SLR 415 (Singapore), Bijun Kalur v Pahayta Sdn. Bhd. [2010] 5 MLJ 684 (Brunei) and Hj. Hassan b. Munap v Petrodril 
(B) Sdn. Bhd. [1988] 1 MLJ 388 (Brunei). 
61
 See Chai Kang Wei Samuel v Shaw Linda Gillian (2010) 3 SLR 587 (Singapore) and Ho Yiu v Lim Peng Seng (2004) 4 SLR (R) 
675 (Singapore), Goh Eng Hong v The Management Corporation of the Textile Center [2001] 1 SLR 209 (Singapore), Murugasu 
Euan v Singapore Airlines Ltd, op. cit. (Singapore), Karuppiah Nirmala v Singapore Bus Services Ltd, op. cit.(Singapore), Bijun 
Kalur v Pahayta Sdn. Bhd. op. cit. (Brunei) and Awangku Muhammad Murshyid b Pengiran Hj Ali & Anor. v Makrami b. Hj. Md 
Noor & Another Appeal [2010] 4 MLJ 662 (Brunei). 
62
 See Wong Kim Lan v Christie Kondalasamy (2004) SGDC 234 (Singapore) and Koh Soon Pheng v Tan Kah Eng (2003) 2 SLR 
(R) 536 (Singapore). Tiong v Vinetti [1984] 2 MLJ 169 (Brunei). 
63
 See Tan Teck Boon v Lee Gim Siong, op.cit. (Singapore) and R J McGuinness v Ahmad Zaini [1980] 2 MLJ 304 (Brunei). 
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6.4.1 Abolishing the Award for Loss of Expectation of Life 
Similar to the situation in Malaysia before the CLA 1956, plaintiffs in personal injury 
claims in Singapore and Brunei were originally entitled to claim for loss of expectation 
of life. The introduction of section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 12 of the 
Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act however completely abolished this head of 
damages from being part of the damages claimable by a living plaintiff in a personal 
injury claims. The abolition is similar to section 28A (2)(a) and (b) of the CLA 1956. 
The sections are direct adoption of section 1(1)(a) of the AJA 1982.  
 
Section 11 (1) of the CLA (cap 43) is almost similar to section 28A (2)(a) and (b) of the 
CLA 1956 except for the use of the term ‘injured person’ instead of ‘plaintiff’ and the 
arrangement of para. The section reads: 
In any action for damages for personal injuries, no damages shall be 
recoverable in respect of any loss of expectation of life caused to the 
injured person by the injuries, except that if the injured person’s 
expectation of life has been reduced by the injuries, the court, in assessing 
damages in respect of pain and suffering caused by the injuries, shall 
take into account any suffering caused or likely to be caused to him by 
awareness that his expectation of life has been so reduced. (emphasis 
added) 
 
Section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) is echoed by section 12 (2) of the Fatal Accidents 
and Personal Injuries Act albeit with slight difference in the arrangement of para. While 
the wordings in Section 12(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act is 
similar to section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43), the arrangement of para is similar to 
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section 28A (2)(a) and (b) of the CLA 1956. Section 12(1) of the Fatal Accidents and 
Personal Injuries Act reads: 
 
(1) in an action for damages for personal injuries –  
(a) no damages shall be recoverable in respect of any loss of 
expectation  of life caused to the injured person by the 
injuries; but 
(b) if the injured person’s expectation of life has been reduced by 
the injuries, the court, in assessing damages in respect of pain 
and suffering caused by the injuries, shall take account of any 
suffering caused or likely to be caused to him by awareness 
that his expectation of life has been so reduced. (emphasis 
added) 
  
The effect of section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 12 (1) of the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act is very much similar to section 28A (2)(a) and (b) 
of the CLA 1956. Despite the heading and the marginal note in the sections which state 
“abolition of damages for loss of expectation of life” and the explicit phrase ‘no 
damages shall be recoverable’, the sections did not abolish the award for loss of 
expectation of life in toto. The effect of the first part sections in abolishing the award 
for loss of expectation of life is negated by the second part of the sections which allows 
judges to take into consideration of plaintiff’s suffering due to the loss of his life’s 
expectation while assessing damages for pain and suffering. Judges therefore have the 
discretion to award damages for loss of expectation of life although the amount is to be 
merged into the assessment for pain and suffering. KS Rajah JC recognized this in his 
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decision in Au Yong Wing Loong v Chew Hai Ban & Anor.
64
 He held that in claims for 
damages for personal injury, section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) only abolishes the 
award for loss of expectation of life as a separate heading, the award can still be 
recovered under the award for pain and suffering should the plaintiff is aware of the 
diminution in his life expectation.  
 
The second part to the sections also allows judges to retain their discretion in the 
assessing damages for loss of expectation of life in personal injury claims. Since the 
Acts did not provide how an ‘account for the suffering caused by plaintiff’s awareness 
that his life expectation has been reduced’ is to be assessed, judges will have to use 
their discretion in assessing the same. The assessment take into consideration plaintiff’s 
personal circumstances, his attitude to the loss and the number of years of life which he 
had been deprive.
65
 All of which is speculative in nature. As such, judges not only have 
the discretion to award damages for loss of expectation of life, they also have the 
discretion to assess the damages to be awarded and to factor that amount in the 
assessment of damages for pain and suffering.
66
  
 
The quantum awarded is usually based on local cases or cases decided by the courts in 
the neighboring countries. This was acknowledged by Roberts CJ in a Brunei case of  R 
J McGuinness v Ahmad Zaini.
67
 While deciding on the quantum to be awarded for pain 
and suffering and loss of amenities for amputation of one leg, the judge took into 
consideration the quantum awarded in Singapore and Malaysia as well as the Common 
Law principles. He held: 
                                                 
64[1993] 3 SLR 355 (Singapore).  
65 Lim, Audrey, et. al, Assessment of Damages: Personal Injuries and Fatal Accidents (Singapore: Butterworth, 2001), at 154. 
66 In Cheng Chay Choo v Wong Meng Tuck & Anor. (unreported, 22 may 1992: suit 1573 of 1989)(Singapore) the court accepted 
that the respondent with her qualifications and mental faculty would have been aware of her diminishing expectation of life 
eventhough no medical evidence was produced. The court allowed SD 120,000 for pain and suffering after taking in to account the 
loss of expectation of life. 
67 Op. cit.(Brunei) 
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“The currencies of Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei are virtually on a par, 
which prima facie suggests that the purchasing power of each of the three 
dollars is roughly the same. I, therefore, consider that Brunei awards 
should, in general, follow those of Singapore and Malaysia, provided that 
the awards in Singapore and Malaysia are based upon the same principles 
of law which are applicable to Brunei... 
The correct approach at common law has been set out by the Court of 
Appeal in Walker v John McLean and Sons Limited [1979] 2 All ER 965. 
In that case, the trial judge awarded to the plaintiff damages of £35,000 for 
pain, suffering and loss of amenities, including loss of expectation of life 
and of sexual function... 
I also take into account the fact the plaintiff has lost more than the average 
person would do by way of loss of amenities, even if his determination to 
overcome his difficulties has enabled him to make a better recovery than 
the average injured person with this disability.” 
 
 
Similar to the circumstances in Malaysia, section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 
12 (1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act also have no noticeable effect 
on the amount of damages being awarded for personal injury claims in Singapore and 
Brunei. In Singapore, despite recognizing plaintiff’s right to be compensated for loss of 
expectation of life, damages for loss of expectation of life was rarely awarded.
68
 In the 
rare cases where the award was allowed such as Au Kee Tuang v Lightweight Concrete 
Pte Ltd.,
69
 Tan Teck Chye v Chua Mee Sieng
70
 and Mohamed Fami Hassan v Swissco 
Pte Ltd.,
71
 the damages awarded was relatively low. The standard and moderate amount 
                                                 
68 Verupillai, Jeyaratnam, “Loss of expectation of Life and the Living Plaintiff”, 1 (1982) Malayan Law Journal, lxix – lxx, at lxix. 
69 [1984] 2 MLJ xxix (Singapore). 
70 [1988] 2 MLJ xxvi (Singapore). 
71 [1986] 1 MLJ 461 (Singapore). 
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of damages was recognized by the Minister of Law in his speech to move the Civil Law 
(Amendment) Bill. The Minister stated that $6500 was the amount generally awarded 
for this head of damages.
72
 The same amount was still awarded in 1993 in Au Yong 
Wing Loong v Chew Hai Ban & Anor,
73
 and three years later in Chua Seng Lee v Ang 
Teow Koon & Anor.
74
Therefore, the abolition of the award for loss of expectation of 
life as a separate head of damages in personal injury claims results in minimal 
reduction in the quantum of damages being awarded under personal injury claims in 
Singapore.  
 
There is an absence of reported cases which allowed damages for loss of expectation of 
life to a living plaintiff in Brunei. As such, the abolition the award as a separate 
heading by section 12 of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act also does not 
carry much effect to the amount of awards being awarded for personal injuries in 
Brunei.  
 
It is also submitted that unlike section 28A (2) of the CLA 1956, section 11(1) of the 
CLA (cap 43) and section 12 (1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act are 
not intended to abolish the award for loss of expectation of life in personal injury 
claims. The actual intention behind section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) is to prevent the 
beneficiaries of deceased’s estate from capitalizing from deceased’s demise. Allowing 
the estate to claim for loss of expectation of life would amount to undeserved 
                                                 
72 See decisions in Chan Heng Wah v Peh Thiam Choh, [1986] 2 MJ 175 (Singapore) and Mohamed Fami Hassan v Swissco Pte. 
Ltd.,op cit. (Singapore) where only $6500 was awarded for loss of expectation of life. See also Au Kee Tuang v Lightweight 
Concrete Pte Ltd, op.cit. (Singapore) and Tan Teck Chye v Chua Mee Sieng, op. cit.(Singapore).  
73 Op. cit. (Singapore). 
74  [unreported – suit no 2103 of 1996] (Singapore)  cited in Lim, Audrey, et. al., op. cit., at 29. 
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enrichment.
75
 KS Rajah JC in Au Yong Wing Loong v Chew Hai Ban & Anor. 
acknowledged his by saying: 
“Section 8 (as it was then) of the said Act abolishes loss of expectation of 
life as a separate head in claims of non-pecuniary loss in an action for 
damages for personal injuries, in claims by the estate, and not by a living 
plaintiff. The estate should not receive compensation meant for living 
plaintiff.” 
 
Similarly, section 12 (1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act is also 
arguably not meant to govern the award for loss of expectation of life in personal injury 
claims. The section is listed under Part IV - ‘EFFECT OF DEATH’. Therefore, it is 
supposed to govern damages for loss of expectation of life under fatal accident claims, 
(i.e., estate claims) and not personal injury claims. Furthermore, section 1(1)(a) of the 
AJA 1982 from which section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 12 of the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act were patented from is also not intended for living 
plaintiff.
76
 The section was enacted due to the insignificant amount of damages 
awarded to deceased estate under this heading. The amount was viewed as an insult to 
the loss suffered by deceased’s family77that it should be removed rather than allowed to 
subsist. 
 
It is therefore concluded that section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 12 of the 
Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act have little effect on the discretionary power 
                                                 
75Based on the explanatory statement by the Singaporean Minister of Law during the tabling of the Civil Law (Amendment) Bill, 
the 1987 statutory amendment is intended to reform the law relating to damages payable in fatal accident cases specifically for 
claims by the estate of the deceased. 
76 Velupillai, Jeyaratnam, Damages: Loss of Expectation of Life Survival and Deductibility, (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal, 
1984), at 19. 
77 The Lord Chancellor of the House of Lords in the Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 8 March 1982, Vol 428, Col 43 commented 
that the award is “of little financial significance and has often been criticized as derisory in respect of the death of husbands, wives 
and children”. 
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of the judges to assess and award damages for loss of expectation of life in personal 
injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. The sections only abolish the 
award as a separate head of damages. Judges however still have the discretion to allow 
damages for loss of expectation of life as part of damages for pain and suffering. Since 
the damages is not abolished altogether, the sections have minimal effect in reducing 
the quantum of damages in personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle 
accidents. 
 
6.4.2 The Absence of Any Provision on the Assessment of Damages for Loss of 
Earnings  
Unlike the CLA 1956, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries 
Act did not contain any provision on the assessment of damages for loss of pre-trial 
earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of future earning capacity. These damages are 
still assessed based on the Common Law principles and decided cases.  
 
(a) Loss of Pre-trial Earnings 
The assessment of damages for loss of pre-trial earnings in Singapore and Brunei is 
based on the Common Law multiplication method; plaintiff’s income multiplies with 
the length of time he was unable to earn that income. The sum obtained by deducting 
income-tax, expenses incurred in producing income
78
  and collateral benefits received 
due to incapacity 
79
 from plaintiff’s pre-injury earning80 is generally accepted as the 
multiplicand. The multiplier on the other hand is usually based on his medical leave 
                                                 
78 Inclusive of travelling, food and lodging etc. 
79 Inclusive of worker’s compensation, unemployment benefits, wages or sick pay etc. 
80 Inclusive of allowances, overtime, bonuses etc. 
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given by the doctors.
81
 In cases where the plaintiff is totally unable to return to work, 
the multiplier is calculated from the date of injury to the date of trial.
  
 
(b) Loss of Future Earnings 
The assessment of damages for loss of future earnings in Singapore and Brunei also 
uses the Common Law multiplication method. The multiplicand and multiplier are 
derived by projecting plaintiff’s probable future earnings and expected working life. 
The multiplication of these figures will generate an amount which constitutes the 
projected future loss that already took into consideration the many possibilities and 
contingencies in life. Since there is no statutory provision in Singapore and Brunei with 
regard to the assessment of loss of future earnings, the need for judicial discretion is 
most apparent. It can be viewed from three (3) perspectives: 
(i) The assessment of multiplicand 
Unlike the CLA 1956, the CLA (cap 43) and Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act 
allow judges to award damages for loss of future earnings to plaintiffs who are not 
earning any income at the time of injury. Judges have the discretion to assess and 
award damages for loss of future earnings to plaintiff who was unemployed, not 
earning income at the time of injury, a student or a minor. The absence of the 
requirement of earning income at the time of injury also allows judges the discretion to 
award the damages to plaintiff who was in between employment, on unpaid leave or 
have a good prospect of earning income in the future to claim for loss of future 
earnings. Although these persons were not receiving earning at the time of the injury, 
                                                 
81 See Wee Sia Tian v Long Thik Boon [1996] 3 SLR(R) 513 (Singapore) and Hj Hassan bin Munaf v Petrodril (B) Sdn. Bhd., op. 
cit. (Brunei). 
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they have the foreseeable probability to earn income in the future. As such, allowing 
these persons damages for loss of future earnings is one of the advantages of the CLA 
(cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act that the CLA 1956 is 
lacking. 
 
However, in order to assess the multiplicand for loss of future earnings to persons who 
were not earning income at the time of injury, an extensive use of judge’s discretion 
and a large degree of speculation
82
 is required. Judges usually will have to take into 
consideration plaintiff’s academic qualifications,83 skills,84 pass achievements, family 
and social backgrounds
85
 or even the national salary average statistic
86
 in order to arrive 
at a hypothetical figure which is to be regarded as the multiplicand. Estimating the 
multiplicand in the absence of current income as a starting point for the assessment 
creates a lot of difficulties, uncertainties and varying results due to the many variables 
involved. The difficulties were apparent in Peh Diana v Tan Miang Lee.
87
 The judge in 
this case had to assess the multiplicand for plaintiff who was a student with below 
average school results. The judge had to assess plaintiff’s hypothetical future income 
by taking into consideration the commencing salary of a stenographic secretary in 
Singapore and the National Statistic published by the Labour Ministry. Similarly, in 
Eddie Toon Chee Meng v Yeap Chin Hon,
88
 the judge had to balance plaintiff’s good 
academic results and his lack of good family and social background in assessing the 
multiplicand. 
                                                 
82 Lee Wei Kong (By his litigation representative Lee Swee Chit) v Ng Siok Tong, op. cit., (Singapore). 
83 In See Soon v Goh Yong Kwang [1992] 2 SLR 242 (Singapore), the court awarded a multiplicand at superscale level in Civil 
Service despite plaintiff a doctor being new to the service. 
84 Tiong Ing Chiong v Giovanni Vinetti, op. cit. (Brunei). 
85 Eddie Toon Chee Meng v Yeap Chin Hon [1993] 2 SLR 536 (Singapore). 
86 See Peh Diana v Tan Miang Lee, [1991] 3 MLJ 375 (Singapore) and Eddie Toon Chee Meng v Yeap Chin Hon, op. cit. 
(Singapore) where the national average was considered based on The Report on the Labour Force Survey published by the Labour 
Ministry authorized under the Statistic Act (cap 317) 1991 Rev Ed. The national median starting pay of a university graduate was 
used as multiplicand in Lee Wei Kong (By his litigation representative Lee Swee Chit) v Ng Siok Tong [2012] SGCA 4. 
(Singapore). 
87 Op. cit. (Singapore). 
88 Op. cit. (Singapore). 
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Even in cases where plaintiff is working with regular periodic pay, with specific career 
path and salary advancement such as those in the public service, judges in Singapore 
and Brunei still need to exercise their discretion in assessing the multiplicand. Since 
there is no requirement for the multiplicand to be assessed based on plaintiff’s income 
at the time of injury only,
89
 judges in Singapore and Brunei are allowed to consider any 
possible future increases in plaintiffs’. They generally adopt a figure as a starting point 
of the assessment based on plaintiff’s earning, allowances, bonuses and other fringe 
benefits received at the time of trial. This figure is later revised to a hypothetical figure 
after taking into account possible prospect for promotion, salary increment, bonuses, 
allowances, career advancement as well as any negative contingencies. Since the 
prospect of future increase in earnings or negative contingencies are difficult to prove 
and predict let alone to confirm with certainty, the assessment of this hypothetical 
figure is highly speculative in nature and riddle with conjectures and presumptions.  
Winslow J in Ngui Kee Siong v Guan Soo Wee
90
 recognized this by stating: 
“It is odious to make comparisons based on promotion prospects and 
salaries as between different departments of the Government service as 
sometimes service in one department, though promising in the early 
stages, may as a result of changing conditions, turn out to be less 
rewarding while service in another department with a seemingly less 
promising future may turn out to be more fruitful than originally 
expected... 
...There are always a number of other factors, both tangible as well as 
intangible, to be considered in assessing future prospects and chances of 
                                                 
89 The CLA 1956 requires that any increase in plaintiff’s income in the future should not be considered in the assessment of 
multiplicand for loss of future earnings.  
90 [1970] 2 MLJ 48 (Singapore). 
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promotion. Some officers have been known to stagnate for reasons only 
known to their immediate superiors and the promoting authority. 
However, in view of the unfortunate accident which has, nevertheless, 
reduced his immediate chances, I would assess, for what it is worth, doing 
what I can in the realm of little more than speculation, damages under this 
head in the round sum of $ 7,000 at the very most.” 
 
The application of judges’ discretion in arriving at a hypothetical figure as multiplicand 
also causes variations in the amount of multiplicand being awarded in cases with 
almost similar facts and circumstances. Since the considerations which the judges take 
into account in arriving at the hypothetical figure are largely depending on the judges’ 
discretion based on the facts of the case guided only by the Common Law principles 
and decided cases, the figure arrived at vary according to what the judges’ believe to be 
plaintiffs’ possible earnings in the future. To illustrate, the decisions in Chan Heng 
Wah v Peh Thiam Choh,
91
 and Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin.
92
which concerned 
claims for loss of future earning by medical students (albeit at different years of study) 
is compared. In Chan Heng Wah v Peh Thiam Choh,
93
 the multiplicand for a second 
year medical student was calculated at the salary of a hospital registrar while in Lai Chi 
Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin
94
 plaintiff who was in his fourth year of medical school was 
awarded a multiplicand which was a median between the maximum and minimum 
salary in the Hong Kong medical service. Although plaintiffs in these cases were 
medical students, the considerations in the assessments and the amount of 
multiplicands greatly differed from one another. The variation in the considerations on 
                                                 
91 Op. cit. (Singapore). 
92 [1981] 2 MLJ 167 (Singapore). 
93 Op. cit. (Singapore). 
94 Op. cit. (Singapore). 
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assessment and the amount of multiplicand in like cases create uncertainty and 
variation in the awards for loss of future earnings in Singapore and Brunei. 
 
The application of judges’ discretion in arriving at a hypothetical figure as multiplicand 
also brings with it the risk of over-compensation. Since the multiplication method 
requires the multiplicand to be directly multiplied with the multiplier, it operates as if 
the plaintiff will receive the increases in earning in the future as a matter of right and 
the amount will be consistent thorough out the balance of plaintiffs’ working life. In 
reality, annual salary increments, bonuses and promotions are not certain and 
depending on many external factors aside from plaintiffs’ personal skills and 
capabilities. As such, judges have to constantly remind themselves of the possibility 
that plaintiffs might not be able to earn the same hypothetical figure throughout their 
working life. This concern was reflected in the decision of the Brunei’s Court of 
Appeal in Bijun Kalur v Pahayta Sdn. Bhd.
95
 In assessing the multiplicand for loss of 
future earnings, the judges took into consideration plaintiff’s future salary increment. 
This increase however was done with some caution that said increment will not 
continue throughout plaintiff’s whole working life. Instead of awarding the projected 
$4200, plaintiff’s projected salary was reduced to $3600 after taking into consideration 
the possibility that plaintiff’s earning might not constantly increase until he retires. 
Similarly, in Awangku Muhammad Murshyid b Pengiran Hj Ali & Anor. v Makrami b. 
Hj. Md Noor & Another Appeal,
96
the Court of Appeal also took into account plaintiff 
modest education level and estimated that his salary would have increase from $900 to 
$1800 a month after contemplating the possibility that plaintiff could not have expected 
to receive an increment of $100 every year throughout his working life. To calculate 
                                                 
95 Op. cit.(Brunei). 
96 Op. cit.(Brunei). 
278 
 
the increment just so would “introduce an arithmetic certainty in a completely uncertain 
future and would be likely to lead to error and over compensation.”97  
(ii) The assessment of Multiplier  
The absence of statutorily prescribed method of assessing the multiplier as provided in 
section 28A (2) (d) of the CLA 1956 made it necessary for the judges in Singapore and 
Brunei to continue applying the Common Law principle in the assessment of multiplier 
for the award for loss of future earnings. The multiplier is arrived at by deducing 
plaintiffs’ probable remaining working life which is generally based on plaintiffs’ age 
at the date of trial to retirement age
98
after taking into consideration their age, nature of 
employment, retirement age, health, social and family background etc.  
 
The absence of statutory multiplier in the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and 
Personal Injuries Act allow flexibility in the assessment of multiplier for loss of future 
earnings for personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. The 
multiplier can be adjust to suit the circumstances of plaintiff’s employment, financial 
needs and obligations, the changes in the employment market and the current national 
life expectancy. Recently, the judges in Singapore have increased the traditional 
maximum multiplier of sixteen (16)
99
 years to eighteen (18)
100
 and twenty (20)
101
 years 
to reflect their considerations for the revision in the national age of retirement, 
increasing life expectancy and changes in work conditions. The court of Appeal in a 
2012 appeal case of  Lee Wei Kong (By his litigation representative Lee Swee Chit) v 
                                                 
97 Per Mortimer JA at 670. 
98 Chan, Gary Kok Yew and Lee Pey Woan, The Law of Tort in Singapore, (Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2011), at 741. 
99 Audrey, Lim, op. cit., at 18. 
100 Teo Seng Kiat v Goh Hwa Teck (Suit no 2224 of 1998) (unreported). 
101 Pundit, “Loss of Future Earning Payout Raise for Student Hit by Taxi”, The New Straits Times, 21st January 2012. 
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Ng Siok Tong
102
 for example had allowed twenty (20) years of multiplier for loss of 
future earnings to the plaintiff who was eighteen (18) years old junior college student.  
 
The flexibility in the assessment of multiplier also allows the courts to adopt the split 
multiplier approach. Since future increases in plaintiff probable future earnings are 
taken into consideration in the assessment of multiplicand, the courts sometimes end up 
with several sets of multiplicands. Therefore, the multiplier also needs to be split up in 
order for it to be applied to the different sets of multiplicand.
103
 In situations where 
there are possibilities that plaintiffs’ possible future income vary due to certain reasons 
such as health improvement which likely to reduce the loss of future salary,
104
 changes 
in plaintiffs employment or in cases involving foreign national working in the 
countries,
105
 the flexible multiplier allows judges to split the multiplier to suit the 
changes in plaintiffs’ future earning period.106 As such, it can be concluded that the 
absence of specific provision regulating the assessment of multiplier for loss of future 
earnings enable the judges to adjust the multiplier to suit the plaintiffs and the current 
employment market. It is an advantage that the judges in Malaysia don’t have. 
 
On the other hand, the absence of specific statutorily prescribed method of assessing 
the multiplier can lead to uncertainty and variation in the assessment of the same. Since 
loss of future earnings are future losses, the number of years is essentially speculative 
depending on what the judges presume to be appropriate depending on plaintiff’s age, 
nature of employment, retirement age, health, social and family background etc. The 
extensive use of judicial discretion in factoring in the above considerations results in a 
                                                 
102 Op. cit., (Singapore). 
103 Chan, Gary Kok Yew and Lee Pey Woan, op. cit., at 742. 
104 Loh Chia May v Koh Kok Han [2009] SGHC 181 (Singapore). 
105 Visvalinggam a/l Arumugam v Toh Gim Choon [1998] 3 SLR 974 (Singapore), Xu Jin Long v Nian Chuan Construction Pte. 
Ltd. [2001] 4 SLR 624 (Singapore) and Liu Haixiang v China Construction (South Pacific) Development Co. Pte. Ltd. [2009] 
SGHC 21 (Singapore). This is based on the probability that the foreign worker is expected to return to his own country and no 
longer earning the same amount of income he earn in Singapore. 
106 See illustration in Chan, Gary Kok Yew and Lee Pey Woan, op. cit., at 742. 
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hypothetical figure which is highly speculative. This fact was recognized by the Privy 
Council in an appeal from Brunei in Tiong Ing Chiong v Giovanni Vinetti
107
 where 
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook while delivering the judgment of the Privy Council for an 
appeal on the award for loss of future earnings held: 
“Their Lordships think it right to emphasize that, even when a court has 
the best possible evidence (which was far from being the case here), the 
selection of an appropriate multiplier can never be a matter of 
precision…” 
 
(iii) Deductions for accelerated payment, contingencies and investment value 
The fact that plaintiffs are receiving the damages lump sum in advance calls for the 
necessarily discounts to be made to the hypothetical future earnings to cater for the 
conjectural aspect of the assessment. These discounts are made in view of possible 
contingencies and vicissitudes in life which might happen to the plaintiffs and affect 
their future earnings
108
 such as sickness, pre-mature death, demotion, unemployment, 
economic downturn, the possibility that they might not work until normal retirement 
age and the possibility that the employment may not be sustainable over their normal 
working life.
109
 Similarly, discounts are also need to be made to the hypothetical figure 
to cater for the possibility that the money if invested will generate interest.
110
  
 
Since there is no specific provision regulating the assessment of damages for loss of 
future earnings in Singapore and Brunei, there is also no specific method in assessing 
                                                 
107 Op. cit., (Brunei) 
108 Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at 257. 
109 See Zaiton Bee Bee Bte Abdul Majeed v Chan Poh Teong [2010] SLR 697 (Singapore). 
110 The discount is also known as discount for investment value or accelerated payment. 
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the deductions available. The assessment of the deductions is left in the hand of the 
presiding judges guided by the Common Law principles and decided cases. The judges’ 
approach to this issue in Singapore and Brunei is not consistent. While it is common for 
judges in Singapore and Brunei to deduct the discounts for contingencies, investment 
value and accelerated payment,
111
there were also cases which shows that deductions for 
these items were not made.
112
 In cases where discounts were made, the methods 
adopted by the judges to arrive at the discounted value were also inconsistent. The most 
common method of deduction are by deducting certain percentage out of the total 
figure arrived at after multiplying the multiplicand and multiplier,
113
 by adopting the 
multiplier in like cases
114
 and by adopting a set of tables known as “tables of present 
value” or “annuity tables.” 115  
 
Tables of present value or annuity tables represent the number of working years that the 
lump sum money will be able to ‘purchase’ if invested.116 The tables generally operate 
under the assumption that the money awarded in lump sum will generate four (4) to 
five (5) percent interest when invested. As such, a deduction for this interest value is 
configured into the tables. Unfortunately, although the application of the tables are said 
to be relatively accurate,
117
 the risk of double discounting caused the judges to abandon 
the method and reapply the method of deducting certain percentage from the figure 
arrived at after multiplying the multiplicand and multiplier.
118
 The percentage 
                                                 
111 See Lai Wee Lian v Singapore Buss Service (1978) Ltd. op. cit. (Singapore), Tominam bte Tukiman v Toh Kai Chup [1985] 2 
MLJ 345 (Singapore) 
112 See Tham Yew Heng v Chong Toh Cheong [1985] 1 MLJ 408. (Singapore) 
113 See Timong binti Musing (Administatrix of the Estate of Madam bin Musing dcd) v Chui Han Hwa & Anor. Suit Civil Suit No 
336 of 1987 (Brunei) where a 1/3 deduction was made to the deceased future earnings for contingencies. In  Tiong Ing Chiong v 
Giovanni Vinetti, op. cit.(Brunei), it was held that while the normal deduction is 10% ,the figure can be revised to 15% in cases 
involving hazardous employment.  
114 The court in Owners of MV 'Kohekohe' & Ors v Supardi bin Sipan, (The 'Kohekohe') op. cit.(Singapore) the court refers to the 
multiplier in Low Kok Tong v Teo Chan Pan [1982] 2 MLJ 299 (Singapore), R J McGuinness v Ahmad Zaini, op. cit. (Brunei) and 
Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin, op. cit.(Singapore). 
115 The practice starts form the beginning of 1960’s. 
116 For example the Messsr Murphy and  Dunbar, Solicitors table entitled “Table Computing Capital Sum Required When Invested 
at 5% Interest Per Annum to Provide Monthly Payments Over a Given Period of Years…”. 
117 Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., (1993), at 286. 
118 See Lai Wee Lian v Singapore Buss Service, op. cit., (Singapore) and Tay Cheng Yan v Tock Hua Bin and another [1992] 1 
SLR(R) 779. 
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deduction method necessitate the judges to build in a “rough and ready (albeit with 
somewhat arbitrary) reduction in the number of years of future earnings (in the 
multiplier), based on past experience and convention”.119All the methods above 
necessitate an extensive application of speculation, conjecture and guesswork which 
leads to uncertainty and variation in the assessment.  
 
(c) Loss of Future Earning Capacity 
The CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act also did not 
contain any provision with regard to the assessment of damages for loss of earning 
capacity. The judges in Singapore and Brunei rely on the Common Law principles and 
decided cases to guide them in assessing damages under this heading. Generally, the 
approach is; when there is a ‘substantial risk’ that a plaintiff’s capacity to earn will be 
effected, plaintiff will lose his present job or that plaintiff’s capacity to compete in the 
job market will be reduced in the future, the judge will estimate: 
“The present value of the risk of the financial damages which the plaintiff 
will suffer if that risk materializes, having regard to the degree of the risk, 
the time when it may materialise and the factors both favourable and 
unfavourable which in a particular case will or may affect the plaintiff’s 
chances of getting a job at all or an equally well paid job.”120 
 
Plaintiff’s age, skills, nature of disability, ability to adapt to other type of employment, 
the nature of employment and job market etc.
121
 are commonly use as guides in order to 
arrive at a figure which in the judges’ estimation will commensurate the ‘risk’. Since 
                                                 
119 Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at 257. 
120 Per Brown LJ in Moeliker v A Reyrolle & Co Ltd. (1977) 1 All ER 9. 
121 Ibid. 
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the assessment is by estimating the risk of future financial loss, the outcome is only a 
hypothetical figure derived based on the judge’s projection of the loss. 
 
The absence of specific statutory provision to differentiate the assessment of awards for 
loss of future earnings and loss of future earning capacity creates confusion on whether 
the judges should allow damages for loss of future earnings or loss of future earning 
capacity. The issue was raised in Karuppiah Nirmala v Singapore Bus Services 
Ltd.
122
where the Singapore High Court had to decide whether the plaintiff was entitled 
to the award for loss of future earnings or loss of future earning capacity. Further, it 
also creates the risk of awards of damages for loss of future earnings and loss of future 
earning capacity being used interchangeably. In situations where it is difficult to assess 
future earnings due to unavailability of evidence on pre-accident earning, unemployed 
plaintiff, or when it cannot fix a proper multiplier,
123
 the award for loss of future 
earnings are often substituted with loss of future earning capacity. The Singapore High 
court in Tan Teik Boon v Lee Gim Siong & Ors.
124
recognized this in its judgement: 
“The Court must also be wary of the fact that some of the older cases 
before Chai Kang Wei Samuel operated on the premise that loss of future 
earnings and loss of earning capacity were awarded as alternatives and did 
not see them as conceptually distinct heads of damages.” 
 
The absence of specific statutory provision for the assessment of damages for loss of 
earning capacity also creates uncertainty as to the method of assessment. The courts in 
Singapore and Brunei have been adopting two (2) methods of assessment; the 
                                                 
122 [2002] 3 SLR 415. (Singapore). See also Koh Soon Pheng v Tan Kah Eng, op. cit. (Singapore) where the court substituted loss 
of future earnings with loss of earning capacity since it was to speculative to determine how will the plaintiff’s business would 
perform in the future. 
123 Tan Teck Boon v Lee Gim Siong & Ors., op. cit. (Singapore). 
124 Op. cit. 
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multiplication
125
 and the lump sum
126
 methods. Both of these approaches are not 
perfect. The lump sum method is riddled with speculation due to the arbitrary nature of 
arriving at the estimated lump sum loss. Similarly, the multiplication method is also 
speculative. It requires a specific date as a starting point in order to estimate the 
multiplier. Since loss of future earning capacity is based on the ‘risk’ of future loss, it is 
difficult to estimate with certainty when the ‘risk’ will translate into specific date. As 
such, the assessment of multiplier is just another speculation. This was noted by Lord 
Scarman LJ in Smith v Manchester Corp.
127
 where he said: 
“It is clearly inappropriate, when assessing this element of loss, to attempt 
to calculate any annual sum or to apply to any annual sum so many years’ 
purchase. The court has to look at the weakness so to speak ‘in the round’, 
take a note of the various contingencies, and do its best to reach an 
assessment which will do justice to the plaintiff.” 
 
 
 
6.5 FATAL ACCIDENT CLAIMS 
Unlike the situation in personal injury claims, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act contain more provisions relating to the assessment 
of damages for fatal accident claims. These provisions regulate the assessment of 
damages for estate claims, claims for loss of support and bereavement in fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicles accidents. The provisions are almost similar to the 
                                                 
125 See R J McGuinness v Ahmad Zaini, op. cit., (Brunei)  for example the damages was assessed by taking the multiplicand 
multiply it with 12 years multiplier and minus one third (1/3) for contingencies. 
126 See Chang Ah Lek & Ors. v  Lim Ah Koon [1999] 1 SLR 82. (Singapore). 
127 (1974) 12 KIR 1. Referred to in Chang Ah Lek & Ors. v  Lim Ah Koon, op. cit., (Singapore). 
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provisions in the CLA 1956. The provisions in these two (2) Acts are however not as 
extensive and far reaching as those in the CLA 1956.   
 
6.5.1 Estate Claim 
The current position in Singapore and Brunei with regard to estate claim is very much 
similar to the position in Malaysia. Perusal of the section 10 and 11 of the CLA (cap 
43) as well as section 11 and 12 of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act shows 
that the provisions in the sections are almost identical to section 8 of the CLA 1956. 
Similar to the position in Malaysia, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and 
Personal Injuries Act in 1991 had abolished two important features of the old law in 
Singapore and Brunei with regard to estate claims: 
 
(a)Abolishing the award for loss of earnings in lost years 
Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 11(3)(a)(ii) of the Fatal Accidents 
and Personal Injuries Act abolishes the right of the deceased’s estate to claim for loss of 
earning for the period after deceased’s demise or better known as ‘claim for lost years’. 
The abolition is in order to avoid double compensation in situation where the claim for 
loss of earnings in lost years and loss of support are brought together by beneficiaries 
of deceased estate who were not his dependants
128
 and to avoid unjust windfall to 
beneficiaries of deceased estate who are not dependants.
129
 Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the 
CLA (cap 43) reads: 
                                                 
128 See the Court of Appeal decision in Low Kok Tong v Teo Chan Pan, op. cit., (Singapore) where the court had called for the 
abolishment of award for loss years. 
129 See statement by the Second Minister of Law of Singapore, Professor S. Jayakumar during the second reading of the Civil Law 
(Amendment) Act 1987 on 4th March 1987. 
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Where a cause of action survives as specified under subsection (1) for the 
benefit of the estate of a deceased person, the damages recoverable for 
the benefit of the estate of that person —  
(a) shall not include —  
(ii) any damages for loss of income in respect of any 
period after that person’s death; (emphasis added) 
 
Almost with similar wording, section 11(3)(a)(ii) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act also abolished the award by stating: 
Where a cause of action survives as aforesaid for the benefit of the 
estate of a deceased person, the damages recoverable for the benefit of 
the estate of that person - 
(a) shall not include- 
(ii) any damages for loss of income in respect of any 
period after that person's death; (emphasis added) 
 
Similar with the effect of section 8(2)(a) of the CLA 1956, the above provisions also 
abolish the discretionary power of the judges in assessing and awarding damages for 
loss of earnings in lost years altogether. Since the award under this heading is usually 
large,
130
the provisions had significantly reduced the amount of damages being awarded 
under fatal claims in Singapore and Brunei.  
                                                 
130 In Chan Heng Wah v Peh Thiam Choh, op. cit.(Singapore), loss of earnings in lost years was awarded at SD$125,000. Roslan 
bin Haji Bongso v Belait United Traction Co Ltd & Anor. Civil Suit No 83 of 1989 High Court, (Brunei) deceased’s estate was 
awarded B$ 454,995, in Hj. Hassan b. Munap v Petrodril (B) Sdn. Bhd, op. cit., (Brunei) B$134,000 was awarded. 
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(b) Abolishing the award for loss of expectation of life 
Another important feature of the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act with regard to estate claim is the abolition of the award for loss of 
expectation of life. The abolition is brought by section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and 
section 12(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. Section 11(1) of the 
CLA (cap 43) reads:  
In any action for damages for personal injuries, no damages shall 
be recoverable in respect of any loss of expectation of life caused 
to the injured person by the injuries, except that if the injured 
person’s expectation of life has been reduced by the injuries, the 
court, in assessing damages in respect of pain and suffering caused 
by the injuries, shall take into account any suffering caused or 
likely to be caused to him by awareness that his expectation of life 
has been so reduced. (emphasis added) 
 
Section 12(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act states: 
In an action for damages for personal injuries – 
(a) no damages shall be recoverable in respect of any 
loss of expectation of life caused to the injured person by 
the injuries; but  
 
(b) if the injured person's expectation of life has been 
reduced by the injuries, the court, in assessing damages in 
respect of pain and suffering caused by the injuries, shall 
take account of any suffering caused or likely to be 
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caused to him by awareness that his expectation of life 
has been so reduced. (emphasis added) 
 
Since the award for loss of expectation of life is abolished, judges’ discretionary power 
to assess and award damages for loss of expectation of life is similarly abolished. The 
effect of these sections was recognized by the court Au Yong Wing Loong v Chew Hai 
Ban & Anor.
131
where the judge held: 
“ Section 8 [as it was then] of the said Act abolishes loss of expectation of 
life as a separate head in claims of non-pecuniary loss in an action for 
damages for personal injuries, in claims by the estate, and not by a living 
plaintiff. The estate should not receive compensation meant for living 
plaintiff.” 
 
However, despite the above, the question of whether these sections have indeed abolish 
the damages for loss of expectation of life from being awarded under estate claims and 
remove the discretionary power of the judges in Singapore and Brunei in assessing and 
awarding damages under this heading is worth to be explored. Unlike section 8(2)(a) of 
the CLA 1956 which expressly excludes the award for loss of expectation of life from 
estate claim, section 11 (1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 12 (1) of the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act merely state that damages for loss of expectation 
of life shall not be awarded in personal injury claims. While it is clear from these 
sections that claim for loss of expectation of life by a living plaintiff is barred, the 
sections does not specifies whether this abolition is extended to estate claim as well. 
This question was noted by Rutter in this book
132
 where he commented: 
                                                 
131 Op.cit. (Singapore). 
132 Rutter, Michael F, op. cit., (1993) at 668. 
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“The reform [the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1987] is unsatisfactory. It 
fails to make clear whether it is directed solely at claims by living 
plaintiffs or by the estate or at both.”133 
 
Looking from the perspective of the CLA (cap 43), Rutter’s observation is justifiable. 
Although the intention behind the introduction of section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) is 
to prevent the beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate from benefiting from deceased 
demise,
134
 there is nothing in the section which state that the estate is barred from 
claiming this head of damages. It is also not listed under section 10(3)(a) of the CLA 
(cap 43) which provides for the list of damages not recoverable under estate claims. 
Had the Singaporean Legislature really intended to abolish the award for loss of 
expectation of life in estate claim,
135
 it would have specifically state it as such in 
section 10(3)(a) of the CLA (cap 43). Since the inclusion of section 11 was made at the 
same time as the amendment to section 10(3) of the same Act, it is a wonder why the 
Singaporean Legislature omitted to include award for loss of expectation of life into the 
list of damages not claimable under estate claim.  
 
On the other hand, although the abolishment of this award in Brunei by section 12(1) of 
the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act is also arguable on similar grounds 
above,
136
 the intention of the Legislature in Brunei to abolish this award from being 
awarded under estate claim is more apparent. Since section 12 of the Act is listed under 
part IV - EFFECT OF DEATH, it can be impliedly understood that the section is meant 
to deal with the effect of death on the cause of actions for loss of expectation of life 
                                                 
133 Unfortunately Rutter did not elaborate on the issue. Although Rutter’s comment was made in reference to section 11(1) of the 
CLA (cap 43), similar observation can be extended to section 12 of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act since the 
wordings in the sections are almost identical. 
134 Supra at 270 – 271. 
135 Rutter, Michael F, op. cit., (1993), at 670. See also statement by the Second Minister of Law of Singapore, Professor S. 
Jayakumar during the second reading of the Civil Law (amendment) Act 1987 on 4th March 1987. 
136 There is nothing in section 12(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act which indicate that the section is to be applied 
to estate claims. Similarly, section 11(3)(a) also did not list damages for loss of expectation of life as among the damages which 
cannot be recovered under estate claims. 
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which are vested on the deceased prior to his demise. Thus, when section 12(1) of the 
Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act abolishes the award for loss of expectation of 
life, it can be understood that such abolition is meant for the award for loss of 
expectation of life under estate claims. However, it is still incomprehensible why the 
award is not listed in section 11 (3)(a) of the Act which categorically abolish the 
awards for exemplary damages and loss of earning for lost years from being awarded 
under estate claim if similar abolition is intended for loss of expectation of life as well. 
 
Apart from the above, the effect of sections 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and 12(1) of the 
Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act in abolishing the award for loss of 
expectation of life under estate claims is also negated by the second part of the sections. 
The second part of the sections allow judges to include the damages to compensate the 
plaintiff for his suffering due to his awareness that his expectation of life had been 
shortened in the assessment of damages for pain and suffering. This part allows judges 
to exercise their discretion to assess damages for loss of expectation of life and to 
include it into the assessment of damages for pain and suffering. Similar to their effect 
in personal injury claims sections 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and 12(1) of the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act merely abolish the award for loss of expectation of 
life from being awarded as a separate heading under estate claim. The damages may 
still be awarded by including it into the award for pain and suffering. Thus, in reality, 
the award for loss of expectation of life under estate claim is not totally abolished in 
both Singapore and Brunei.   
 
It is therefore concluded that the absence of specific provision abolishing the award 
from being awarded under estate claims such as in section 8(2)(a) of the CLA 1956 and 
the inclusion of the second part of the sections negates the intention of the Legislature 
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in Singapore and Brunei to abolish the award for loss of expectation of life from being 
awarded in fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents in the countries. 
The judges’ discretion to assess and award damages under this heading is also intact.  
 
6.5.2 The Award for Loss of Support 
The provisions allowing for damages for loss of support in Singapore and Brunei are 
provided by section 20(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 3(1) of the Fatal Accidents 
and Personal Injuries Act respectively. Both of these sections are literally identical. 
Both states:  
If death is caused by any wrongful act, neglect or default which is such as 
would (if death has not ensued) have entitled the person injured to 
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person who 
would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action 
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured. 
 
 
Similar to section 7 of the CLA 1956, section 20(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 
3(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act allow for the dependants of 
deceased victim to claim compensation for the loss of monetary support due to the 
death of the deceased. However, unlike the CLA 1956, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act did not specify in detail how the award for loss of 
support is to be assessed. The Acts only laid down the right to claim,
137
 persons who 
may benefit from the claim,
138
 persons who may bring the claim
139
 and the time 
                                                 
137 Sections 20(1) and 22(1) of the CLA (cap 43). Sections 3(1) and 6(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. 
138 Section 20 (2), (8), (9) and (10) of the CLA (cap 43). Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries 
Act. 
139 Section 20(3) and (4) of the CLA (cap 43). Section 5 (1) and (2) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. 
292 
 
limitation in which the claim is to be filed.
140
 There are several key features in which 
the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act seems to differ 
from their Malaysian counterpart. Below are the analyses of the differences; 
 
(a) Different Measure of Damages  
Section 22(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 6(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act use the term ‘damages proportion to the losses resulting from the death’ as 
the measure of damages for loss of support. Section 22(1) of the CLA (cap 43) reads: 
In every action brought under section 20, the court may award such 
damages as are proportioned to the losses resulting from the death to the 
dependants respectively except that in assessing the damages there shall 
not be taken into account... (emphasis added) 
 
Section 6(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act states:  
In the action such damages, other than damages for bereavement, may be 
awarded as are proportioned to the injury resulting from the death to the 
dependants respectively. (emphasis added) 
 
The term ‘damages proportion to the losses resulting from the death’ in the sections 
brings to mind a broader range of damages which judges in Singapore and Brunei are 
allowed to award under the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries 
Act. While judges in Malaysia is limited by section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 only to 
award damages for loss of support, sections 22(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and 6(1) of the 
Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act seems to allow judges in Singapore and 
                                                 
140 Section 20(5) of the CLA (cap 43). 
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Brunei the discretion to awards any damages which proportionate to the loss suffered 
by the dependants’ which was caused by deceased demise. 
 
It is however submitted that the differences in the measure of damages have no effect 
on judges’ discretionary power to assess and award damages for loss of support in 
Singapore and Brunei. The measure of damages in section 22(1) of the CLA (cap 43) 
and section 6(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act is not interpreted as 
‘all losses suffered by the dependants as the result of deceased’s demise’. Judges in 
Singapore and Brunei has been interpreting the measure of damages as only the 
pecuniary losses suffered by deceased’s dependants in their capacity as dependants and 
not for other loss. The judge in Chan Yoke May v Lian Seng Co. Ltd.
141
 for example 
had applied this interpretation by stating that step two (2) in the assessment of loss of 
support is to calculate “what sum during these years (deceased expectation of life if he 
had not been killed) he (deceased) would have applied to the support of his wife and 
children...”.142As such, the interpretation of ‘losses resulting from death’ in Singapore 
and Brunei is similar to ‘loss of support’ in section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 as defined by 
the Malaysian courts.  
 
(b) No Provision Regulating the Assessment of Multiplier and Multiplicand 
Similar to the situation in Malaysia, the assessment of damages for loss of support in 
Singapore and Brunei also uses the Common Law multiplication
143
 method.
144
 
However, unlike in section 7(3) of the CLA 1956, the CLA (cap) and Fatal Accidents 
                                                 
141 (1962) MLJ 243. 
142 Rutter, Michael F, op. cit., (1993), at 596 – 597. 
143 The projected loss of annual support (multiplicand) to be multiplied by the expected period in which the support is expected to 
be lost (multiplier). 
144The current law in Singapore and Brunei with regard to the assessment for multiplier and multiplicand for loss of support are 
more or less similar to the situations prior to the enactment of the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Acts. 
As such, the pre-1987 and 1991 cases on these matters are still relevant to date.  
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and Personal Injuries Act did not contain any provision regulating the assessment 
multiplicand and multiplier for loss of support. While section 7 (3) of the CLA 1956 
focuses primarily on the circumstances surrounding the deceased
145
 as the basis of 
assessment, judges in Singapore and Brunei have the discretion to take into 
consideration the circumstance surrounding the deceased and the dependants in order to 
come up with suitable multiplicand and multiplier. The claim by each dependants are 
assessed separately and the damages is given to each of them individually and not as a 
group.
146
 The absence of specific provision in the Acts and the individuality of 
assessment of damages necessitate an extensive application of judicial discretion. It can 
be viewed from three (3) perspectives:  
(i) Allowing the Dependants to Unemployed Deceased to Claim for Loss of 
Support 
Unlike proviso (i)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956, there is not requirement that 
deceased must be earning income at the time of his demise in the CLA (cap 43) and the 
Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act.  The CLA (cap) and Fatal Accidents and 
Personal Injuries Act allows judges the discretion to award damages for loss of support 
even to dependants of deceased who was not earning income at the time of demise. To 
do so, judges will usually make a calculated presumption as to deceased’s projected 
future earnings and to deduce from that figure the portion in which he would have in 
probability contribute to his dependants.
147
 The contributions is a hypothetical figure 
assessed based on the circumstances surrounding the deceased and his dependants. 
 
                                                 
145 Income, living expenses and age at the time of demise. 
146 See Dobb v Dobbs (1976) 1 QB 143 and Wong Fook Cheong v Hj. Abd. Khani b. Hj. Abd. Kadir [1996] 1 LNS 570 (Brunei). 
147 In Tan Ngo Hwa v Siew Mun Phui, op. cit., (Singapore) the court allowed the claim for loss of support by the parent of a sixteen 
(16) years old deceased who have yet to take her GCE “O” Level Examinations. The court accepted that the deceased could have 
graduated from an overseas university and awarded multiplicand based on median salary. See also Ho Yeow Kim v Lai Hai Kuen 
[1999] 2 SLR 246 (Singapore) and Man Mohan Singh s/o Jothirambal Singh v Dilveer Singh Gill s/o Shokdarchan Singh [2007] 
SGHC 73, [2007] 4 SLR 843 (Singapore). 
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The absence of pre-condition of earning income prior to demise is beneficial in 
situations where the deceased was not earning income at the time of his demise but 
have the possibility of contributing in the future especially in cases involving 
dependants who are deceased’s spouse, children and parents. The dependants will not 
be precluded from obtaining damages for loss of support merely on the ground that 
deceased was not earning income at the time of injury.  
Assessing deceased’s possible future income and contribution to the dependants 
requires an extensive use of estimation and speculation. In order to estimate deceased’s 
probable future earnings, the national salary average, deceased’s education levels, 
skills, family and social background are often used as reference. The Singapore’s Court 
of Appeal in Ho Yeow Kim v Lai Hai Kuen
148
for example, estimated the future salary 
of a seventeen (17) year old final year engineering student studying at Institute of 
Technical Education at SD $1,784.50. Deceased prospective earnings was assessed by 
taking the mean salary of a Mechatronics Engineering graduate (deceased was studying 
mechatronics at the time of his death) after six to nine months of employment and the 
mean salary of such a graduate after five years of employment.  
 
The speculative nature of the assessment is doubled when the projected earning is used 
as the basis to estimate the probable future contribution to deceased’s dependants. 
Judges will have to estimate the portion of his future income which the deceased in all 
probability will contribute to his dependants after taking into consideration the 
estimated value of various factors such as his own personal expenses, joint benefits
149
 
possibility of marriage (in claim by parents to unmarried deceased), dependant’s needs 
                                                 
148 op. cit. (Singapore). Similarly in Man Mohan Singh s/o Jothirambal Singh v Dilveer Singh Gill s/o Shokdarchan Singh op. cit., 
(Singapore) the average median monthly salary were derived from the Ministry of Manpower’s “Report on Wages in Singapore, 
2005” after taking into consideration the average median monthly commencement salary based on gender and types of 
employment. (Affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Man Mohan Singh s/o Jothirambal Singh and Another v Zurich Insurance 
(Singapore) Pte. Ltd. (now known as QBE Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd) and Another and Another Appeal [2008] 3 SLR 735; 
[2008] SGCA 24). 
149 Expenses paid for benefits enjoyed by both deceased and dependants as a whole such as house rental, car loan, house whole 
expenses etc. 
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etc. In Man Mohan Singh s/o Jothirambal Singh v Dilveer Singh Gill s/o Shokdarchan 
Singh
150the judge reduced deceased’s’ estimated contribution to their parents from forty 
(40) percent to thirty five (35) percent in view of the likelihood that deceased would 
have married and established their own families thus reducing their contributions to 
their parents.  
(ii) Allowing Future Increase in Earnings to be Included in the Assessment of 
Multiplicand 
The assessment of multiplicand for loss of support is based on judges’ discretion guided 
by the Common Law principles and decided cases. The judges in Singapore and Brunei 
usually adopt two (2) Common Law methods of assessment. In situation where 
evidence of deceased’s contributions to his dependants is available, judges will directly 
adopt the amount as multiplicand. However, when such evidence is lacking, the 
multiplicand is assessed based on the amount of deceased earnings which is available to 
be spent on the dependants.
151
 The ‘available amount’ is arrived at by deducting 
deceased probable expenses
152
 from his income.
153
 At the same time, the dependency 
aspect such as the number of dependants, age, nature of dependency etc. are also taken 
as part of the considerations.
154
  
 
Unlike proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 which limits the assessment of 
multiplicand to only the amount received by the deceased at the time of his demise, the 
                                                 
150 Op. cit. (Singapore). In Ho Yeow Kim v Lai Hai Kuen, op. cit. (Singapore) the Court of Appeal estimated that the deceased 
would probably be allocating forty (40) percent of his future monthly earnings considering that he would have to support his parent 
and a younger brother.  See also Tan Harry v Teo Chee Yeow Aloysius [2004] 1 SLR 513. 
151 See Hanson Ingrid Christina v Tan Puey Tze [2008] 1 SLR 409. 
152 Includes food, clothing, expenses in earning income, hobbies and vices etc. See list of deceased’s expenditures in Rutter, 
Michael F., op. cit., (1993), at 606 - 607. 
153 Includes earnings, fringe benefits, positive contingencies (bonuses, raises, overtime) and negative contingencies (demotion, 
salary decreases). 
154 In Wong Fook Cheong v Hj. Abd. Khani b. Hj. Abd. Kadir, op. cit. (Brunei) for example, the Brunei Court of Appeal deducted 
plaintiff expenditures from her monthly salary and uses that figure as the basis to calculate her probable contributions to her 
parents, husband and children. The Court also took into consideration the contributions by other family members for the upkeep of 
her parents as well as the fact that that her husband was not depending on the deceased for his livelihood except for a small degree 
of contribution for household expenses. 
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assessment of multiplicand in Singapore and Brunei may include possible future 
increases or decreases in deceased’s income.155 To do so, judges have to predict the 
probable future increases or decreases in earning for the period after the trial. The 
assessment is usually based on the nature of employment, career path, age, health and 
skills. The discretionary power granted to the Singaporean and Brunei judges in the 
assessment of multiplicand makes the amount of multiplicand awarded very realistic. 
Since a person’s contribution to his dependants would not be static as time goes, the 
probable raise and fall of future contributions should be taken into consideration.  
 
The discretion to factor in future increases or decreases in earnings however causes an 
extensive amount of speculations, conjectures and guesswork.  Various considerations 
such as the nature of deceased’s employment, career path, age, health, education level, 
skills and social background are taken into account. Further, it also requires multiple 
calculation of multiplicand. Since judges can take into consideration future increases or 
decreases in deceased future earnings, judges not only have to speculate deceased’s 
probable future income, he also will have to assess the multiplicand according to the 
possible future variations in deceased’s earnings. In the claim for loss of support by 
deceased’s parents in Tan Ngo Hwa v Siew Mun Phui,156the judge had to assess two (2) 
sets of multiplicand after taking into consideration the possibility that deceased’s 
contribution to her parents increasing along with the possible increase in her income. 
The multiplicand was fixed at $900 for the first two and a half (2½) years and $1,000 
for the next seven and a half (7½) years. The need to make separate assessments for 
different set of dependants or different period in deceased’s working life makes the 
assessment of damages very tedious and time consuming.  
                                                 
155 Rutter. Michael F., op. cit., (1993), at 608. Any increases or decreases in deceased’s earnings between the dates of demise to the 
date of trial are automatically included into the assessment of multiplicand. Furthermore, judges in these countries are also at 
liberty to consider the possible future increases or decreases in deceased’s earning in the future which may affect his future 
contributions to his dependants. 
156 [1998] SGHC 376 (Singapore).  
298 
 
(iii) The Assessment of multipliers 
Similar to the assessment of multiplicand, judges in Singapore and Brunei also have the 
discretion to assess the multiplier for loss of support. The absence of any statutorily 
prescribed method of assessing the multiplier as provided by proviso (iv)(d) to section 
7(3) of the CLA 1956, necessitates an extensive exercise of judicial discretion guided 
by the Common Law principles. The followings are usually taken into consideration in 
the assessment:  
a. Deceased life expectation – for how long deceased would have lived, 
had he not been prematurely killed.
157
 
b. Deceased earning life expectation - for how deceased would be earning 
the income to support the dependants.
158
  
c. Period of dependency – for how long the deceased would have 
supported the dependants.
159
 
At the same time judges also have to make deductions for the possible contingencies in 
deceased’s life160 as well as the investment value of the money receive lump sum. 
Necessary discount or reduction in the multiplier must be main view of those 
contingencies.  
 
Once again, it is submitted that the assessment of multiplier for loss of support in 
Singapore and Brunei is more realistic compared to their Malaysian counterpart. 
Staying true to the purpose of the award for loss of support which is to compensate the 
                                                 
157 Bearing in mind the discount for contingencies such as sickness and premature death of deceased. 
158 Bearing in mind the discount for contingencies such as the possibility of unemployment, demotion and strikes.  
159 Bearing in mind the discount for contingencies such as premature death of dependants, dependants becoming self-supporting, 
adoption (children), and prospect of marriage of the deceased which would affect the ability to support dependants (parents). 
160 Lord Diplock in Mallett v McMonagle, (1970) AC 166 held “The stating point in any estimate of the number of years that a 
dependency would have endured is the number of years between the date of the deceased death and that at which he would have 
reach normal retiring age. that falls to be reduced to take account the chance, not only that she might not have lived until retiring 
age, but also the chance that by illness or injury she might have been disabled from gainful occupation.” Contingencies may 
include sickness, unemployment, pre-mature death, prospect of marriage (affecting a son’s contribution to his parents) etc. 
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dependants for the loss of support which would have been provided by the deceased 
had he did not die, the length of time over which the dependant would be needing the 
support plays an essential role in determining the multiplier. For example, instead of 
automatically allowing a maximum sixteen (16) years of multiplier to dependants to a 
deceased who was at or below the age of thirty (30) year old,
161
 judges in Singapore 
and Brunei are have the discretion to consider whether the dependants will actually be 
depending on the deceased for the following sixteen (16) years. Thus, seventy (70) 
years old parents of a twenty nine (29) years old deceased will not be receiving the 
maximum sixteen (16) years of multiplier in consideration of their advance age.  
 
On the other hand judges in Singapore and Brunei are also not restricted to the 
maximum of twelve (12) years multiplier for deceased who was beyond thirty years 
(30) year old at the time of demise.
162
 As such, a one (1) year old child of thirty one 
(31) years old deceased would be entitled to more than twelve (12) years multiplier 
considering his young age and the possibility of him being continuously depending on 
the deceased for at least another seventeen (17) years (18 being the general age of 
majority). This double-factor (deceased – dependants) considerations enable judges to 
adjust the multiplier to the age and needs of deceased and dependants after taking into 
account the age, life span and expected working life of both.
163
 
 
The double-factor method is not without its own problems. Since the assessment of 
multiplier is not a “scientific or exact process,”164 an extensive exercise of judicial 
                                                 
161 Proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 stipulates that the multiplier for loss of support for deceased who was or below 
the age of thirty (30) years old is sixteen (16) years.  
162 Proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 stipulates that the multiplier for loss of support for deceased who had passed the 
age of thirty (30) years old is calculated according to the formula of ‘fifty five (55) minus the age at the date of demise divided into 
two (2). The maximum multiplier is twelve (12) years and minimum is six (6) months. 
163 Hwang, Michael and Fong, Lee Cheng, “Loss of Inheritance or Savings : A Proposal For Law Reform”, April 2008, 1-67, Law 
Reform Committee Singapore Academy of Law, 18th May 2011, 
<http://www.sal.org.sg/digitallibrary/Lists/Law%20Reform%20Reports/Attachments/27/Loss%20of%20inheritance%20-
%20proposal%20for%20reform%20-%20final.pdf > 
164 Rutter. Michael F., op. cit., (1993), at 616. 
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reasoning, as well as “considerable extend of “impression and discretion”165is required. 
The whole process can also be very tedious. In the effort to simplify the assessment of 
multiplier, the esteemed Denys Roberts of the Brunei High Court had even ventured to 
formulate his own table for the assessment of multiplier. This table was first applied in 
Chan Chi Fook v Spennex Stainless Steel Industries.
166
  The application of the table 
was later extended to the assessment of multiplier for loss of support in Wong Fook 
Cheong v Hj. Abd. Khani b. Hj. Kadir.
167
  
 
 
The double-factor assessment of multiplier also sometimes necessitates multiple 
assessment of multiplier. In situation where the age, health and circumstances of each 
dependant are different from each other, the double-factor method requires multiple 
multipliers to be assessed. The Singapore Court of Appeal in Man Mohan Singh s/o 
Jothirambal Singh & Anor. v Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd (now known as 
QBE Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd) & Anor.
168
for example had to deliberate two sets 
of multipliers since there were two different dependants claiming for loss of support 
(deceased’s’ father and mother). Applying the separate multiplier method for each, 
Andrew Phang JA commented that a broad-brush approach
169
 taken by the Assistant 
Registrar in the assessment of multiplier: 
“would tend to obscure dependant-specific factors, such as age and life 
expectancy, which are important considerations when setting the 
multiplier. For example, a mother would typically have a longer life 
expectancy than a father and, if she was a housewife, she would also for 
that reason have a greater need for financial support.” 
  
                                                 
165 Robertson v Lestrange [1985] 1 All ER 950. 
166 (1995) BJ 208. (Brunei). 
167 Op. cit.(Brunei). 
168 Op. cit. (Singapore). 
169 Allowing the same multiplier for all dependants. 
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The judge accordingly awarded eight (8) years multiplier to the father and thirteen (13) 
years to the mother after taking into consideration the national life expectancy and the 
fact that the father would be able to support himself while the mother who was 
unemployed would be totally dependant on her husband and deceased had they not 
been prematurely killed.
170
Similarly, the courts in Brunei also employed the double-
factor approach. In Wong Fook Cheong v Hj. Abd. Khani b Hj. Kadir
171
the Brunei High 
Court had to assess five (5) sets of multiplier for deceased’s parents, two (2) children 
and husband after considering deceased’s age, working life and dependency aspect each 
dependants separately. 
 
(c) Death Benefits to Be Excluded in the Assessment of Multiplicand 
Both the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act provide for 
the exclusion of benefits which the dependants will receive as a result of deceased’s 
demise from the assessment of damages for loss of support. Section 22 of the CLA (cap 
43) states: 
In every action brought under section 20, the court may award such 
damages as are proportioned to the losses resulting from the death to the 
dependants respectively except that in assessing the damages there shall 
not be taken into account —  
(a) any sum paid or payable on the death of the deceased under 
any contract of assurance or insurance;  
                                                 
170 Also see Tan Ngo Hwa v Siew Mun Phui, op. cit.(Singapore), multipliers of eight years (8) for the father and ten (10)  years for 
the mother were given to a forty six (46) year old parents.  Similarly in Sim Hau Yan v Ong Sio Beng  [1996] SGHC 256 
(Singapore), where the deceased was a 26 year old unmarried man, the Singapore High Court awarded a multiplier of nine (9) years 
for the deceased’s fifty six (56) years old father and twelve (12) years for the fifty three (53) year old mother. The Assistant 
Registrar in Lee Kwan Kok v Wong Chan Tong [2004] SGHC 211 (Singapore) awarded a multiplier of ten (10) years to the fifty 
(50) year old father and twelve (12) years to the forty six (46) year old mother of a twenty five (25) year old deceased after taking 
into consideration the dependency factors of the dependants. 
171 Op. cit.(Brunei). 
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(b) any sum payable as a result of the death under the Central 
Provident Fund Act (Cap. 36); or  
(c) any pension or gratuity which has been or will or may be paid 
as a result of the death.  
 
The provision is almost an exact copy of proviso (i) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. 
The CLA (cap 43) however did not contain any provision similar to proviso (i)(d) to 
section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. As such, the Singaporean Courts are only required to 
exclude benefits received by way of insurance or assurance, benefit received out of 
deceased contributions in the Central Provident Fund and any pension or gratuity 
received as the result from deceased death. Any benefits received from sources other 
than stated above may be considered in the assessment of damages for loss of support; 
i.e; must be deducted from the amount to be awarded as damages for loss of support.
172
 
The inclusion of this provision into the CLA (cap 43) has no significant effect on the 
assessment of damages for loss of support in Singapore. It has always been the practice 
of the Singapore judges to disregard these benefits even prior to the enactment of CLA 
(cap 43).
173
  
 
The Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act on the other hand provides a very general 
provision regarding this matter. Unlike the CLA 1956 and the CLA (cap 43), the Act 
did not contain specific provision listing the death benefits to be excluded in the 
assessment of damages for loss of support.  Section 7 of the Act merely states that any 
benefits received by any person as the result of deceased’s demise is to be excluded 
from the assessment of damages for loss of support. The section reads:  
                                                 
172 Tan Harry v Teo Chee Yeow Aloysius (2004) 1 SLR (R) 513. 
173 Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at 672. See Singapore Buss Service (1978) Ltd. v Lim Soon Yong [1983] 2 MLJ 306. (Singapore).  
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In assessing damages in respect of a person's death in an action under 
this Part, benefits which have accrued or will or may accrue to any 
person from his estate or otherwise as a result of his death shall be 
disregarded. 
 
As such, judges in Brunei are totally prevented from taking into consideration any 
benefits which the dependants may receive as a result of deceased’s demise in the 
assessment of damages for loss of support. The absence of specific provision listing the 
benefits however has no obvious effect to the law on fatal claims in Brunei since the 
section is broad enough to cover all the benefits that deceased’s dependants may 
receive out of deceased’s demise. 
 
(d) Benefits to Be Included in the Assessment of Multiplicand 
The CLA (cap 43) specify that any benefits either monetary or non-monetary which the 
dependant would likely receive from the deceased by way of bequest, gift or succession 
had deceased did not die is to be considered in the assessment. This was provided by 
section 22(1A) to the Act. The section states: 
In assessing the damages under subsection (1), the court shall take into 
account any moneys or other benefits which the deceased would be likely 
to have given to the dependants by way of maintenance, gift, bequest or 
devise or which the dependants would likely to have received by way of 
succession from the deceased had the deceased lived beyond the date of 
the wrongful death.  
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The section was introduced in 2009 by clause 5 (i) to the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 
2009 (no 7 of 2009). By virtue of the section, the principle laid by Lassiter v 
To
174
which stated that loss of savings or inheritance cannot be awarded in a 
dependency claim was abolished.  
 
The introduction of this section solves the issue of dependants not being compensated 
for the loss of monetary benefits which may come in form of deceased saving, gift, 
maintenance or any other forms which the dependants can expect to receive if deceased 
had not succumbed to the injuries. The multiplicand for loss of support in Singapore 
can either be the actual amount received by the dependants or the available amount out 
of deceased income (after deducting deceased expenses). Should the judges adopt the 
first method, a portion of deceased income which he set aside for saving is lost to the 
dependants. Since deceased saving will usually be utilize for his dependants in the 
future or given to his dependants by way of bequest, this portion is possibly the rightful 
loss of the dependants. As such, by ensuring that these items are considered in the 
assessment of damages, the CLA (cap 43) is ensuring that the dependants will be 
compensated for the loss of a portion of deceased income which in most probability 
will be spent on them in the future. 
 
There is no equivalent provision in England, Malaysia or Brunei on this matter. This 
however does not prevent the judges from including deceased’s saving as part of 
multiplicand. In a Malaysian case of Chan Yoke May v Lian Seng Co Ltd., 
175
 the judge 
accepted that an amount equal to what the deceased would have saved should be added 
in the assessment of damages but after taking into consideration the possibility that the 
may have died the deceased and would not be able to benefit from deceased’s saving.  
                                                 
174 [2005] 2 SLR 8; [2005] SGHC 4 (Singapore). 
175
 Op. cit. (Malaysia).  
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(e) Persons Allowed to Claim for Loss of Support 
Similar to the CLA 1956, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act limit the power of judges to award damages for loss of support to 
deceased’s dependants only. This is provided in both Acts by sections 20(2) and 3(3) 
respectively. The sections are identical except for their referral to the connected 
provisions in the respective Acts. Section 20(2) of the CLA (cap 43) reads: 
 
Subject to section 21 (2), every such action shall be for the benefit of the 
dependants of the person (referred to in this section and in sections 21 
and 22 as the deceased) whose death has been so caused. (emphasis 
added) 
 
Section 3(2) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act states: 
Subject to section 4, every such action shall be for the benefit of the 
dependants of the person ("the deceased") whose death has been so 
caused. (emphasis added) 
 
Although the sections did not limit the beneficiaries to the persons listed in the 
section,
176
 the absence of specific list of persons in section 20(2) of the CLA (cap 43) 
and section 3(2) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act makes not much 
difference to the law since the interpretation of the term ‘dependants’ is provided in 
section 20(8) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 3(3) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act. 
 
Compared to Malaysian judges, judges in Singapore and Brunei have the power to 
award damages for loss of support to a broader range of people. While the Malaysian 
                                                 
176 Unlike section 7(2) of the CLA 1956 which limits the beneficiaries to deceased’s spouse, parent and children. See also section 
7(11) of the CLA 1956 for the definition of the term spouse, parent and children. 
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judges are only allowed to award damages for loss of support to deceased’s spouse, 
parents,
177
 grandparents, children, grandchildren and stepchildren, the Singaporean 
judges are allowed to extend the damages to deceased’s former wife, great 
grandparents, great grandchildren, siblings, nieces and nephews, uncles and aunts as 
well as cousins.
178
 This power is granted by section 20(8) of the CLA (cap 43) which 
reads: 
In this section, “dependant” means —  
(a) the wife or husband or former wife of the deceased;  
(b) any parent, grandparent or great-grandparent of the deceased;  
(c) any child, grandchild or great-grandchild of the deceased;  
(d) any person (not being a child of the deceased) who, in the case 
of any marriage to which the deceased was at any time a party, 
was treated by the deceased as a child of the family in relation 
to that marriage;  
(e) any person who is, or is the issue of, a brother, sister, uncle or 
aunt of the deceased.  
 
Section 3(3) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act allow for an even wider 
range of beneficiaries compared to the CLA 1956 and the CLA (cap 43). Other than the 
persons mentioned above, judges in Brunei can extend the damages to deceased’s 
                                                 
177 Includes parents to an illegitimate child and legally registered adoptive parents. 
178 At the Second Reading of the Bill to amend the Civil Law Act, Prof S Jayakumar stated that “the expansion of the definition of 
dependants is in order to ensure that other relatives who are actually dependant on the deceased but did not fall within the then 
existing categories could claim for loss of dependency”. See Hwang, Michael and Fong Lee Cheng, “Loss of Inheritance or 
Savings : A Proposal For Law Reform”, April 2008, 1-67, Law Reform Committee Singapore Academy of Law, 18th May 2011, 
<http://www.sal.org.sg/digitallibrary/Lists/Law%20Reform%20Reports/Attachments/27/Loss%20of%20inheritance%20-
%20proposal%20for%20reform%20-%20final.pdf > 
See also Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (4 March 1987) vol 49 at cols 66 – 69.  
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former husband, de-facto spouse,
179
 and adoptive parents who are not legally registered 
as deceased’s adoptive parents.180 The section reads: 
In this Part 'dependant' means - 
(a) the wife or husband or former wife or husband of the deceased; 
(b) any person who- 
(i) was living with the deceased in the same household 
immediately before the date of the death; and 
(ii) had been living with the deceased in the same household 
for at least two years before that  date; and 
(iii) was living during the whole of that period as the husband 
or wife of the deceased; 
(c) any parent or other ascendant of the deceased; 
(d) any person who was treated by the deceased as his parent; 
(e) any child or other descendant of the deceased; 
(j) any person (not being a child of the deceased) who, in the case 
of any marriage to which the deceased was at any time a party, 
was treated by the deceased as a child of the family in relation 
to that marriage; 
(g) any person who is, or is the issue of, a brother, sister, uncle or 
aunt of the deceased. 
 
One of the interesting feature in the definition of dependants in the CLA (cap 43) and 
the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act which is absent from the CLA 1956 is the 
                                                 
179 Provided that he or she had been living with the deceased as husband or wife immediately prior to deceased’s demise in the 
same house for a minimum period of two (2) years. 
180 Unlike the proviso to section 7(11) of the CLA 1956 and section 20(10) of the CLA (cap 43), the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act did not specify that the “parent” must be a legally registered adoptive parent. It allows damages to be awarded to 
anybody who was treated by the deceased as his or her parents. 
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inclusion of deceased’s former wife181 or husband182 as dependants. While judges in 
Malaysia can only award damages for loss of support to deceased’s spouse, judges in 
Singapore and Brunei can extend the damages to deceased’s former spouse together 
with deceased’s existing spouse. However, Section 22(3A) of the CLA (cap 43), limits 
the judges’ power to award damages for loss of support only to deceased’s former wife. 
As such, unlike in Brunei, judges’ in Singapore have no power to award damages for 
loss of support to deceased’s former husband. Section 22(3A) of the CLA (cap 43) also 
limits the power of the judges to award this damages to only those former wife who had 
obtained maintenance order against the deceased prior to his demise. Section 22(3A) of 
the CLA (cap 43) reads:
183
  
In an action brought under section 20, the damages payable to a former 
wife of the deceased shall only be in respect of a subsisting 
maintenance order against the deceased at the time of his death.  
 
Judges in Brunei are not similarly restricted. The Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries 
Act did not contain any provision similar to section 22(3A) of the CLA (cap 43). The 
problem with section 3(3)(a) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act is, while 
one may presume that the intention of the legislature in Brunei is to allow damages for 
loss of support to be awarded to deceased’s former wife or husband who has been 
supported by the deceased prior to his death pursuant to maintenance orders, there is 
nothing in the whole Act which state the same. The absence of specific provision 
limiting the power of the judges to award damages for loss of support only in pursuance 
of maintenance order may open up the interpretation of the provision to include 
                                                 
181 The CLA (cap 43) only include deceased’s former wife. The inclusion was introduced by clause 3 to the Civil Law 
(Amendment) Act 2009 (no 7 of 2009). 
182 Brunei only.  
183 The limitation was introduced by clause 5(ii) to the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 2009 (no 7 of 2009). 
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deceased’s former spouse irrespective of whether or not a maintenance order had been 
obtained.  
 
(f) Prospect of Remarriage  
Unlike the CLA 1956, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries 
Act contain specific provision relating to the effect of a widow’s remarriage on the 
assessment of damages for her claim for loss of support. Both Acts specify that a 
widow’s remarriage or prospect of remarriage should not be considered in the 
assessment of damages for loss of support. Section 22(3) of the CLA (cap 43) reads: 
In an action brought under section 20 where there fall to be assessed 
damages payable to a widow in respect of the death of her husband, there 
shall not be taken into account the remarriage of the widow or her 
prospect of remarriage. (emphasis added) 
 
 
In almost exact wording, section 6(3) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act 
states: 
In an action brought under the Part where there fall to be assessed 
damages payable to a widow in respect of the death of her husband, there 
shall not be taken into account the remarriage of the widow or her 
prospect of remarriage. (emphasis added) 
 
Both of these sections are the carbon copy of section 3(3) of the AJA 1982. All three 
(3) sections remove the Common Law practice of considering subsequent remarriage of 
a widow or her prospect of remarriage as one of the negative contingencies which a 
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judge needs to take into consideration in the assessment of multiplier for loss of 
support.
184
 By specifying that subsequent marriage or prospect of marriage is not to be 
considered in the assessment of multiplier, judges are barred from reducing the amount 
of multiplier to be awarded solely on the basis that the widow has already remarried at 
the time of trial or have the prospect of re-marrying in the future. The introduction of 
these two (2) sections is crucial to the law on the assessment of damages for loss of 
support in Singapore and Brunei. Although it was viewed that remarriage among Asian 
widows are generally accepted as a rare occurrence,
185
 the situation have now changed 
and remarriage is a common occurrence. As such, to continue taking in account a 
widow’s remarriage or prospect of remarriage in the assessment of damages for loss of 
supports would inflict more uncertainty onto the already hypothetical amount. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the forethought by the Singaporean and Brunei’s legislature, both 
sections failed to include the widower’s remarriage or prospect of remarriage. The 
omission brings to mind the possibility that a widower’s remarriage or the prospect of 
him remarrying after deceased demise should still be considered as one of the negative 
contingencies which may affect the assessment of multiplier for loss of support in 
Singapore and Brunei. This omission was noted by Sir Danys Roberts J in Wong Fook 
Cheong v Hj Abd Khani b. Hj Abd Kadir
186
 where he held: 
“By section 6(3) of the Order,187 if damages are payable to a widow, in 
respect of the death of her husband, her re-marriage, or prospects of it, 
shall not be taken into account. This sub-section does not refer to the 
possible re-marriage of the husband of the deceased.”  
                                                 
184 See Mead v Clarke Chapman & Co. Ltd. [1956] 1 All ER 44, Goodburn v Thomas Cotton Ltd. (1968) 1 QB 845 and Curwen v 
James (1963) 1 WLR 748. See also summery of contingencies affecting dependants in the assessment of damages for loss of 
support in Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at 619. 
185Per Yong Pung How CJ in Ooi Han Sun & Anor. v Bee Hua Meng, op. cit. (Singapore). 
186 Op. cit. (Brunei). 
187 Emergency (Fatal Accident and Personal Injuries) Order 1991. In pari materi with section 6(3) of the Fatal Accidents and 
Personal Injuries Act.  
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The need for a specific provision on the same is crucial if a widower remarriage or 
prospect of remarriage is to be officially ignored in the assessment of multiplier for loss 
of support. 
 
6.5.3 Bereavement 
Similar to Malaysia, the award for bereavement is also available in Singapore and 
Brunei. The award was introduced by section 21(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 
4(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. These two (2) sections are the 
carbon copies of section 1A of the AJA 1982. Section 21(1) of the CLA (cap 43) reads:  
An action under section 20 may consist of or include a claim for damages 
for bereavement.  
 
Almost with identical wording, section 4(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act states: 
An action under this Part may consist of or include a claim for damages 
for bereavement.  
 
Similar to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956, the term ‘may’ in section 21(1) of the CLA 
(cap 43) and section 4(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act also does not 
allow any form of discretion to the judges in the assessment of the award. Since both 
Acts contain specific provisions in respect of right to claim,
188
 persons entitled to 
claim
189
 and the amount to be awarded,
190
 judges in Singapore and Brunei have no 
                                                 
188 Section 21(1) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 4(1) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. 
189 Section 21(2) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 4(2) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. 
190 Section 21(4) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 4(3) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. 
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discretion in the matter. Nevertheless, these are several pertinent features in the CLA 
(cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act which set these two (2) Acts 
apart from the CLA 1956. The features are as follows: 
 
(a) Beneficiaries to the Award 
Although the provision in section 4(2) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act 
is very much similar to section 7(3B) of the CLA 1956,
191
  the beneficiaries to the 
award for bereavement is confined only to deceased’s spouse and parents (or 
deceased’s mother if deceased was illegitimate).  Unlike section 7(11) of the CLA 
1956, section 4(2) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act did not include 
grandparents in the definition of parents. The provision is an exact copy of section 2 of 
the AJA 1982. As such, judges in Brunei are barred from awarding damages for 
bereavement to deceased’s grandparents even in the absence of deceased’s parents. 
Section 4(2) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act reads:  
A claim for damages for bereavement shall only be for the benefit- 
(a) of the wife or husband of the deceased; and 
(b) where the deceased was a minor who was never married - 
(i) of his parents, if he was legitimate; and 
(ii) of his mother, if he was illegitimate. (emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
191 The section limits the beneficiaries to the award for bereavement only to deceased’s spouse and parent (only if the deceased is a 
minor and unmarried at the time of demise). 
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Compared to section 7(3B) of the CLA 1956 and section 4(2) of the Fatal Accidents 
and Personal Injuries Act, section 21(2) of the CLA (cap 43) lists down a wider range 
of beneficiaries for award. The section states: 
A claim for damages for bereavement shall only be for the benefit of such 
of the following persons as survive the deceased:  
(a) the wife or husband of the deceased;  
(b) where there is no spouse by or for whom a claim can be made 
under paragraph (a), the children of the deceased;  
(c) where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made 
under paragraph (a) or (b), the parents of the deceased or, if the 
deceased was illegitimate, his mother;  
(d) where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made 
under paragraph (a), (b) or (c), but the deceased was at the date 
of his death a minor, any person who during any marriage to 
which that person was a party treated the deceased as a child of 
the family in relation to that marriage; or  
(e) where there is no other person by or for whom a claim can be 
made under this subsection, any brother or sister of the 
deceased. (emphasis added) 
 
Unlike the CLA 1956 and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act, the CLA (cap 
43) allows deceased’s children to receive damages for bereavement in the absence of 
deceased’s spouse. Only in their absence that deceased’s parents, siblings or extended 
families are entitled to receive the damager for bereavement.  The Act also allows 
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deceased’s adoptive parents192 and siblings are also allowed to receive the award of 
bereavement. Their right to claim however only arises in the absence of deceased’s 
spouse, children and parents.  
 
Similarly, unlike the CLA 1956, and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act, 
deceased’s age at the time of his or her demise is immaterial. Judges in Singapore are 
allowed to award damages for bereavement to deceased’s parents and siblings even if 
deceased had already reached the age of majority.
193
 Deceased’s age is only material 
when awarding damages for bereavement to deceased’s adoptive parents. In this 
situation, judges are only allowed to award the damages if the deceased was still a 
minor at the time of his demise. 
 
It is submitted that the wider range of beneficiaries for the award for bereavement in 
Singapore makes the award in Singapore more reasonable and oriented to the local 
circumstance. Family relationship is an integral part of the local social scenario. It is 
only reasonable that deceased’s parents (irrespective of deceased age at the time of his 
demise), children and siblings should be compensated for the loss, grief and sorrow 
suffered due to deceased demise. These persons would have been devastated by 
deceased’s demise. As such, barring them from receiving damages for bereavement is 
repugnant to the local social make-up.
194
 Similarly, including these people into the list 
of beneficiaries for the award also ensure that the objective behind the introduction of 
the award for bereavement is met. Since the intention behind the introduction this 
award is to give some solace or consolation to the close relative of the deceased in 
respect of his demise in lieu of the award for loss of expectation of life in estate claim 
                                                 
192 Only if the deceased is a minor at the time of demise. 
193 Under the CLA 1956 and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act, deceased parent are allowed to claim damages for 
bereavement only if deceased was a minor and unmarried at the time of demise  
194 Under the CLA 1956 and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act, only deceased’s spouse and parent (provided that 
deceased was a minor and not married at the time of demise) are allowed to receive damages for bereavement, 
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which had been abolished by section 11(1) of the CLA (cap 43),
195
 the inclusion of 
deceased’s parents, children and siblings as beneficiaries to the award allows these 
persons who are deceased’s close relative to be comforted or consoled.   
(b) Amount to be Awarded 
Similar to the CLA 1956, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act also specifically provide for the amount of damages to be awarded for 
bereavement. This amount is fixed and judges have no discretion to vary the same. The 
power to vary the amount of damages for bereavement is accorded only to the 
Minister.
196
 Section 21(4) of the CLA (cap 43) provides that the award for damages in 
Singapore is SGD 15,000. The section reads: 
Subject to subsection (6), the sum to be awarded as damages under this 
section shall be $15,000. (emphasis added) 
 
In Brunei, the amount of damages to be awarded for bereavement is provided by 
section 4(3) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. The section limits the 
amount to BD 10,000: 
Subject to subsection (5), the sum to be awarded as damages under this 
section shall be $10,000. (emphasis added) 
 
Unlike in Malaysia and Brunei, the amount of damages for bereavement in Singapore 
has been revised on one occasion.  The amount which was initially set at SGD 10,000 
                                                 
195 See speech by Dr. S. Jayakumar during the second reading of the Civil Law (Amendment) Bill 1987 (Bill 1 of 1987) in 
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (4 March 1987) vol 49 at col 68). 
196 See section 21(6) of the CLA (cap 43) and section 4(5) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act. In Singapore, the power 
to vary the amount was initially given to the President of Singapore. This power was later transferred to the Minister in 2009 via 
section 4 (ii) of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 2009 (no7 of 2009).In Malaysia, such power is accorded only to the Yang 
Dipertuan Agong. 
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was revised to SGD 15,000 in 2009.
197
 The revision was done in order to suit the 
circumstance and monetary value of the country.
198
 The Malaysian Yang Dipertuan 
Agong and the Brunei Minister of Law, although accorded with the same power have 
yet to grant any revision to the amount in Malaysia and Brunei. The amount still stands 
at RM 10,000 and BD 10,000 from 1984 and 1991 respectively when the award was 
first introduced.   
 
6.5.4 Loss Service of Wife and Child 
In the absence of any provision in the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and 
Personal Injuries Act similar to that of section 7(3)(iii) of the CLA 1956, the Common 
Law head of damages known as damages for loss of service is still available in both 
Singapore and Brunei. It is awarded to compensate the husband and the parents for the 
loss of the service of his wife or their child respectively. Since neither the CLA (cap 
43) nor the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act contain any provision on the 
assessment of this head of damages, the damages is assessed based on the judge’s 
estimation of a reasonable value of the loss. Thus, requiring an extensive exercise of 
judicial discretion especially when there is no indicator of the monetary value for the 
service rendered. In Ng Siew Choo v Tan Kian Choon,
199
 for example, the High Court 
of Singapore had to estimate the value of ‘service’ given by a son to his mother by 
working at her ice-water stall.  
 
 
                                                 
197 The amount was revised via section 4 of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 2009 (no7 of 2009). See also the Second Reading 
Speech on Civil Law (Amendment) Bill by Senior Minister of State Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee published in < 
http://app2.mlaw.gov.sg/News/tabid/204/currentpage/8/Default.aspx?ItemId=67 > 
198 See the Explanatory Statement to the Civil Law (Amendment) Bill 2008 (no 38 of 2008). 
199 [1990] 2 MLJ 333 High Court. (Singapore). 
317 
 
6.5.5 Loss of Consortium  
Similar to the award for loss of service above, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act also have no provision pertaining to the 
abolishment of the award for loss of consortium. However, it should be noted that the 
absence of provision abolishing the award for loss of consortium have no effect onto 
the law on fatal accident claims in either Singapore or Brunei. Since this head of 
damages had never been recognized under the Common Law, and it was never 
statutorily recognized in the CLA (43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries 
Act, the courts in these countries are not in the habit of allowing damages under this 
heading in fatal accident claims. 
 
 
 
6.6 PROVISIONAL DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING 
Another interesting feature of the law governing the assessment of damages for 
personal injury and fatal accident claims in Singapore and Brunei is the discretionary 
power granted to the judge to award provisional damages for pain and suffering and 
loss of amenities in personal injury claims. This award is awarded in situations where 
plaintiff can prove that his injury, physical or mental disabilities is expected to get 
worse in the future although at unspecified date.
200
 The discretionary power to award 
provisional damages is a departure from the traditional lump sum once and for all 
approach in assessing damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities. The court 
will assess the value of plaintiff’s injury as it stands at the time of the trial,  and at the 
                                                 
200 There is nothing to indicate that provisional damages can be awarded in fatal accident claims. 
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same time order that plaintiff to be allowed to come back to court should the his injury 
or disabilities gets worse in the future. 
 
In Brunei, this power is provided in by section 21(1) and (2) of the Fatal Accidents and 
Personal Injuries Act. The section reads: 
 
(1) This section applies to an action for damages for personal injuries in 
which there is prove or admitted to be a chance that at some definite 
time in the future the injured person will, as a result of the act or 
omission which gave rise to the cause of action, develop some serious 
disease or suffer some serious deterioration in his physical or 
mental condition. 
(2) Subject to subsection (4) of this section, as regards any action for 
damages to which the section applies in which a judgment is given in 
the High Court, provision may be made by rules of court for enabling 
the court, in such circumstances as may be prescribed, to award the 
injured person - 
(a) damages assessed on the assumption that the injured person 
will not develop the disease or suffer the deterioration in his 
condition; and 
(b) further damages at a future date if he develops the disease 
or suffers the deterioration. 
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In Singapore, the discretionary power to award provisional damages is granted to the 
High Courts by paragraph 16 of the First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature 
Act (cap 322).
201
 The para reads:  
Power to award in any action for damages for personal injuries, 
provisional damages assessed on the assumption that a contingency will 
not happen and further damages at a future date if the contingency 
happens. 
The Subordinate Courts in Singapore on the other hand are granted such power by 
section 32 and 52 of the Subordinate Courts Act (cap 321). Section 32 reads: 
A District Judge shall have power in any civil proceeding pending in a 
District Court to make any order or to exercise any authority or 
jurisdiction which, if it related to a proceeding pending in the High Court, 
might be made or exercised by a Judge of the High Court in chambers. 
 
Section 52 of the Act states: 
Subject to subsection (1A), a Magistrate’s Court shall have all the 
jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and try any action in personam 
where - 
(a) the defendant is served with a writ of summons or any other 
originating process — 
(i) in Singapore in the manner prescribed by Rules of 
Court; or 
(ii) outside Singapore in the circumstances authorised by 
and in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court; or 
                                                 
201 Tan, How Teck, “The Gourley Principle and The Income Tax Element in Awards of Damages: Some Tax Aspects in 
Singapore”, 17 issue 1 (2007) Revenue Law Journal, at 9. 
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(b) the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate’s 
Court.
202
 
 
Such power is not available to the Malaysian judges. Damages for personal injury and 
fatal accident claims in Malaysia are awarded once and for all. As such, judges have to 
assess the damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities based on plaintiff 
condition at the time of trial.  
 
However, despite the power granted by the above provisions, there are very few cases 
in which this award is allowed in either Brunei or Singapore. To the researcher’s 
knowledge, there is no reported case which involves provisional damages in Brunei. 
While in Singapore, there are only two (2) reported cases thus far where the courts find 
it suitable to award order for provisional damages; ACD (by her next of friend B) v See 
Mun Li
203
 and Koh Chai Kwang v Teo Ai Ling (by her next friend, Chua Wee Bee)
204
 
The application of the provision in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (cap 322) 
(2007 Rev Ed) is still uncertain and calls for further clarification.
205
  
 
 
 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
The laws on personal injury and fatal accident claims in Singapore and Brunei are still 
relatively similar to the law applicable in England. Although the 1987 and 1991 
                                                 
202 The above power is further regulated by Order 37 Rule 8 of the Rule of Court (cap 322) (2006 rev Ed).  
203 [2009] SGHC 217. (Singapore). 
204 [2011] SGCA 23. 
205 See discussion by Fordham, Margaret, “Providing for Contingencies – the Award of Provisional Damages in Singapore”, [Nov 
2011] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 250 -259. 
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statutory revamp to the laws on personal injury and fatal accident claims in both 
countries had altered many facets of the laws, the changes brought by the statutory 
amendments are not as extensive as the ones introduced by the CLAA 1984 in 
Malaysia. The amendments merely amended the provisions in the old laws to be more 
in line with the provisions in the AJA 1982. Therefore, the English Common Law 
principles are still extensive applied in the assessment of damages for personal injury 
and fatal accident claims in Singapore and Brunei. 
 
Compared to the situation in Malaysia, the application of judicial discretion is still an 
integral part of the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims 
in Singapore and Brunei. Other than abolishing the award for loss of earnings in lost 
years and loss of expectation of life, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and 
Personal Injuries Act only regulate the assessment of damages for loss of support and 
bereavement. Other heads of damages are not statutorily regulated. The assessment of 
which are still left in the hands of presiding judges guided by the Common Law 
principles and decided local cases. Even in respect of the assessment of damages for 
loss of support, judicial discretion still plays an important role in calculating the 
multiplier and multiplicand. The only head of damages in which judges have no 
discretion over is the award for bereavement.  
 
As seen above, the application of judicial discretion in the assessment of damages 
allows judges to adjust the amount of damages to suit the plaintiff. As such, the amount 
awarded is realistic and suitable to the circumstances. Nevertheless, in order to arrive at 
a figure which is reasonable to compensate the loss suffered by the plaintiff, a myriad of 
considerations need to be factored in into the assessment. This makes the whole process 
of assessing damages for personal injuries and fatal claims arising out of motor vehicle 
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accidents in Singapore and Brunei more tedious and time consuming if compared to 
Malaysia. Furthermore, the extensive use of judge’s personal reasoning in the 
assessment of damages also makes the amount of damages being awarded uncertain and 
speculative. 
 
 
 
 
6.8 COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THE LAW ON PERSONAL 
INJURY AND FATAL ACCIDENT CLAIMS IN MALAYSIA, 
SINGAPORE AND BRUNEI 
 
HEADS OF 
DAMAGES 
 
 
EFFECTS 
 
MALAYSIA 
 
 
SINGAPORE 
 
BRUNEI 
  
 
 
Civil Law Act 
1956 (Act 67) 
Civil Law Act, 
(Cap 43) 
Fatal 
Accidents and 
Personal 
Injuries Act 
(Cap 160) 
 
 
Personal 
Injury Claims 
Abolition of the award for  
loss of expectation of life 
for living plaintiff 
 
s. 28A (2)(a)  
s. 28A (2)(b) 
s. 11 (1) s. 12 
The cause of action for 
loss of future earnings 
 
 
i. Pre- conditions in the 
assessment of award  
 
 
ii. Future increases in 
earning not to be 
considered  
 
s. 28A (2)(c) - - 
s. 28A(2)(c)(i) - - 
s. 28A(2)(c)(ii) - - 
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iii. Deduction for living 
expenses in the 
assessment of 
multiplicand 
 
 
iv. Compensation benefits 
from other 
compensation funds not 
taken into consideration 
 
 
v. Fixed multiplier 
 
s. 28A(2)(c)(iii) - - 
s. 28A(1) - - 
s. 28A (2)(d) - - 
Abolition of the award for 
loss of pre-trial earnings 
 
s. 28A (2)(d)  - - 
The assessment of 
damages for loss of future 
earning capacity 
 
(plaintiff must be 
earning income 
at the time of 
injury) 
 
 
 
-` - 
Estate Claims 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cause of action for estate 
claims 
 
s. 8  s. 10  s. 11  
Abolition of the award for 
loss earnings in lost years 
 
s. 8 (2)(a) s. 10 (3)(2) s. 11 (3)(a)(ii) 
Abolition of the award for 
loss of expectation of life 
for estate claim 
 
s. 8 (2)(a) s. 11 (1) s. 12 
Claims for 
Loss of 
Support 
The cause of action for 
loss of support 
 
 
Measure of damages 
 
 
 
i. Pre- conditions in the 
assessment of award  
 
 
ii. Future increases in 
earning not to be 
considered  
 
s. 7 
 
s. 20 
 
 
s. 3 
 
s.7 (3)  
loss of support  
 
s. 22 (1) 
loss resulting 
from death 
s. 6 (1) 
loss resulting 
from death 
 
s. 7 (3) - 
 
- 
s. 7 (3)(iv)(b) - - 
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iii. Deduction for living 
expenses in the 
assessment of 
multiplicand 
 
 
iv. Compensation benefits 
from other 
compensation funds not 
taken into consideration 
 
 
v. Fixed multiplier 
 
 
vi. Defining dependant 
 
 
 
 
vii. Consideration for 
Remarriage or prospect of 
remarriage 
 
s. 7 (3)(iv)(c) - - 
s. 7 (3)(i) s. 22 (1) s. 7 
s. 7 (3)(iv)(d) - - 
s. 7 (2) 
s. 7 (11) 
 
s. 20 (8) 
s. 20 (8) 
s. 22 (3A) 
(Wider)  
 
s. 3 (2) 
s. 3 (3) 
s. 3 (3) 
(Wider) 
-  s. 22 (3) s. 6 (3) 
Bereavement The cause of action for 
bereavement 
 
s. 7 (3A) s. 21(1) s. 4(1) 
i. Person entitled to claim 
for Bereavement 
 
 
ii. Amount awarded 
s. 7 (3B) s. 21 (2) 
(Wider) 
 
s. 4 (2) 
s. 7 (3A) 
 
s. 21 (4) 
(Revised) 
 
s. 4 (3) 
 
Claim for Loss 
of Service of 
Child and 
Wife 
 
Abolition of award for 
Loss of Service of child 
and wife 
s. 7 (3)(iii) - - 
Claim for Loss 
of Consortium 
of Wife 
 
Abolition of award for loss 
of consortium of wife 
under fatal claims 
 
s. 7 (3)(iii) - - 
Provisional 
Damages 
 
 
 
 
- - s. 21 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 RECAPITULATION 
It is accepted that the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident 
claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents in Malaysia is not totally dependant on 
the Common Law principles. The Malaysian Legislature has developed our own rules 
to govern the assessment of damages under this type of claim via the Civil Law Act 
1956.
1
 The CLA 1956 is supplemented by the Common Law principles and decided 
cases in situations where there is a lacuna in the provisions of the Act. Judges’ 
discretion also plays an integral part in the assessment of damages. Since the 
assessment process involves the consideration of multitude of elements which form the 
basis of the award, judges’ discretion is necessary in order to ensure that the damages 
and interest awarded reasonably commensurate the loss suffered by plaintiff and 
bearable by the defendant (or in actuality the insurance company insuring the vehicle at 
fault) while at the same time adhering to the letters of the law. 
 
In Malaysia, judges’ discretionary power in assessing damages for personal injury and 
fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents was initially regulated by 
the Civil Law Act 1956 (rev 1972).
2
  The introduction of the Civil Law (Amendment) 
                                                 
1
 (Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1956”. 
2 (Act 67). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA 1956 (rev 1972)”. The Act replaced the Civil Law Enactment of 1937(F.M.S no 3 of 
1937)  and the Civil Law Ordinance 1956 (F. of M. No 5 of 1956). 
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Act 1975
3
 and the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1984
4
 which amended the CLA 1956 
(rev 1972) had altered many facets of the law on the assessment of damages for 
personal injury and fatal accidents claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. The 
current provisions on the assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident 
claims in the CLA 1956 are unique. They contain several elements which are 
distinctively ours and not parallel to the provisions in any other statute relating to the 
assessment of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims elsewhere.   
 
The changes to the law and practices brought by the CLAA 1984 are so immense that 
the current provisions in the CLA 1956 has been castigated as an attempt by the 
Legislature to restrain or fetter judicial discretion in the assessment of damages. This is 
due to the fact that the provisions in sections 7, 8, and 28A of the CLA 1956 abolish 
several Common Law heads of damages, impose pre-conditions before damages can be 
awarded, specify precise methods of assessment as well as introduce and regulate a 
new head of damages. Due to the strict regulatory nature of the sections, the 
discretionary power of the judges in assessing damages for personal injury and fatal 
accident claims and the quantum of damages is somewhat effected.  Similarly, the 
quantum of damages being awarded under this type of claims is also affected.   
 
The assessment of interest on damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims 
arising out motor vehicle accidents is also generally at the discretion of the judges. 
This discretion is granted by section 11 of the CLA 1956, the Courts of Judicature Act 
1964,
5
 the Subordinate Courts Act 1948
6
 and the Subordinate Courts Rules Act 1955.
7
 
                                                 
3 (Act A 308). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLAA 1975”. The amendments were consolidated into the CLA 1956 (rev 1972). 
4 (Act A 602). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLAA 1984”. The amendments were consolidated into the CLA 1956 (rev 1972) 
forming the current CLA 1956. 
5 (Act 91). Hereinafter referred to as the “the CJA 1964”. 
6 (Act 92). Hereinafter referred to as the “the SCA 1948”. 
7 (Act 55). Hereinafter referred to as the “the SCRA 1955”.  
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However, the Rules of High Court 1980,
8
 the Subordinate Court Rules 1980
9
 and later 
the Rules of Courts 2012
10
 have to some extent restricted the discretion of the judges 
by providing specific provisions regulating the assessment and the award of interest on 
damages. These provisions have also led to some issues, all of which are inter-related 
with judges’ discretionary power. 
 
The findings of this research show that the criticism leveled at the CLA 1956 by many 
writers
11
 are not without basis. The discretionary power of the judges in assessing 
certain head of damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents has indeed been abolished by the provisions in sections 7, 8 
and 28A of the CLA 1956. The abolition however does not extend to all heads of 
damages available this type of claims. Sections 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956 still 
allow judges to apply their discretion in assessing the majority of the heads of 
damages. Some of the provisions in the sections allow judges to exercise their 
discretion as it was before the introduction of the CLAA 1984 while others allow 
judges to exercise their discretion but with minimal statutory regulation. Similarly, the 
effects of sections 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956 in reducing the quantum of damages 
for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents are 
also mixed. Some provisions result in major reduction of the quantum while others 
produce minimal reduction or no reduction at all.  Therefore, it is concluded that the 
application of the provisions in the CLA 1956 has led to mixed results on discretionary 
power of the judges in the assessment of damages and quantum of damages being 
awarded by the courts in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents.  
                                                 
8 [PU (A) 50/1980]. Hereinafter referred to as “the RHC 1980 (repealed)”. Repealed and substituted with the Rules of Courts 2012. 
Governed the civil procedures in the High Court. 
9 [PU (A) 328/1980]. Hereinafter referred to as “the SCR 1980 (repealed)”. Repealed and substituted with the Rules of Courts 
2012. Governed the civil procedures in the Subordinate Courts. 
10 [PU(A)205/2012]. Hereafter referred to as “the Rules of Court 2012”.  
11 Supra, at 5 – 6. 
322 
 
The research also finds that the discretionary power of the judges in assessing and 
awarding interest for damages personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents is still intact. The discretionary power accorded by the CLA 
1956, CJA 1964, SCA 1948 and SCRA 1955 has not been abolished by any statutory 
provision or court’s rules.  Judges generally still have the discretion to decide whether 
interest is to be awarded, at what rate, on which part of damages and within which 
period.  
 
The followings are the summary of the analysis on the effects of the statutory 
provisions on judicial discretion and quantum of damages in personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. 
 
7.1.1 Effects of sections 7, 8, 11 and 28A of the CLA 1956 on Judicial Discretion 
From the discussion in Chapters three (3), four (4) and five (5), it is observed that the 
effects of sections 7, 8, 11 and 28A of the CLA 1956 on the exercise of judicial 
discretion in the assessment of damages and interest in personal injury and fatal 
accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents can be categorized into four (4) 
main categories; total abolition of the discretionary power, maintaining the 
discretionary power, maintaining the discretionary power but with restrictions and 
finally, mere codification of existing practice.  
 
This research observes that section 7 and 8 of the CLA 1956 have totally abolished the 
power of judges to exercise their discretion the assessment of damages for the awards 
for loss of consortium of wife, loss of services of child and wife, loss of expectation of 
life under fatal accident claims and loss of earnings in lost years. Since these heads of 
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damages were totally abolished by the CLA 1956, the discretionary power of the judges 
to assess and award damages for these heads of damages is also abolished. The award 
for bereavement is another area in which judges’ have no discretion over. This head of 
damages was introduced complete with specific provisions regulating the quantum of 
damages to be awarded, the beneficiaries to the award as well as how the damages is to 
be divided among the beneficiaries. As such there is not much room left for judges to 
exercise the discretion in assessing damages for bereavement.
12
 The abolition of 
judges’ discretionary power in the assessment of damages for loss of services of child 
and wife however is not absolute. Although judges can no longer award damages under 
these headings, they still have the discretion to assess and award damages to 
compensate the plaintiff for the expenses incurred to replace the loss of services 
provided by the child or wife. As such, if plaintiffs can prove that they suffered 
monetary loss in order to replace the services which their child or wife, judges still 
assess and award damages to compensate the loss. The damages however will not be 
itemized as damages for loss of service of child or wife, but damages for hiring maid, 
helper, babysitter etc.  
 
The research also perceives that apart from the five (5) heads of damages mentioned 
above, the CLA 1956 does not take away the discretionary power of the judges in 
assessing damages for the other heads of damages. The assessment of damages is still 
arguably
13
 discretionary. In fact, judges still maintain their discretion in the assessment 
of damages for loss of future earning capacity and loss of expectation of life for living 
plaintiff as it was prior to the CLA 1956. The assessment of these heads of damages is 
in the hands of the presiding judges based on the facts of the case and guided by the 
                                                 
12 However, the absence of specific interpretation of the term ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ allow a small amount of leeway in which judges 
may exercise their discretion in interpreting the same. 
13
 Arguable since the discretionary power of the judges although still applicable, it is regulated by the provisions in section 7, 8, 
and 28A of the CLA 1956. 
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Common Law principles and decided cases. There is nothing in section 28A of the 
CLA 956 which provides for the award for loss of future earning capacity. Although 
there is a pre-condition that judges can only award damages for loss of future earning 
capacity to plaintiff who was earning income at the time of injury, this pre-condition is 
not imposed by the CLA 1956. Section 28A (2)(c) of the CLA 1956 did not incorporate 
the award for loss of future earning capacity into the parameters of the section. It was 
the judges themselves who chose to widen the scope of the section to include the award 
for loss of future earning capacity and adopt the pre-condition of earning income at the 
time of injury as the pre-condition for the award.  
 
Similarly, the assessment of damages for loss of expectation of life in personal injury 
claims is also discretionary. Judges are only prohibited by section 28A (2)(a) of the 
CLA 1956 from awarding the award as a separate head. Judges still have the discretion 
to award damages for loss of expectation of life as part of damages for pain and 
suffering. Similarly, section 28A (2)(b) of the CLA 1956 also calls for judges’ 
discretion. The section did not specify how plaintiff’s suffering due the awareness that 
his expectation of life has been reduced is to be assessed. It also did not indicate how 
the plaintiff’s suffering is to be taken into account in the assessment of damages for 
pain and suffering. Judges have the discretion to assess the loss as they deem fit based 
on the facts of the case guided by the Common Law principle and decided cases. 
 
However, with regard to the assessment of interest for damages, damages for loss of 
support, damages for loss of future earnings and damages for loss of pre-trial earnings, 
the research found that the discretionary power of the judges is still intact. The 
discretionary power however is somewhat regulated by the provisions in the CLA 
1956. In Chapter Five (5), it was observed that although section 11 of the CLA 1956 
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allows judges the discretion in determining whether interest is to be allowed, at which 
period of time, at which part of the award and at what rate, the discretion is regulated 
by the three (3) provisos in the section and confined only to the award for pre-judgment 
interest only. It cannot be extended to post-judgment interest, interest for contractual 
debt and interest for damages recoverable for bill of exchange which had been 
dishonoured. Judges also have the discretion to award compounded interest. Contrary 
to common interpretation, proviso (a) to section 11 of the CLA 1956 did not take away 
judges’ discretion in awarding compounded interest. It only prohibits judges from using 
the section as the authority to allow compounded interest.  
 
Judges’ discretion in assessing damages for loss of support and loss of future earnings 
has also been regulated by the CLA 1956. The discussions in Chapters three (3) and 
four (4) showed that the CLA 1956 had introduced several provisions which have 
mandatory effect. Sections 7 and 28A of the CLA 1956 laid down the pre-condition to 
the awards for loss of support and loss of pre-trial earnings, the methods for the 
assessment of multiplier and multiplicand, the items to be considered and ignored in the 
assessment of multiplicand as well as the beneficiaries to the awards.
14
 As such, 
although judges have the discretion to assess the damages based on the fact of the case, 
the assessment must be based on the provisions in the sections. Nevertheless, there 
were many attempts made by the courts and legal scholars over the years to depart from 
following the strict letter of the provisions and revert back to the practice of using the 
judges’ discretion. These attempts have been made possible due to several vague and 
ambiguous wordings in the provisions which allow for disparity in interpretation.  
 
                                                 
14 Sections 7(2) and 7(11) of the CLA 1956 provide the beneficiaries to the award for loss of support. 
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Chapter three (3) concluded that the assessment of damages for loss of pre-trial 
earnings also falls within the third category. Despite some opinions which state that this 
head of damages has been abolished by section 28A (2)(d) of the CLA 1956, there is 
nothing in the section which clearly states the same. Judges still have the discretion to 
assess and award damages for loss of pre-trial earnings provided that the multiplier for 
the loss is assess out of the multiplier assessed for loss of future earnings. If there is no 
loss of future earnings awarded, the assessment of the multiplier must be assessed 
based on the actual period of incapacity where plaintiff was not able to earn his pre-trial 
income. 
 
Finally, the research also finds that the provisions in provisos (i) and (iv)(c) to section 
7, sections 28A (1) section and 28A92)(c)(iii) of the CLA 1956 which provide lists of 
benefits not to be taken into consideration in the assessment of multiplicand for loss of 
support and loss of future earnings as well the deduction for living expenses fall within 
the fourth category. The provisions are mere codification of existing practices. Judges, 
even without the provision have been taking these factors into consideration assessing 
damages for loss of support and loss of future earnings. 
  
7.1.2 Effects of sections 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956 on the Quantum of damages 
Based on the discussion in Chapters Three (3) and Four (4), the research observes that 
sections 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956 also furnish mixed results in respect of the 
amount of damages being awarded under personal injury and fatal accident claims 
arising out of motor vehicle accidents. The provisions in the sections which abolished 
the award for loss of earning in lost years, regulate the assessment of damages for loss 
of support and loss of future earnings by introducing the pre-conditions of earning 
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income before the injury or death and below the age of fifty five (55) years old, 
imposing fixed multiplier and prohibiting judges from taking into account future 
increases in earnings in the assessment of multiplicand have greatly reduced the 
quantum of damages being awarded. Other than the effects stated above, the provisions 
in sections 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956 did not cause significant effect in reducing 
the quantum of damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents. 
 
7.1.3 Analysis of the Provisions on Assessment of Damages in Singapore and 
Brunei 
Singapore’s Civil Law Act15 and Brunei’s Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act16  
retain much of the Common Law methods in the assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. The 1984 and 
1991 statutory revamps of the laws in Singapore and Brunei did not result in many 
changes in respect of the judges’ discretion. The assessment of damages for personal 
injury and fatal accident claims in Singapore and Brunei is still largely depending on 
the discretion of the presiding judges based on the facts of the case and guided by the 
Common Law principles and decided cases. The only significant changes brought by 
the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act on the assessment 
of damages are the abolition of the award for loss of expectation of life and the award 
for loss of earnings in lost years as well as the introduction of the award for 
bereavement.  
 
                                                 
15 (cap 43). Hereinafter referred to as “the CLA (cap 43)”.  
16 (cap 160). Hereinafter referred to as “the Fatal Accident and Personal Injuries Act”. 
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It is observed in Chapter Six (6) that the provisions in CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act in Singapore and Brunei have the advantage of 
being flexible and amendable to suit the circumstance or matrix of each case, the 
claimants and the changing social and economic circumstances. By leaving the 
assessment of damages at the discretion of the presiding judges guided by minimal 
statutory regulation, the Common Law principles and decided case, the assessment of 
damages for personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle 
accidents can be tailor-made to suit the circumstances of each case.  
 
The absence of specific statutory provisions regulating certain aspects of the 
assessment of damages, however, sometimes leads to difficulties and complications. 
Since the method of assessing the damages is not built into the CLA (cap 43) and the 
Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act, judges have to make an estimation of the 
damages based on variety of factors. This requires more judicial time and effort.  The 
absence of specific provisions in the Acts also results in variations and fluctuations in 
the assessment of damages.   
  
Compared to the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act, the 
CLA 1956, on the other hand, has indeed altered many aspects of the law relating to the 
assessment of damages and interest in personal injury and fatal accident claims arising 
out of motor vehicle accidents in Malaysia. Although the provisions in sections 7, 8, 11 
and 28A of the CLA 1956 have regulated or in some cases abolished the discretionary 
power of the judges in assessing several heads of damages, these provisions have to 
some extend accorded some degree of certainty and consistency in the assessment. This 
benefits not only the judges but also the plaintiffs and the insurance industry. Although 
the application of the provisions in the CLA 1956 sometimes leads to plaintiffs not 
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getting full compensation for the loss suffered, this drawback have some extend be 
tolerated in view of the need to provide a fair compensation scheme to both the plaintiff 
and the insurance industry. Motor vehicle insurance should not be perceived the same 
way as personal or life insurance. It is merely a scheme to ensure that victims of motor 
vehicle accidents can be compensated for the loss of suffered due to the accident. It 
balances the interest of both the plaintiffs and the insurance industry since the effect of 
the claim pay-out will affect the public by way of possible increase in motor insurance 
premium. 
 
 
 
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Having analysed the effects of the provisions in the CLA 1956 on judicial discretion in 
the assessment of damages and interest in personal injury and fatal accident claims 
arising out of motor vehicle accidents in Malaysia and comparing them with the 
corresponding provisions in Singapore and Brunei, it is apparent that some aspects of 
the provisions in the CLA 1956 need to be reviewed. The revision is necessary in order 
to solve the problems arising from the current provisions and hopefully improve the 
effectiveness of those provisions. Some of the recommendations will affect the use of 
judicial discretion in the assessment of damages.  
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7.2.1 Revising the Pre-Condition that Plaintiff or Deceased Must Be Below the Age 
of Fifty Five (55) Years Old 
It is suggested that proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) and section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 
1956 relating to the pre-condition that the deceased in the claim for loss of support and 
the plaintiff in the claim for loss of future earnings must be below the age of fifty five 
(55) years old before the award for loss of support and loss of future earnings can be 
awarded need to be revised. The current provisions in proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) 
and section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 limit the award for loss of support and loss 
of future earnings only  to the dependant of a deceased and to a plaintiff who have yet 
to reached the age of fifty five (55) years old at the time of demise or injury. By virtue 
of the pre-conditions in the sections, while a person is generally allowed to work 
beyond the age of fifty five (55), his dependants  will not compensated for the loss of 
support once he (the deceased) have reached the age of fifty five. Similarly, a person 
who has reached the age of fifty five (55) will not be compensated for the loss of his 
future earnings even if he was still working at the time of injury.  
 
While fifty five (55) years old is probably a reasonable retirement age when the 
provisions were introduced in 1984, they however are ‘draconian’17 or arbitrary at 
present. A revision to proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) and section 28A(2)(c)(i) of the 
CLA 1956 is essential to enable the CLA 1956 to catch-up with the current trends in 
the national retirement age. The retirement age of the Malaysian civil servants had been 
adjusted from fifty five (55) to fifty six (56)
18
 in 2001 and later revised to fifty eight 
(58) in 2008.
19
 It was further revised to sixty (60) years old in 2012.
20
 The maximum 
                                                 
17 Dass, K.S., Quantum of Damages in Personal Injury, Parliament v Common Law, A critical Examination of the 1984 
Amendment to the Civil Law Act 1956, (Kuala Lumpur: Legal Circle Book Sdn. Bhd, 1997), at 93.  
18 Section 12 (3B) of the Pension Act 1980 (Act 227). See also Pekeliling Perkhidmatan Bilangan 3 Tahun 2001. Effective only 
with regard to civil servant appointed on or after 1st October 2001. 
19This was declared by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 10th May 2008. See New Straits Times, 11th May 2008.  See also 
Pekeliling Perkhidmatan Bilangan 6 Tahun 2008. Effective only with regard to civil servant appointed on or after 1st July 2008. 
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retirement age in the private sector has also been revised to sixty (60) years old in 
2012.
21
  
 
A revision in the maximum working age in proviso (iv)(a) to section 7(3) and section 
28A(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 is also necessary to cater for situations where the 
deceased or the plaintiff were engaged in a type of employment where age is 
immaterial, if they were self-employed or if they were working on contract basis after 
retirement. The rise in the national life expectancy and employment age, the current 
employment market
22
 and the advancement in medical science
23
 have caused many 
people to work beyond the age of fifty five (55) years old. The present trend in delaying 
marriage in favour of pursuing higher education
24
 and career development also 
increases the possibility that a person could still be working and supporting his family 
at an advanced age. In these circumstances, setting or fixing fifty five (55) years old as 
the maximum age for the award for loss of support and loss of future earnings would be 
unjust especially when the deceased or the plaintiff was still gainfully employed 
beyond that age.  
 
While it is understandable that the introduction of the pre-condition that the deceased or 
the plaintiff must be below the age of fifty five (55) by the CLAA 1984 was necessary 
in order to prevent judges from awarding damages for loss of support or loss of future 
earnings to the dependants of a deceased or plaintiff who was not working at the time 
of accident, it creates a dilemma to the dependants of a deceased or plaintiff who were 
actually working albeit being over fifty five (55) years old. To continue applying the 
                                                                                                                                              
20 Under the New Civil Servant Scheme (SSM). See Pekeliling Perkhidmatan Bilangan 11 Tahun 2011. Effective only with regard 
to civil servant appointed after 2012. 
21 Section 4 of the Minimum Retirement Age Act 2012 (Act 753). The Act was gazetted on 16 August 2012. 
22 The working age population (15 to 64 years) increased from 62.8 per cent in year 2000 to 67.3 per cent in 2010. 
23 The Malaysian Department of Statistic forecast that Malaysian men are expected to live up to 71.9 year of age while women will 
live up to 77 years 
24Pinvader, “LPPKN Pandang SeriusTrenWanitaLambatKahwin”, Utusan Malaysia, 23 May 2011, Utusan Malaysia Online, 23 
May 2011, 28 Disember 2011, <http://www.utusan-malaysia-online.com/lppkn-pandang-serius-trend-wanita-lewat-kahwin> 
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pre-condition at a time when more and more people are working beyond fifty five (55) 
years old would be detrimental to their financial wellbeing. Even countries such as the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America where old age pensions and 
unemployment benefits are provided still adopt higher retirement age.
25
  
 
On this point, it should be noted that by looking at the development in the employment 
market nowadays, it is fair to say that more and more people are working beyond their 
retirement age.
26
 This is not only due to financial demand, but also due to the fact that 
there is greater appreciation for the talent and skills people over the age of fifty five 
(55) can offer. The test employed by Chang Min Tat FJ in Murtadza bin Mohamed 
Hassan v Chong Swee Pian
27
 is a good illustration to show that retirement age is 
governed by the nature of the profession. With life expectancy rising over the recent 
decades due to much improved quality of life, medical breakthrough and health 
awareness, it is unrealistic to consider Malaysians over the age of fifty five (55) to be 
past their prime and unable to engage in gainful employment. It is, therefore, submitted 
that the injustice and financial burden borne by the dependants or the plaintiffs due to 
the application of this pre-condition far outweighs the mischief the Legislature wanted 
to rectify. If the pre-condition must remain, the maximum age should be amended to 
follow the changes in the current general retirement age and the development in the 
employment market.  
 
                                                 
25Reiss, Seth M., “Quantum for Future Loss in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Cases After the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 
1984”, (1985), 2 Malayan Law Journal lxii – lxxi, at lxv. In Gilbertson v Harland and Wolf Ltd (1966) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 190. It was 
decided that a 70 years old victim is likely to continue working until the age of 75 years old. See also Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving 
Co Ltd (1959) 2 All ER 745. 
26Also see comments made in Parliamentary Debates, Representative, Sixth Parliament, Second Session, 19 July 1984, at 3326 -
3337 and Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Sixth Parliament, Second Session, 3rd August 1984, at 138 -152 where the members of the 
Parliament had voiced their discontentment with the proposed Bill. 
27 [1980] 1 MLJ 216. 
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It has also been suggested by several writers that the age limit is to be removed 
altogether.
28
 It would allow judges to have the discretion in assessing damages for loss 
of support and loss of future earnings in cases involving the dependant of a deceased or 
plaintiffs who have reached the age of fifty five (55) years old. Where there is sufficient 
evidence to show that the deceased or the plaintiffs were working at the time of 
accident, the award for loss of support or loss of future earning can be awarded 
irrespective of their age at the time of demise or injury. This proposition, however, 
would open up the possibility that while the dependants of a deceased or plaintiffs who 
were fifty-four (54) years old at the time of demise or injury have to be contend with a 
maximum multiplier of six (6) months,
29
 the dependants of a deceased or plaintiffs who 
have reached the age of fifty five (55) may receive longer multiplier based on judge’s 
discretion. Abolishing the maximum retirement age will cause injustice to the 
dependants of a deceased or plaintiffs who have to follow the statutory multiplier. As 
such, a total revamp of the statutory multiplier is required should the maximum 
retirement age is to be abolished. The proposal to remove the maximum retirement age 
must be treaded carefully as it will open the possibility of speculation and varying 
awards
30
 in respect of dependants of a deceased or plaintiffs who was fifty five (55) 
year old at the time of demise or injury.  It also will cause injustice to the dependants of 
a deceased or plaintiffs who were below the age of fifty five (55) years old if the 
statutory multiplier is maintained as it is. 
 
                                                 
28See suggestions by  Dass, K.S., op. cit., (1997), Balan, P. “Loss of Future Earnings, Loss of Earning Capacity and the Civil  Law 
(Amendment) Act, 1984”, 17 (1990) Journal of Malaysian Comparative Law, 169 – 180, Bar Council Malaysia, “Civil Law 
(Amendment) Act 1984”, (1984) 2 Current Law Journal, 209 – 216 and Etican Ramasamy, “Difficulties Suffered by Accident 
Victims”, (2000) INSAF, 35-51. 
29 The assessment of multiplier for deceased or plaintiff who have reached fifty four (54) years old under sections 7(3)(d) and 
28A(2) (d) of the CLA 1956 is fifty five (55) minus fifty four (54) and divided with two (2).  
30 Since the assessment of multiplier is not regulated by any provision and left at the discretion of the judges. 
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7.2.2 Revising the Maximum Age in the Assessment of Multiplier 
Should the pre-condition of below the age of fifty five (55) be revised, the maximum 
age of fifty five (55) years old in the multiplier provided by proviso (iv)(d) in section 
7(3) and section 28A (2) (d)(ii) of the CLA 1956 for the assessment of damages for loss 
of support and loss of future earnings must also be similarly revised. The reason 
applicable in respect of revising the pre-condition in para 7.2.1 above is also applicable 
to this matter mutatis mutandis. If the maximum age in the pre-condition is revised, the 
maximum age in the assessment of multiplier should also be revised to correspond with 
the revised age in the pre-condition. For example, if the pre-condition age is revised to 
sixty (60) years old, the assessment of multiplier for the person or deceased who had 
passed the age of thirty years old must also be sixty (60) minus the age at the date of 
accident or demise and divide by two (2).  
 
7.2.3 Revising the Fixed Multiplier 
From the discussions in Chapters Three (3) and Four (4), it has been observed that the 
statutory multiplier is flawed in many aspects. It fails to take into consideration the 
many factors which may affect the length of time in which the plaintiff should be 
compensated for their loss. It is also stagnant and not flexible to suit the facts of the 
case as well as the changes in the society. Further, the multiplier does not differentiate 
the classes of dependants claiming for the damages. This leads to injustice to the 
claimants. In addition, the provisions in proviso (iv)(d) in section 7(3) and section 28A 
(2) (d)(ii) of the CLA 1956 multiplier is also vague and does not properly reflect the 
real intention of the Legislature. As such, in order to address these defects, the 
followings proposals are suggested: 
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(a) Amending proviso (iv) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 to better reflect the 
compulsory nature of the statutory multiplier 
It is suggested that the wording in proviso (iv) to section 7(3) of the CLA 1956 needs to 
be amended. The current provisions do not sufficiently convey the compulsory nature 
of the provision. Instead of specifically stating that the multiplier in para (d) is to be 
used for loss of support, proviso (iv) states that para (d) is to be used in assessing the 
multiplier for loss of earning. The use of the term ‘loss of earning’ in proviso (iv) 
seems to be deliberate since it is not used in other part of section 7. Therefore, it opens 
up the possibility the proviso being read as only making the multiplier compulsory only 
in respect of assessing the multiplier for deceased’s earnings and not for assessing the 
multiplier for loss support.  
 
As such, it is suggested that the wording in proviso (iv)(d) to section 7(3) of the CLA  
1956 should be amended from “in assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any 
period after the death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the 
damages under this section” to “in assessing the loss of support,”. The intention of the 
Legislature to confine the application of proviso (iv) to section 7(3) of the CLA 19546 
will be conveyed clearly. It will also better reflect the compulsory nature of the 
statutory multiplier in the assessment of multiplier for loss of support. 
 
(b) Differentiating the multiplier for different types of dependants 
The findings in Chapter Four (4) show that section 7(3)(iv) of the CLA 1956 
sometimes causes injustice to the different classes of dependants. Since the multiplier 
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did not differentiate the different classes of dependants,
31
 there are times when the 
application of the multiplier results in under or over compensation to the dependants. 
For example, in situations involving claims by the parents of an unmarried deceased 
and claims by wife of young children where the deceases were of the same age, the 
multiplier for loss of support in both cases will be similar despite the possible 
difference in the length of dependency period
32
 and the possibility that an unmarried 
child would cease providing for his parent or at least reduce his contribution after he 
marries.
33
 As such, to accord similar multiplier to the parents and the wife or young 
children would under compensate the wife and children whose dependency would 
normally be about the same as deceased’s working life. It would also be an over 
compensation to the parent.
34
  
 
Similarly, in cases of elderly parents, it is only reasonable to accept that the parents will 
only be supported during their lifetime and not the deceased’s working life. To allow 
sixteen (16) years of multiplier to elderly parents whose deceased child is below thirty 
(30) years old would be excessive considering the parents’ age and possibility of them 
dying and no longer depending on the deceased for long. VT Singham J in Marimuthu 
Velappan v Abdullah Ismail
35
 rightfully pointed out:  
“It is regrettable however that one thing seemed to have not been 
considered or made clear by the amendment and which is not an issue or 
argued in the instant appeal, it is, the advanced age of the 
dependants/parents, like 75 years and above. Did the legislature intend that 
                                                 
31 The multiplier for damages for loss of support suffered by deceased’s wife, child, grandchildren, parents’ of married and 
unmarried deceased as well as grandparent is calculated in the same way. 
32 The length of dependency period for parent is generally not as long as the period for wife and young children.   
33 As observed by Peh Swee Chin SCJ in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233 stated that “it is an undisputable fact 
that the duration of loss of support sustained by parent of unmarried child ordinarily and simply cannot be ever so long as the 
duration of the loss of support sustained by the widow and children.” 
34 Dass, S. Santhana, “Chan Chin Min v. Ibrahim Ismail - the Unsettled Dispute as to Whether the Court Has the Authority to 
Reduce the Statutory Multiplier in Dependency Claim”, (2006) 3 Current Law Journal, i-xliii, at xxiv – xxv. 
35 High Court Malaya, Ipoh [Civil Appeal No: 12-9-05] 
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the 16 years statutory multiplier should still be applied in those 
circumstances? The statutory multiplier does not seemed to have taken 
into considerations or made allowance for this factor on parents’ advanced 
age as the contribution may not continue for 16 years had the deceased 
been alive as this will depend on the health status of the aged parents who 
may be considered under the category of advance age, eg, 75 years and 
above ‘since good health’ is also a relevant consideration in a claim for 
loss of future earnings by a claimant who was injured. The amendment in 
fact, with respect, has become a live issue and resulting in constant 
debates and has caused more uncertainties especially when the legislature 
had decided to take away the discretion given to the courts which no doubt 
would be exercised judicially. 
 
This court is of the considered view that the damages to be awarded for 
dependency actions to parents of an unmarried deceased should have been 
left open to the discretion of the courts. The reason being, the amendment 
on the formula for the multiplier seemed not have taken into consideration 
two factors, the prospect of marriage had the deceased continued to live 
and the chances of the contribution being reduced or diminished and the 
advanced age of the parents who may not live to receive the contribution 
for 16 years.” 
 
Should the parents pass away, the damages for loss of support will go into estate and 
ultimately to deceased’s siblings or other beneficiaries who are not ‘dependant’ as 
defined in section 7(3) of the CLA 1956. As such, not only that the elderly parent is 
overly compensated, the non-dependant would also receive a windfall out of the claim.  
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Therefore, it is the researcher’s suggestion that the multiplier for loss of support must 
not only concern the expected working life of the deceased but also the anticipated 
length of the dependency relationship. The multiplier must stay true to the prefatory 
clause limiting the dependant’ recovery to ‘such as will compensate the party... for any 
loss of support suffered ...”. Thus by implication, the multiplier must also take into 
consideration the length of dependency relationship.
36
 Dependants should not be 
allowed to receive more than what they would have expected to receive from the 
deceased had the deceased did not succumbed to his injuries. As such, it is suggested 
that an amendment section 7(3)(iv) of the CLA 1956 is necessary. The amendment 
however should take the following into consideration: 
(i) In relation to claims for loss of support by parents of unmarried deceased 
Irrespective whether it was the “general system of law”37 or that “para (d) of section 
7(2) is tailor made for only claims by spouse and children,”38 which allow judges to 
differentiate the multiplier for loss of support by parent of unmarried deceased from 
other classes of dependants, the fact remains that the multiplier for loss support by 
parents of unmarried deceased is generally not as long as the multiplier for other 
classes of plaintiffs.
39
 Although the nature of local society does not support the general 
presumption that a child’s contribution to his parent would cease once he marries,40 
the researcher submits that the subsequent marriage of a child may to some extent 
have some effect on his contribution to his parents although not to the point of ceasing 
it altogether. As such, necessary adjustment should be made to the multiplicand and 
                                                 
36 Reiss, Seth M., “Quantum for Future Loss in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Cases After the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 
1984”, (1985), 2 Malayan Law Journal lxii – lxxi, at lxix. 
37Per PehSwee Chin SCJ in Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng, op. cit. 
38Ibid. 
39Even prior to the 1984 amendment, it was generally accepted and practiced that the multiplier in these cases was only seven (7) to 
eight (8) years. 
40See Pang Ah Chee v Cheng Kwee Sang [1985] 1 MLJ 153 where the multiplier for loss of dependency claimed by mother of a 
deceased unmarried son was reduced from 17 to 7 years.  
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multiplier to reflect the period in which the child may have gotten married and his 
contributions to his parents would somehow reduce in view of his additional financial 
obligations.  
 
Because of this, it is suggested that instead of reducing the statutory multiplier, the 
existing multiplier should be divided into two (2) periods; before and after marriage. 
The amount of multiplicand also should be similarly differentiated to reflect the 
possible changes in the contributions. By applying this method, judges will still adhere 
to the statutory multiplier in section 7(3)(iv) of the CLA 1956, while at the same time 
cater for the possibility that deceased contributions to his parents may reduce after 
getting married.  
 
Dividing the multiplier is not new to the judges in Malaysia. This method is being 
used to divide the multiplier for loss of future earnings to reflect pre-trial and post–
trial period, However, unlike the division in pre-trial and post-trial earnings where 
there is a definitive division date (i.e. the date of judgment), the application of judicial 
discretion is crucial in order to divide the multiplier for loss of support since judge will 
have to determine the possible date in which deceased could have gotten married. 
(ii)  In relation to claims for loss of support by elderly dependants 
In cases where the dependants are elderly persons, such as parents or grandparents, 
necessary consideration should be given to the period of dependency in view of their 
old age and the imminent demise of the dependants. Thus, ending the need for support 
from the deceased. This consideration was one of the key factors in the assessment of 
multiplier in pre-1984 cases. The pre-1984 cases showed that the courts allowed lesser 
multiplier for elderly dependants compared to young ones. To allow the same 
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multiplier for elderly dependant where the period of dependency is shorter than those 
of younger dependants leads to undue enrichment to the elderly dependants.  
 
It is, therefore, suggested that necessary deduction should be made to the multiplier in 
order to limit the compensation to an amount which will cover only the period in 
which the elderly dependant is expected to live. The number of multiplier to be 
reduced should be left at the discretion of the judges after taking into account the 
dependant’s age.  
(c) Consider Applying Actuarial Approach to the Assessment of Multiplier 
The actuarial approach is widely applied in the United Kingdom, United States 
Australia and Canada to provide some kind of guidance for the judges in determining 
the economic loss in personal injury and fatal accident claims. The multipliers are 
assessed based on the expected present value of all future losses and expenses.
41
 The 
Government Actuary’s Department, United Kingdom,  for example, had produced a 
table listing a set of multipliers in named “Actuarial Tables with Explanatory Notes for 
Use in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Cases”42 or also known as the “Ogden 
Table”43 in 1984. The table is based on the assumption that a victims would invest his 
or her award in index-linked gilts, which are a risk-free vehicle producing an income in 
accordance with the fluctuations of the Retail Price Index.
44
 Since 1998, the actuarial 
approach has been accepted evidence in assessing the multiplier for personal injury and 
                                                 
41Chan, Wai Sum, et. al.,“Actuarial Approach To Assessing Personal Injury Compensation in Singapore : Theory and 
Practice”,China International Conference on Insurance and Risk Management 2011, (Beijing,  5 July 2011). 
42Currently in its 7th edition. 
43Named after the first chairman the working party that developed the actuarial tables, Sir Michael Ogden. 
44Haslifah Hashim and Massita Mohamad, “Factors in Estimating Compensation in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death using 
Actuarial Approach”, 2011 International Conference on Financial Management and Economics, 2-3 July 2011, ( Singapore : 
IACSIT Press, 2011), 334 -337. 
341 
 
fatal claims cases rather than viewing it as a mere check.
45
 This approach is also 
currently being promoted in Singapore.  
 
The demographic factors, mortality rates, differences in retirement age, work-life 
expectancy, investment returns, accelerated payment, education level, employment, 
disability and economic activity are several of the considerations that need to be 
factored in while developing the table. This proposed table can be improved and 
updated based on current or prevailing situations. When new data or statistics which 
may affect the multiplier is published, the table should be revised to suit or reflect the 
current variables. The application of revisable table such as Ogden Table allows for 
adjustment to suit current situations and prevent the assessment of damages from being 
archaic and draconian. Since the route to a statutory provision is a long and tedious 
process, the application of revisable table is the answer to the static nature of the fixed 
multiplier in sections 28A (2) and 7(3) of the CLA 1956. The revisable nature of the 
table is not new to the CLA 1956. Section 7(3B) of the CLA 1956 has adopted similar 
approach by allowing a revision to the amount awarded for bereavement at the 
discretion of the Yang Dipertuan Agong. Similarly, the Rules of Court 2012 also 
empowers the Chief Justice to revise the rate for post-judgment interest.  
 
 
7.2.4 Amending the Pre-Condition of Good Heath 
Good health is one of the pre-conditions for the award for loss of support and loss of 
future earnings stated in sections 7(3)(iv) and 28A(2)(c) of the CLA 1956 respectively. 
The findings in Chapters Three (3) and Four (4) indicate that there are two (2) main 
problems in respect of this pre-condition. Firstly, the absence of definitive definition to 
                                                 
45Chan, Wai Sum, et. al. 
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the term ‘good health’ and secondly, the split views in interpreting the requirement of 
proving that deceased or plaintiffs was in good health prior to demise or injury. In view 
of these problems, this research suggests: 
 
(a) Provide a definitive interpretation for the term good health. 
A definitive interpretation to the term ‘good health’ must be provided so as to avoid 
confusion and unnecessary speculation. It is proposed that good health is to be defined 
as a state of health in which a person is able to lead a normal life and engage in gainful 
employment. In the event that the person has some problems relating to his health, the 
person should still be considered as in good health to satisfy the requirement in sections 
7(3)(iv) and 28A(2)(c) of the CLA 1956 as long as the problem does not interfere with 
his employment. 
 
(b) Allowing a reduction in multiplier on account of poor health 
The research also proposes that judges should be given the discretion to reduce the 
statutory multiplier for loss of support and loss of future earnings in situations where 
there are evidence indicating that while the deceased or plaintiff was able to work at the 
time of demise or injury, he however has some medical problems which may affect his 
earnings in the future. A reduction in the multiplier is necessary in order to cater for the 
possibility of him being unable to work in the future.  
 
The recommendation above is not something new to the assessment of damages for 
personal injury and fatal accident claims arising in motor vehicle accidents in Malaysia. 
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The pre-1984 cases showed that while deceased or plaintiff’s existing poor health 
might impaired his prospects of having a normal working life, it would only operates to 
reduce the quantum of damages for loss of support or loss of future earnings. Judges in 
the past used their discretion in assessing the gravity of deceased’s or plaintiffs’ 
medical problem and adjust the multiplier to a figure which they considered reasonable 
for a person with that particular medical issue. The dependants or plaintiffs were not 
precluded from obtaining compensation merely due to poor health unless the poor 
health bars them from earning altogether.  
 
The consideration of poor health should only act as a ground to reduce the multiplier 
but not a total bar for the damages. This way, dependants of a deceased who was 
unhealthy prior to demise or plaintiffs who have some medical problems prior to his 
injury will not be totally precluded from being compensated. At the same time, they 
will not be receiving the full statutory multiplier in view of their medical conditions. 
 
(c) Removing the requirement of proving good health 
The requirement of proving good health has been commonly criticized as imposing a 
heavy burden on the dependants of the deceased or plaintiffs since it requires the 
production of medical records or expert witness to prove deceased’s or plaintiffs’ good 
health. This is why judges sometimes refuse to adhere to this requirement. As long it 
can be proven that the deceased or the plaintiffs were working at the time demise or 
injury, judges will assume that they were in good health. This assumption is rebuttable 
by the defendants if they can prove to the contrary.  
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It is suggested that the pre-condition of proving good health should be removed. 
Instead, deceased’s or plaintiffs’ good health is to be presumed.46 Therefore, sections 
7(3)(iv) of the CLA 1956 and 28A(2)(c) of the CLA 1956 should be amended to 
convey that deceased’s or plaintiffs’ good health is to be presumed if the deceased or 
the plaintiffs were gainfully employed at prior to their demise or injury. Judges should 
only direct deceased’s dependants or the plaintiff to prove good health if the 
presumption is challenged by the defendant.
47
 However, it is submitted that the 
proposition that good health is to be presumed would necessitate not only an 
amendment to sections 7(3)(iv) and 28A(2)(c) of the CLA 1956, but also to section 114 
of the Evidence Act 1956 as well. Section 114 of the Evidence Act 1956 should include 
the presumption of good health as part of the general presumption.
48
  
 
7.2.5 Amending the Pre-Condition of Earning Income at the Time of Accident or 
Demise 
The pre-condition in sections 7(3)(iv)(a) and 28A (2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956 requiring 
that deceased or plaintiffs must be earning income at the time of demise or injury 
before damages for loss support and loss of future earnings can be awarded are often 
criticized. The criticism centres mainly on the fact that they restrict the discretionary 
power of judges to award damages for loss of support and loss of future earnings in 
situations where the deceased or plaintiffs were not earning at the time of the accident 
or demise. While it is understandable that the sections intend to prevent judges from 
speculating on the deceased’s or plaintiffs’ possible income, it is proposed that some 
amendments are to be made to the sections.  
                                                 
46 See also Rajasooria, J. Edwin, “Necessity of Proving Good Health”, 9th July 2010, The Malaysian Bar 8th November 2010, 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=30358.> 
47
 Ibid.  
48
 Ibid. 
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The sections should be re-defined in order to allow dependants of a deceased or 
plaintiffs who had been earning before his (although not at the precise date of) demise 
or injury to claim for loss of support and loss of future earnings. The requirement that 
deceased or plaintiffs must be ‘receiving earning ‘prior/before his demise or injury’ 
should not be narrowly interpreted as ‘earning at the time of demise or injury” or ‘on 
the day of demise or injury’. It should whenever suitable be loosely construed to 
encompass any previous income which is not too remote to the deceased or plaintiffs. 
The dependant to a deceased or plaintiffs who were on unpaid leave, on sabbatical 
leave, in between employment or about to start another employment in the near future 
should be allowed to claim for loss of support or loss of future earnings. Although 
deceased or plaintiffs were not receiving any earning at the time of demise or injury, 
they have the foreseeable possibility of earning income in the future. The calculation of 
multiplicand can be based on his previous income. Thus, it will not involve too much 
speculation or guesswork on the part of the judge.  
 
The proposed interpretation had been used by the Kuala Lumpur High Court in Low 
You Choy v Chan Mun Kit.
49
 The judge refused to interpret the term ‘prior’ in section 
28A(2)(c)(i) of the CLA 1956  as ‘at the time of injury’ and allowed the claim for loss 
of future earnings even though the plaintiffs were in-between jobs at the time of 
injury.
50
 Although the judge conceded being an odd-job labourer, the plainitff’s income 
depended on whether they were able to secure another job, he still chose to distinguish 
the case from Dirkje Pietenella Halma v Mohd Nor bin Baharom & Ors.
51
 on the 
ground that the plaintiffs had been working before the injury. The fact that the plaintiffs 
were not working on the day of the injury does not constitute ‘not receiving earnings’. 
                                                 
49 [1992] 3 CLJ 1550. 
50 Both plaintiff did not have permanent job and only work for eight to ten months a year depending on contract. 
51 [1990] 3 MLJ 103, 
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It is therefore proposed that this line of reasoning should be adopted in interpreting the 
pre-condition of receiving earning ‘prior/before’ the injury or demise. 
 
7.2.6 Amending the Provisions Relating to the Award for Bereavement 
The award for bereavement was introduced by section 7(3A) of the CLA 1956. Sub-
sections 7(3B) to 7(3E) to the section deal with various matters relating to this head of 
damages. However, despite the precise wordings in the sub-sections, there are several 
areas in which some amendments are proposed in order to make the provisions clearer, 
precise and in line with the current situation. 
 
(a) Revising the amount to be awarded for bereavement 
The amount awarded for bereavement under section 7(3A) of the CLA 1956 has 
remained static at RM 10,000 for the past twenty eight (28) years. Although the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong has the discretionary power to vary the amount under sub-section 
3D, this power has never been exercised. An example should be drawn from the CLA 
(cap 43) of Singapore where the amount to be awarded for bereavement was revised 
from SGD 10,000 to SGD 15,000 to better suit the current circumstances and value of 
money in the country. Therefore, it is submitted that the amount specified in section 
7(3B) of the CLA 1956 should be similarly be reconsidered so as to commensurate 
with the current socio-economic condition in the country.  
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(b) Revising the list of beneficiaries to the award 
Section 7(3B) of the CLA 1956 specifically lists the persons entitled to the award for 
bereavement. Only deceased’s spouse and parent52 are entitled to claim. In the event 
that deceased was not survived by his parent, his grandparent may claim for 
bereavement by virtue of sub-section 11 of section 7 of the CLA 1956. The limited 
number of people entitled to claim for bereavement causes injustice to several classes 
of people who are similarly aggrieved as deceased’s spouse or parents. These people 
will not able to claim for bereavement despite suffering from the same emotional loss, 
sadness and sorrow. It is, therefore, suggested that the provision in section 7(3B) of the 
CLA 1956 is to be amended to include deceased’s children and siblings as part of 
persons entitled to claim for bereavement. It is only reasonable that deceased’s children 
and siblings would be devastated when deceased passed away. Allowing damages to 
parent for the grief suffered due to the demise of their children while barring the 
children from receiving the same when their parent passed away is incomprehensible 
and defies logic.  
 
 
If deceased’s children and siblings are to be included in the list of beneficiaries to the 
award, the order of beneficiaries should also be amended to better suit the degree of 
grievance suffered.  The provision in section 21(2) of the CLA (cap 43) of Singapore 
may serve as guide for the amendment.
53
 In the proposed order of beneficiaries, it is 
suggested that the deceased’s children’s entitlement to bereavement should arise only 
in the absence of deceased’s spouse. In the event the deceased not survived by spouse 
or children, his parent’s will be able to claim for bereavement followed by his siblings.   
 
                                                 
52 Provided that the deceased is a minor and unmarried at the time of demise. 
53 The section lists the order of persons who are entitled to claim for bereavement as follows; deceased’s spouse, followed by his 
children, parent and siblings. 
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At the same time, it is also proposed that section 7(3B)(b) of the CLA 1956 is to be 
amended to remove the portion which allow deceased’s parent to claim for 
bereavement only if the deceased was a minor. It is incomprehensible why the section 
bars parent to a deceased who had attained the age of majority from claiming 
bereavement. The grief and sorrow suffered would still be the same irrespective of 
deceased’s age. The parent’s entitlement to bereavement should only be subject to 
deceased’s marital status. Only in the event that deceased is survived by his spouse and 
children should the parent’s entitlement to bereavement be barred.  
 
(c) Defining the term ‘spouse’ 
Section 7(3B)(a) of the CLA 1956 did not provide any definition to the term ‘spouse’. 
Although it is generally understood to signify the husband or wife of the deceased, the 
absence of specific interpretation to the term invite attempts to insinuate that in cases of 
Muslim polygamous marriage, each of deceased wives is entitled to RM 10,000. The 
arguments in the cases highlighted in Chapter Four (4) on this matter are not without 
merits. Especially when sub-section 3C of the section made no mention that the amount 
that RM 10,000 is to be divided equally among deceased’s wives.54 As such, in order to 
avoid any further complication, it is suggested that the term spouse is to be specifically 
defined as referring to deceased’s husband, wife or wives (in cases involving valid 
polygamous marriage).  At the same time it is also suggested that sub-section 3C is to 
be amended to convey the meaning that in the event of valid polygamous marriage,
55
 
the amount specified under sub-section 3B is to be divided equally among the wives. 
 
                                                 
54 Note that section 7(3C) of the CLA 1956 specifies that in claims for bereavement by deceased parent, the damages is to be 
divided equally among the parent. 
55 The marriage must be a legally recognized and registered marriage under the prevailing law. 
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7.2.7 Amending the Provision on ‘Statutory Dependant’ 
The findings in Chapter Four (4) lead to the conclusion that the provisions in sections 
7(2) and 7(11) of the CLA 1956 had left out several classes of dependants in the list of 
‘dependant’ entitled to claim damages for loss of support. Compared with these 
sections, the term ‘dependant’ in Singapore and Brunei respectively comprises of a 
wider range of dependants. The CLA (cap 43) of Singapore and the Fatal Accident and 
the Bruneian Personal Injuries Act’s definition of ‘dependant’ include deceased’s 
siblings and extended family. As such, these classes of people are allowed to claim for 
loss of support in Singapore and Brunei. By doing this, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal 
Accidents and Personal Injuries Act ensure that these people will be taken care of after 
deceased’s demise. This makes the assessment of damages for loss of support in these 
countries more oriented to the local conditions compared with their Malaysian 
counterpart. It is, therefore, suggested that the list of ‘dependant’ in section 7(2) of the 
CLA 1956 is to be widened to enable the CLA 1956 to provide for a wider range of 
people who may be very well depending on the deceased. 
 
However, unlike the extensive definition of ‘dependant’ in the CLA (cap 43) and the 
Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act, it is suggested that only deceased’s siblings 
and former spouse should be included in the list of ‘dependant’ in section 7(2) of the 
CLA 1956. Siblings are a person’s close relatives. Their dependence on the deceased 
may come in two forms; either them being the dependant of the deceased or dependant 
of their parent who are depending on the deceased for the upkeep of the family. As 
such, by including sibling in the list of ‘dependant’ in section 7(2) of the CLA 1956, 
the sibling will be compensated for the loss of support suffered due to deceased demise.  
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It is also suggested that deceased’s former spouse should also be included in the list of 
‘dependant’. Unlike the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries 
Act, the provision allowing former wife to receive damages for loss of support is absent 
in the Malaysian CLA 1956. Hence, a former wife in Malaysia will be deprived of 
support despite having obtained a maintenance order from by the court. However, 
instead of including only former wife in the list of dependant as in sections 20(8) of the 
CLA (cap 43) and 3(3) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act, the CLA 1956 
should be amended to include both former wife and husband (former spouse). As such, 
the right to claim for loss of support can also be extended not only to deceased former 
wife but also to former husband if they were indeed receiving financial support from 
their former spouse. At the same time, a provision similar to section 22(3A) of the CLA 
(cap 43) restricting the former spouse’s right to claim for loss of support only when a 
maintenance order had been obtained against the deceased prior to his demise should be 
also inserted into the CLA 1956. 
 
The findings in Chapter Four (4) also shows that in several cases the absence of 
specific interpretation for the term wife and husband in section 7(2) of the CLA 1956 
allows spouse who was not legally married under the prevailing law of the land to 
claim for loss of support.  The courts in Joremi bin Kimin & Anor v Tan Sai Hong
56
 
and Chong Sin Sen v Janaki a/p Chellamuthu (suing as the widow of Muniappa Pillai 
a/l Maritha Muthoo, deceased, on behalf of herself and the dependants of the 
deceased),
57
 set aside the issue of validity of marriage and allowed deceased’s’ wives 
to claim for loss of support even though the wives were not legally married. It is 
humbly submitted that this interpretation of the term ‘wife’ is be contrary to notions of 
family law.  Under family law or the law of succession, a wife’s or a husband’s right to 
                                                 
56 [2001] 1 AMR 675 (CA). 
57 Op. cit. 
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their spouse’ assets or any other rights which come with marriage depends on the 
validity of their marriage. As such, it would be unacceptable if the judge is to take the 
stand that the validity of a marriage is immaterial for a claim under section 7(3) CLA 
1956. It is understandable that the motivation behind these decisions was to achieve 
moral and social justice;
58
 that a dependant should not be deprived of their entitlement 
merely on the basis of technicalities. The judges in these cases were trying to find ways 
in which a dependant may claim for loss of support without going beyond the letter of 
the law.  However, such liberal interpretation of the term ‘wife’ would allow more 
people to claim for loss of support.  
 
While the Federal Court’s decision Chai Siew Yin v Leong Wee Shing59 which 
established that customary marriage which was not registered under the Law Reform 
(Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 as void may bring a closure to the dilemma brought 
about by the absence of specific interpretation of the term ‘wife’, a suitable amendment 
to the section is imperative in order to give more definite interpretation to the section. 
The term ‘wife’ and ‘husband’ in section 7(2) CLA 1956 should be defined as the legal 
wife or husband of the decease according to the prevailing law at the time of death. 
 
7.2.8 To Specifically Exclude the Effect of Spouse’s Remarriage in the Assessment 
of Damages for Loss of Support 
Unlike sections 3(3) of the Fatal Accident Act 1976, 22(3) of the CLA (cap 43) and 
6(3) of the Fatal Accidents and Personal Injuries Act, section 7 of the CLA 1956 did 
not contain any provision on the effect of widow’s remarriage or prospect of remarriage 
                                                 
58 Also see Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, Damages Under Malaysian Tort Law: Cases and Commentary, (Petaling Jaya: 
Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2009) at 95. 
59 Civil Appeal No 02-10 of 2003 (W). 
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on the assessment of damages for loss of support. The absence of such provision in the 
CLA 1956, however, does not mean that the widow’s remarriage or prospect of 
marriage is taken into consideration in assessing damages for loss of support in 
Malaysia. Although under the Common Law, remarriage or prospect of remarriage is 
one of the negative contingencies which may cause a reduction in damages being 
awarded for loss of support, the Malaysian judges have long disregard widow’s 
remarriage or prospect of remarriage in the assessment of damages for loss of support.   
 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that a specific provision excluding the consideration of 
spouse remarriage or prospect of remarriage from the assessment of damages for loss of 
support is to be included in the CLA 1956. Although such provision would tantamount 
to a codification, what have been generally practised by the local courts, the 
codification will ensure that this practice is strictly adhered to, so as to avoid future 
confusion or departure from the generally accepted practice. It is also suggested that 
instead of stating that the a widow’s remarriage or prospect of remarriage must not be 
taken into consideration in the assessment of damages for loss of support, section 7 of 
the CLA 1956 should state that spouse’s remarriage or prospect of remarriage should 
be excluded from the assessment of damages. It should be noted that sections 3(3) of 
the Fatal Accident Act 1976, 22(3) of the CLA (cap 43) and 6(3) of the Fatal Accidents 
and Personal Injuries Act make no mention of the effect of a widower’s remarriage or 
prospect of remarriage on the assessment of damages. The omission to include 
widower’s remarriage or prospect of remarriage may lead to some confusion as to 
whether his remarriage or prospect of remarriage has any effect on the quantum of 
damages. Therefore, in view of consistency and comprehensiveness of the CLA 1956, 
it is suggested that the new provision should read as follows:  
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Where there fall to be assessed damages payable to a spouse in respect of 
the death of his or her spouse, there shall not be taken into account the 
remarriage or prospect remarriage of the widow or widower. 
 
Using the term ‘widow or widower’ instead of ‘widow’ as used in provisions in the 
Fatal Accident Act 1976, the CLA (cap 43) and the Fatal Accidents and Personal 
Injuries Act will ensure that a widower remarriage or his prospect of remarriage will 
similarly be excluded. As such, the weakness of section 6(3) of the Fatal Accidents and 
Personal Injuries Act by not providing for effect of widower remarriage or prospect of 
remarriage as noted by Sir Danny Roberts J in Wong Fook Cheong v Hj. Abd. Khani b. 
Hj. Abd. Kadir 
60
 will not be repeated in the CLA 1956. 
 
7.2.9 Amending the Provision in Section 28A Relating to Deduction for Living 
Expenses 
Based on the findings in Chapter Three (3) it is submitted that para (iii) to section 28A 
(2)(c) of the CLA 1956 should be amended to state that the expenses incurred by the 
plaintiffs to earn their income need to be deducted from the assessment of multiplicand 
for loss of future earnings. This amendment is necessary to better reflect the current 
practice of the judges. Although para (iii) to section 28A (2)(c) of the CLA 1956 
requires that plaintiffs’ living expenses must be deducted from the assessment of 
damage, judges are reluctant to  do so. They prefer to interpret the term ‘living 
expenses in the para as ‘expenses in earning income’ instead of the actual day to day 
expenses spent by the plaintiffs.  
 
                                                 
60 [1996] 1 LNS 570. 
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The courts reluctance to deduct actual day to day living expenses from the assessment 
of multiplier is understandable since such deduction is unfair to the plaintiffs. Unlike 
the deceased’s contributions to his dependants under loss of support,61 the amount spent 
for living expenses is part of plaintiff’s earnings which will be lost to the plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs would still be paying for their living expenses even when they are no longer 
able to work in the future. In fact, their living expenses would probably increase 
considering their injuries and incapacity. If living expenses are deducted from the 
multiplicand, plaintiffs will have to use the balance of their earnings to pay for their 
expenses, thus they would be losing double the amount for living expenses.
62
 Such 
being the case, it is dumbfounding why the legislature saw it fit to equate the deduction 
living expenses in the award for loss of support with the award for loss of future 
earnings
63
 when these two (2) heads of damages involve different set of losses. 
 
Living expenses under loss of future earnings also need to be distinguished from living 
expenses for loss of future earnings in lost years. Since lost years are the years in 
plaintiff’s life which in most probability be shortened due to the injuries suffered, it is 
only reasonable that his living expenses in the years in which he might already 
succumbed to his injuries be deducted.
64
 The plaintiff is expected to be dead in the lost 
years, he would definitely not be spending this amount for ‘living’. This is not so in 
respect of the award for loss of future earnings. Since the plaintiff will still be living the 
years following his injuries, he will still be incurring the same amount of living 
expenses.  However, the approach of Malaysian courts on deduction for living expenses 
                                                 
61 Amar Singh v Chin Kiew (1960) 26 MLJ 77. Deceased living expenses are deducted in the award for loss of support since the 
amount is used by the deceased on himself. It is not part of the deceased contribution to the dependants. The dependants therefore 
are not entitled to that amount. 
62 Rutter, Michael F. , op. cit., at 300 and Balan, P., op. cit., (1992), at 230. 
63Harun Hashim SCJ in Chan Chong Foo & Anor. v Shivanathan, op. cit, at 480 held “It will be seen that the same language is used 
in both s 7(3)(iv)(c) and s 28A(2)(c)(iii). It follows that the legislature intended that the same principle be applied in both cases, 
that is to say, in respect of a dependency claim for loss of earnings arising out of a fatal accident and in respect of a claim for loss 
of future earnings for personal injury. We are accordingly of the view that the term 'living expenses' in s 7 and s 28A bear the same 
meaning.” 
64 Ibid. 
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for loss of future earnings in lost years cannot be ascertained since there is no reported 
case which allows for the award for loss of earning for loss years for a living plaintiff.
65
   
 
Therefore, it is proposed that para (iii) to section 28A (2)(c) of the CLA 1956 is to be 
amended to change the term ‘living expenses’ to ‘expenses in earning income’. This 
would be more in line with the interpretation generally adopted by the judges. It would 
also distinguish the assessment of multiplicand for loss of future earnings from loss of 
support. Plaintiff’s day to day expenses should not be deducted in loss of future 
earnings. It should be limited only to expense in earning income.  
 
7.2.10 To Include any Increase in Plaintiffs’ Earning at the Time of Trial in the 
Assessment of Multiplicand 
It is also proposed that in assessing the multiplicand for loss of future earnings, any 
increase in plaintiffs’ earning from the date of injury to the date of trial (date of 
judgement) is to be taken into consideration. Instead of excluding any increase in 
plaintiffs’ earnings from the date of injury, the assessment of multiplicand for loss of 
future earnings should exclude any increase in plaintiff’s earnings from the date of trial 
onwards.  
 
Currently para (ii) to section 28A(2)(c) of the CLA 1956 specifies that only plaintiffs’ 
earning at the time of injury can be assessed as multiplicand for loss of future earnings. 
Any increase in the earnings after the date of injury should not be considered. As such, 
not only any prospects of plaintiffs’ earning after the date of trial is excluded, any 
increase in plaintiffs’ earnings between the date of injury and date of trial is also 
excluded from the assessment. The introduction of para (ii) to section 28A(2)(c) of the 
                                                 
65Rutter, Michael F., op. cit., at 249. 
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CLA 1956 by the CLAA 1984 was done in order to prevent high and oscillating awards 
caused by speculative and discretionary assessment by the courts. In order to do so, the 
Legislature imposes several regulations in the assessment of damages. Among them is 
the provision which requires judges to base their assessment on hard fact and actual 
monetary value of the loss. Hence the prohibition against taking into account future 
increases in plaintiff’s earnings.  
 
However, since any increase in plaintiff’s income from the date of injury to the date of 
trial is something which is actual and not speculative, the Legislature could not have 
intended to ignore this tangible and obvious increase in the assessment of multiplicand. 
Ian Chin J had rightfully concluded: 
“The language if that section also makes it clear that when it talks of 
‘prospect of earning as aforesaid being increased at sometime in the 
future’ which the court must not speculate. It does not say that the Court 
should ignore the reality of the situation where the appellant’s basic salary, 
a constituent of part of the ‘earnings’, had been increased at the date of 
trial. The increase in that part of the ‘earnings’, actual, not prospective. 
Therefore, I am of the view that section 28A(2)(c)(ii) of the Act does not 
prevent the court from taking into account the actual increase in the basic 
salary which the respondent was earning at the date of trial in order to 
arrive at a just award since that section applies to a prospective or 
speculative situation and not the actual.”66 
 
Besides being a total departure from the Common Law accepted principles relating to 
the assessment of multiplicand for loss of future earnings, the prohibition against taking 
                                                 
66 Chang Ming Feng v Jackson Lim @ Jackson ak Bajut, op. cit. 
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into consideration any increase in plaintiffs’ earnings from the date of injury to the date 
of trial fly in the face of the principle of compensation. Should there is an increase in 
plaintiffs’ earnings at the time trial compared to the time of injury, it is only reasonable 
that his loss of future earnings would be the loss of the amount he was earnings at the 
time of trial, not at the time of injury.
67
  Therefore, if the assessment of damages it to be 
based only on plaintiffs’ earnings at the time of injury, the compensation would be less 
than the amount which he would be receiving in the future even without taking into 
account any increase in his earnings from the date of trial.  
 
By amending para (ii) to section 28A(2)(c) of the CLA 1956 to include any increase in 
income at the time of trial, plaintiffs’ loss can be more accurately assessed. The 
consideration for the increase in plaintiffs’ earning from the date of injury to the date of 
trial will not in any way open up the assessment of damages for loss of future earnings 
to speculation. This is due to the fact that increase in earning already occurred and it 
can be calculated based on the deceased’s earnings at the date of trial. Therefore, it is 
submitted that para (ii) to section 28A(2)(c) of the CLA 1956 should be amended so as 
to allow increase in plaintiffs’ earnings from the date of injury to the date of trial to be 
included in the assessment of multiplicand for damages for loss of future earnings in 
personal injury motor accident claims. Should there is no increase in plaintiffs’ earning 
within this period, only his earning at the time of injury is to be assessed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 The law requires that ‘plaintiff must give credit for what he will actually receive’. See Billingham v Hughes (1949) 1 KB 643. 
Tiong Ing Chiong v Giovanni Vinetti [1984] 2 MLJ 169; Owners of MV 'Kohekohe' & Ors v Supardi bin Sipan (The 'Kohekohe') 
[1985] 2 MLJ 422. 
358 
 
7.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although it is commonly accepted that judicial discretion is “the life blood of the living 
law”68 and disparity in the awards for damages is accepted69 as part and parcel of the 
law on personal injury and fatal accident claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents, 
some degree of statutory regulation over the exercise of judicial is needed to ensure that 
the assessment of damages is fair, reasonable, consistent and certain. The provisions are 
not intended to fetter or restrict the use of judicial discretion. They serve as the outer 
parameters in which judicial discretion should operate. As such, judges can still use 
their discretion provided that it is within the confines of the statutory provisions.  
 
Nevertheless, the provisions in the CLA 1956 are far from perfect. A number of 
weaknesses of the provisions in the CLA 1956 have been highlighted in this research.  
Any attempt to revamp the personal injury and fatal claims arising out of motor vehicle 
accident scheme
70
 will be futile if the provisions in the CLA 1956 remain as it is. As 
such amendment to section 7, 8 and 28A of the CLA 1956 is necessary. With proper 
application, the combination of the exercise of judicial discretion and a properly 
amended provisions in the CLA 1956 would allow judges in Malaysia to ensure that the 
law keep abreast with the changing social and economic condition and ultimately to 
ensure that ‘justice’ as is understood by all is achieved and meted out from case to case.
                                                 
68 Bar Council Malaysia, “Editorial: The Uncivil Act”, (1984), 17 No 3 Oct Journal of the Malaysian Bar (INSAF), 3. 
69Dass, K.S., Quantum in Accident Claims, (Kuala Lupur: Malaysian Law Publishers, 1975), at 10. 
70 A Joint Working Committee was formed by the General Insurance Association of Malaysia (PIAM) in 2010 to develop methods 
to enhance the motor insurance scheme. The enhancement measures proposed includes the establishment of specific timelines to 
produce medical and police reports, promotion of court or independent mediation and legal aid service, setting up guidelines on 
compensation awards, revision of interest rates for court’s judgment, devising simpler and transparent claims notifications and 
settlement processes,  and establishing a centralized call centre to assist road accident victims.  
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